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THE WRITINGS

OF

JAMES MONROE

VOLUME II.

1794-1796

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March, 1899

THE WRITINGS

OF

JAMES MONROE

INCLUDING A COLLECTION OF HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED

EDITED BY

STANISLAUS MURRAY HAMILTON

"Unless the government is placed completely in the hands of the people, there will be in the publick councils neither energy nor integrity to the cause of the people."—MONROE.

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ANNALS OF THE LIFE

OF

JAMES MONROE.

MISSION TO FRANCE.

Insurrection in Pennsylvania,—"The Whiskey Rebellion." The United States excise law was enacted March 3, 1791. About July 14, 1794, the first insurrection, so-called, first broke out; coming to a head in August. Among the manuscripts in the Department of State is a bound volume, lettered "Insurrection in Pennsylvania, 1792–1796," containing unpublished material.

1794. July–Nov.

Fall of Robespierre. News of this event reached the Secretary of State October 9, 1794. In writing to the President on that date Randolph felt himself "happy that Col. Monroe's instructions forbid him to attach himself to the uncertain fate of any individuals," and that this was the only effectual security for the United States amidst such a series of unprecedented revolutions. "So signal an event, if true," he continued, "must make a part of his first despatches; and possibly may demand some very special instructions to him."

1794. July 28.

1794. Aug. 2. Monroe's arrival in Paris.

1794. Aug. 15. Received by the National Convention.

1794. Aug. 20. General Anthony Wayne defeats the Indians near Maumee Rapids.

1794. Oct. 31. Date of Fauchet's intercepted despatch. [See Ford's *Writings of Washington*, xiii., 87.]

1794. Nov. 3. Second Session of the Third Congress opens at Philadelphia.

1794. Nov. 18. French Directory decreed merchandise in neutral vessels belonging to the enemy liable to seizure, until French merchandise, similarly situated, should be exempted.

Message of the President reciting the events of the late insurrection (The Whiskey Rebellion) as they had thus far transpired.

1794. Nov. 19. "In this message appeared for the first time a political censure in the shape of his" [Washington's] "official rebuke of the Democratic Societies which Genet had instituted in imitation of the Jacobin Clubs of his own country" [Schouler, I., 283].

1794. Nov. 19. Jay signed the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain.

1794. Nov. 21. Thomas Pinckney nominated to be Envoy Extraordinary of the United States to His Catholic Majesty. Confirmed November 24.

Timothy Pickering nominated Secretary of War. By unanimous consent it was agreed to dispense with the rule

1795. Jan. 2. "that the papers lie for consideration" and Pickering was confirmed.

1795. Jan. 2. The French Directory repealed the Decree of November 18.

1795. Jan. 29. Enactment of the emigration laws, which lengthened the term of residence preliminary to citizenship.

1795. Feb. 2. Oliver Wolcott, junior, nominated to be Secretary of the Treasury. Confirmed February 3.

Message of the President on foreign relations. "Our Minister near the French Republic has urged compensation for the injuries which our commerce has sustained, from captures

1795. Feb. 28. by French cruisers, from the non-fulfilment of the contracts of the agents of the Republic with our citizens, and from the embargo at Bordeaux. He also pressed an allowance for the money voted by Congress, for relieving the inhabitants of St. Domingo. It affords me the highest pleasure to inform Congress that perfect harmony reigns between the Republics; and that those claims are in a train of being discussed with candor, and of being amicably adjusted."

1795. March 7. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation with Great Britain delivered to the Secretary of State. The Ninth Session of the Senate expired March 3.

1795. June 8. Senate convened to consider the message of the President, laying before it the Treaty with Great Britain.

1795. June 24. Advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Treaty with Great Britain on condition that there should be added thereto an article agreeing to suspend the operation of so much of Article XII as respected the West Indian Trade.

1795. June 25. Nomination of the first Consul General of the United States to France on the recommendation of our Minister Plenipotentiary that our commercial relations with that country could not be executed without such an official.

1795. June 26. Notes submitted by the Secretary of State to the consideration of the President in regard to the British Treaty.

1795. Aug. 18. Ratification by the President of the Treaty with Great Britain.

1795. Aug. 19. Edmund Randolph's resignation of the office of Secretary of State. On the original letter Washington has endorsed "From Edm^d Randolph Esq. 19th Augt 1795. rec^d the 20th ab^t noon."

1795. Sept. 5. Joseph Donaldson signs the Treaty of Peace and Amity with Algiers.

1795. Oct. 27. Thomas Pinckney signs at San Lorenzo el Real the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain.

1795. Oct. 28. Exchange, at London, of the Ratifications of the Treaty with Great Britain.

1795. Dec. 7. First Session of the Fourth Congress opens at Philadelphia.

1795. Dec. 10. Timothy Pickering nominated to be Secretary of State. Confirmed the same day.

1795. Dec. 21. Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Morocco transmitted to the Senate.

1796. Feb. 26. Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation with Spain transmitted to the Senate.

1796. Feb. 29. Proclamation by the President of the Treaty with Great Britain.

1796. March 1. The President lays the Ratified Treaty with Great Britain before Congress, in order that the appropriations for carrying it into effect might be made.

1796. March 2. Advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Treaty with Algiers.

1796. March 24. Request by the House of Representatives for the papers and correspondence relative to the Treaty with Great Britain.

1796. March 30. Message of the President refusing to comply with the request of the House of Representatives.

1796. March 31. Nominations of Commissioners under the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of the Treaty with Great Britain.

1796. April 30. House of Representatives agrees to sustain the Treaty with Great Britain.

1796. May 6. Passage of the Act making appropriations towards defraying the expenses which may arise in carrying into effect the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation made between the United States and Great Britain.

THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO JAMES MONROE.[1]

PHILADELPHIA, June 10th, 1794.

SIR,—You have been nominated as the successor of M[r] Gouverneur Morris, in the office of Minister Plenipotentiary of the

[1] Considering the important relation these instructions bear to Monroe's mission, it is not improper to insert them in full. Monroe, from the beginning, never received the full confidence of the Administration; he was continually harassed for want of information, particularly on the one subject that gave rise to the deep feeling of uneasiness and distrust in Paris. A comparison of these instructions with the condition of affairs in France shows the full value of Monroe's efforts "*to strengthen our friendship with that country*," and "*to let it be seen that in case of war with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally.*" It is to be remembered that Monroe arrived in Paris shortly after the downfall of Robespierre. The government had passed into the hands of those members of the Convention who had combined to overthrow the tyrant. But the reign of terror, of uncertainty, and of suspicion was yet by no means at an end. He found, says Trescot, the commercial interests of the country suffering under legislative enactments, impolitic in themselves, and at variance with the explicit stipulations of existing treaties; general distrust of the sentiments and intentions of the United States; great dissatisfaction with the course and sympathies of his predecessor; *a special jealousy of Jay's mission to London*, and an apparent conviction that his own embassy was a mere feint to withdraw the attention of the French government, and to amuse with warm expressions of friendship until the conclusion of the English negotiation should enable them to drop the mask. With these *instructions* to guide him in his most important and delicate mission, for the connection between the two countries seemed to hang upon a thread, Monroe arrived in Paris, about two months after Jay's arrival in London.

United States of America to the Republic of France, from a confidence, that, while you keep steadily in view the necessity of rendering yourself acceptable to that government, you will maintain the self-respect due to our own. In doing the one and the other of these things, your own prudence and understanding must be the guides; after first possessing yourself of the real sentiments of the Executive, relative to the French nation.

The President has been an early and decided friend of the French Revolution; and whatever reason there may have been, under our ignorance of facts and policy, to suspend an opinion upon some of its important transactions; yet he is immutable in his wishes for its accomplishment; incapable of assenting to the right of any foreign prince to meddle with its interior arrangements; persuaded that success will attend their efforts; and particularly, that union among themselves is an impregnable barrier against external assaults.

How the French government, when it shall be no longer attacked by foreign arms, will ultimately settle, is a point, not yet reduced to any absolutely certain expectation. The gradation of publick opinion from the beginning of the new order of things to this day; and the fluctuation and mutual destruction of parties, forbid a minister of a foreign country to attach himself to any as such, and dictate to him not to incline to any set of men, further than they appear to go with the sense of the nation.

2. When the executive provisory council recalled Mr. Genet, they expressed a determination to render it a matter of eclat, as you have seen; and at the same time disavowed all his offensive acts. Nothing having been forwarded to us, relative to Mr. Morris, which requires a disavowal, you will, if you should be interrogated as to any particular feeling prevailing with the President upon the occasion, refer to the letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Fauchet, as explanatory of the President's promptness to comply with their demand.

3. From Mr. Genet and Fauchet we have uniformly learned, that France did not desire us to depart from neutrality; and it would have been unwise to have asked us to do otherwise. For our ports are open to her prizes, while they are shut to those of Great Britain; and supplies of grain could not be forwarded to France

with so much certainty, were we at war, as they can even now, notwithstanding the British instructions; and as they may be, if the demands to be made upon Great Britain should succeed. We have, therefore, pursued neutrality with faithfulness; we have paid more of our debt to France than was absolutely due; as the Secretary of the Treasury asserts; and we should have paid more, if the state of our affairs did not require us to be prepared with funds for the possible event of war. We mean to continue the same line of conduct in future; and to remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission to London, you may say, that he is positively forbidden to weaken the engagements between this country and France. *It is not improbable, that you will be obliged to encounter, on this head, suspicions of various kinds. But you may declare the motives of that mission to be, to obtain immediate compensation for our plundered property, and restitution of the posts.* You may intimate by way of argument, but without ascribing it to the government, *that, if war should be necessary, the affections of the people of the United States towards it, would be better secured by a manifestation, that every step had been taken to avoid it, and that the British nation would be divided, when they found that we had been forced into it.*[1] This may be briefly touched upon as the path of prudence with respect to ourselves; and also with respect to France, since we are unable to give her aids of men or money. To this matter you cannot be too attentive, and you will be amply justified in repelling with firmness any imputation of the most distant intention to sacrifice our connection with France to any connection with England. You may back your assertions by a late determination of the President to have it signified abroad that he is averse to admit into his public room, which is free to all the world besides, any Frenchmen, who are obnoxious to the French Republic; although, perhaps, it may again happen sometimes, as many go thither, whose names and characters are utterly unknown.

It is very probable that our country will become the asylum for most of the French who expatriate themselves from their native land. Our laws have never yet made a distinction of persons,

[1] Monroe, in his *View of the Conduct of the Executive*, emphasizes, by italics, this and other portions of the "Instructions."

nor is such a distinction very easy. Hence some of those who are perhaps attainted in France, have thrown themselves upon the protection of the United States. This will not, as it surely ought not to be misinterpreted into any *estrangement from the French cause.* You will *explain this, whensoever it shall be necessary.*

The stories of Genet as to the Royal Medallions &c: being exhibited in the President's Room, and his giving private audiences to certain French Emigrés, are notoriously untrue. And if any insinuation should be made in regard to M. de la Fayette, so directly, as indispensably to call for an answer; it may be affirmed, that notwithstanding the warmest friendship, contracted between the President and him, in the most interesting scenes; notwithstanding the obligation of the United States to him, and the old prepossessions in his favor, the efforts of the President in his behalf have never gone further than to express a wish to the authority which held him in confinement, that he should be liberated. But even thus much need not be said without the most invincible necessity, because though what has been done is justified by every consideration, it is never well to give notice of it to those whose extreme sensibility may see impropriety where none exists.

4. If we may judge from what has been at different times uttered by Mr. Fauchet, he will represent the existence of two parties here irreconcileable to each other. One republican, and friendly to the French revolution; the other monarchical, aristocratic, Britannic, and anti-Gallican; that a majority of the House of Representatives, the people, and the President, are in the first class; and a majority of the Senate in the second. If this intelligence should be used, in order to inspire a distrust of our good will to France, you will industriously obviate such an effect:— and if a fair occasion should present itself, you may hint, that the most effectual means of obtaining from the United States what is desired by France, will be by a plain and candid application to the government, and not by those insidious operations on the people, which Genet endeavored to carry on.

5. The information which we possess of France, before and in the early stages of the revolution, must be considerably changed at this day. You will, therefore, transmit to us, as soon as possible,

an account of the navy, the agriculture, and the commerce of France. It is desirable too to know, upon what footing religion really stands. These however are general objects. But we are particularly concerned to understand the true state of the different sects of politics. Are there any of the old friends to the ancient regime remaining? Are any new friends created by the course of things? Are the Brissotines extinguished? Are the Dantonists overwhelmed? Is Robespierre's party firmly fixed? Is he capable from talents and personal fortitude to direct the storm? Is his character free from imputation, as to money? Is he friendly to the United States? How is the executive power administered now? What new accession of authority may have lately accrued to the committee of public safety? What relation do the twelve commissions of administration, which have been lately established, bear to that committee? What is the true cause of the various changes, which have lately taken place, by one party rising upon the ruins of another? What assurance can be had, that any party can so long maintain itself, as to promise stability to the government? Are the people sincerely affectionate to the present government; or are they restrained by the terror of the revolutionary tribunal, or by the danger of having their country dismembered by the coalesced princes? What species of executive will probably be at last adopted? What characters bid fair to take the helm of affairs, after the great destruction and banishment of able men? These and many other questions of the same nature ought to be solved, to enable us to see things in a true light. For without doubting the solidity of the French cause, we ought not to be unprepared for any event. If, therefore, any very momentous turn should arise in French affairs, upon which the conduct of our government may depend, you need not hesitate at the expence of an advice-boat, if no other satisfactory opportunity should occur. But it is the wish of the President, that at the end of every week, you commit to a letter the transactions of it, and embrace every proper conveyance, by duplicates, and, in great cases, even by triplicates.

6. Should you be interrogated about the treaty of commerce, you may reply that it has never been proposed to us by Mr. Fauchet. As to anything else concerning it, you will express

yourself not to be instructed; it being a subject to be negociated with the government here.

7. In like manner, if a treaty of alliance, or if the execution of the guarantee of the French islands, by force of arms, should be propounded, you will refer the Republic of France to this side of the water. In short, it is expected, with a sure reliance on your discretion, that you will not commit the United States, by any specific declarations, except where you are particularly instructed, and except too in giving testimony of our attachment to their cause.

8. There is reason to believe, that the embargo, when it was first laid, excited some uneasy sensations in the breast of the French minister. For it so happened, that at the moment before its operation, pretty considerable shipments of flour were made to the British West-Indies, and a snow, called La Camille, laden with flour, for France, was arrested near New-Castle, on the Delaware, after she had quitted the port of Philadelphia. But you know enough of the history of this business, to declare, that the embargo was levelled against Great Britain, and was made general, merely because, if it had been partial against her, it would have amounted to a cause of war; and also, that it was not continued, merely because it was reputed to be injurious to France. My letters to Mr. Fauchet will explain the case of La Camille; and all his complaints about the embargo.

Should our embargo be brought up, the way will be easy for our complaint against the embargo of Bourdeaux. At any rate, you will remonstrate against it, and urge satisfaction for the sufferers. You will receive all the papers, which have come into the department of state, relative to these matters; and you will besides open a correspondence with the captains and persons interested at Bourdeaux, in order to obtain more accurate information.

But you will go farther and insist upon compensation for the captures and spoliations of our property, and injuries to the persons of our citizens, by French cruisers. Mr. Fauchet has been applied to; and promises to co-operate for the obtaining of satisfaction.

The dilatoriness with which business is transacted in France

will, if not curtailed in the adjustment of these cases, produce infinite mischief to our merchants. This must be firmly represented to the French Republic, and you may find a season for intimating, how unfortunate it would be, if so respectable a body, as that of our merchants should relax in their zeal for the French cause, from irritation at their losses. The papers on this head are a statement of French cases, Mr. Fauchet's letters to me, and the documents themselves.

9. You know the extreme distress in which the inhabitants of St. Domingo came hither after the disasters of the Cape. Private charity, and especially at Baltimore, most liberally contributed to their support. The Congress at length advanced 15,000 dollars with a view of reimbursement from France. This subject has been broken to Mr. Fauchet here, and he appears to have been roused at the idea of supporting by French money French aristocrats and democrats indiscriminately. Both he and his nation ought to be satisfied, that in the cause of humanity, oppressed by poverty, political opinions have nothing to do. Add to this, that none but the really indigent receive a farthing. It was the duty of the French Republic to relieve their colonists labouring under a penury so produced; and as it would have been too late to wait for their approbation before the payments were decreed, it will not be deemed an offensive disposal of French money that we now make a claim for repayment. If Mr. Fauchet has power upon the subject, an attempt will be made for a settlement with him here; but that being very doubtful, it will forward the retribution by discussing it in Europe.

10. You will be also charged with the demands of several American citizens for bills of exchange drawn in the French West-Indies on France. The report of a committee of them, Mr. Fauchet's letter, and the vouchers, which you will carry, leave no doubt of your success. But if there should be any difficulty, do not fail to communicate it to the Secretary of State instantaneously. The sooner, therefore, the affair is entered upon the better.

11. It is important, that no public character of the United States should be in France, which is not acceptable. You will inquire into the consuls; and inform, how they are approved, and whether

they be deserving. *Although the President will avoid, as much as possible, to appoint any obnoxious person Consul, it may happen otherwise, and must be considered as accidental.* Mr. Alexander Duvernat goes for Paris in the quality of Vice-Consul, and Mr. Fauchet said that he had nothing to object to him.

Consulates are established in every port of France, where they are conceived useful. But perhaps you may find it advisable to mark out some other places for such offices.

12. It is recommended, that no business of consequence, be carried on verbally or in writing, but in your own language.

The minister of each nation has a right to use his national tongue, and few men can confide in their exactness when they do business in a foreign one. But great care is necessary in the choice of interpreters, when they are to be resorted to.

13. It is a practice of great utility to note down every conversation of consequence, which you hold, immediately after retirement; and the Executive will expect to receive copies of what shall be thus written.

14. A communication with our other ministers in Europe, under proper caution, may be advantageous.

15. Let nothing depend upon verbal communication which can be carried on in writing.

16. To conclude.—You go, Sir, to France, to strengthen our friendship with that country; and you are well acquainted with the line of freedom and ease, to which you may advance, without betraying the dignity of the United States. You will show our confidence in the French Republic, without betraying the most remote mark of undue complaisance. *You will let it be seen, that in case of war, with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally.* You may dwell *upon the sense which we entertain of past services*, and for the more recent interposition in our behalf with the Dey of Algiers. Among the great events with which the world is now teeming, there may be an opening for *France to become instrumental in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi.* Spain may, perhaps, *negociate a peace, separate from Great Britain, with France.* If she does, *the Mississippi may be acquired through this channel*, especially if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner solicited.

With every wish for your welfare and an honourable issue to your ministry, I am, Sir, Yo. mo. ob. serv.

EDM: RANDOLPH.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

BALTIMORE, June 17, 1794.

DEAR SIR,—The urgent pressure of the Executive for my immediate departure has deprived me of the pleasure of seeing you before I sailed. I sincerely regret this for many reasons but we can not control impossibilities—will you forward me a cypher, & letters for yr. friends remaining in Paris to the care of Mr. R. as soon as possible, they may probably reach Paris as soon as I shall—I beg you to add whatever occurs which may be useful where I am going to the cause in which I am engaged, or to myself in advocating it. Being well acquainted with the theatre on which I am to act, it will be much in yr. power to give me hints of that kind which may be serviceable.

As you will shortly see Mr. Madison who leaves this tomorrow or next day,[1] I decline saying anything on the subject of the late proceedings in Phila. in either department of the government—indeed you know so much of them already that I can add but little.

I shall place in the hands of James Maury[2] of Liverpool a sum of money to answer my engagement to you—I have written to Colo. Lewis & Mr. Divers to entreat them to value Theresa & her children & hope

[1] Madison accompanied Monroe from Philadelphia to Baltimore.

[2] Of Virginia, Consul of the United States at Liverpool.

they will do it immediately—Let your draft be abt. Sepr. & payable at 60 days sight—Let it be accompanied with a letter of advice—The money shall certainly be deposited, unless you w'd. prefer it in France of which you will advise me & draw on myself.—I beg you not to omit this as the money will be idle in his hands in case you do not direct otherwise soon.

I shall confide to Mr. Madison yrself & Mr. Jones the fixing on a spot where my houses shall be erected. The doubt will be between the hill to the left of the road as you approach towards Blenheim or the one where the barn stands—on whichever you place it I have given orders for an enclosure and the commencement of those improvements w'ch. are contemplated. —Yr. advice on that head as well as the most suitable for the commencement of orchards of different kinds will be regarded.

We expect to embark to-morrow & to fall down the bay immediately—Accept my most affectionate wishes for your welfare & that of Mr. Randolph & yr. daughters & be pleased likewise to unite with them those of Mrs. Monroe—we contemplate a return in abt. 3 or 4 years at farthest—perhaps sooner—In the interim I wish every preparation for our final repose, I mean from active life, be on the farm adjoining yours—To this object my attention will be turned whilst abroad & I will endeavor to bring back what will contribute to its comforts—I wish you to command me in all respects wherein I can favor you—perhaps you may wish things from the quarter I shall be in, not obtain-

able so easily elsewhere—I am Dear Sir with the sincerest regard

Yr. affectionate friend & servt.

Ja^{s} Monroe.

POWER OF ATTORNEY TO JAMES MADISON.

Baltimore, June 17, 1794.

Mr. Madison will be pleased to receive from Gen'l Wilkinson, or draw on him for the sum of three hundred doll'rs or thereabouts (due me by him) according as the Gen'l shall direct—He will likewise receive whatever is obtained from Gen'l Bradley from the sale of our Vermont property, or otherwise from the sale or upon acc't of it—He will likewise be pleased, in case he is applied to, to give advice as to the course to be taken for obtaining justice ag'nst J. Kortright and others under the will [of] L. Kortright (father of Mrs. M.) of New York—and whatever he does in the above will be satisfactory & binding on me.

Ja^{s} Monroe.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

[Merlin de Douai.]

Paris, August 13, 1794.[1]

Citizen President,—Having arrived here a few days past, commissioned by the President of the

[1] Enclosure No. I. in letter to the Secretary of State of August 25, 1794. "As soon as this letter was read in the National Convention, it was decreed that it should be inserted in its process verbal, and in the bulletin of correspondence, and that a copy of it, with one of the letter of credence which accompanied it, should be sent to the committee of public safety, with instructions to report thereon during the present sitting; and afterwards, upon the report of the committee, the Convention decreed as follows: Art. I. The Minister

United States to represent those States in character of Minister Plenipotentiary with the French Republic, and not being acquainted with the competent department or forms of recognition prescribed by law, I have thought it expedient to make known my mission immediately to the Representatives of the people. They possess the power to affix the time and prescribe the mode by which I shall be recognized as the representative of their ally and sister Republic; and they will likewise have the goodness in case such department now exists, to cause the same to be designated to me that I may immediately present myself before it to be recognized in the character I bear. I make this communication with the greater pleasure, because it affords me an opportunity of testifying to the Representatives of the Free Citizens of France, not only my own attachment to the cause of liberty, but of assuring them at the same time and in the most decided manner of the deep concern which the Government & people of America take in the liberty, prosperity, and happiness of the French nation.

With sentiments of the highest respect

JA^{s} MONROE.

Plenipotentiary of the United States shall be introduced into the bosom of the Convention, to-morrow at two o'clock P.M. He shall then explain the object of his mission; and after which the President shall salute him fraternally, in testimony of the friendship which unites the American and French people. Art. II. The President of the Convention shall write a letter to the President of the United States, and transmit to him the process verbal of this sitting.

At two the next day Mr. Monroe was accordingly introduced into the Convention, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, accompanied by several of the members of the committee of public safety, and upon which the following address in English, with a translation of it into French, and which latter was read by a secretary."—MONROE'S *View*.

ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.[1]

Citizens, President and Representatives of the French People :—My admission into this Assembly, in the presence of the French Nation (for all the citizens of France are represented here) to be recognized as the Representative of the American Republic, impresses me with a degree of sensibility which I cannot express. I consider it as a new proof of that friendship and regard which the French Nation has always shewn to their ally, the United States of America.

Republics should approach near to each other. In many respects they all have the same interest. But this is more especially the case with the American and French Republics :—their governments are similar ; they both cherish the same principles and rest on the same basis, the equal and unalienable rights of men. The recollection too of common dangers and difficulties will increase their harmony, and cement their union. America had her day of oppression, difficulty and war, but her sons were virtuous and brave and the storm which long clouded her political horizon has passed and left them in the enjoyment of peace, liberty and independence. France our ally and our friend and who aided in the contest, has now embarked in the same noble career ; and I

[1] Subsequently the subject of severe criticism by the Administration at home, when Monroe was charged with having exceeded his instructions. It certainly cannot be said to go any farther than the declarations of both houses of Congress (page 15, post.) and indeed not as far as the resolutions adopted by our House of Representatives of *very decided* sympathy for France. Lyman considers that Monroe's address is "plain, sensible and appropriate to the occasion."

am happy to add that whilst the fortitude, magnanimity and heroic valor of her troops, command the admiration and applause of the astonished world, the wisdom and firmness of her councils unite equally in securing the happiest result.

America is not an unfeeling spectator of your affairs in the present crisis. I lay before you in the declarations of every department of our Government, declarations which are founded in the affection of the citizens at large, the most decided proof of her sincere attachment to the liberty, prosperity and happiness of the French Republic. Each branch of Congress, according to the course of proceedings there, has requested the president to make this known to you in its behalf; and in fulfilling the desires of those branches I am instructed to declare to you that he has expressed his own.

In discharging the duties of the office which I am now called on to execute, I promise myself the highest satisfaction; because I well know that whilst I pursue the dictates of my own heart in wishing the liberty and happiness of the French nation, and which I most sincerely do, I speak the sentiments of my own Country; and that by doing everything in my power to preserve and perpetuate the harmony so happily subsisting at present between the two Republics, I shall promote the interest of both. To this great object therefore all my efforts will be directed. If I shall be so fortunate as to succeed in such manner as to merit the approbation of both Republics I shall deem it the happiest event of my life, and return

hereafter with a consolation, which those who mean well and have served the cause of liberty alone can feel.[1]

[1] Along with his address Monroe delivered the official reply of the Senate and of the House of Representatives to the French Committee of Public Safety, made through the Secretary of State. In making this response Randolph wrote: "In executing this duty, which has been allotted by the President to the Department of State, the liberal succours which the United States received from the French nation, in its struggle for independence, present themselves warm to the recollection. On this basis was the friendship between the two nations founded; on this basis and the continued interchanges of regard since, has it grown; and, supported by these motives, it will remain firm and constant.

The Senate, therefore, tender to the Committee of Public Safety, their zealous wishes for the French Republic; they learn with sensibility every success which promotes the happiness of the French nation; and the full establishment of their peace and liberty will be ever esteemed by the Senate as a happiness to the United States and to humanity. And for the House of Representatives as follows: That the letter of the Committee of Public Safety of the French Republic, addressed to Congress, be transmitted to the President of the United, and that he be requested to cause the same to be answered on behalf of this House, in terms expressive of their sensibility for the friendly and affectionate manner, in which they have addressed the Congress of the United States; with an unequivocal assurance, that the Representatives of the people of the United States, have much interest in the happiness and prosperity of the French Republic.

The President of the United States has consigned this honourable and grateful function to the Department of State. In no manner can it be more properly discharged, than by seizing the occasion of declaring to the ally of the United States that the cause of liberty, in defence of which so much American blood and treasures have been lavished, is cherished by our Republic with increasing enthusiasm. That under the standard of liberty, wheresoever it shall be displayed, the affection of the United States will always rally: And that the successes of those who stand forth as her avengers will be gloried in by the United States, and will be felt as the successes of themselves and the other friends of humanity.

Yes, Representatives of our ally, your communication has been addressed to those who share in your fortunes, and who take a deep interest in the happiness and prosperity of the French Republic."

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, August 15th,[1] 1794.

SIR,—On the 31th ultimo I arrived at Havre, and on the second instant at this place. Mr. Morris was, upon my arrival, from town, but he came in as soon as advised of it. By him I was presented to the commissary of foreign affairs, who assured me that, as soon as the form of my reception should be settled, he would apprize me of it, but that this would unavoidably create a delay of some days, as well from the present derangement of their affairs on account of the late commotion of Robespierre, as from the necessity of making some general regulation in that respect, it being the first instance in which a minister had been addressed to the Republic. I assured him I should wait with pleasure the convenience of those whom it concerned, since which I have not seen him, but hear that the subject is under consideration of the committee of public safety, and will probably be concluded in a day or two.

I heard at Havre of the crimes and execution of Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon and others of that party, and should have written you on the subject from that port, but that I knew I could only give the current report, varying, perhaps, in every sea-port town, and which might reach you before my letter. I hastened, therefore, to Paris, in the hope of acquiring there immediately more correct information of

[1] In American State Papers, August 11th; in Monroe's *View*, printed the 10th, but corrected to bear date of the 11th. This date is from the Official Record Book.

facts, as well as of the causes which gave birth to them ; but even yet, I suspect, I am on the surface only, for it will take some time to become well acquainted with the true state of things on a theatre so extensive and important.

That Robespierre and his associates merited their fate, is a position to which everyone assents. It was proclaimed by the countenances and voices of all whom I met and conversed with from Havre to Paris. In the latter place, where the oppression was heaviest, the people seem to be relieved from a burden which had become insupportable. It is generally agreed that, from the period of Danton's fall, Robespierre had amassed in his own hands all the powers of the government, and controuled every department in all its operations. It was his spirit which ruled the committee of public safety, the Convention, and the revolutionary tribunal. The Convention was soon found, after the abrogation of the constitution to be too unwieldy, and slow in its deliberations, to direct the great and complicated mass of executive business ; this had given birth to two committees, the one of *salut publique*, the other of *sureté generale*, into whose hands the whole was deposited. To the former was assigned the management of foreign affairs, the direction of the armies, &c. to the latter, the interior administration, and they were respectively enjoined to render an account monthly of their transactions to the Convention. It was intended that those committees should be independent of each other, and both under the immediate controul of the Convention ; but by the dis-

tribution of their powers, this design was defeated, for such an ascendancy was thereby given to the committee of public safety, that the other became its instrument, acting only under its authority. The principal members of the Convention were placed in these committees, and Robespierre, who was by far the most influential one, was assigned to the committee of public safety. It soon happened in the course of the administration, from the very extensive patronage, comparative weight of character, and immense power that this committee gained likewise an entire ascendancy in the Convention, and controuled all its measures. Nor was the organization of the revolutionary tribunal more favourable to the independence of that branch, and of course to public and personal liberty. It was equally dependant on, and the creature of, this committee. Robespierre therefore had become omnipotent. It was his spirit which dictated every movement, and particularly the unceasing operation of the guillotine. Nor did a more bloody and merciless tyrant ever wield the rod of power. His acts of cruelty and oppression are perhaps without parallel in the annals of history. It is generally conceded, that for some months before his fall the list of prisoners was shewn him every evening, by the President of the revolutionary tribunal, and that he marked those who were to be the victims of the succeeding day, and which was invariably executed. Many whole families, those under the age of sixteen excepted, were cut off upon the imputation of conspiracies, &c. but for the sole reason that some

members had been more friendly to Brissot, Danton, &c. or had expressed a jealousy of his powers. His oppression had, in fact, gained to such an height, that a convulsion became unavoidable. The circumstances which immediately preceded and brought on the crisis are differently recounted. Some make him the active party and believed that he had arranged with the commune and the guards of the city, the plan of a general massacre of his enemies in the Convention. But I am of opinion, that these projects, for they were certainly contemplated, proceeded from despair, and were adopted at the moment only, as the means of defence. The time and manner of the explosion which was in the Convention support this idea. It had been intimated some days before by him or St. Just, that other conspiracies threatened the safety of the Republic and which ought to be laid open. The communication was given in such a manner as to satisfy the audience, that he meant Tallien and some other members of the house. And, in the moment of the explosion, St. Just had commenced a development of this pretended conspiracy, leading to a denunciation of these members. If the power of Robespierre remained, it was well known, that death and denunciation were hand in hand. To repel it by a counter one was the only remaining hope. It could, in no event, produce a worse effect. Tallien therefore rose and interrupted St. Just, demanding: "How long shall we be abused with denunciations of pretended conspiracies. 'Tis time to draw the veil from perfidy so flagrant." St. Just was silenced and driven from the

tribune. Robespierre ascended and made many efforts to speak in vain. The whole Convention rose and cried out with one voice, "Down with the tyrant." He stood like one amazed and stupefied, staring at the Convention with a countenance equally bespeaking indignation and terror; deprived of the power of utterance, but yet afraid to descend. As soon as the convention saw its strength, he was arrested and sent a prisoner to the committee of public safety; but by this time, his immediate coadjutors had taken the alarm, and were endeavoring to excite commotions in the city in his behalf. Henriot, the commander of the guard, with a few followers, pursued and rescued him from the committee. He then took his station with the commune, heretofore the theatre of his power, and began to harangue the people, and with some effect; whilst Henriot, in the character of *general*, was busied in assembling the guards in the place before the Hall of the Convention, with intention to fire on it. There was at this moment an awful pause in the affairs of the Republic. Everything was suspended, and the public mind greatly alarmed and agitated. The situation of the Convention was truly interesting. They knew that all the appointments were conferred by Robespierre, that he had been long deemed a patriot, and still possessed, by means of affection or terror, a wonderful influence over the citizens at large; and more immediately in their presence, they saw Henriot at the head of a respectable force menacing an attack. But that body was not unmindful of its dignity or its duty upon that great occasion: On the contrary, i

displayed a degree of fortitude and magnanimity, worthy of those who aspire to the exalted character of defenders of their country. It calmly entered upon the subject of defence; declared Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon, Henriot, and the commune without the protection of the law, appointed a commandant of the guard, and sent deputies to the sections to admonish them of their danger, and warn them to stand at their posts in defence of their country. A moment's reflection settled the public mind. The people beheld on the one side, the Convention labouring to save the Republic, and on the other, Robespierre and his associates in open rebellion. Hesitation was at an end. The citizens rallied immediately to the standard of their sections, and Robespierre and his associates were taken at the same time to prison, and on the next day to execution, amidst the rejoicing and acclamations of the people.

Many believe that Robespierre aimed at a despotic power, and sought to establish himself upon the throne of the Capets, in the character of protector, or some such character; and, in pursuit of this idea, say, that he counted upon the support of the armies, and particularly the army of the North, and had otherwise arranged things in such order as to favour the project. What his views of ambition and carnage were, I know not: That they had been great was certain; but that he had concerted any plan of permanent establishment for himself, or been promised such support, even where his influence was greatest, cannot be true, nor is it warranted by circumstances. If he

was not promised the support, it is not probable he had such a scheme; and that it was not promised, must be obvious to those who take into view all the circumstances which merit consideration. It will be observed, by those who wish to form a just estimate of the future course and fortune of this revolution, that from its commencement, to the present time, no person ever raised himself to power but by the proof he had furnished of his attachment to the cause, by his efforts to promote it; and that from the moment doubts were entertained of the solidity and purity of his principles, did his influence begin to decline in equal degree. This was seen in the instances of La Fayette, Dumourier, Brissot, Danton, and finally, Robespierre himself; two of whom, though popular generals, were abandoned by the armies they commanded; the former compelled to seek refuge in a foreign country, and the latter in the camp of the enemy; and the others, tho' eminent in the civil department, were, upon like charges, condemned by the public voice to the same fate. In fact, the current of sentiment and principle has been such, that no character or circumstance has been able to obstruct its course; on the contrary, it has swept everything before it. Can it be presumed then, and especially at this moment, when the ardour of the nation, inflamed by conquest, is at the height, that any respectable number of citizens, of any description, would turn aside from the great object of the revolution, to countenance, in any individual, schemes of usurpatic and tyranny? Did not the late event, even in P

disprove it, where Robespierre had most influence? There was no opposing force but what depended on public opinion, and everything tended to favour his views.

From due consideration of all circumstances, I am led to ascribe the sanguinary course of Robespierre's proceedings to a different cause. I consider the contest between him and Danton, as a contest for power between rivals, having the same political objects in view. The former was jealous of the latter, and having gained the ascendancy, and the defective organization of the government permitting it, by means of his influence in the judiciary, he cut him off. But the arrestation and condemnation were regular, according to the forms prescribed by law, and were on that account submitted to. The public, however, saw into the oppression, and disapproved of it; for at the moment when Danton was led to execution, there was a general gloom upon the countenances of the citizens. They all attended at the place in hope of hearing the explanation: They heard none and retired dissatisfied. Robespierre saw this, and in it the foreboding of his own ruin. From that moment he saw nothing but conspiracies, assassinations, and the like. He was surrounded by informers, and had spies and emissaries in every quarter. By means of severity he sought his safety, and therefore struck at all his enemies in the hope of extirpating them. But it happened in this as it always happens in like cases, every new execution increased them tenfold. It progressed thus until it could be no longer borne, and terminated as I have already stated.

It may be asked: Is there any reason to hope that the vicious operation of the guillotine will be hereafter suspended? May not factions rise again, contend with and destroy each other as heretofore? To this I can only answer, that the like is not apprehended here, at least to the same extent; that the country from Havre to Paris, and Paris itself, appears to enjoy perfect tranquility; that the same order is said to prevail in the armies, who have addressed the Convention, applauding its conduct, and rejoicing at the downfall of the late conspirators. Some circumstances, it is true, have been seen, indicating a suspicion, that all Robespierre's associates had not suffered the fate they merited, and ought not to escape; but latterly this has abated, though it is possible it may revive again. In general it may be remarked that, until peace and a well organized government shall be established, no sure calculation can be formed of what may happen in this respect. I am happy, however, to observe, that the subject of reform in the committees and revolutionary tribunals (and which was taken up immediately after the late commotion subsided) is now under discussion, and that the propositions which are depending, are calculated to preserve, as far as possible, the controul of the Convention over the former, and promote the independence, and otherwise improve the organization, of the latter.

But are not the people oppressed with taxes, worn out by continual drafts to reinforce the armies; do they discover no symptoms of increasing discontent with the reigning government, and of a desire to re-

lapse again under their former tyranny? What will become of the army at the end of the war? Will it retire in peace, and enjoy in tranquility, that liberty it has so nobly contended for; or will it not rather turn its victorious arms against the bosom of its country? These are great and important questions, and to which my short residence here will not permit me to give satisfactory answers. Hereafter I shall be able to give you better information in these respects. At present I can only observe, that I have neither seen nor heard of any symptom of discontent shewing itself among the people at large. The oppression of Robespierre had indeed created an uneasiness, but which disappeared with the cause. I never saw in the countenances of men more apparent content with the lot they enjoy, than has been shewn everywhere since my arrival. In the course of the last year the Convention recommended it to the people, as the surest means of support for their armies, to increase the sphere of cultivation, and from what I can learn, there never was more land under cultivation, nor was any country ever blessed with a more productive harvest. Many fathers of families, and a great proportion of the young men, are sent to the frontiers, and it was feared it would be difficult to reap and secure it; but the women, the boys, and the girls, even to tender age, have supplied their places. I saw this with amazement on my route from Havre to this place, and am told 'tis generally the case. The victories of their armies are celebrated with joy and festivity in every quarter, and scarce a day has latterly passed

without witnessing a deputation to the convention, and often from the poorest citizens, to throw into its coffers some voluntary contribution for the support of the war. These are not symptoms of disgust with the reigning government, and of a desire to change it!

With respect to the present disposition of the Army, or what it may be at the end of the war, I can say less as I have not seen it. At present the best understanding subsists between it and the Convention. It is possible that in the course of the service, if the war should last long, many of its members may acquire habits unfriendly to retirement; but in an army composed of the yeomanry of the country, as this is, that sentiment will be less apt to gain ground than in any other. Besides, it is not presumable, that the spirit which has raised and influenced this, will continue to produce some effect, even in its final disposition. If, however, there should still remain a considerable force on foot, which could not be prevailed on to retire; fond of conquest, of rapine, and of plunder, can it be supposed that its parent country will furnish the only and most grateful theatre to act on? Will no other portion of Europe present before it a more productive field, whereon to gratify ambition, avarice or revenge? There must always remain in the breasts of the soldiers some sentiment in favour of their relatives; and the fortunes of the wealthy will be pretty well broken and dissipated here by the course of the Revolution. The example of the Roman Empire is always before those, whose apprehensions are greatest upon this head: They see the

nothing but kindred armies fighting against each other, and tearing the commonwealth in pieces: But they make no allowance for the great difference in the state of things. The armies of the Empire were raised in the conquered provinces, and composed of foreigners: They, therefore, had no attachment to Rome. The State of the Country, and the spirit of the age are likewise different. The dissentions of Rome were the convulsions of a corrupt and worn out monarchy, verging rapidly to a decline. But here the case is different; the armies are otherwise composed, and the spirit of the age, that of a rational and philosophical reform, seeking to establish the public liberty, and sweeping before it old and corrupt institutions which were no longer tolerable.

I have thus gone into this interesting subject from a desire to give the best view in my power of the late commotion, and present state of the internal affairs of this country, because I well know its importance to my own. It will be my object to improve my knowledge of it, and keep you correctly informed in every particular, and as regularly as opportunities offer.

With respect to the State of the war I can only say, in general, that the armies of France have prevailed over the combined forces every where. The commencement of the campaign was favorable to them; but the action which took place in July, near Charleroy, on the plains of Fleurus, between Cobourg, at the head of about 100,000 men, and Jourdan, with an inferior force; and which terminated after the severest conflict and great slaughter on both

sides, in favour of the French arms, has evidently given them the superiority ever since. This was certainly one of the most important and bloody actions which has been fought in the course of the present war. Cobourg, unwilling to retire before the republican troops, had gathered together all his forces, with design to hazard a general action, and in the hope of regaining Charleroy. He attacked them at every point, about five in the morning, formed in the field and ready to receive him. Three times he drove them back within their entrenchments, reluctant to yield the day. But they sallied out a fourth time, with still greater impetuosity, shouting through all their ranks, "*We will retreat no more*"; and, singing the Marseillese Hymn, and other patriotic songs, advanced with an ardour which was irresistible. The attack succeeded. Cobourg, with his routed army, fled before them, leaving on the field, according to the French accounts, about 10,000 slain. The French, it is supposed, lost about 15,000 men. They have taken in the course of the present campaign, Ostend, Mons, Tournay, Namur, Tirlemont, Landrecy, Anvers, Ghent, Charleroy, Brussels, Quesnoy, Louvain, Liege, Nieuport, Cadsandt (at the mouth of the Scheldt) with some other places lying in that quarter. Cobourg at present occupies the ground in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, and endeavours to cover the frontier of Holland. It is, however, daily expected an other action will take place, which may settle the fate of the low countries. Conde and Valenciennes, you observe, are left in the rear; they are

yet possessed by the combined forces, but are invested, and it is thought will soon fall.

Their success in Spain has likewise been great. They are in possession, at present, of the whole of the province of Guypuscoa, Bilboa excepted. Many prisoners and immense parks of artillery have been taken from the Spaniards. The detail I cannot give you with any kind of accuracy, but will endeavour to comprise it in my next.

There has been but one sea action, and which was between the French and English fleets, in the course of the present summer. The French had 26 ships, and the English 28. The English, having the wind, bore down on the French and separated 7 ships from their main force. Of these they took 6 and sunk the other. It is said there never was a more bloody, or better fought action on both sides. It lasted three days. On the fourth the British filed off with the ships they had taken, and sailed into port. The French having offered to renew the combat, likewise retired afterwards to Brest, whither they conducted the merchantmen convoyed from America, and which was the object of the contest, safe.

I shall write you again in a few days, and I hope to inform you of my reception. For the present therefore I shall conclude with assurance of the great respect and esteem with which I am, dear Sir, Your most obedient and very humble servant,

Jas Monroe.

TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

PARIS, August 22d., 1794.

CITIZEN,—I was favored yesterday with yours of that date informing me that the Committee of Public Safety had authorized you in the name of the Republic, to appropriate a house for my use as minister of their ally the United States of America and in such part of the city as I should designate.[1]

I have received this Communication with peculiar satisfaction, because I consider it a proof of the sincere regard which the Committee entertain for their ally whose servant I am ; but upon this occasion I am not permitted to indulge in any respect my own opinion or feelings. The Constitution of my Country, an extract from which is hereunto annexed,[2] has prescribed a line of conduct to me and which it is my duty to follow. The Committee of public safety and you citizen, respect too highly the fundamental laws o your own country not to approve my reason for de clining the kind offer you have made me. I shal however immediately communicate it to our Govern ment and doubt not it will produce the good effec it merits.

[1] Citoyen,—Après avoir accuiilli le Representant de ses bons alliés avec l temoignages les plus sinceres de son affection pour les Etats-Unis le Gouvern ment de la République désire de faire tout ce qui depend de lui pour rendre s séjour au France agréable. Le Comité de Salut Publique m'autorize en cons quence t'offrir au nom de la République la jouissance d'une maison national Je te prie de me faire connaître tes intentions à cet égard pour determiner choix du local que tu trouveras à ta convenance.—BUCHAT.

[2] No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no pers holding any office of profit or of trust under them, shall, without the consent Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind wha soever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, August 25, 1794.

SIR,—In my last of the 15th., instant, I mentioned to you that I had been presented to the Commissary of foreign affairs, for reception, and was assured he would lay the copy of my credentials, which I left with him, before the committee of public safety, under whom he acted, and to whom it more particularly belonged to appoint the time and regulate the mode. After this I waited eight or ten days without progressing an iota; and as I heard that a minister of Geneva had been here about six weeks before me, and had not yet been received, I was fearful I might remain as long, and perhaps much longer in the same situation. It was obvious that the public boards had been so much shocked by the late disaster, that from a variety of considerations, some public and others personal, they could scarcely move forward upon any subject. At the same time I had reason to believe it was the general desire that I should be received as soon as possible, and with every demonstration of respect for the country I represented. Upon the most mature consideration, therefore, I thought it incumbent on me to make an effort to break through these difficulties, and expedite my reception. The Convention, I knew, possessed the sovereign authority of the nation; and I presumed, that by addressing myself to that body, and especially in the present state of things, I should not only avoid the censure of any subordinate department, but perhaps relieve it from an unpleasant

dilemma, and at the same time, make an experiment of the real disposition of this country towards my own. The latter consideration I deemed of some importance, as it would ascertain to me a fact which might have influence on my conduct on other occasions. I therefore addressed a letter to the President of the Convention, of which the enclosed No. 1 [1] is a copy, and was happy to find it well received; for it was immediately taken, by a member present, to the committee of public safety, by whom a report was made in two hours afterwards to the Convention, and a decree adopted by the latter body, of which No. 2 [2] is a copy, for my reception by the Convention itself at two the following day. I deemed it my duty to avail myself of this opportunity to dissipate, if possible, by the documents in my possession, impressions which had been made and are still making, of the unfriendly disposition of the American government towards the liberty and happiness of the French nation. At the same time, therefore, that I presented my credentials, I laid before the Convention the declarations of the Senate and House of Representatives, as conveyed to me by the President, through the Secretary of State, with an assurance that I was authorised to declare, that the President was actuated by similar sentiments. The communication was received in a manner very interesting, and which furnished at the same time, the strongest proofs of the affection entertained by the French nation for the United States of America. The enclosed No. 3 [3] is a copy of

[1] Page 11, *ante*. [2] Page 12, *ante*. [3] Page 13, *ante*.

my address to the Convention and of the President's answer.[1] Every department has since shewn the strongest disposition to prove its attachment to their ally, by embracing every opportunity which the slightest incident has offered. A few stores brought for the accommodation of my family, in the ship in which I sailed, were arrested at Havre because no declaration was rendered of them by the Captain. This was casually heard of by the Committee of public safety, and, without any intimation from me, by their order, restored. But being desirous more formally to certify their regard, the Commissary of foreign affairs announced to me yesterday, that he was instructed, in the name of the Republic, to appropriate a house for my use, as minister of the United States, of such

[1] "The French people have not forgotten that it is to the American people they owe their initiation into the cause of liberty. It was in admiring the sublime insurrection of the American people against Britain, once so haughty, but now so humbled; it was in taking themselves arms to second your courageous efforts, and in cementing your independence by the blood of our brave warriors, that the French people learned in their turn to break the sceptre of tyranny, and to elevate the statue of liberty on the wreck of a throne, supported during fourteen centuries, only by crimes and by corruptions.

"How then should it happen that we should not be friends? Why should we not associate the mutual means of prosperity that our commerce and navigation offer to two people freed by each other? But it is not merely a diplomatic alliance: It is the sweetest fraternity, and the most frank at the same time, that must unite us; this it is that indeed unites us; and this union shall be forever indissoluble, as it will be forever the dread of tyrants, the safeguard of the liberty of the world, and the preserver of all the social and philanthropic virtues.

"In bringing to us, citizen, the pledge of this Union so dear to us, it could not fail to be received with the liveliest emotions. It is now five years since an usurper of the sovereignty of the people, would have received you with the pride which belongs alone to vice; and he would have thought it much to have given to the minister of a free people some tokens of an insolent protection. But to-day the sovereign people themselves, by the organ of their faithful representatives, receive you; and you see the tenderness, the effusion of soul

accomodations and in such part of the city as I would designate. The enclosed No. 4,[1] is a copy of his letter and of my reply. These latter acts, it is true, may be deemed in some measure, acts of ceremony. So far, however, as they furnish any indication of the disposition of this country towards our own, it is a favorable one.

I found here many of my countrymen, captains of vessels, who were taken at sea and brought in,[2] in derogation of the treaty. I intend immediately to make an effort to have that decree rescinded, and compensation rendered for the injury sustained. I have written to Mr. Fenwick[3] who is best acquainted with

that accompanies this simple and touching ceremony. I am impatient to give you the fraternal embrace, which I am ordered to give in the name of the French people. Come and receive it in the name of the American people, and let this spectacle complete the annihilation of an impious coalition of tyrants."

The *Moniteur* chronicles that "the Minister entered the hall amidst the cries of '*Vive la République*'; and the President having announced that Mr. Monroe spoke only the English language one of the Secretaries was ordered to read a translation of the discourse the Minister had prepared. The Minister was conducted to the President who gave the kiss and the embrace [l'accolade] in the midst of universal acclamations of joy, delight and admiration." Afterwards the following decree was passed :—"Article I. The reading and verification being had of the powers of Citizen James Monroe, he is recognized and proclaimed minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America near the French Republic. Article II. The letters of credence of Citizen James Monroe, minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, those which he has remitted on the part of the American Congress and its President, addressed to the National Convention and to the Committee of Public Safety, the discourse of citizen Monroe, the response of the President of the Convention, shall be printed in the two languages, French and American, and inserted in the bulletin of correspondence. Article III. The flags of the United States of America shall be joined to those of France, and displayed in the hall of the sittings of the Convention in sign of the Union and eternal fraternity of the two people."

[1] Page 30, *ante*.

[2] The beginning of the "French Spoliation Claims."

[3] James Fenwick our Consul at Bordeaux.

the affair of the Bordeaux embargo, to request his attendance here, or to forward such documents as will enable me to pursue, with suitable information, the interest of those who were affected by it. And I shall likewise [bring forward at the same time, the claims of others of our citizens for supplies rendered to the government of S: Domingo[1]].

The position of the armies is nearly the same as when I wrote you last. No action has been fought, nor any other material change taken place since.

A perfect tranquillity too continues to reign throughout the Republic. The execution of Robespierre and his associates has produced the same effect ~~everywhere~~. Every person seems to be freed from an oppression which was really destructive and terrible, and the more so, because it was sanctified by the authority of the people, and covered with the mask of patriotism. It is, however, said, that others who have been equally guilty (for Robespierre who was a small and timid man, could not make the majority of the Committee vote against their own opinions) will probably yet be brought to justice. Of this I shall be able to give you better information in my next.

The reform which I suggested in my last, contemplated in the organization of the committees and revolutionary tribunal, is now completed or nearly so. I will enclose you copies of the decrees in my next. A great number of prisoners have been discharged, who were confined here, and in other parts of the Republic, in consequence of a decree, that those

[1] Finally adjudicated under the Treaty of 1803.

should be liberated who were committed upon suspicion only. It was, however, greatly unfortunate, that Robespierre was not cut off a month sooner; for it is most certain, that his last days were stained with some of the most innocent blood of the Republic.

The *Vice Consul*[1] has not yet arrived, and, to be candid, I doubt when he does, whether he will be received or not. A native of this country, is at the present moment, unable to render any service to our own, although he may have always resided here, and his political principles been unquestionable. But one who has been absent, is considered, if not an emigrant, at best indifferent, and perhaps unfriendly, to the revolution, and therefore, odious. If this gentleman has arrived, I think it probable he is confined at the port where he landed. I deem this unfortunate, for there is much business which properly belongs to the Consular department here; as all the commercial affairs of the Republic are transacted here.

I have reason to believe that Laforest and Petri are displeased, and that a frigate is dispatched to announce it with you, and that Leblanc and Fauchet, the former for British connection the latter as followers of the fortunes of Robespierre.

With great esteem, I am, dear Sir,

Very respectfully your very Humble Servant,

JA^{s} MONROE.

[1] Alexander Duvernat, nominated vice-consul for Paris, June 7, 1794. *Cf.* page 8, *ante*.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Sepr 2 [1794]

DEAR SIR,—Tomorrow will make one month since our arrival here, and such have been my engagements that altho. I resolved that I would begin a letter to you every succeeding day yet when the day arrived it was not in power heretofore. You will readily conceive that the variety of the objects to which I have been forced to attend, many of which requiring the utmost effort of my judgment, all delicate and interesting and you will readily admit my embarrassment when you know that I have not had a single person (Mr. Skipwith excepted and who is new in this line) with whom I could confidentially confer. I wished not to write you a superficial letter, but whether I shall be forced to hurry this is what I cannot at present determine. Between Baltimore and Paris we were 45 days. The passage was free from storms and between the soundings of each coast short, being only 29 days. We enjoyed our health; none were sick except Joseph a few days, & myself an hour or two. Mrs. M. and the child escaped it altogether. We landed at Havre and left it for this the day after, whither we arrived in three days being the [2] 3 of August. We are yet at lodgings but expect to be fixed in Mr. M's house, which I took, in less than a week. I found Mr. Morris from town but he came in, in two or three days after my arrival.

About a week before my arrival Robespierre had been executed with St Just, Couthon and others so that the scene upon which I had to commence was a

troubled one. The publick councils were yet somewhat agitated but tranquillity and joy upon acct of that event reigned every where else. The whole community seemed to be liberated from the most pestilent scourge that ever harassed a country. I found I had better look on for some days, merely to inform myself of the course to be taken to obtaining recognition.

I found myself under difficulties from the commencement. The fall of Robespierre had thrown a cloud over all whom it was supposed he had any connection with or in whose appointment he had been in any wise instrumental. This included my fellow passenger so that it was not prudent to avail myself of his aid in presenting me or even making known my arrival to the Committee of public safety, and I was averse to taking the introduction of my predecessor for as good a reason. I did not know the ground upon which the Americans stood here, but suspected as the acquisition of wealth had been their object in coming, they must have attached themselves to some preceding party & worn out their reputations. Upon mature reflection therefore I resolved to await the arrival of my predecessor & present myself as a thing of course with him. I concluded it could do me no detriment as it was the official mode & more especially as he would have to file off at the moment I took my ground. This was done. He accompanied me to the office of foreign affrs, notified his recall & my succession. I left with the commissary a copy of my credentials & requested my recognition from the

competent department as soon as possible which was promised. But my difficulties did not end here. Eight or ten days elapsed and I was not accepted, nor had I heard a syllable from the Committee or seen a member. And upon enquiry I was informed that a minister from Geneva had been here 6 weeks before me and was not yet received. Still further to increase my embarrassments I likewise heard that the Commissary to whom I was presented being of Robespierre's party was out of favor, and that probably his letter covering my credentials had not been read by the Committee. I could not longer bear with this delay. I foresaw that the impression to be expected from the arrival of a new minister might be lost, and that by the trammel of forms and collision of parties I might while away my time here forever without effect. I was therefore resolved to place myself if possible above these difficulties, by addressing myself immediately to the Convention. I knew this would attract the publick attention and if my country had any weight here produce a proportional effect not only upon that body, but upon every subordinate department. The result was as I had expected; my letter being read in the Convention was well received; taken immediately to the Committee of Publick Safety, reported on in two hours afterwards by that body & a decree passed the same day for my admission on the next, at two in the afternoon. It was at the same time intimated by a special messenger from the President that he sho^{d} be glad to have a copy of what I sho^{d} say an hour or two before I was

presented. I had of course but little time to prepare my address. I thought it expedient to make the occasion as useful as possible in drawing the two republicks more closely together by the ties of affection by shewing them the interest which every department of our government took in their success and prosperity. With this view I laid before the Convention with suitable solemnity the declarations of the Senate and H. of R., and added a similar one for the President. The effect surpassed my expectation. My reception occupied an hour and a half, of not merely interesting but distressing sensibility, for all who beheld it. It was with difficulty that I extricated myself from the House and Committee of Public Safety and indeed the crowd which surrounded it, after the business was over. The cordial declaration of America in favor of France and of the French Revolution (for although I have not mentioned the word revolution, after the example of both houses yet after the example of both and especially the H. of R. I have strongly implied it) in the view of all Europe and at a time when they were torn in sunder by parties, was a gratification which overpowered them.

I doubt not this measure will be scanned with unfriendly eyes by many in America. They will say that it was intended that these things should have been smuggled in secretly and as secretly deposited afterwards. But they are deceived if they suppose me capable of being the instrument of such purposes. On the contrary, I have endeavoured to take the opposite ground, with a view of producing the best

effect here as well as there. And I am well satisfied that it has produced here a good effect. It is certain that we had lost in a great measure the confidence of the nation. Representations from all parties had agreed (and men of different characters [1]

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, September 3, 1794.

CITIZENS,—There are some subjects to which I wish to call your attention and which I deem of equal importance to both Republics. They have grown out of the occurrences of the present war; have pressed particularly hard on the United States, and will I doubt not be immediately rectified in a manner becoming the French nation and of course satisfactory to us.

The first respects the departure on the part of France from the 23^{d} and 24th. articles of the treaty of commerce subsisting between the two Republics.

The second the embargo of our vessels at Bordeaux and the injuries arising from it to those whom it concerns.

The third, respects the claims of some of our citizens for supplies furnished to the Government of St Domingo, authenticated by Bills upon the Minister of the Republic in Philadelphia, by Bills upon France, and by Mandates and other instruments usual in such cases.

By the 23rd Article of the Treaty of Amity and

[1] The remaining pages of this manuscript are missing.

[illegible] ships shall make [illegible] except [illegible] that no dis- [illegible] those which [illegible] on the one hand, and [illegible] on the other are par- [illegible]

[illegible] this subject to [illegible] these articles have [illegible] that our vessels [illegible] the property of [illegible] these articles, but like- [illegible] which was always free, [illegible] detained for a [illegible] and the cap- [illegible] subjected to great [illegible] But I will not [illegible] because I frankly [illegible] contemplate it. [illegible] on the other side [illegible] explain the mo- [illegible] country what I hope you will enable me to communicate, the ready acquiescence with which the order was rescinded.

It may be said that Great Britain has rendered us the same injury, and that when we shall charge her conduct in that respect France will likewise follow her example. But the case is vastly different. Britain may dispute the law of nations, however clear its doctrine even with respect to contraband; but with France it is in both respects regulated by treaty. Be-

sides we are allies, and what is more interesting, the friends of France. These considerations naturally inspire in the councils of the two countries, different sentiments in regard to us; and if Britain proves true to those which belong to her situation, shall we, on the other hand, find France reluctant to cherish such as are friendly to us, and correspondent with hers? Will she say that the injuries of Britain furnish a justificatory example for her to render us like injuries? Will our ally contend with that nation in rivalship, which shall harrass our commerce most and do us the greatest detriment? This is surely not a relation for the two Republics to bear towards each other. Other sentiments will I hope inspire their common councils; sentiments more congenial with their mutual interests and consonant to the dispositions of the citizens of both countries.

If the French Republic gained the smallest benefit from the regulation, there might be some motive for adhering to it. But this cannot, it is presumed, be the case. The most to be derived from it, is the occasional seizure of a straggling vessel destined for the ports of Spain and Portugal; for they are excluded from the ports of England, except under particular circumstances and which rarely happen. It must be obvious, if the price was higher here, this would be their destination; add to which the charges attending the seizure and conducting of vessels from their course, must be great, and will make it not only an uncertain but unprofitable mode of supply.

It may be apprehended that if this decree should

Commerce it is stipulated that free ships shall make free goods, and that all goods shall be free except those which are termed contraband and that no dispute might arise as to *contraband*, all those which should be deemed *such* on the one hand, and which should be deemed *free* on the other are particularly specified in the 24th.

It is necessary for me, in bringing this subject to your view, briefly to observe, that these articles have been dispensed with on your part: that our vessels laden with merchandize, not only the property of your enemies, made free by these articles, but likewise our citizens, the latter of which was always free, have been brought into your ports, detained for a great length of time, their cargoes taken, and the captains and proprietors otherwise subjected to great embarrassments, losses and injuries. But I will not dwell upon this subject in this view, because I frankly own to you it is painful for me thus to contemplate it. I wish to reserve my free comments for the other side of the picture where I shall favorably explain the motives of the act, in communicating to my country what I hope you will enable me to communicate, the ready acquiescence with which the decree was rescinded.

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If the French Republic gained the smallest benefit from the regulation, there might be some motive for adhering to it. But this cannot, it is presumed, be the case. The most to be derived from it, is the occasional seizure of a straggling vessel destined for the ports of Spain and Portugal; for they are excluded from the ports of England, except under particular circumstances and which rarely happen. It must be obvious, if the price was higher here, this would be their destination; add to which the charges attending the seizure and conducting of vessels from their course, must be great, and will make it not only an uncertain but unprofitable mode of supply.

It may be apprehended that if this decree should

be rescinded, it will open a door, through whicl under the protection of our flag, the commerce Britain may be carried on with advantage to her, an detriment to France. But a moment's reflection w demonstrate, that this apprehension cannot, in an degree, be well founded; for the navigation act England, whose great principles have been wisely adopted here, forbids almost altogether any such commerce. By this act the manufactures of the metropolis cannot be carried to the colonies, nor can the productions of the colonies, nor the productions or manufactures of any other country, be carried in our bottoms to Great Britain. This restriction must in a great degree inhibit the use of our vessels in any but the direct trade between the two nations; for it is not probable that Great Britain will use the American vessels to export her cargoes to other countries, to any amount, if at all; since, not being able to return, they would generally be left there empty and idle. On the contrary we know that her practice, in such cases, has been not to countenance the navigation of any other country at the expense of her own; but to protect the latter by convoys. But if this were otherwise, it is to be presumed that the fortune of the present war, in the triumphant success of the French arms, will have decisively settled itself, before that could have produced any material defect.

It must be obvious that the conduct of Great Britain, and especially in regard to the articles of contraband, must depend in a great measure upon that of France in this particular. For if France de-

cline to rescind this decree, Great Britain most probably will, unless indeed she should make a merit of receding at the expence of France; for if France should comply in the first instance, she will put Great Britain in an embarrassing dilemma; for, if she refuses afterwards, it will tend not only to cement our union with France, but combine all America in the condemnation of the conduct of Britain: And if they should then comply, to France will the credit be given of having forced her into it.

At the same time I express to you a desire that this decree be rescinded, and the parties heretofore affected by it compensated for the injuries they have received, I consider it likewise my duty to add some observations upon the state of our trade in general with the Republic. When an American vessel arrives in any port of France, it is immediately in the hands of the government. The Captain or Supercargo cannot sell the cargo to any other person, nor can he get more for it than the public agents will give, nor sail elsewhere without permission. Oftentimes it happens that great delays take place, from the necessity of communicating from the sea ports with the metropolis, and other inconveniences detrimental to the parties. A regulation of this kind, in its fullest extent, must prove very injurious to both countries, and especially to France. Trade cannot exist under it. It will soon happen that not a single adventurer will seek the French ports: no merchant will enter them but by restraint. The consequence must be, that the commerce of America so extensive and productive,

and especially in those articles in greatest demand here, will be either exterminated, thrown into other channels, or forced here by public funds, and under the direction of public agents: a resource which, however productive, should not be the sole one, for many reasons; but more especially because the produce of our country, having thus become the property of France, will be liable, by the law of nations, equally in yours and in our vessels, to seizure and condemnation by your enemies; and because if we succeed in securing the respect which is due to our flag by other nations, and which would enable our citizens in their own bottoms to supply in abundance your markets (and in which I trust we shall succeed) it would be of no use to you; and lastly, because the competition of private adventurers would thus be destroyed, a competition which, with suitable encouragement, would not only supply the defect of these agents and satisfy the demand of the market; but by making known constantly and regularly the prices in America, form a check on their conduct and furnish the best test of their integrity.

You will observe I do not complain that the public are the sole purchasers and regulate at pleasure what shall be exported, provided the vendors are paid for their cargoes in some commodity or specie, at their option; or that agents of the public are appointed in the United States, and as many as may be thought necessary, to purchase our productions on public account and send them here. These are subjects which the legislators of the Republic will regulate according

as public exigencies may in their judgment require. What I wish is that the ports of France may be opened freely to the enterprizes of my countrymen, and which will be the case provided they be permited to leave them immediately if they do not like the market, and despatched without delay in case they do. To accomplish the first point a general order only will be requisite to the officers of the customs or other persons in authority in the several ports; and the latter, a regulation of the prices to be immediately given by these officers upon all occasions, when a vessel should arrive, and which might be furnished as often as any change should be deemed necessary. This would, I am satisfied, banish every cause of complaint, greatly increase the competition and of course the supply of the market, and at a much less expense.

Upon the second subject, the Bordeaux Embargo, I find the Committee has already passed an Arret which secures to the persons interested an indemnity for the delay and other injuries sustained; it only remains, therefore, to adjust the amount of the claims and pay the parties entitled to it.

The third which respects the claims for supplies rendered by our citizens to the government of S.t Domingo, is likewise a matter of account, and which it is earnestly hoped will be immediately adjusted and paid. A person authorized will appear in support of the claims, with the evidence, before any board or tribunal which shall be appointed for that purpose.

I have to observe that I shall be happy to give every aid in my power to facilitate the adjustment and

subsequent payment of these several classes of claims. So far as they are well founded I doubt not they will be allowed by the French Republic, and where this is not the case they will not be supported by me. Is the aggregate view they respect the great mass of American merchants. It is of importance for France to cultivate that interest, and the present is, for many reasons, a critical moment to make an impression on it. I hope, therefore, it will not be neglected.

It is my duty to observe to you that I am under no instruction to complain of, or request the repeal of, the decree authorizing a departure from the 23^{d} and 24th. articles of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce; on the contrary I well know that if, upon consideration, after the experiment made, you should be of opinion that it produces any solid benefit to the Republic, the American government and my countrymen in general will not only bear the departure with patience but with pleasure. It is from the confidence alone which I entertain that this departure cannot be materially beneficial to you, and that the repeal would produce the happiest effect, in removing every possible cause of uneasiness and concilliating still more and more toward each other the affections of the citizens of both Republics, and thereby cementing more closely their union, that I have taken the liberty, as connected with the other concerns, to bring the subject before you. To cement that union in other situations has long been the object of my efforts; for I have been well satisfied that the closer and more intimate it was, the happier it would be for both countries.

America and France thus united, the one the greatest power in the European World and the other rapidly repairing the wastes of war, and rising to the first rank in the scale of nations, both bounding by and measuring an immense space along the Atlantic, abundant in productions, suiting the demand of each other, and above all, both Republics, have nothing to fear from foreign danger, and everything to hope from the happiest and most beneficial domestic intercourse. By a generous and liberal policy, France has it at the present moment much in her power to promote this more intimate union, and in the hope she will avail herself of it I have thought proper thus to develope the subjects which I have submitted to your consideration.[1]

JA^S. MONROE.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

PARIS Sepr. 7, 1794.

DEAR SIR,—I have been here rather more than a month and so much engaged with the duties which devolved on me immediately that I have not yet been able to send a single private letter to America. It happened that I took my station a few days after Robespierre had left his in the Convention by means of the guillotine, so that everything was in commotion, as was natural upon such an event; but it was the agitation of universal joy occasioned by a deliverance from a terrible oppression & which had pervaded every part of the Republick. After encountering

[1] Supplemental Observations, page 90, *post*.

some serious difficulties growing out of the existing state of things, I was presented to the Convention and recognized in the manner the enclosed paper will shew you. Many incidents have since turned up to shew the pleasure with which the organized departments and the people generally have received a mission immediately from our Republick to theirs, and I have every reason to believe that it will not only remove any previous existing solicitude, but tend to encrease permanently the harmony between the two countries.

After Robespierre's exit there seemed to be an end of divisions and altercations for some time in the Convention. Even those of his own party were most probably happy in the event, for in the progress of his power a connection with him had already been of little service, and it was to be apprehended that it would prove of less hereafter. It was not only necessary to be devoted to him, but to be unpopular with the community also. The list of his oppressions and the acts of cruelty committed by means of his influence, in the Convention & in consequence the revolutionary tribunal, would amaze you. He was believed by the people at large to be the foe to Kings, nobles, Priests, etc., the friend of republican govt. regardless of mercy & in fact devoted to their cause. Under this impression he perpetrated acts, which without perceiving the cause, had gradually spread a gloom over the whole republick. But as soon as they saw him in opposition to the Convention, the cause was known, his atrocities were understood, and the

people abandoned him with demonstrations of joy rarely seen.

But it seemed improbable he sho'd. have been able to carry every thing in the committee of p: safety & by means of it in the Convention &c. with out more associates than St. Just & Couthon, who were executed with him or rather this was the opinion of others, for I can readily conceive that a man may gain an influence in society powerful enough to control every one & every thing. As soon, therefore, as the preternatural calm subsided, which the liberation from him had universally created, a spirit of enquiry began to shew itself, as to other accomplices. It terminated in the denunciation of Barrere, Collot d' Herbois, & some others. The Convention gave a hearing to the charges, rejected them, & pass'd a censure upon the author as seeking to disturb the publick repose. Thus, therefore, that business rests, and I declare to you that I not only think hereafter they will be more free from parties of the turbulent kind heretofore known, but if they sho'd. not, that I am persuaded their revolution rests perfectly secure in the unanimity & affections of the people. Greater proofs of patriotism and personal sacrifice were never seen in any country than are daily shewn in this, and in acts of heroism they have thrown a shade over the ancient and modern world. The spirit of the combination is absolutely broken. In the neighbourhood of Charleroy a decisive action was fought in July between Jourdan & Cob[1]: & in which the former gained

[1] The Prince of Coburg.

the victory with the loss of abt. 1500 men, & at the expense to the latter of abt. 10,000 slain on the field. This has eventually driven the troops of the combined powers to Mastrecht and the neighbourhood of the Rhine, & of course out of all their possessions, not only in France [including Condé & Valenciennes] but likewise their proper territory in the low countries. 'Tis thought they are abt. to hazard another great action, but they do it with hazard for they fight dispirited troops against those who are flushed with victory, superior numbers, & resolved to conquer, & sure in case of misfortune of immediate succour. If France succeeds and which I am led to believe from every thing I can hear & very dispassionately, the combination in the ordinary course of war will be at an end, and the several powers composing it entirely at the mercy of France, except the Islands in her neighbourhood whose safety will depend altogether on the superiority at sea, if preserved there. 'Tis said that these powers (the Islanders excepted & who probably prompted the others with a view of taking advantage in case of success) sounded this govt. last winter upon the subject of peace, but without effect: that on the contrary they were treated with the utmost contempt, and I have reason to believe they will never treat with them under the govts. at present existing in each, to press the war till no force shews itself against them & in case the people sho'd. rise in any one & organize themselves, treat such organiz'd body as the only legitimate gov't. & aid it in crushing the ancient one. If France succeeds in the battle co'

templated this will soon be the state of things : indeed it must be so immediately after.

That Mr. Jay sho'd. easily obtain the object of his errand in Engl'd.[1] will be readily inferred. The successful battles of France have plead our cause with great effect in the councils of that humane Cabinet. He will however arrogate to himself much merit for address in negotiation, and the concession of the court will be a theme for high panegyric to many in our country. They will deem it a proof of that sincere attachment to us which has already been shewn in that quarter.

The spirit of liberty begins to shew itself in other regions. Geneva has undergone revolution — the people have taken the gov't. into their hands, apprehended the aristocrats, & executed seven of the most wicked. And in Poland under the direction of Kosciusko who acted with us in America, a formidable head has been raised against Prussia & Russia. I have hopes that our trade, by mere negotiation, will be plac'd on a very safe & good footing shortly : and that France will rescind the decree respecting the seizure of our vessels laden with provisions &c. as heretofore. Indeed I think she will go back to the ground of the commercial treaty. I have hinted the good effect such a measure wo'd. have in America, without positively requesting it to be done.

[1] It is to be remembered that the report that Jay's negotiations contained stipulations unfriendly and injurious to the interests of the French nation did not reach Paris until December; and that Monroe's only understanding of the purpose of Jay's mission at this time was based on the language of Randolph's instructions. *Cf.* page 3, *ante*.

I rely upon yr. self & Mr. Jones[1] in planning the many little tho' very important matters for me, abt. my farm. Such as fixing the place for my house orchards & the like. It will not be very long before we join you—we are all well—Mrs. M. is with her child a pupil to a professor in the French language. They desire to be affectionately remembered to yr. self & family taking it for granted you have Mrs. Randolph & both yr. daughters with you.

I am, Dear Sir,

Yr. affectionate friend & servant

JA^{S} MONROE.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

PARIS, September 9, 1794.

CITIZEN,—The Convention having decreed, that the flag of the American and French Republics should be united together and suspended in its own hall, in testimony of eternal union and friendship between the two people; I have thought I could not better evince the impression this act has made on my mind, or the grateful sense of my constituents, than by presenting in their behalf, that of the United States to the representatives of the French people. Having caused it, therefore, to be executed, according to the modes prescribed by a late act of Congress, I now commit it to the care of Captain Barney,[2] an officer of merit in our own revolution, and who will attend for the purpose of depositing it wherever you

[1] His uncle, Joseph Jones.

[2] Commodore Joshua Barney was a warm partizan of the French, entering their navy as commander of a squadron, serving until 1802. LOSSING.

will be pleased to direct. I pray you therefore to accept it, as a proof of the sensibility with which my country receives every act of friendship from our ally, and of the pleasure with which it cherishes every incident which tends to cement and consolidate the union between the two nations.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS 15th. Septr 1794.

SIR,—As soon as I could command a moments leisure, I applied myself to the immediate duties of my station. I found many of my countrymen here laboring under embarrassments of a serious kind growing out of the war, and was soon furnished with like complaints from others in several of the seaports. Correct information upon every point was my first object, for unless I knew the nature & extent of the evil, I could not seek a remedy. I encouraged therefore by my letters these representations, as the only means by which I could acquire it, nor was it difficult to be obtained, for the parties interested have been deeply affected and long delayed, to be remiss upon the present occasion. In the course of a few weeks, I believe most of the complaints which had been occasioned by the War, and especially where the parties were present either in person or by attorney, were laid before me. By analysing them (including those which were committed to me from your department whilst in Philadelphia) I found they might be classed under the following heads.

1. Those who were injured by the embargo of Bordeaux.

2. Those who had claims upon the Republic for supplies rendered the government of St Domingo.

3. Those who had brought cargoes in for sale and were detained by delay of payment or some other cause.

4. Those who had been brought in by the Ships of the Republic in derogation of the treaty of amity and commerce and were subjected to like detention and delay.

5. Those who had been taken at sea or elsewhere and were confined in derogation of the treaty of amity and commerce or rights of citizenship in the United States.

Upon the two first heads, and indeed upon the two latter, so far as compensation to the injured parties was in question I had no difficulty how to act. Your instructions had fully marked the course to be taken. I therefore required that compensation be made as soon as possible, and upon just principles according to the contract where such was the case, and the fair estimated value where it was not. But the two latter[1] involved in them something more than the mere adjustment of existing claims, and which closed the scene when that was made. They grew out of measures which if suffered to continue might create like injuries every week, & which would require a like interposition on my part. I therefore considered it my duty not only to require a full indemnity to the

[1] The third and fourth are meant.—MONROE.

claimants, as in the other instances, but to mount to the source of the evil and seek a remedy commensurate therewith.

I found that the delays above spoken of did not proceed from interest or design on their part; from interest they could not for they not only disgusted and injured the claimants but likewise exposed the Government to considerable loss, upon account of demurage. And if there was no motive of interest there could be none for design. They proceeded in fact from the system of trade adopted here by which the whole commerce of the country was taken into the hands of the republic itself. The regulation was such, that none but the officers of Government could purchase, nor could any contract be concluded and executed in any of the sea ports, or elsewhere than in Paris. This threw every case into the hands of a board of commerce in this city, who were otherwise borne down with an immense weight of the most extensive and complicated duties. The defeat in our arrangements too, had increased the embarrassment; for as we had no Consul here every Captain or Supercargo became his own negotiator, and as they were generally ignorant of the City, the language and the prices last given, they were badly calculated for the purpose. Every new cargo formed a distinct negotiation, and as there was no system on the part of the vendors, who wished as was natural, to make the most of their voyage, they usually asked an extravagant price for it in the first instance. This occasioned a kind of traffic between the parties, and which fre-

quently terminated in the disgust of both, and particularly of the vendors, who after they were wearied out with the clerks in the department, and whose duty it was to receive them, generally assigned the business over to some agent, and who as he was not cloathed with any public character, could neither be much respected by the French Government, nor possessed in any high degree of the confidence of his employers. Such was the state of our trade in the Republic, and such the cause of the delay. As soon therefore as I understood it I considered it my duty to bring the subject before the Government, and desire on its part a suitable remedy: and if the person lately appointed does not soon arrive, I shall deem it equally necessary to nominate someone as Consul provisionally, to take charge of the business on ours. And if he does arrive I am by no means certain it will remedy the difficulty, for reasons I shall hereafter explain.

I had more difficulty in determining how to act on the fourth point.[1] I was not instructed to desire a repeal of the decree, and did not know but that it had been tolerated from the soundest motives of political expedience. This Republic had declined calling on us to execute the guarantee, from a spirit of magnanimity, and strong attachment to our welfare. This consideration entitled it to some attention in return. An attempt to press it within the pale of the stipulations contained in the 23^{d} and 24th articles of the treaty of Amity and Commerce might give

[1] Otherwise as related to compensation to individuals.—MONROE.

birth to sentiments of a different kind and create a disposition to call on us to execute that of the treaty of alliance. The subject was therefore of the utmost delicacy, and I saw that I could not enter on it without the greatest care. But yet I was pursuaded that France gained nothing by the departure, and had reason to believe if it were otherwise she would at the present time concede it for our accommodation: and I knew its importance to our commerce, and especially as it would deprive the Cabinet of St. James of the smallest pretext for continuing the violation on its part. Upon full consideration of all these circumstances the paper presented was drawn and I trust whatever may be its effect, it will have the approbation of the President, since it may prove a beneficial one, and has in no respect compromitted him. My note was presented a few days past, and I shall expect an answer as soon as circumstances will permit paying due regard to the immense weight of business before the department.

Upon the article of Citizenship I have as yet said nothing. I did not wish to complicate the subjects which I presented before them too much at any one time. It is however an important one, and shall be soon attended to, as shall likewise the claim for reimbursements of 50,000[1] dollars advanced to the French Emigrants from S[t] Domingo.[2]

Nothing of great importance has lately taken place

[1] The amount was 15,000 only.— MONROE.

[2] Under authority of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act providing for the relief of such of the inhabitants of Saint Domingo, resident within the United States, as may be found in want of support," approved February 12, 1794.

quently terminated in the disgust of both, and particularly of the vendors, who after they were wearied out with the clerks in the department, and whose duty it was to receive them, generally assigned the business over to some agent, and who as he was not cloathed with any public character, could neither be much respected by the French Government, nor possessed in any high degree of the confidence of his employers. Such was the state of our trade in the Republic, and such the cause of the delay. As soon therefore as I understood it I considered it my duty to bring the subject before the Government, and desire on its part a suitable remedy: and if the person lately appointed does not soon arrive, I shall deem it equally necessary to nominate someone as Consul provisionally, to take charge of the business on ours. And if he does arrive I am by no means certain it will remedy the difficulty, for reasons I shall hereafter explain.

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in the public councils. The remaining spirit of ancient parties has, it is true, occasionally shewn itself, but not with its former vigor, for it seems in a great measure to have withdrawn and to lurk in the bosoms of the more inveterate only. Happily a different spirit more congenial with the temper of the nation and which inclines to humanity, to peace and concord, seems to pervade the great mass of the convention. I think this latter will soon prevail so as not only to prevent, at least for the present further enormities, but to heal in some degree the wounds which have already been inflicted. Some latter circumstances authorise this expectation. Barrere, Collet d'Herbois, and Billaud Varenne of the Committee of Public Safety and several of the Committee of Surety general, were suspected by many of having countenanced and supported the measures of Robespierre, and it was apprehended that after the perfect and preternatural calm, which ensued his execution, should subside some discussion would take place on that subject,—accordingly they were lately denounced by Le Cointre of Versailles, who brought forward a long list of charges against them. But it was immediately seen that the party in favor of the denunciation though violent was weak. The convention heard the accusation with patience and rejected it with disdain, and Le Cointre himself was eventually censured as a disturber of the public repose. Many of this party were now in their turn alike agitated and alarmed b cause they thought they saw in the rejection of motion the invincible strength of the other party

the certainty of their own fate. But they were superficial observers of the course of the present revolution, and of the theatre on which they acted. They did not perceive that there was a force in the Convention actuated by more humane and dignified principles, able to controul both, and render their extravagant and pernicious efforts abortive and harmless. This latter fact was farther demonstrated by an event which followed immediately after. Under the reorganization of the committee of public safety, it became necessary to re-elect its members; and if the influence of those lately denounced had preponderated, they would of course have been re-chosen. But the contrary was the case for they were every one rejected and others preferred in their stead. I have mentioned this incident because I deem it an important one in the character of the present moment, tending to prove the certainty with which the revolution progresses towards a happy close, since the preponderance of those Councils which are equally distinguished for their wisdom, temperance and humanity, continues to increase.[1]

Nor is fortune less propitious to the affairs of this Republic in the field than in the Cabinet. Within a few days past Condé and Valenciennes have surrendered to its victorious arms. About 6,000 troops were taken in these garrisons and 1,100 emigrants and which latter were immediately put to the sword. The rigor with which the emigrants have been pursued

[1] This is to be considered as comparing the present state of things with that which existed before the fall of Robespierre.—MONROE'S VIEW.

continues nearly the same and seems still to be dictated equally by the sentiments of the public councils and the people at large: it will therefore not be easily or soon removed.

The surrender of these garrisons has relieved from a state of inactivity about 50,000 men who were immediately added to the armies upon the Meuse and on the frontier of Holland. These armies are at present of great strength and certainly upon the ordinary rules of calculation, not to be resisted by the force now embodied against them. In point of numbers they are by far superior and they possess the means by which this superiority may be increased at pleasure and to any amount. Their discipline too is exact, their spirits high and enterprize astonishingly great, whilst on the other side everything wears a more gloomy aspect. Their troops are dispirited and daily wasting away by the events of War and reinforcements have been for a long time past with difficulty obtained & seem now to be exhausted or at least at a stand. And to increase the embarrassments on their part 'tis said a dispute has taken place between Cobourg and York for the command, in case they should unite their forces: the latter having set up a claim in consequence of the great force, Prussians &c. in British pay.

Cobourg occupies at present a position near Maestricht, and York one in the neighbourhood of Bergen-op-Zoom. 'Tis thought the French will direct their principal force towards these posts, since their conquest will not only lay open the whole country to the

Rhine, but likewise deprive Holland of its chief barrier. They are strong and well provided but deemed by no means impregnable to the ardor and enterprize of the French troops. 'Tis therefore probable some severe rencontre may take place in each quarter, for surely nothing but absolute despair will induce the combined forces to abandon them and which they must otherwise do, in case the French continue to exert themselves with their usual vigor.

You will observe I have adopted in my movements here the plan of conciliation, and that I have intimated in consideration of the alliance subsisting between the two Republics, the preference we have on that and other accounts, for France to any other country. I have done so not only in obedience to the dictates of my own judgment, but because I thought I thereby followed the spirit of your instructions, and because I well knew I could not otherwise count upon success in any thing I undertook. In the brilliant career of victory which now attends the arms of the Republic you will readily conceive that a cordial but dignified tone is better calculated to produce a happy effect, than one which was distant, formal, and merely diplomatic. And I was the more inclined to it from a belief that I saw in the temper of the nation a sincere disposition to accomodate us in all cases within its power, and to cultivate the most perfect harmony between the two countries. Whether this is real or fallacious, time, and a very short one, will now disclose, since I have presented before the Government propositions which must eventually test it.

I have the honor to be with great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

JA.S MONROE.

TO THE MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF GENEVA.[1]

[M. REYBAZ.]

PARIS, September 15, 1794.

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I have received, with great satisfaction, the account you have been pleased to render me of the generous impression which the suspension of the flags of the three Republics of America, France and Geneva, in the hall of the National Convention, has excited in the breasts of your countrymen. The standards of Republics should always be ranged together, and I am perfectly satisfied, that this event will be received with equal joy by the Government and Citizens of the United States, to whom I shall communicate it. I beg of you, citizen minister, to be assured of the solicitude which the Government and People of America feel for the freedom, prosperity and happiness of the Republic of Geneva, and of the pleasure with which I shall at all times become the instrument of the most intimate and friendly communications between them.

[1] Geneva's revolution followed that of France, her National Convention adopting, in 1794, a Constitution that declared political equality to all the Genevese. In March, 1798, Geneva elected to become a part of France, and in June following, the French authorities entered the city. By the Treaty of Paris its independence was restored, and it became one of the Cantons of the Swiss Confederation. Our first treaty with the Swiss Confederation was in May, 1847.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Sep'r 20, 1794.

DEAR SIR,—Mr. Swan[1] of Boston who has resided for some years past in this city in the character of a merchant & in which time he has been extensively engaged will present you this. He leaves this for the purpose of purchasing & shipping to this country the productions of ours & relies much on the advances to be made by our gov't for the means. He will I understand be sole agent in that line of this republick in America. He well knows y'r disposition on this head & will confer with you in regard to it. I beg you to be attentive to him as he has been very obliging to us here. I have written you very fully by the way of Bordeaux, and as Mr. S. proposes landing at Ch'stown shall have more early opportunities of apprizing you

[1] On October 11, 1794, James Swan addressed the following letter to Monroe: "Being on the point of departing for America, I beg you to give me your certificate of being a citizen of the United States:—and as my name is marked by the British as being an agent of this Republic, they might in wantonness carry me into England, in order to baulk the business for which I am going, and this is the most likely to be done on my voyage, as it is the Marine only that is instructed to stop vessels which have been fitted out by me. Your attachment to the interest and happiness of France,—and how much that depends on my safe arrival, so far as respects provisions, I trust will be a sufficient apology for my praying you to put in your certificate James Keadie (my mother's name) instead of James Swan & will be a sufficient inducement for you to grant it. I engage to deposit it in the hands of the Secretary of State on my arriving in America, or to destroy it as you shall desire. You may rest assured that I shall make use of it for myself only—besides my signalment would hardly fit any other person in the world." Monroe's subsequent "signalment" of Swan does not appear to have been favorable (*see* his letter of June 30, 1795). Swan figured as a claimant under the Convention of 1803, having no less than nine cases before the Board of Commissioners. They were rejected mainly on the ground of his being in partnership with foreigners and that he was an agent of the French government.

of those events of the present day which may escape him. We are well. Very sincerely I am y'r friend & serv't, JA^S. MONROE.

TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

[M. BUCHAT.]

PARIS, September 22, 1794.

CITIZEN COMMISSARY,—I have this moment received the enclosed memorial from the masters of two American vessels; the Mary, commanded by Henry Preble and the Severn, by Jared Goodrich, who were boarded at sea by the Proserpine,[1] frigate of the Republic, and all the passengers taken from the one vessel, and the other, with her cargo and passengers, brought into Brest where they are now detained. As these cases form like departures from the treaty of amity and commerce between the two Republics, and are in that respect, analogous with those complained of in my note lately presented to the committee of Public Safety, I have thought it my duty, as connected with that subject, to bring them immediately before the same department. Independently of the propriety of accommodating the principle to the wishes of my country and which I earnestly hope, for the common interests of both Republics, will be soon done, I presume the embarrassment of virtuous men, and good

[1] The Severn from Bristol to New York with emigrants for America on board, captured September 1st, and sent into Brest, where the passengers were placed on board the prison ship L'Orient. The Mary, captured on August 18th, experienced the same treatment. These appear to have been among the first cases brought up of the historical "French Spoliation Claims." The case of the Severn subsequently appears on the Records of the Board of 1803, by which it was adjudicated.

patriots, as is the case in the present instance, will be an additional motive for their immediate enlargement.

TO THE COMMISSARY OF EXTERIOR RELATIONS.

[M. MIOT.]

PARIS, September 1794.

CITIZEN COMMISSARY,—A short experience has already demonstrated the interest which my country has in the appointment of some person here known to your government and responsible to ours to take charge of the affairs of its citizens in the commercial line. This consideration has induced me to appoint Fulwar Skipwith,[1] heretofore Secretary of Legation, to the office of Consul for the department of Paris, and who will take on himself and discharge the duties properly belonging thereto, until the sense of our government shall be known on the subject. I have therefore to request you will be so obliging as to cause this to be communicated to the several departments of your government, in such manner that he may be known and respected as such.

TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

[M. BUCHAT.]

PARIS, September, 1794.

CITIZEN COMMISSARY,—My predecessor Mr. Morris, finding it impossible to procure a vessel to embark his

[1] Of Virginia; Consul for the island of Martinique, June 4, 1790, until June 25, 1795, when he was nominated Consul-General of the United States in France. January 6, 1802, he was appointed Commercial Agent at Paris. June 18, 1803, he was appointed by Monroe and Livingston to assist in the operations of the Board of Commissioners under the Convention with France of 1803.

baggage and sail for some weeks yet to come, wishes to employ that time in an excursion into Switzerland, and has requested me to obtain, for him, a passport for that purpose. The better, however, to explain to you his wishes, I have enclosed a copy of his letter to me on that subject. Perhaps, it may be more conformable to the course of proceedings in such cases, that it should be granted, in the present instance, by the Committee of public safety. But in either case, I presume it will be more agreeable to him, as it likewise would be to me, that their approbation of the measure should be previously obtained. I have, therefore, to request, citizen, that you will be so obliging as to make known to that body his wishes, and obtain their sanction.

TO LE RAY DU CHAUMONT.

PARIS, October 13, 1794.

SIR,—I was lately advised by the Secretary of State, that the negociation of a treaty with Algiers had been committed to Col. Humphreys, our Minister at Lisbon; and that of course every movement having that object in view, must be conducted under his care. Your agency if carried into effect, must of course be in that line. I give you this information that in case you wish to render your services in that respect to the United States, you may communicate the same to Colonel Humphreys; who will I doubt not, pay every attention to it that a sense of your merit and existing arrangements will allow of. I have also the pleasur to inform you, that the President has approved of

measures taken by Mr. Morris and of the confidence reposed in you by him, in relation to that object.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, Octr 16th 1794.

SIR,—I gave you in my last a sketch of the embarrassments under which our commerce laboured in the ports of this Republic, and of my efforts to emancipate it, as shewn by my letter to the Committee of Public Safety, a copy of which was likewise forwarded. To this I have as yet received no answer although I have requested it more than once. To my applications, however, which were informal I was informally answered, that the subject was under consideration, and would be decided on as soon as possible.

But as these propositions were of extensive import, and connected with the system of commerce and supply, which had been adopted here, 'tis probable I shall not be favoured with an answer until the subject is generally reviewed. Nor shall I be surprized to find extraordinary efforts to protract a decision, and even defeat the object in view. But as the opposition will not be warranted by the interest, so I am well satisfied it will not be supported by the sense of the French nation, when the object is well understood. To make it so will be the object of my future, and I trust not ineffectual endeavours.

You were, I doubt not, surprised to hear that the whole commerce of France, to the absolute exclusion

of individuals, was carried on by the government itself. An institution of this kind would be deemed extraordinary, even in a small state; but when applied to the French Republic it must appear infinitely more so. Nor were the circumstances which gave birth to it, more a proof of the calamities with which the society was inwardly convulsed than of the zeal and energy with which it pursued its object. Through the channel of trade it was found, or suspected, that the principles of the revolution were chiefly impaired; that through it, not only the property of the emigrants and the wealth of the country were exported, but that foreign money was likewise thrown in, whereby the internal dissensions were fomented, and in other respects the intrigues of the coalesced powers promoted. For a considerable time it was believed that most of the evils to which France was a prey, proceeded from this source. Many remedies were in consequence applied, but still the disease continued. Finally an effort was made to eradicate the cause by exterminating private trade altogether, and taking the whole commerce of the country into the hands of the government. A decree to this effect accordingly passed on the day of October 1793, and which has since continued in force.

But now many circumstances incline to a change of this system. The act itself was considered as a consummation of those measures which completed the ruin of the Girondine party, whose principal leaders had already fallen under the guillotine. By it, the commercial interest, as distinct from the landed, and

dividing in certain respects with opposite views, the councils of the country, was totally destroyed. All private mercantile intercourse with foreign nations was cut off, and so severe were the measures, and great the odium on the mercantile character that none were pleased to have it attached to them. But when the apprehension of danger from that source was done away, the motive for the act itself was greatly diminished. Accordingly the public mind was soon seen vibrating back to its former station; and in which it was greatly aided by the fortune of the late dominant party, whose principal leaders had now likewise in their turn settled their account with the Republic at the receipt of the guillotine. Thus we find, and especially in great commotions, that extraordinary measures not only bear in general the strong character of their author, but frequently share his fate. The fall of the Brissotine party extirpated private trade; the fall of Robespierre's may probably soon restore it.

At present many symptoms indicate that a change is not distant, though none seem willing so prominently to take the lead, as to make themselves responsible for the consequences. The only active interest that I can perceive against it, consists of those who have managed the public trade and been entrusted with the public monies for that purpose. They readily foresee that a change will not only take from them the public cash but likewise lead to an adjustment of their accounts for past transactions. 'Tis however generally the fortune of an opposition of this

kind, to precipitate the adoption of the measure it wishes to avert; for as every one suspects that its motive is not found, and which is proportionally increased by the degree of zeal shewn, so every one feels an interest in defeating it.

I have endeavoured in my propositions to confine them entirely to external objects, by suggesting such remedies as might be adopted without any interference with the interior general system of France. By so doing I hoped that the injuries of which we complain might be sooner redressed and not made dependant on the great events which happen here.

I soon found that the extraordinary expedient to which this Republic had had recourse, of excluding individuals from trade and conducting it themselves, would require in a great measure, a correspondent regulation on our part: For if the conduct of the public servants, on the one side, was not in some measure supervised, and which it could not be, but by public agents on the other, the impositions which might be practised on our improvident countrymen would be endless. In every contest between a public officer here, and the citizens of another country in the purchase of supplies for the Republic or execution of a contract, the bias of the government and of the people would be in favour of the former. The consulate, under the superintendance of the minister, forms their natural bulwark in the commercial line against impositions of every kind. Indeed it is the only one which can be provided for them. But to guard them against those proceeding from the source above d

scribed, it should be organized with peculiar care. I was sorry, therefore, upon inspecting into our establishment, to find that whatever might be its merits in other situations, it was by no means in general endowed with sufficient strength or vigour for the present crisis. American citizens alone can furnish an adequate protection to their countrymen. In the hands of a Frenchman or other foreigner, the consular functions lie dormant. In every litigated case the former shrinks into the citizen and trembles before the authority of his country; and the latter, especially if the subject of one of the coalesced powers, finds our commission only of sufficient force to exempt him from the decree which would otherwise doom him to a prison. I annex at the foot of this a list of our Consuls and Consular agents, with a note of those who have been actually under arrestation and confinement and by which you will be better enabled to comprehend the nature of these remarks.

My situation was, therefore, in every view, beyond measure an embarrassing one. But as there was no consul or agent of any kind or country here, where the whole business was concentred, and every transaction closed, it became on that account infinitely more so; for I was in consequence not only daily surrounded by many of my countrymen, complaining of delays and injuries and entreating my intercession for redress, but applied to by them from every quarter and upon every difficulty. I could not settle their accounts with the departments, nor could I interfere in any other respect in particular cases, where there

were more of the same description. I could not even go through the forms in the offices where it was necessary to verify facts, and which if true furnished ground for complaint; nor could I demand redress of the government upon any supposititious case, and which every one must be until verified. I remained thus for some time in expectation of the arrival of M. Duvernat, although I was apprehensive such an event, in consequence of the general objection above stated, and the decree which applied particularly to his case, instead of affording relief would plunge me into a new embarrassment. But finding that he had not arrived, and that I could make no progress in the public business here, without the aid of a consul, I finally nominated my Secretary, M^r. Skipwith, provisionally Consul for this City, on the day of and notified it to this government, a copy of which and of the answer of the Commissary of Foreign Affairs I herewith inclose you. To him I have since assigned the interesting duty of developing and demonstrating the cause of these difficulties, by an appeal to authentic facts; and the better to enable him to perform this service, I have instructed our consuls and agents in the several ports to render him a statement of those within their particular jurisdictions. Thus enlightened he will make a report upon the whole subject to me and which I will immediately lay before the Committee of Public Safety, in illustration of my former comments, and with such others as may be found necessary.

At present I can say nothing decisively upon the subject of a general arrangement of the Consulate.

What I have said may furnish some hints that may be useful. But I wish before anything is definitively done in that respect to give you the result of my further remarks on it. M^r. Fenwick will be here in a few days, and from whom I doubt not I shall derive much useful information. In the interim Mr. Skipwith will perform the duties of the office in which I have placed him. But as he undertook it without the prospect of emolument in the official line (for in truth the duties required of him are not strictly consular, but novel and growing out of the emergence of the time) and more from a regard for the public interest, and to accommodate me than himself, although I was thereby deprived of his services in the immediate station in which he had accompanied me, yet I could not bereave him of the appointment I had personally conferred, nor divert from him the salary belonging to it. By permitting things to stand where they are for a few weeks longer, the public will derive no detriment, and I shall be able to acquire and give such information as will enable you to proceed with more propriety afterwards; a consideration which will enable me to bear the inconvenience to which I shall be personally subjected, with pleasure.

I found, upon my first arrival, that I should have much difficulty upon the subject of passports. The jealousy of this government was immediately discovered with respect to those who, being subjects of England, or any other of the coalesced powers, had passed over to America since our revolution, become citizens of some one of the States, and returned to

their proper country, where they now resided. It was suggested to me by the Commissary of Foreign Affairs, that if these people were covered by my passports, I should immediately spread through France, in the armies, and in presence of the public councils, a host of spies who would report the circumstances of the country to their enemies. It was likewise urged that I had no right to do it; for although this description of persons had acquired for the time, the right of citizenship with us, yet they were more attached to other countries since they resided and had their property there. I was likewise told of instances wherein this privilege had been abused by such persons, two of whom were said to be confined at Dunkirk as spies. The subject was in point of principle difficult, and I was really embarrassed how to act in it so as to satisfy this government and do justice to the parties concerned; for if citizens of America it seemed difficult to distinguish between such and any other citizens. And yet the argument was equally strong on the other side; for if the subject of another power, it was equally difficult to distinguish between such and any other subject of the same power, where the right of expatriation is generally denied. But in point of expedience there was less difficulty in the case. Citizenship is in its nature a local privilege. It implies a right within the government conferring it. And if considerations of this kind are to be regarded, I can see no reason why it should not, in the present instance, be construed strictly: For if a temporary emigrant, after availing himself of this benefit

for a few years, and for the purposes of trade, in our indulgent country, chuses to abandon us and return from whence he came, why should we follow him on this side of the Atlantic to support in his behalf a privilege which can now only be claimed at best for private and perhaps dishonourable purposes? Can any motive be urged of sufficient force to induce us to embark here in this kind of controversy at the hazard of our national character and the good will of the nation believing itself injured by it? Will the refusal to grant passports to such persons check emigration to our country? I am satisfied it will not, of the kind that merits encouragement; for it will rarely happen that a single member of that respectable list of philosophers, artists and yeomen who seek an asylum with us from the troubled governments on this side of the Atlantic will ever re-cross it. These observations apply only to those who settled with and abandoned us since the peace; for I consider those, be they of whatever country they may, and especially if of the British territory (who were of course, in the common character of British subjects, equally members of our revolution) who threw their fortunes into our scale, as being as much Americans as if they were born with us. After some discussion with the commissary on the subject, it terminated by an assurance on my part that I should be particularly cautious as to such characters and refuse my passports to all of that description (except in particular cases of hardship, and upon which he should be previously consulted) who were not actually resident within the

United States. This arrangement was satisfactory to the government as you will perceive by the commissary's letters to me, copies of which are herewith transmitted. I shall, however, be happy to be instructed by you on that head.[1]

The Councils of this Republic still continue to present to view an interesting, but by no means an alarming spectacle. Instances of animated debate, severe crimination and even of vehement denunciation, sometimes take place; but they have hitherto evaporated without producing any serious effect. It is obvious that what is called the mountain party is rapidly on the decline, and, equally so, that if the opposite one acts with wisdom and moderation, at the present crisis, it will not only complete its overthrow, but destroy the existence (if possible in Society) of all party whatever. The agitation which now occasionally shews itself, proceeds from the pressure of this latter party on the mountaineers, and who in their defence, sometimes make a kind of incursive or offensive warfare upon their enemy; for havn g since the fall of the Brissotines, wielded the councils of the nation, and been accustomed to a pretty liberal use of their authority over the remaining members of that party, they bear with pain, and not without apprehension of danger, their present decline. The tone of the discussion, therefore, frequently exhibits to view the external of a violent controversy between two rival parties, nearly equally balanced, and which must ter-

[1] *See* Randolph to Monroe, March 8, 1795. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 699.

minate under the preponderance of either, in the extirpation of the other. But this I deem only the external aspect, and upon considerations, in my judgment the most solid. I have observed generally, that the first indications of warmth have proceeded from the weaker party, and from its less important members, who occasionally break through the restraint imposed on them by their leaders; (if, when a force is broken and routed, there can be any leader) and sally forth into extravagancies, which provoke resentment, where they should only endeavour to excite pity; and whilst a different conduct is observable by the leaders themselves; for neither Barrere, Billaud de Varennes, nor Collot d'Herbois, ever take part in these discussions, otherwise than to explain some severe personal attack, and to which they confine their comments strictly and with all suitable respect for their opponents. I observe it rarely happens that any very distinguished member in the preponderating party takes share in these discussions; though the field invites, and much might be said with truth and of course with effect. From these considerations I infer, not only that the party of the plain has already acquired the complete preponderancy; but also that its motive is rather to save the Republic, than to persecute its enemies. There is, likewise something in the origin and spirit of these debates, which authorizes a belief they portend nothing alarming; for they generally proceed from a review of past enormities, which most deny, and few justify. But the scene through which they have past, cannot always be covered with a veil;

on the contrary it frequently breaks in upon their discussions, and always excites, like the Ghost of Hamlet, whenever it appears, the horror of the innocent and the terror of the guilty spectators. The debates, therefore, which ensue, though violent, are more of the exculpatory than of the assailing and sanguinary kind. Each party endeavours to vindicate itself from the charges alledged against it; sometimes by absolute denial, and at others by a counter crimination of its adversary. Hitherto the business has ended by a general reference of the depending motions to the committee of Public Safety solely; or to it, associated with the two other committees of general surety and legislation, and who have had sufficient wisdom, either to keep up the subject till it was forgotten, or to report such a general essay upon the state of affairs, the views of the coalesced powers, trade, finance and the like, as always to obscure, and sometimes to throw it entirely out of view.

By this, however, I do not wish to be understood as intimating, that in my opinion none of the members of the Convention will in future be cut off. On the contrary I think otherwise; for it cannot be possible that some of those who have perpetrated such enormities in their missions in the several parts of the Republic and particularly at Nantes, should escape the justice of their country.

In the movements of the present day, the Jacobin Society has, as heretofore, borne its part. The history of this Society, from its origin to the present time, is of importance to mankind and especially that

portion upon which Providence has bestowed the blessing of free government. It furnishes a lesson equally instructive to public functionaries and to private citizens.[1] I am not yet fully possessed of the details, although I have endeavoured to acquire them; but the outline I think I now understand. In its history, as in that of the revolution itself, there are obviously two great eras. The first commenced with the revolution and ended with the deposition of the King. The second fills the space between that event and the present day. The former of these is still further divisible into two parts, upon each of which distinct characters are marked. The first commenced with the revolution and ended with the constituent assembly, or adoption of the constitution. The second comprises the administration under the constitution. During the first of these, the Jacobin Society was composed of almost all the enemies to the ancient

[1] Monroe's history of the Jacobins arrived very seasonably for Washington in his denunciation of the "Democratic" societies in our own country. Randolph in acknowledging it wrote "Your history of the Jacobin societies was so appropriate to the present times in our own country, that it was conceived proper to furnish the public with those useful lessons, and extracts were published, as from a letter *of a gentleman in Paris to his friend in this city.*" Madison wrote to Monroe under date of March 11, 1795. "I have not yet rec^{d} a single line from you except yours of Septr 2 long since acknowledged. Your last letters of the official kind were duplicates of October 16, Nov. 7 & 20. You will perceive in the newspapers that the parts of them relating to the Jacobin Societies have been extracted and printed. In New York they have been republished with your name prefixed. The question agitated in consequence of the President's denunciation of the Democratic Societies will account for this use of your observations. In New York where party contests are running high in the choice of a successor to Clinton who declines, I perceive the use of them is extended by adroit comments to that subject also. It is proper you should be apprised of these circumstances that your own judgement may be the better exercised as to the latitude or reserve of your communications."

despotism; for in general those who were friends of the public liberty, and wished its establishment under any possible modification, became at this time members, and attended the debates of this Society. But with the adoption of the constitution many were satisfied and kept it. After this and during the second part of this era, it was composed only of the enemies to hereditary monarchy, comprising the members of the three succeeding parties, of Brissot, Danton, and Robespierre. During the whole of the first era, therefore, or until the deposition of the King, this society may be considered as the cradle of the revolution, for most certainly the Republic would not have been established without it. It was the organ of the public sentiment and, by means of discussion and free criticism upon men and measures, contributed greatly to forward that important event.

But from that period and through the whole of the second era, this Society has acted a different part and merited a different character. The clergy, the nobility and royalty were gone; the whole government was in the hands of the people, and its whole force exerted against the enemy. There was, in short, nothing existing in that line which merited reprehension, or with which the popular sentiment could take offence. But it had already gained a weight in the government, and which it had now neither sufficient virtue nor inclination to abandon. From this period, therefore, its movements were counted Revolutionary, and we behold the same Society which was heretofore so formidable to the despotism, now brandishing

the same weapon against the legitimate representation of the people.

Its subsequent story is neither complicated nor various. As the revolution was complete so far as depended on the interior order of things, it had no service of that kind to render, nor pretext to colour its movements. It was reduced to the alternative of either withdrawing from the stage, or taking part in the ordinary internal administration, and which it could not do otherwise than becoming an instrument in the hands of some one of the parties against the other. This station, therefore, it at once occupied, and has since held it to the present time. It became the creature of Robespierre and under his direction the principal agent in all those atrocities which have stained this stage of the revolution. It was by means of this society that he succeeded in cutting off the members of the two succeeding parties of Brissot and Danton, and had finally well nigh ruined the Republic itself.

It is an interesting fact and very deserving of attention, that in the more early and latter stages of this society, the best men of France were seeking an admittance into it, but from very different motives. In the commencement and until the establishment of the Republic, it was resorted to by them for the purpose of promoting that great event. But in the latter stage and until the fall of Robespierre, it was resorted to by them merely as a shelter from danger. Virtue and talents, with every other great and noble endowment, were odious in the sight of that monster,

and were of course the object of his persecution. Nor was any man of independent spirit, possessing them, secure from his wrath. The Jacobin Society could alone furnish any kind of protection, and to this circumstance it was owing that many deserving characters were seen there, apparently countenancing measures which in their souls they abhorred. It is therefore only justice that the present preponderating party in France, and the world at large, should now look with indulgence, and indeed with forgiveness, upon the conduct of many of those who seemed at the time to abet his enormities. Unfortunately for them and for their country, their presence secured only a personal exemption from danger: the preponderating influence had long been in the hands of those of a different description.

In the last scene which was acted by Robespierre, and in which he placed himself at the Commune in open rebellion against the Convention, 'tis said that this Society arranged itself under his banner against that assembly. But after his fall, and which was instantaneous, it immediately endeavoured to repair the error of this step, by charging it upon some who were admitted to be bad members, and others who were said to have forced themselves, at that tumultuous moment, unlicensed into the society, and who were not members at all. It even went into high crimination of Robespierre himself. But the principles of the controversy were too deeply rooted in the minds of all to be so suddenly eradicated. It was obvious that a crisis had arrived which must eventually settle

the point, whether the Convention or this Society should govern France, and equally so, that the public mind was, and perhaps long had been, decisively settled in favor of the former. As the catastrophe was approaching, this Society, as heretofore, used, at one time, an elevated or commanding tone, and at others, an humiliating one. But the Convention acted with equal dignity throughout. Whether it contemplated to strike at its existence, by an overt act, or to seek its overthrow by contrasting the wisdom, the justice and magnanimity of its own present conduct, with the past and recent enormities of this Society is uncertain. The leading members of the preponderating party seemed doubtful upon this point. But finally the rash and outrageous extremities of the Society, which was secretly exciting commotions through the country forced the convention into more decisive measures. By its order the Secretary of the Society at Paris was arrested, and all the deputies from those associated with it through France, and who had arrived to deliberate upon the state of their affairs, were driven from the city, under a decree which exempted none, not inhabitants of Paris, except our countrymen. Of all France, Marseilles was the only district, in which its efforts produced any effect. A small commotion, excited there, was immediately quelled by the ordinary police, and who after making an example of the leaders, reported it to the Convention.

What further measures may be adopted by the Convention, in regard to this Society is uncertain. The subject is now under discussion, and, I shall, I presume, be able in my next to give you the result.

The same success continues to attend the arms of the Republic, and in every quarter. They have taken, since my last, in the north, Juliers, Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne and Bois-le-duc, and in the south, Bellegarde, with immense stores of cannon, provision, &c. in each, and particularly in Juliers and Bois-le-duc, at both of which latter places, a general action was hazarded by the opposite generals, and in which they were routed with great loss. It is said, indeed, that the action which atchieved Juliers, was among the most important of the present campaign, since they consider it as deciding, eventually, the fate of Maestricht, Bergen-op-Zoom, and of Holland itself. Maestricht is now closely invested and must fall in the course of a few weeks, since the Austrian general has obviously abandoned it to its fate. Holland must fall immediately afterwards; for there is, in truth, nothing to prevent it. Indeed I think it probable they will previously detach twenty or thirty thousand men to take possession of it; for it is generally believed it may be easily accomplished.

What effect these events may produce in England it is difficult for me to say. That Austria, Prussia and Spain have been for some time past wearied with the war, and have wished to withdraw from it is certain. That they will withdraw from it soon is more than probable, and upon the best terms they can get. England, therefore, will have to maintain the contest alone; for Holland will be conquered and subject to the will of the conquerors. This, however, is not the only danger which impends over her. Denmark

Sweden,[1] offended at the unlawful restraints imposed by her on their trade, in the arbitrary rule of contraband, have for near three months past, united their fleet to the amount of about thirty sail, for the purpose of vindicating their rights; and Spain, equally unfriendly, and irritated with that power, has, I have reason to believe, serious thoughts, not only of abandoning the war but of acceding to this combination. The lapse of a few weeks, however, will, no doubt, unfold these subjects more fully to view.

I have the honor to be, dear Sir, with great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

JA[s] MONROE.

LIST OF CONSULS.

Mr. FENWICK, Consul[2]

Mr. CATHALAN, V. Consul

Mr. DOBREE, V. Consul,—arrested but released.

Mr. LAMOTTE, V. Consul,—arrested but released.

Mr. COFFYN, V. Consul, arrested but released.

Mr. CARPENTIER, Agent,—arrested but released.

P.S.—I likewise send you a copy of my application for the release of some persons, emigrating from England for America, taken in two of our vessels, and which I presume will experience the fate of the other question which depends on the Treaty.

[1] Monroe in publishing his *View* adds that "it is a fact that these powers considered themselves as forsaken by America." His belief in this respect was doubtless based on the understanding communicated to him by certain members of the Committee of Public Safety that the United States had declined some proposals made to it by Denmark and Sweden for joining their armed neutrality.

[2] Joseph Fenwick, of Maryland at Bordeaux; the Sieur Etienne Cathalan, the younger, of France at Marseilles; P. F. Dobree at Nantes; the Sieur de la Motte of France at Havre; Francis Coffyn at Dunkirk.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, October 18, 1794.

CITIZENS,—Upon the several subjects on which I addressed you on the 17th. Fructidor (September 3rd) viz, The embargo of Bordeaux; the supplies rendered to the government of St Domingo, and the departure by France from the 23rd and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce subsisting between the two Republics, I have but little to add at present. The two former were matters of account only, and could of course involve no topic for discussion between the committees and myself. I had only to ask for such dispatch in the adjustment and payment, as the exigence of the parties and the circumstances of the Republic would admit of. Nor shall I add anything upon the third point to change the principle upon which I rested it. The committee will therefore be pleased to decide upon each under the considerations which have already been urged.

I likewise stated in that note, generally the embarrassment under which our commerce laboured in the ports of the Republic. A general view was all I could then give: But the appointment of a consul for this city has since enabled me to obtain a more circumstantial and accurate statement on this head. This officer has already examined it with great attention and reported the result to me, a copy of which I now lay before you.[1] It presents to view a frightful

[1] Statement by Fulwar Skipwith of the embarrassments and difficulties of American commerce in France; spoliations, etc. *See American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, vol. i., pp. 749, 753, 757.

picture of difficulties and losses, equally injurious to both countries, and which if suffered to continue, will unavoidably interrupt, for the time, the commercial intercourse between them. I trust, therefore, the causes will be immediately removed, and suitable remedies adopted; and in this I am the more confident, because those which would be deemed adequate will not, in any degree, interfere with the internal police or regulations of the country.

I also suggested in my former note, that however necessary it might be for France to avail herself of Agents in America at the present crisis, for the purchase and shipment of supplies thence here, it should not be relied on as a principal resource. The more attention I have since paid to this subject, the better satisfied I have been of the justice of that remark. I have therefore, thought it my duty to add some further observations on it, and which I now beg leave to submit to your consideration in the annexed paper.

You will observe the consul has likewise comprised in his report the cases of many seamen and other persons, citizens of the United States, taken at sea or elsewhere, and who are now held as prisoners in confinement. I hope an order will be issued for their immediate enlargement; and as it is possible many others may be in like situation, that it may be made to comprehend all the citizens of the United States not charged with any criminal offence against the laws of France, and of which latter description I hope there are none. The committee will, I doubt not, designate such species of evidence necessary to estab-

lish the right of citizenship in doubtful cases, as it will be practicable for the parties to furnish.

Permit me to request an early decision upon these subjects, that I may immediately communicate it to our government. The Congress will commence its session in a few weeks, and it is the duty of the President to lay before that body, and at that time, the state of public affairs; comprising, as the most interesting particular, the conduct and disposition of other nations towards the United States. Information upon these points will of course be expected from me, and I should be mortified not to be able to give such as would be deemed satisfactory.

JAMES MONROE.

SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS to the note of the 3d. of September, upon the American Commerce.

That France will have occasion, whatever may be the crop for the present year, for supplies of provision from foreign countries for the next, is certain. These must be obtained from the neutral countries, and chiefly from the United States of America. It is important for her to ascertain how they shall be obtained, and brought into her ports with greatest certainty and least expense.

There are but two possible ways or modes by which these supplies or any others can be brought here, which are: First; by public exertion, or by agents in those countries, whose duty it is to purchase the articles in demand, and send them here on public

account: And secondly; by the enterprize of individuals. Both shall be partially examined.

First, as to the certainty; and which will depend upon prompt purchases, safe carriage and integrity of the agents.

As soon as agents arrive in America, it will be known to the commercial interest in every quarter. When ever they appoint sub-agents, this will likewise be known. When it is intended to make purchases and shipments, this will be known. The movement of vessels to take in cargoes will be observed. Immediately a combination will be formed among the merchants of the place, who will buy up the flour, &c. with a view of taking an advantage of the emergence, and this will raise the price and create delay. A monopoly naturally revolts the society against it, and this will add a new stimulus to the otherwise sufficiently active one of private interest, to speculate and prey upon these agents, and of course upon the embarrassments of their country.

But the purchase is finally made and shipped for France; the ships are at sea; the property belongs to France, and the ships though American, give no protection, by the antient law of nations, which is in force where not otherwise regulated by treaty, and of course with England. The cargo of every vessel which shall be taken will be condemned; and will not many be taken? The movements of this agency will be well known to the British administration, and it will be employed to counteract it in the purchase and upon the sea. It will be apprized of the ports

from whence shipments will be made, and have vessels of war stationed to seize them.

It is the nature of an agency to be at war with every other mode of supply. The amount of its profits will depend upon the exclusion of every other; for every cargo which shall arrive from another source, will take from it so much. It will, therefore, see with jealously the commencement of enterprizes of this kind, and deem each in the degree a robbery of its own resources. It will fear that not only the amount of its profits will be diminished, but that the funds upon which they are to be made, will be exhausted. It will, therefore, discourage there enterprises, by hinting that the Republic does not want them; that it has no money to pay for them; that the captains and supercargoes are ill-treated in France by delay. It will be the interest of the agency to crush every other mode of supply, and it will accomplish it, unless the wisest precautions are used to prevent it.

These latter observations apply to the motive of interest only, supposing the agency disposed to discharge the trust as faithfully as it could, making, at the same time, the greatest profit for itself and which would generally be done. But let it be supposed that it was capable of defrauding the public as much as possible, without being detected. In that case it would have additional motives for discouraging private adventurers; because as these would flock to the market and bid one against the other, they would keep the price at its proper level, and thus check its conduct, for if it charged more than they (allowing for the difference

of the Commission) it would of course be convicted of fraud, and if capable of fraud, other and numerous temptations to seduction might be counted. The chief agent would be known to the British administration. Suppose France in great distress for bread and without any other resource. The withholding it might bring on a crisis in her affairs, and which might terminate in an arrangement that would applaud the agent for his perfidy. Would he not be an object for the British administration to assail, and would it be proper that France and the French Revolution should be thus made dependant on agents in foreign countries.

As to the comparative expense there could be no question on that point. The commission itself would be no inconsiderable thing, in addition to which the freight will be increased; for if American vessels are employed, the owners will charge more on account of the hazard, than if there was none and which would be the case if the property was their own: Not to repeat the increased price which would be demanded by the agents in consequence of the combination among the merchants, to take advantage of circumstances which would be known to them; nor to suggest that, under any probable modification, it would be the interest of the agents to give the highest price possible.

Besides, funds must be raised somewhere to answer the drafts of these agents: Will it be in the seaports, in Paris, Hamburgh or some other neutral town? The former, as heretofore, will probably be in a great

measure declined; and if the latter is adopted, how will they be raised there? By the exportations of the productions or other commodities of the country; incurring thereby the expense of double commissions, storage, the hazard of the sea and of the enemy, together with the further inconvenience of overstocking the market, and raising at the same time, such town to grandeur, by making it the entrepot of French provisions, whilst her own were impoverished.

Every thing that has been said or can be said against a chief dependence on agencies, forms an argument in favour of encouraging the ordinary private trade by individuals and shews that the supply by that mode might be made more sure and cheap. If France would regulate things so that the parties bringing provisions into her ports were paid immediately and dispatched, she might command, if necessary, the whole produce of America. Nor would it be necessary that the payment be always in specie: On the contrary, return cargoes would more frequently be taken of productions, manufactures and of prize goods.

The above is a short sketch of the conveniences and inconveniences which attend the two modes of supply. The one which commences in a monopoly will be attended with all the inconveniences which belong to monopolies in general, greater expense, disgust to all parties affected by it, &c. &c. with others which are peculiar to it: For other monopolies of foreign trade, are confined to luxuries of little importance, and of countries whose citizens cannot send

them to market; whereas the present one is a monopoly of the necessaries of life in great demand here; to be obtained from countries whose citizens can best supply them, and at a crisis of affairs when the failure may hazard every thing valuable to France, and when of course it should be most avoided. Whilst on the other hand, the latter, which is a system of free trade, will not only be free from these objections, but enjoy some benefits which are peculiar to it. It will leave commerce in the hands of individuals and under the protection of the flags of both countries. If it was made known that France would protect the neutral commerce, the merchants would have a new encouragement to enterprize, and the neutral powers would be more decisive in vindicating their own rights. The French flag would be deemed the guardian of trade and the asserter of the freedom of the seas. The American merchants would behold it with pleasure, because they would find under its banner, not only the friendly welcome of their ally, but likewise a safety from the pirates of the ocean. If the demand in France was great, it would be known in the United States, whose merchants would immediately supply the demand. And if it was interrupted on the sea by the vessels of another power; what would be the obvious effect of such interruption? Might not France oppose it and conduct the vessels safe to her ports, and would it not rouse the nation injured to vindicate its rights and protect its own commerce?

Unhappily France has adopted a different policy towards us heretofore. Instead of encouraging indi-

viduals to supply her market, she has given them every possible discouragement which could be devised. Instead of protecting our commerce at sea, and leaving us to seek reparation for the injuries which were rendered us by other powers, she has rendered us like injuries and thus embarrassed our councils. But it is not too late to change this system of policy. The Americans have lamented it not more on their own account than that of France. It has, as yet, left no unkind impression behind it, and if the necessary regulations are made, commerce will soon resume its ordinary course.

I do not by this object to the plan of supplying by agency altogether: On the contrary, I deem it necessary, because I think it proper for France to avail herself at the present crisis of every resource within her reach. I only wish that it be not relied on as the sole one, and which it will certainly be if the wisest measures are not adopted at home, to encourage the ordinary private trade, and to restrict and otherwise guard against any misconduct in the agency abroad.

JA^{s} MONROE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF GENERAL SURETY.

PARIS, November 1st, 1794.

CITIZENS,—In all cases where the citizens of the United States commit themselves to the jurisdiction of the French Republic, it is their duty to obey the law, in consideration of the protection which it gives, or otherwise submit to its penalty. This principle is unquestionable; it belongs to the nature of sover-

eignty, it can never be separated from it. All that my countrymen thus circumstanced have a right to claim of me as their representative, is to see that they have justice rendered them, according to the nature of the charge, and their offence, if they have committed any, by the tribunals whose duty it is to take cognizance of it.

I hope that few cases will ever happen where the conduct of an American citizen will become the subject of discussion here before a criminal tribunal. In those cases which may happen, if any do, I shall repose entire confidence in the justice of the tribunal, being well satisfied, that if any bias existed in the bosom of the judge, it would be in favor of my countrymen. To hasten their trial before the judge, where one was deemed necessary is I am persuaded, the only point upon which I shall ever feel or express any solicitude.

I should not at the present crisis, call your attention to any case of the kind, if I were not impelled by considerations of peculiar weight. Considerations which I know you will respect; because every succeeding day more fully demonstrates how thoroughly the whole French nation is devoted to the cause which gave birth to them. The great efforts which it has already made and is now making in favor of the public liberty, sufficiently shows how highly it estimates that blessing, and gratitude to those who have served that cause is deemed by you inseparable from a veneration for the cause itself.

The citizens of the United States can never look

back to the æra of their own revolution, without remembering, with those of other distinguished Patriots, the name of Thomas Paine. The services which he rendered them in their struggle for liberty have made an impression of gratitude which will never be erased, whilst they continue to merit the character of a just and generous people. He is now in prison, languishing under a disease, and which must be increased by his confinement. Permit me then, to call your attention to his situation, and to require that you will hasten his trial in case there be any charge against him, and if there be none, that you will cause him to be set at liberty.[1] JAS. MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, November 7th, 1794.

SIR,—I have been favoured with yours of the 30th. July, original and duplicate, and had the pleasure to receive them unopened.

In my two last letters, which were of the 15th. September and 16th. October, I informed you of the several subjects which I had brought before the Committee of public safety, as also of the ill-success which had attended my efforts to obtain an answer upon any one; and I am sorry to be under the necessity now to add, that although I have pressed a decision with

[1] Paine was liberated by the Committee of General Surety in consequence of Monroe's assertion of his American citizenship, and demand for his release; but he had suffered an imprisonment of ten months and nine days before Monroe's generous and manly aid reached him. Monroe's attitude towards Paine is fully and admirably told in Conway's *Life of Thomas Paine*.

the utmost possible zeal, yet I have not been able to accomplish the object.

Being wearied with the delay, I notified to the committee soon after the date of my last letter to you, that I should be glad to confer with them, or some few members on the subject; provided it comported with their rules in such cases, and would otherwise be agreeable. The proposition was immediately assented to, and the evening of the same day appointed for the interview. I attended in their chamber; we had some discussion, and which ended in a request, on their part, that I would present in writing the sum of what I had said, or wished to say, either on the points depending, or any others I might find necessary to bring before them, and which I readily promised to do.

By this time I had obtained from Mr. Skipwith a comprehensive statement of the embarrassments attending our trade here; as well those which proceeded from the cruizers of the Republic, and applied to what was destined or cleared out for foreign countries, as those which proceeded from the commercial system of France and applied to the direct commerce between the two Republics. As his report to me specified not only each particular cause of complaint but likewise furnished facts to support them, I thought it best to make that report the basis of this my second communication on that head. I accordingly laid it before the committee with such comments as appeared to me suitable; and I now transmit to you a copy of it, that you may be apprized how fully the subject is

before them. I was assured that it exhibited a picture which shocked them ; for these evils, progressing with the course of their own affairs, were long accumulating, and had probably attained a height of which they had no conception.

As I had reason to suspect, that the chief opposition proceeded from those who conducted the public trade, and who were attached to that mode, from motives not the most patriotic, I thought it better to examine the question; whether it were best for the Republic to encourage the competition of individuals in neutral countries, for the supply of its markets, or depend on agencies employed in or sent to countries for that purpose. This subject had been incidentally touched in my first note; but I thought some benefit might be derived from a more thorough development of it. With this view I sent in at the same time, the paper entitled "Supplemental observations on the American Commerce."

I felt extremely embarrassed how to touch again their infringement of the treaty of commerce ; whether to call on them to execute it, or leave that question on the ground on which I had first placed it. You desired me in your last to contest with them the principle, but yet this did not amount to an instruction ; nor even convey your idea, that it would be advisable to *demand* of them the execution of those articles. Upon full consideration therefore I concluded that it was the most safe and sound policy to leave this point where it was before, and in which I was the more confirmed by some circumstances that

were afterwards disclosed. The day after this last communication was presented, I received a letter from the Committee assuring me, that the subject engrossed their entire attention, and that an answer should be given me as soon as possible; and a few days after this I was favoured with another, inviting me to a conference at 12, the next day. I attended and found only the three members of the diplomatic branch of the committee present, Merlin de Douay, Thuriot and Treilhard. Merlin commenced by observing that I had advised and pressed them to execute the 23rd and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce: that they were pursuaded their compliance would be useful to us, but very detrimental to them: It would likewise be distressing for Frenchmen to see British goods protected by our flag, whilst it gave no protection to theirs; and after making other comments, he finally came to this point: "Do you insist upon our executing the treaty?" I replied, I had nothing new to add to what I had already said on that subject. Treilhard seemed surprised at the reply, and expressed a wish that I would declare myself frankly on the subject. I told him I was surprised at his remark, since I had not only declared myself frankly but liberally. We then passed from the point of demand to a more general discussion of the policy in France to execute the Treaty, and in which I urged, that if she considered her own interest only, she ought not to hesitate, since it gave her the command of neutral bottoms, and under the protection of their own flag, to supply her wants; with other considera-

tions which had been before pressed in my notes that were before them. I was, however, brought back twice again to the question: "Do you insist upon or demand it?" I found that a positive and formal declaration on this point was the sole object of the interview; and as I perceived that something was intended to be founded on it, either now or hereafter, if given in the affirmative, I was the more resolved to avoid it, and to adhere to the ground I had already taken. I therefore repeated my declaration, and in the most explicit terms, that I was not instructed by the President to insist on it; that their compliance would certainly be highly beneficial to my country, but that in my observations I had considered the proposition merely in relation to France, and wished them to do the same, since I was satisfied that the true interest of France dictated the measure. They all expressed an attachment to us, spoke much of the difficulty of the situation, and of the peculiar delicacy in adapting, in the present state of the public mind, any measure which might be construed as eventually favouring England; and thus the conference ended.

In revolving the subject over since, I have been doubtful whether the solicitude shewn to draw from me a decisive answer to the question: "Whether I insisted, or demanded of them to execute the articles of the treaty," was merely intended as the basis of their own act, complying with it, and a justification for themselves in so doing, or as a ground to call on us hereafter, in the prosecution of the war against England, to fulfil the guarantee. I was, at the mo-

ment of the discussion in the committee, of the latter opinion; but I must confess, upon a more general view of all circumstances that have passed under my observation since my arrival, that I am at present inclined to be of the former. I rather think, as there is an opposition to the measure, and it would commence an important change in their system, and might also be construed into a partiality for England, (a nation by no means in favor here) that the dread of denunciation in the course of events suggested it. Be this as it may, I am perfectly satisfied it would be impolitic to demand it, since the refusal would weaken the connection between the two countries, and the compliance, upon that motive, might perhaps not only produce the same effect, but likewise excite a disposition to press us on other points, upon which it were better to avoid any discussion. I hope, however, soon to obtain an answer, and a favourable one. If the subject was before the Convention, in the same light it was before the Committee, I am convinced it would since have been the case: But it is difficult to get it there; for if I carried it there myself, it would be deemed a kind of denunciation of the committee. Yesterday there was a change of several of the members of that body, and which I deem, from my knowledge of those elected, favourable to our views. Be assured that I shall continue to press this business with all suitable energy; and in the mode that shall appear to me most eligible; and in the interim that I will do everything in my power to prevent abuses under the existing system.

Upon the subject of the fifteen thousand dollars, advanced for the emigrants from S[t] Domingo, I have made no formal demand, because I wished the other points, which were depending, settled first; from an apprehension that if they granted several little matters it would fortify them in a different position to reject those that were important. I have, however, conferred informally upon it, and have no doubt it will be peremptorily allowed. I think, therefore, this should be calculated on by the department of the treasury. I shall certainly bring it before them shortly, as I shall immediately the affair of the Consul in the Isle of France, upon which latter point, however, permit me respectfully to add, that the appointment of a person, not an American, perhaps an Englishman, to the office of Consul, has not only been the cause of the disrespect shewn to our authority, but even of the embarrassments to which our countrymen were exposed there.[1]

With respect to the business with Algiers, I have not known how to act. It will be difficult for France, in the present state of affairs, to support the measures of our resident in Portugal, or for them to concert any plan of co-operation. It seems, however, in every

[1] Wm. Macarty was United States Consul in the Isle of France (Mauritius). He was in business there but was an American citizen, born in Connecticut. The circumstances which gave rise to the Secretary of States' instructions to Monroe were serious and important. The strongest prejudices existed against us; our merchantmen were seized, their cargoes confiscated and the masters and seamen continually molested and imprisoned with no pretence of legal proceedings, and on the ground usually that they were Englishmen or had English goods on board. In short it appeared that Americans were outrageously treated, our flag fired upon and no attention paid to the representations of our Consul, whose stores were sealed up and keys seized.

view, proper to rid ourselves of the person in Switzerland[1] who I understand has been in readiness to prosecute the business for some time past. I have, in consequence, written him a letter in conformity to your idea, of which I inclose you a copy, and which I presume, he will consider as a respectful discharge.[1] I am inclined to think France will co-operate with us upon this point, and if any plan can be adopted by which she may forward the measure of Colonel Humphreys, I will endeavour to avail him of it. But certainly if it is expected that her aid will be efficacious, or that she will embark with zeal in the business, the whole should be concerted and executed from this quarter. Perhaps as I have heard nothing from Colonel Humphreys, the business is now done, or he is pursuing it without calculating upon any aid from France. A letter which was presented me by Mr. Cathalan, our Consul at Marseilles (and who is now here, as are Mr. Fenwick, Dobrée and Coffyn, a son of Mr. Coffyn, Consul, and who came here to represent his father,) from Captain O'Brien, and which I now inclose, will shew you the state of the business in August last. Be assured I shall be happy to render my country any service in this distressing business, in my power, even by visiting Algiers if it were necessary.[2]

I have enquired into the character of our Consuls at the several forts: I mean those who are Frenchmen; for Mr. Fenwick is well known, viz., La Motte

[1] Le Ray du Chaumont. See page 68, ante.

[2] See *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 117, 119, 129, 416, 417, 419.

at Havre; Dobrée at Nantes: Coffyn at Dunkirk and Cathalan at Marseilles, and find them likewise all men of understanding and of excellent reputation, attached to our country and grateful for the confidence reposed in them. If displaced, it will subject them to some censure: I do not, therefore, wish it, though I most earnestly advise that in future none but Americans be appointed.

I was extremely concerned, upon my arrival here, to find that our countryman Mr. Paine, as likewise Madame La Fayette were in prison; the former of whom had been confined near nine months and the latter about two. I was immediately entreated by both to endeavour to obtain their enlargement. I assured them of the interest which America had in their welfare; of the regard entertained for them by the President, and of the pleasure with which I should embrace every opportunity to serve them; but observed at the same time that they must be sensible it would be difficult for me to take any step officially, in behalf of either, and altogether impossible in behalf of Madame La Fayette. This was admitted by her friend, who assured me, her only wish was that I would have her situation in view, and render her, informally, what services I might be able, without compromitting the credit of our government with this. I assured him she might confide in this with certainty, and further, that in case any extremity was threatened, that I would go beyond that line and do everything in my power, let the consequence be what it might to myself to save her; with this he

was satisfied. She still continues confined, nor do I think it probable she will be soon released. I have assured her that I would supply her with money and with whatever she wanted; but as yet, none has been accepted, though I think she will soon be compelled to avail herself of this resource.

The case was different with Mr. Paine. He was actually a citizen of the United States, and of the United States only; for the revolution, which parted us from Great Britain, broke the allegiance, which was before due to the crown, of all those who took our side. He was, of course, not a British subject, nor was he strictly a citizen of France; for he came by invitation, for the temporary purpose of assisting in the formation of their government only, and meant to withdraw to America when that should be completed: And what confirms this, is the act of convention itself arresting him, by which he is declared to be a foreigner. Mr. Paine pressed my interference. I told him I had hopes of getting him enlarged without it; but if I did interfere, it could only be by requesting that he be tried in case there was any charge against him, and liberated in case there was none. This was admitted. His correspondence with me is lengthy and interesting, and I may probably be able hereafter to send you a copy of it. After some time had elapsed without producing any change in his favour, as he was pressing and in ill health, I finally resolved to address the Committee of general surety in his behalf, resting my application on the above principle. My letter was delivered

by my secretary, in the Committee to the President, who assured him he would Communicate its contents immediately to the Committee of public safety and give me an answer as soon as possible. The conference took place accordingly between the two Committees and as I presume, on that night, or the succeeding day; for on the morning of the day after, which was yesterday, I was presented by the Secretary of the Committee of general surety, with an order for his enlargement. I forwarded it immediately to the Luxembourg and had it carried into effect, and have the pleasure now to add that he is not only restored to the enjoyment of his liberty, but in good spirits. I send you a copy of my letter to the Committee of general surety, and of their reply.

Since my last the French have taken Coblentz, and some other post in its neighborhood; they have likewise taken Pampeluna, and broken the whole of the Spanish line through a considerable extent of country. About twenty standards, taken from the routed Spaniards, were presented to the Convention a few days past.

I likewise send in the enclosed papers, a decree respecting the Jacobins by which all correspondence between the different societies is prohibited, as likewise is the presenting a petition to the Convention in their character as such, with some other restraints I do not at present recollect.

With great respect and esteem, I am, Dear Sir, your most obt & very Humble Servant,

Jas Monroe.

TO COLONEL DAVID HUMPHREYS.[1]

PARIS, November 11, 1794.

SIR,—I have lately received a letter from the Secretary of State, mentioning that the power to treat with the regency of Algiers was committed to you, and that the aid of this Republic, if attainable, must be thrown into that line. I was likewise apprised by Mr. Morris of some measures taken by him in concert with the government here, relative to that object, but which were unconnected with you. As I have reason to think you possess powers flowing from the last session of Congress, I think it possible you have already progressed in the business, and therefore that the aid of this government will be useless. But if you have not how shall a cooperation be concerted, supposing this government disposed to enter into it? Will it not be neceseary for you to come into some part of France and depart thence with some agent from her? Your thoughts upon this head will be useful; but until I know the state of the business in your hands, it will be useless and improper for me to occupy the councils of this Republic on the subject. I therefore hope to hear from you on it as soon as possible.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, November 13, 1794.

CITIZENS,—I received some weeks past, a letter from Mr. Gardoqui, minister of the Spanish finances, inclosing one to my care for Mr. Otto, then in the de-

[1] Our Minister at Lisbon when commissioned, March 21, 1793, Commissioner Plenipotentiary to Algiers.

partment of foreign affairs, requesting me to present it to him. As I did not wish to be the channel of communication from Mr. Gardoqui to any citizen of France, whatever might be its object, and whether of a private or public nature, I resolved, neither to deliver the letter, nor give an answer for the time, to that which was addressed to me. And I was the more inclined to this, from the persuasion that, if of a private nature, the delay could be of no great importance, and, if of a public one, and especially upon an interesting subject, that when it was found I attended only to the concerns of my own country, and did not chuse to interfere in those of Spain, that he would take some course more direct for the attainment of the object in view. As some weeks had now elapsed, I took it for granted, that this was the case. In this, however, I have been disappointed; for I was favored within a few days past with a second letter from Mr. Gardoqui, in which he enters more fully into the object of the first communication. Finding, therefore, that he still addressed himself to me, notwithstanding the discouragement already given, I deemed it necessary, not only to examine more attentively the object of this communication, but likewise to adopt, definitively, some plan in regard to it. Nor had I much difficulty in either respect; for when I recollected that he was a minister of Spain, and observed that his letters, as well as that to Mr. Otto, and which I have since examined, as those to me, expressed only a wish to be admitted within the government of France, to atten-

[illegible]ths, I could not but conclude, that this w[illegible]

the ostensible motive whilst some other in reality existed. And in this I am the more confirmed from a recollection of the relation in which Mr. Gardoqui and myself formerly stood in America to each other, and which on account of my strong opposition in the Congress to his proposition for secluding the Mississippi, was not the most amicable one. From that consideration, I do not think he would solicit a correspondence with me for a trifling object. What other then must be the motive? In my judgment there can be none other than the hope of thereby opening the door for the commencement of a negotiation for peace, and that the Spanish Court has availed itself of this mode of making that wish known to you.

Presuming then that this was in truth the object, it remained for me only to decide what course I should take in regard to Mr. Gardoqui's communications; nor could I hesitate long upon this point; for I well knew it was of importance to you to become acquainted with the disposition of other powers towards the French Republic. I have therefore deemed it consistent with the sincere friendship which the United States bears towards you, and the interest they take as your ally in whatever concerns your welfare, as well as with that candour which I mean to observe in all my transactions, to lay the letters before you; knowing their contents you will be enabled to determine how to act in regard to them. As it respects the United States whom I serve, or myself personally, it can be of no importance to me to be acquainted with the result; since I doubt not, that un-

der the wise councils of the Republic, the revolution will progress to a happy close: But permit me to assure you, that if I can be of any service to the French Republic, in regard to the answer to be given to this communication, it will give me the highest satisfaction to render it.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

PARIS, Nov. 19, 1794.

DEAR SIR,—I had the pleasure some weeks past to receive your favor of the 25 of June and should have answered it sooner, had any safe private opportunity offered for Bordeaux, from whence vessels most frequently sail for America. I called the evening after its receipt on Mr. Morris & put your letter for him into his hands so that he rec'd it unopened. He left this about the beginning of Oct'r for Switzerland, from whence I understood he would probably proceed to Engl'd. His first intention was to have sailed from Havre to America, but this was afterwards declined and the latter rout preferred. As there was some delay in obtaining his passport & which gave him displeasure, and as I disliked from motives of delicacy to him to mention it in an official dispatch, I take the liberty to communicate it to you. Some weeks after my arrival, he intimated to me, that as it would take some time to pack up his baggage and he should in the interim be idle, he wished me to procure for him a passport from the Committee for the seat of John James Rosseau in Switzerland where he wo'd stay

that time & return to take his departure. I did so. It was in reply suggested to me that he might choose his rout to leave France, but that they did not like to permit him to go into Switzerland, where the emigrants (his connections) were & return back into the Republick: that indeed they were surprised he had made such a request. I was asked would I take the measure on myself, and in case any censure attended it, be responsible to the publick opinion? To this I replied that I had shown Mr. Morris my letter submitting it to the Committee, and that it would be more agreeable to him as well as myself should it proceed from them. Thus the matter rested for some time; finally as Mr. Morris pressed for a passport and complained much of the delay, and which I knew proceeded solely from an objection to his return, a circumstance I did not wish to mention to him, I found it indispensably necessary to send Mr. Skipwith explicitly to ask whether he was anxious upon that point. He had suspected this difficulty before and immediately agreed to abandon the idea. The form of the passport then became a question. It was notified to him that if he would take one from me, viséed by the Commissary of foreign aff'rs, what depended on them sho'd be performed immediately. But he wished one from the Committee or the gov't independently of me: the latter being the ordinary mode in the case of private citizens, merchants & others travelling thro' France. I was of opinion this sho'd be granted him & said so to the Commissary. I was equally so that the other mode sho'd have been

quietly accepted by him, or in other words that neither party should have made an object of the mode. I think it was Mr. Morris's expectation I should demand a passport in the form desired by him & risque whatever consequences might result from it; he did not ask this of me but it was to be inferred from what I heard him say on the subject. I was, however, resolved to embark in no such discussion and especially upon a point so unimportant in itself. The passport was of course granted by me & certified by the Commissary in the usual course, and under whose protection he has safely passed beyond the bounds of the Republick. I do not know that this incident will ever reach you thro' any other channel but as it possibly may, I have thought proper to state it to you correctly & according to my own knowledge.

The successes of this Republick have been most astonishingly great in every quarter. In my letter to the Sec'y of State I have detailed the many victories gained and posts taken up to the 7th of this month: since which Mæstricht has fall'n with ab't 300 cannon & 8 or 10,000 troops: for a considerable time past the combin'd powers have been able only to retard the progress of the French by defending posts; for ever since the battle of Fleury they have avoided, except where not to be avoided, a general action. And every post w'h the French have sat down before, has yielded sooner than was expected. At present there appears to be nothing to impede their march to Amsterdam if they incline & of which there can be no doubt. 'Tis said the Prince of Orange has requested

of the States General to overflow the country, & which is opposed & will probably be rejected. If the people rise & change the gov't they will be treated with as a free people, and I am inclined to think no treaty will otherwise be made with them. In Spain their success has been equally great: great part of that country has been overrun and in truth it appears to me to be within their power, even to march to Madrid if it was their wish. 'Tis said that a treaty has already been made with Prussia, but this I do not credit, not because it is not attainable for I am convinc'd it is, but because I do not think the Committee wo'd form a treaty without some hint of it to the Convention, & indeed their approbation. Spain and Austria both want peace & will I doubt not soon make one: and that Engl'd likewise wants it there can be no doubt. In short it appears to me unquestionable that France can command a peace from every power & upon her own terms. Engl'd alone can at present hesitate or talk of terms, and this she is enabled to do only by her fleet which may secure her from invasion: but I am inclined to think a storm is gathering over her more dangerous than any she has yet known: for I have reason to believe that Denmark and Sweden are ready to fall on her, and that Spain will be compelled to purchase her peace with France by uniting in a similar operation. A curious incident relative to this latter power has lately come to my knowledge, and which from the delicacy of the subject—I shall put in cypher to the Sec'y of State, by which you will perceive how critically we

are circumstanced in respect to that power, if she sho'd close with France upon terms of neutrality, being at liberty to unite with England in case of such an event in hostility against us.

Every consideration of expedience invites us in my judgment to a close union with our ally: and believe me I have done all in my power to promote this object. But I have had to contend with many difficulties of a serious nature & which still embarrass me to a certain degree. These I cannot hazard otherwise than in cypher tho' I would with pleasure, did I know that my letter would reach you unopened, speak more confidentially than I can do in an official despatch. A new minister will leave this for America in a few days: I think the change a fortunate event, for I am persuaded the successor will see cause to doubt many of the communications heretofore given. I am told the successor is a cool, well-disposed & sensible man. Within a few days past Nimeughen has also been taken, the hall of the Jacobin society shut up by the Convention, & two members appointed by the Committee by consent of the Convention, whose names & offices are unknown—some say the object is to treat with Prussia, Spain or the States Gen'l, or rather to accompany the army with power to treat with the people in case they rise—others say 'tis to treat with Denmark & Sweden, whose agents are said to be incog: in town. Certain, however, it is the Committee asked for permission to appoint such persons under such circumstances & that it was granted.

I found myself plac'd here as you will readily con-

ceive upon a theatre new & very difficult to act on. And what has encreased my embarrassment has been the ignorance of the disposition of Engl'd towards us as well as of the U. States towards her. I have also been destitute of all kind of council except Mr. Skipwith, & some is necessary in every situation. I have, however, acted as well as my judgment could dictate & I hope to y'rs & the satisfaction of my Countrymen in general. With great respect & esteem I am, Dear Sir, y'r most obt. & very, humble servant

JA^{S}. MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

PARIS, November 20th, 1794.

SIR,—I was favored about five weeks past with a letter from Mr. Gardoqui, minister of finance in Spain, inclosing one for Mr. Otto formerly in America, and at present Chief of a Bureau in the department of foreign affairs; mentioning the decline of his health, and requesting my cooperation with Mr. Otto, in soliciting of this government, permission for him to visit certain baths within the Republic. This application surprized me. The season I knew was too far advanced for him to derive any benefit from the waters, and I was not apprized that those suggested were better than others within his reach: Besides Mr. Gardoqui and myself were, in consequence of a collision on the much litigated question of the Mississippi, not on the best terms while in America; certainly not on such as to authorize an application of this

kind to me. The disguise was therefore too thin to hide from me the true object; I immediately inferred that it was the body politic of Spain that was disordered, and not the animal one of Mr. Gardoqui. As I did not wish to become the instrument of Spain in this business, or incur the slightest suspicion of the kind, since I well knew it would benefit Spain at the expense of the United States. I declined delivering his letter to Mr. Otto, or answering, for the time, that of Mr. Gardoqui to me.

About three weeks afterwards I received a second letter, which confirmed me in the opinion first taken up, that the object was to open the door, through me, to the commencement of a negociation for peace. I found, therefore, that it became my duty to take some step in regard to this business, and was, in consequence, resolved to shape my course in such manner as to make the incident, if possible, productive of some good to the United States, if of none to Spain.

When I reflected that we had interfering claims with Spain, as well in respect to boundaries as the Mississippi; and that we had a minister there negociating upon those points; that the negociation was closed without a satisfactory adjustment, and that Spain was probably in concert with England, exciting the Indians against us, I was from these considerations inclined to deem this movement of Mr. Gardoqui an insidious one. I was the more so from the further consideration that he had made this application to me without the knowledge of Mr. Short; through whom it ought to have been made, had the proposi-

tion been a candid one, and founded on any claim of Spain upon the United States. I was therefore the more resolved to suffer myself to be restrained by no unnecessary and false motives of delicacy towards Mr. Gardoqui, in the manner in which I should treat the subject.[1]

I was persuaded that a peace between France and Spain, at the present moment, whilst our claims were unsettled, must be prejudicial to the United States. Such a peace would free Spain from a pressure which at present shakes her monarchy to the foundation. By continuing the war, it enables the United States in case they should take decisive measures to do what they please with that power. For it is not reasonable to suppose, when the French troops are over-running a great part of Spain, and her whole force is exerted for her protection at Rome, that she would be able to make a respectable opposition to any effort we might make on the other side the Atlantic. But a peace with France would remove such pressure, and leave the Spanish government at liberty to act with its whole force against us.

I was likewise persuaded it was the interest of France to have our accommodation in view, and to give her aid in forwarding our arrangement with Spain at the same time that she adjusted her own; for if she should close a peace with that power whereby she left it at liberty to act against us singly, or jointly with England, in case of a war with the latter,

[1] Monroe's conduct in this was approved by the Administration as evincing his "judgment and assiduity."

she would not only expose us to great and unnecesary detriment, but likewise hazard the probability of being drawn into it again, in case it should take an adverse course in regard to us.

Upon full consideration of all these circumstances, I thought it best to lay the letters of Mr. Gardoqui before the Committee, with my free comments upon them. I did so and told them explicitly that, in my opinion, it was the wish of the Spanish Court to commence a negociation and that it had addressed itself through me, to inspire a distrust in me by creating a belief that the United States were more friendly to Spain and Britain than to France. I explained fully our situation with both those powers, assuring them that we were threatened with a war from both. I also mentioned the indelicacy and artifice of Mr. Gardoqui, in applying to me without the knowledge of our minister at that court; and resting it upon a ground of ancient friendship, which never existed to any great degree. I assured them at the same time, that if I could be of any service in forwarding their wishes in regard to peace, in the present or any other instance, it was the wish of the United States I should be, and would personally give me great pleasure to render it. I intimated also the danger which would attend a peace between the Republic and Spain, unless our differences should be compromised at the same time. The communication was well received, and the business terminated in an arrangement by which I was to answer Mr. Gardoqui's letters, declining any agency in the business myself; advising him,

at the same time, to make his application directly (in case he continued indisposed) to the committee, and from whom I was persuaded, he would obtain a satisfactory answer. This was accordingly done in a letter which was forwarded about five days past.

In the close of this affair I was invited by the diplomatic members of the committee of public safety, to a conference upon a new topic. I was informed it was their intention to press the war against England in particular; but that they were distressed for funds, and was asked, could any aid be obtained from the United States? I told them I was satisfied if it was in their power, it would be rendered; that I possessed no power on the subject, and could only advise of the probability &c., that, with their permission, I would put on paper such ideas as occurred to me in respect to that point, and upon which I would more fully confer. This incident furnished me with a new opportunity of pressing more forcibly the propriety of their securing for us the points in discussion with England and Spain, at the time their own peace should be made with those powers. I send you a copy of the paper delivered to them to-day and to which I have as yet received no answer.

Whether France will make any arrangement upon this point with us, I cannot tell. When I mentioned in the committee the danger which menaced us, of a war with Britain and Spain, I asked what reliance we might have on France in such an event. I was answered they should consider ours as their own cause. No other arrangement can well be made than that of

lending money to France, if in our power; it being understood that she will secure at the time of her own peace, the complete recognition of our rights from Britain and Spain, and which she may easily do in my judgment, and without prolonging the war a moment on that account.

On the other hand if the United States ever mean to assert those rights, the present is of all others, the most suitable moment. The Fortune of France has risen to the utmost height of splendor; whilst that of her enemies has declined to the lowest state of depression. Her armies are everywhere triumphant, whilst theirs are everywhere routed and broken. Spain makes no head against her; but in trying as already shewn, to steal a peace in obscurity. And Britain is perhaps in nearly as bad a situation. Maestricht has lately surrendered; whereby eight thousand troops were yielded with about three hundred pieces of cannon, two hundred and fifty-seven of which were brass; with other warlike stores and in great abundance. Nimeguen was likewise taken a few days afterwards, with considerable amount in stores; and, it is said, that commotions are taking place in five of the provinces, who have formally resolved to dismiss the Stadtholder; reform the government by the Republican standard, and ally with France. This must be felt in England and will probably excite disturbance there. In any event it will produce such effect, that if America strikes the blow her own interest dictates, and which every other consideration prompts, it must be decisive, and if not ruinous to the fortunes of that proud and insolent

nation, it will certainly secure us the objects we have in view.

If I hear further from the committee about the proposition for a loan, &c., I will advise you of it by the French minister who leaves this in about five days. By the paper which I send you will understand how far the point has been discussed, of the propriety of France to support our claims against Britain and Spain; the opportunity for which was furnished by my friend Mr. Gardoqui, and you will soon be able to ascertain from the minister, what his powers on that head are.

Within a few days past, two deputies were appointed by the committee of public safety, by consent of the convention to some important trust, but whose names and office were unknown. It is supposed they are commissioned to treat on peace with some one of the powers, and which is most probable; but with which of the powers or whether this is the object are only matters of conjecture.

I apprized you in a late letter that I had written to Colonel Humphreys, and was endeavoring to concert with him, if possible, the mode by which the aid of this government, if disposed to grant it (and which I presume to be the case), may be given him in the negociation with Algiers. As yet, I have not heard from him. As soon as I do, provided I find it necessary, I will apply for the support contemplated. Previous to this it will be improper. Touching this subject, I send you a proposition from the govern. ment of Malta, presented by its *chargé d' affaires* here, to be forwarded for your consideration. You

will give me for that government such answer as shall be deemed suitable.

Within a few days past, the hall of the Jacobins was shut up by order of the Convention. That body was constantly at work to undermine and impair the regular and constituted authority of the government. Moderate measures to check its enormities were found only a stimulus to greater excesses. This last step was therefore taken, and there is reason to fear its dispersed members will still continue to provoke by some rash measure, the indignation of the Convention to such a height, as to bring upon them a degree of severity it were better to avoid. Within a few days past also, the commission to whom was referred the charge against Carrier, formerly representative at Nantes, has reported there was ground for accusation; and today, it is believed, the Convention will approve the report and consign him over to the Revolutionary tribunal, who will, with equal certainty and with the general plaudit of the nation doom him to the guillotine.

With great respect and esteem I am,
Dear Sir,
Sincerely Yours
Jas Monroe.

Observations Submitted to the Consideration of the Diplomatic Members of the Committee of Public Safety.

It is the wish of the French Republic to obtain by loan, a sum of money from the United States of America, to enable it to prosecute the war.

This is to be expected from three sources; the general government, the State governments and from individuals.

The French cause and the French nation are greatly regarded in America, and I am persuaded some money may be obtained, and perhaps a very respectable sum, from the three sources above mentioned. For this purpose the Minister should possess power to make loans from either of the above parties and to give such security as the Republic shall deem suitable.

The committee, however, should advert to the situation of the United States in regard to England and Spain. Both those countries have encroached upon our rights; the one holding the western posts, in violation of the treaty of peace of 1783, whereby she harrasses our frontiers, by means of the Indians; and the other by shutting the Mississippi and likewise exciting the Indians against us to the south: So that the United States are in a kind of hostility with both powers. There is likewise reason to believe that a Convention subsists between Britain and Spain, defensive and probably offensive against us, in support of their respective claims.

In this situation would it be proper for France to make peace with either of those powers, whilst our claims were unsettled with either, and whilst both encroach on our territory? Would it not leave those powers free to attack us united, and, in that situation would not France be forced again to embark in the war or tamely look on and see our dismemberment? Could the Republic in short deem its own peace se-

cure or durable whilst these points remained unsettled between the United States and those powers and should it not therefore seek an adjustment of the whole at the same time?

I have suggested these considerations in the hope that the Committee will give the Minister about to depart for America, full power in relation thereto, and in the confidence that a satisfactory assurance on that head would greatly facilitate the object of the loan; for if the United States were assured that they would have no occasion for their own resources to support a war against those powers, it would of course be more in their power to lend them to the French Republic.

It must be obvious that France may not only secure these points for us and without any difficulty, but with Spain whatever else she pleased; for I am persuaded that the Spanish monarchy would even agree to open the islands to the world and perhaps even South America to end a war which endangers the crown itself.

The mode would be by insinuating to both those powers, when France commenced her negociation, that they must also adjust at the same time their differences with the United States.

The sum which might be raised in America from the different sources above mentioned, upon an assurance of this kind, would, in my judgment be considerable. In any event, however, I shall be happy to give the Minister about to depart every information and aid in my power, in forwarding the object in view.

I submit to you however whether it would not be proper to enable me in my letters on that subject, to declare what your sense is upon these points.

TO DON DIEGO DE GARDOQUI.

PARIS.[1]

I have been favored with your two letters lately, and can assure you that the pleasure I should otherwise have derived from a renewal of our former acquaintance was sensibly diminished by the information they contained of the decline of your health: And I am sorry to add that considerations of peculiar delicacy render it impossible for me to take that part, in the means necessary in your judgment for its restoration, you have been pleased to desire. You will naturally infer what these are, without my entering into them, and ascribe to these, and these only, my not aiding you in that request. I beg of you however to make your application to the committee of public safety, directly, and from whom I doubt not you will readily obtain an answer, which will be satisfactory to you; for I am well convinced that the circumstances of the existing war will form no obstacle to your admission into the country, upon an occasion so interesting to yourself. Be assured if the officer your friend, whom you speak of, falls within my reach, I will be happy to render him any service in my power being well satisfied of his merit from your recommendation.

[1] From Record Book, no date.

FROM THE CHARGÉ D' AFFAIRES OF MALTA.

[MR. CIBON.]

The Chargé d' Affaires of Malta, has the honour to communicate to Mr. Monroe, Minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, the *annexed reflections*, and to request that he will be pleased to weigh them in his mind, and give him frankly the result.

Mr. Cibon seizes this occasion to renew to Mr. Monroe an assurance of the respect and attachment with which he is, &c.

If there are nations who by their position, their industry, and their courage, become naturally opposed to, and rivals of each other; so there are other nations who with as much courage and industry, feel a motive to esteem, approach and unite together, to increase their mutual prosperity, and to render themselves reciprocally happy by a continual exchange of attentions, regards and services.

The United States of America and the Island of Malta, notwithstanding the distance which separates them, do not appear to be less bound to cultivate a close and friendly union between them, by motives of interest, than they are by those of a benevolent amity.

It is principally towards the Mediterranean that the American sailors, guided by their industry, present themselves in great numbers, forgetting the danger to which they are exposed of becoming a prey to the Algerine corsairs who cover that sea.

The Island of Malta, placed in the centre of the Mediterranean, between Africa and Sicily, offers by its position to all navigators, an asylum, provisions and succour of every kind. Of what importance would it not be for the American commerce to find upon this stormy sea, fine ports, provisions, and even protection against the Algerine pirates.

In exchange for the succours and protection, by means whereof

the American vessels might navigate the Mediterranean freely and without inquietude, would the United States consent to grant, in full right, to the order of Malta some lands in America, in such quantity as might be agreed on between the two governments, placing such lands under the immediate protection and safeguard of the American loyalty?

Thus the commerce of the United States would find in the Mediterranean ports to secure it from storms, and vessels of war to protect it against the pirates of Algiers; in exchange for which Malta would posses in America property granted forever, protected by the United States, and guaranteed by them in a manner the most solid.[1]

TO THE CHARGÉ D' AFFAIRES OF MALTA.

PARIS, 22d November, 1794.

CITIZEN,—I have received with great pleasure the considerations you were pleased to present to me; pointing out the mode by which the United States of America and the Isle of Malta may be serviceable to each other. It is the duty of nations to cultivate, by every means in their power, these relations subsisting between them, which admit of reciprocal good offices, and I am persuaded the United States will omit no opportunity which may occur to testify that disposition towards the Island of Malta.

The Americans have, it is true, received already

[1] The Knights of Malta possessed considerable estates in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany conferred on them by pious Catholics to enable them to protect Christians going to the holy places. The property of the Order was sufficient to maintain a considerable naval force but the Knights took no pains to form one; they had but two or three old frigates and a few galleys, which went to give and receive entertainments in the ports of Italy.—THIERS.

great injury from the Algerines, and it is their intention to adopt such measures as shall prevent the like in future. The Island of Malta by its situation and maritime strength possess the means of yielding that protection, and your suggestion on that subject merits, in my opinion, the serious consideration of our government, to whom I have already transmitted it.

The United States possess at present extensive and very valuable territory. It is their intention to dispose of it by sale: by which however the right of soil only will be conveyed: the jurisdiction still remaining with them. The government too of such territory is already prescribed: It must be elective or republican, and forming a part of the existing national system. I have thought proper to add this information that you may know the powers of our government in relation to this object. Permit me to assure you, that as soon as I shall be instructed thereon, I will immediately communicate the same to you.[1]

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Nov. 10, 1794.[2]

DEAR SIR.—By not hearing from you before this I conclude I shall not until after you shall have commenc'd the session in Phila. Indeed I calculate upon

[1] I am unable to find that Monroe received any instructions in this proposed "alliance." About this time the agitation in connection with the attitude of France toward the Jay treaty fermented the entire attention of the administration.

[2] Madison's indorsement on this letter is that it was "opened at Halifax and thence forwarded in that state."

hearing at the same time from Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Jones, for surely they will not decline writing by you to be forwarded thence with your communications. I therefore wait the lapse of sufficient time to bring y'r letters here with that kind of patience which arises from a conviction I shall not get them sooner. You will I presume be able at the same time to give me a good idea of the prospect before you, and which I conclude has become more decisively settled, in regard to the European powers, than when I left you; for surely the publick mind has before this expressed itself, in this respect, with such a degree of force, as to have left no alternative to the representative.

I gave you in my last, w'h contained several sheets, a detail of the incidents up to that date, with respect to the general state of affr's here as well as of those which more particularly regarded myself. The interval between that & the present time, presents to view a series of events favorable to France, both in her internal & external operations. The fall of Robespierre bequeathed to the convention the remnant of a controversy, whose fortune seemed to be marked by that event. The issue at stake with him was, whether the party of the mountain and which was in truth always the minority in the convention, or in other words the Jacobins whose principal member consisted of that party connected with the military force & commune of the city (who were likewise all of that society) sho'd by means of terror, for as they had the force of the city in their hands, they could at pleasure & legally put it in motion, or the majority in the con-

vention sho'd govern France. His fate settled the point in that respect, but yet it did not give entire repose to the country. As only the principal members oft he party were cut off, it was natural that those who were left sho'd still be disquieted, it was likewise natural that many of those in the preponderating party, should be well disposed in gratification of private revenge, to pursue the advantage they had gained and endeavor to exterpate all their enemies. I am happy, however, to assure you that no event has taken place which in any respect discredits the councils of the country; on the contrary I infer from what has passed the happiest results for the future. The mountain party in convention & more especially in the Jacobin society have done much to provoke the indignation of the convention, but the indignation of the publick mind has constantly pervaded that of that body, if indeed it can be said to have shewn any. It has in no instance taken any step which was not previously maked out & called for by the publick voice. In the extremities of this society, which was exciting by all kinds of practices, commotions thro' the country, it at length yielded to solicitations from many quarters to shut its door in Paris; and to similar solicitations & denunciations from every quarter, it has likewise yielded, after solemn discussion, & in the most formal manner, one of its members, to trial before the revolutionary tribunal, one Carriere, a man infamous for every possible vice & enormity and which were perpetrated in his mission to Nantes.

There was a strong disposition in the preponderat-

ing party not to proceed to this extremity ag'nst the Jacobins of Paris, from the apprehension it might be deemed an encroachment upon the essential rights of men, establishing in that respect a dangerous precedent, but as it was in truth in a state of rebellion ag'nst the convention, and it was manifest that if it prevailed the representative body would be annihilated, and complete disorder ensue, there seemed to be a necessity for that body to adopt a remedy commensurate with the evil. None would be so but that of shutting up their door and which was accordingly done, and since which things have remained in a state of tranquillity.

Whether any other members of the late dominant party will be executed, for I take it for granted Carriere will be, is in my opinion doubtful. If any have committed enormities in their missions thro' the country like him, they certainly ought to be. There was obviously a belief existing generally upon my arrival, that some of the old Committee of p : safety merited the fate of Robespiere, but it was equally obvious that a majority were of opinion that it were best to cultivate the esteem of the world, by sheathing the sword of justice & suffering even villains to escape. I was therefore persuaded it would be practicable to suspend the guillotin at that point, yielding it only to such men as Carriere, and whose punishment would tend to retrieve the injured fame of France, and form a bright ornament in the character of the present party ; and subsequent events have convinc'd me that this was then practicable : perhaps it is still so : but

the members of the late dominant party have lately committed several capital blunders, and put in hazard their own safety when it might otherwise have been avoided. It was certain that the safety of these members depended upon the magnanimity, the benevolence and the patriotism of the majority of the present reigning party. To these virtues, therefore, sho'd the app'l have been made, nor sho'd any step have been taken to diminish the effect. The contrary, however, has been the case in many respects, for it is well known that some of these members & particularly Billaud Varenne were active in stirring up the Jacobins ag'nst the convention, this member having in pointed terms denounc'd the reigning party not many days before the hall was shut up, to the society. Barrere likewise presented himself forward a few days after that event, in a manner to excite the disgust of that party by seconding a motion for breaking up the convention & putting the constitution into motion, a measure he was formerly opposed to, and perhaps would not now have thought of had the Jacobins retained the ascendancy. At this too I was the more surprised because he was noted for dexterity upon all previous occasions, in the vicissitudes of the several preceding parties, and had likewise observed his usual circumspection in other respects since the fall of Robespiere. These members have likewise erred in the countenance they have given to Carriere, for instead of drawing a line between themselves and him & yielding him to the justice of their country, they appeared for some time to consider his as a common

cause, and acted accordingly. It is true in the close of the business, and when the appeal nominal, as yeas and nays were taken, of 500 members present 498 voted there was cause of accusation, & that he sho'd be sent to the tribunal revolutionary & the other two were for his trial but hesitated on some collateral point.

Upon the whole, however, I am of opinion that as it respects the publick councils every thing bears the happiest aspect. There may yet be some irregularities, but not of the kind heretofore experienc'd. And with respect to the state of the war the prospect is still more brilliant. Mæstricht & Nimeughen have lately surrendered and opened the road directly for Holland, upon w'h the French troops are now pressing with an energy not to be resisted. The probability is they will take possession of it unless prevented by inundation, a resource not to be relied on in case the winter sho'd be severe, and which will in any event ruin the country for many years to come. This must strike terror into Engl'd & probably shake that gov't. In Spain their success has been equally great. The Sp'h forces have been routed in several actions, many prisoners & posts taken, & in fact the prospect of achieving in that quarter what they please. The present is certainly the moment for our gov't to act with energy. They sho'd in my judgment put the British beyond the lakes & open the Mississippi, & by so doing we sho'd be courted into peace by those powers rather than threatened with war; and merely by negotiation we know we can do nothing,

TO MADISON

on the contrary we play the game that those powers wish us to play, for we give them time to try their fortune with France reserving to themselves the right of pressing us after that conflict shall be over, let the issue be as it way, even in case they sho'd be, as they certainly will be defeated. If we took this step at this moment, France would in my opinion not make peace without us, in case they considered it as war, but as they find that we stand with France they wo'd probably not consider it in that light. One other great advantage resulting from this measure is that it wo'd be supported by the wishes of all America & take with it in particular the suffrage of the western people. This wo'd terminate at once the discontents in that quarter: how much more wise & benevolent is that policy which points the force of the country against the invaders of the publick rights than that which turns it against the members of the society itself. I do not by this mean to intimate that the effort to crush the movement at Fort Pitt was unwise. I think otherwise, for the law must be supported, but I likewise think that if the one above suggested would produce the same effect in that respect, and a very salutary one in many others, it ought to be adopted. Indeed I am persuaded it has been adopted, for many reports authorize a belief that Gen'l Wayne has had a rencounter with the British & taken from them the post at the rapids of the Miamis.

You will readily conceive that the mission of Mr. Jay & his continuance in Eng· have greatly embar-

rass'd my movements here. It has been intimated in such manner as to inspire doubts that a mere reparation for injuries co'd not be the sole motive; and in proportion as those doubts have existed, have they produc'd a repellant disposition towards me not from any real distrust in me, but from a distrust of the Ex: adm'n. I have done all in my power to remove it and hope I have now succeeded. But I trust he will not stay there the winter for by so doing he only gives the British time, which they want, & keeps alive the ill founded suspicion here.

You will hear with surprise that I have been fav'd with a letter from Mr. Gardoqui that the object was to get within the republick upon pretence of ill-health but in my judgment to begin a negotiation for peace. I laid his letters, for I rec'd two, before the Committee intimating what I believed to be the object & avail'd myself of the opportunity to state our situation with Sp'n; so that instead of bringing his wishes forward in a manner to create a belief we assisted Sp'n in her efforts for peace, as was I presume intended by writing me on the subject, I took the opportunity of urging France to make no peace with her until the Mississippi be opened. Since in case we were involv'd in a war with her, France wo'd be forc'd to join, so that it were better to compromise the whole at once. I am certain the incident has produced a good effect.

Soon after this it was intimated to me by the Committee of P. S. that they wanted to borrow some money of us. I then took occasion to state our

situation with Engl'd in like manner, pressing them to make our dispute theirs—and whether we embarked in the war or not to aid our negotiation for the posts so as to have their & our dispute settled at the same time, I am convinc'd the communication has been useful.

I think it probable they will ask our aid in money & I most sincerely wish we may give it—I sho'd suppose we might lend 40 or 50 millions of livres by the gen'l, the State guv'ts, & individuals. If a loan of the latter kind was opened guaranteed by the Congress the whole wo'd be loaned by foreigners if necessary and I am sure it wo'd be paid by this gov't as they have great resources in national property.

I have nominated Mr. Skipwith as Consul for Paris. If appointed I shall want some one to supply his place. I leave this to y'rself in concert with Mr. R. to send the suitable person. First, however, I wish you to communicate to Colo. Burr that if Mr. Provost will come it shall be for him. Mr. Purvyance is here in trade & declines the offer in case Mr. P. will not accept as in that case it wo'd be offered. How wo'd Mr. Dawson do, if Provost wo'd not come? I fear he is distressed and as an old acquaintance having some claim on me & which I never wish to disappoint, I confess if he wo'd be benefited by it which I doubt—under any other alternative, I sho'd be glad to serve him. But this is only for y'r consideration for I leave it to you as mentioned above in concert with Mr. R.

I feel extremely anxious to hear from you. My conduct here is by this time before you & the subject of criticism—and y'r measures are greatly interesting

to me. I hope therefore soon to hear on these topics as well as whatever else you deem necessary to be notic'd.

We had in idea a loan here to be vested in America—I am satisfied it may be procured if desirable. Provided I established the fund in Hamburg for instance to the am't of 5 or 10,000 £ ster'g to be secur'd by landed security such as the property purchased could you draw for it so as to answer the purpose? where wo'd you vest it? answer me upon these points & in the interim I will endeavor in reply to assure you where the fund will be plac'd & to what amount. I really think it may be counted on. And in the interim if a most eligible contract offers itself you may draw on me to be paid in Hamburg at three months sight for three thousand pounds ster'g: in one, two or three bills. I am sure I can borrow the money there of Van Staphost of the house of V. S. of Amsterdam; this genl'm lives here but co'd place the money there for me & I think wo'd at a word.

I wrote you not long since by a Mr. Swan—his character is better known to me now than it then was, be cautious of him & give the same hint to Mr. R. Major B. & other fr'ds to whom I wrote, this you may do without compromitting me except where perfectly safe.

There are many things here which I think would suit you. I beg you to give me a list of what you want, such as clocks, carpets, glass, furniture, table linen, &ca.—they are cheaper infinitely than with you considering I have advantages of the exch'ge & you

might pay the am't to Mr. Jones. Tell Mr. R. I shall also be glad to serve him—I beg you to command me freely for I need not tell you how happy it will make me to serve you—ask Taylor if I shall send him a good watch.

Will you be so kind as obtain from Colo. Orr or if he has them not, get him to bring them hereafter, my patents for my western land consisting of 20.000 acres on Rock Castle & 5 or 600 beyond the Ohio & give to Mr. Jones. Capt'n Fowler acts for me. My other items you will recollect of Vermont & New Y'k. Remember me affectionately to all friends of both houses and to Mr. Beckley—to Mr. Yard & Dr. Stevens & families—Tell them Mrs. M. & child are well & desire to be remembered—very affec'y I am, Dear Sir, y'r friend & servant

JA^{s} MONROE.

Mr. Paine who is of my family desires to be remembered to you. He will be with you in the spring. Not being able to present Mr. Fauchet's draft here for 3000 dol'rs on acc't of the depreciat'n I shall return it to Mr. Randolph & subject it to Mr. Jones's order. Will you attend to this?

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, December 2d, 1794.

SIR,—I have at length obtained an answer from the Committee of Public Safety, to the several propositions heretofore presented before it, in an arrêté

of the 15th. ultimo. By this arrêté the Commission of Marine is ordered to adjust the amount due to such of our citizens as were injured by the Embargo of Bordeaux, and likewise to such others as have claims for supplies rendered to the Government of St. Domingo. By it also many embarrassments which impeded the direct trade between the two countries are removed: The arbitrary rule of contraband, which authorised the seizure of our vessels laden with provisions destined for other countries, is done away; and the stipulation of the Treaty of Commerce which gives free passage under our flag to the subjects of any of the powers at war with the Republic is likewise inforced. In short everything has been conceded that was desired, except the execution of that part of the Treaty which gave freedom to goods in ships that were so.

I have, in consequence, notified to the Commission of Marine that I had empowered Mr. Skipwith to take charge of these claims, and attend their adjustment on the part of our citizens, and I shall continue to give every aid in my power to obtain for them the justice to which they are entitled. In respect to the liquidation, unless indeed, some difficulty should arise, as to the mode of payment, whether in assignats or specie, I presume all difficulty is at an end. But in regard to the payment, I think it probable, unless assignats are taken and which are now depreciated,[1] further delay will be desired, owing to the great expenditures of the government at this very import-

[1] The *assignat* at this time passed only for one-fifteenth of the real value.

ant crisis of its affairs. Upon this, however, I shall be able to give you more correct information in my next.

If the treaty could have been carried into effect by general agreement, I should have deemed it a fortunate thing; because it would have secured our commerce hereafter from the possibility of vexation, and upon any pretext whatever by the French cruisers; and because it would have ranged the French Republic at an important period of its affairs on the side of a principle founded in benevolence and necessary to the freedom of the high seas.[1] But as connected with other considerations more immediately applicable to ourselves and especially if the hope of forcing it upon other nations, as a law, is abandoned, I have deemed it of but little consequence. It certainly precludes the probability of our being called on hereafter to fulfil any stipulation whatever, and will of course gain us greater credit for any services we may render them, in case it should suit us to render them any. I am likewise persuaded, from the responsibility the arrêté imposes, and the increasing partiality pervading all France towards us and which is felt by the Americans and observed by the subjects of other neutral powers that the execution will not vary much from the import of the treaty itself; for I cannot think that many of our vessels will hereafter be brought in upon the suspicion of having enemy's goods on board.

I informed you some time since that I was per-

[1] Little was it suspected at this time, that we should be ranged on the side of England to support the opposite principal.—MONROE'S *View*.

suaded if the subject was before the Convention it would readily be granted; and in this I have not only been since confirmed, but in the further belief that a majority of the several committees were favorable to the object. The dread however of denunciation in the course of events deterred them from adopting it. It was opposed as was likewise every other change by a party who would not fail to take advantage of it, should a favorable opportunity occur. The sordid spoilers of the public wealth never forgive those who detect and expose to view their iniquities. And this was the most vulnerable point upon which recrimination could hereafter act; for as it is contemplated when the other powers are withdrawn to prosecute the war against England with the collected force of the Republic, and this might be construed into a partiality for that nation, it was deemed too hazardous a measure in respect to the personal safety of the members, to be encountered. In this decision too it is probable they were the more confirmed by the necessity of cultivating Denmark and Sweden at the present moment, from whence great resources are drawn in support of the war; whose councils are wielded by Bernstorff, a man believed to be well disposed to a reform in the existing governments of Europe[1] and whose fleets are combined with no friendly disposition towards England. They would most probably have

[1] Monroe, in his *View*, indicates his uncertainty respecting this disposition on the part of Christian, Count of Bernstorff. As far as Denmark's neutrality was concerned she adhered to that plan until the Emperor Paul's compact of 1801; but appears to have furnished in the meantime to France, breadstuffs which the dearth in the latter country rendered extremely valuable, besides the timber and hemp requisite for her navy.

pressed to be put on the same footing, and the pressure could not easily have been resisted, after the example was given. As a proof, however, of the disposition of the Committee, upon the subject generally, I transmit to you a copy of a report drawn upon my notes by Merlin of Douai to whom they were referred and which was informally given me by its diplomatic members.[1]

I apprized you in my last of the 20th., instant of Mr. Gardoqui's attempt to obtain permission to attend certain baths within the Republic; ostensibly upon account of his ill health, but in my judgment to commence a negociation for peace (a finesse too often practiced by a certain grade of politicians) and at the same time lessen any weight the United States might have upon that subject, in respect to their own affairs, by inspiring a distrust in me in the outset. I likewise stated to you in what manner I had acted upon that occasion, laying his original letters before the Committee, with my free and candid comments upon them: As also the further discussion which took place between the committee and myself in regard to Spain, and to which an incident of a different kind gave birth; in which I exposed as far as the nature of the case would admit of, the real situation of the United States with respect to Spain and Britain, menaced with war by both; shewing how France

[1] This report may be found in full in the Official Record Book of Communications from James Monroe to the Secretary of State [France, No. 4, James Monroe, p. 148]. For the Arrêté by the Committee of Public Safety (Acts of Reparation in consequence of Monroe's Memoir of September 3d), *see* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 689.

would be affected by that event and of course the part she should take in our affairs at the present moment. To that communication I have now nothing new to add, having since heard neither from Mr. Gardoqui on the subject of his proposition, nor the Committee upon that, or the one which afterwards occurred. I omitted, however, at that time, to transmit to you a copy of my letter accompanying Mr. Gardoqui's to the Committee, and which I now inclose for the purpose of presenting that business more fully before you.

I am convinced that this exposition of our situation with Britain and Spain, and to which the incident of Mr. Gardoqui furnished the first opening, has been useful: For before that exposition, I had reason to believe that it was not only unknown, but that a very erroneous opinion was entertained by many in the committee upon that subject. I thought I had felt the effect of that opinion, created no doubt in the manner you suggest; but as it was not communicated in a way to enable me to take official notice of it, I was embarrassed how to act or what measure to adopt in regard to it. For awhile as it was circulated only in private, I thought it best to counteract it, by making the necessary explanation only to those who mentioned it to me. Finally as I knew the campaign was progressing towards a close, and that the winter was the season for negociation; and more especially as I feared its commencement with either of those powers, with such improper opinion of our situation with each, because I well knew they would improve it with great

dexterity to their advantage, I deemed it my duty to make an extraordinary effort to remove it. With this view I appointed a rendezvous with the diplomatic members of the Committee, and which took place accordingly. I was resolved, however not to meet the imputation as a charge supposed to exist, or which I was bound to answer in case it did. A denial of a charge might beget a suspicion where there was none. I took different ground by informing the committee, that the war in which they were engaged, like all other wars, must have a termination: that most were concluded by the friendly mediation of third powers: That I was well convinced the United States would be happy to render the French Republic any service in their power, in that respect, to bring the present war to a happy close: That it was not their interest to interfere even by mediation, nor, in my judgment, would they, otherwise than at the instance and by the request of the French Republic, in the hope of promoting thereby the success of their revolution. I observed further that I wanted no answer to this, and had only given the information, that they might retain it in memory for the purpose of availing themselves of it hereafter, in case it should be found expedient. It was received respectfully but calmly. By one of the members it was observed: "That having beaten their enemies completely, it belonged to those enemies to determine whether they wished peace or not; and if they did, they would no doubt, be able to find a way whereby to make it known to the Republic." By another, I was asked: "Whether Mr. Jay was still in

London and whether he intended to come over to Paris, as had been published in an English paper?" This was the very suspicion I wished to combat and remove; though indeed I did not expect it would have been avowed in so abrupt a manner. I replied I could not tell whether he had returned or not; but that it was impossible the paragraph in the English paper should be true, as he was sent to England upon an especial business only; to demand reparation for injuries, and to which his authority was strictly limited. I then repeated what I had before said of the friendly disposition of the United States towards the French Republic, in all cases, and of the pleasure with which they would, in my judgment, serve it upon the present one, if in their power. That I was persuaded they would listen to no proposition on the subject of mediation from any other power; for as it was a business which could not possibly benefit them, they would, of course, embark in it only upon account of their ally. I likewise added, that I knew nothing of the disposition of any power upon the subject of peace; but presumed the success of their arms had disposed them all well towards it; and thus I left them to reflect at leisure upon what I had said; in the belief however that the communication must produce a good effect. As this took place prior to the affair of Mr. Gardoqui, and which was more particularly detailed in my last, I have thought proper to communicate it to you, that you may be possessed of every, the minutest, circumstance relative to our affairs upon this very interesting theatre.

If the subject of a loan is mentioned again here, or in America, that of securing for us the points in question, must likewise be; but as I have said every thing on that head that I can say, having only a right to conjecture, I am not anxious to revive it here. I am, however persuaded it will be revived with you; for so vast are their armies, and extensive their operations, that they must be distressed for money, and forced to gain it from whence they can. And I sincerely wish we may assist them, if possible, and which I presume it will be, especially if not comprised in the war, and which I think cannot be, although we should immediately wrest from Britain and Spain the rights they have usurped from us. The credit of the United States is such in Europe and America, and their means of reimbursement so unquestionable, especially in the particular of the Western Territory (an object viewed at present with great cupidity on this side the Atlantic) that I am persuaded the amount expected might be obtained by loan; and I am equally so that the people would cheerfully bear a tax, the product of which was to be applied in aid of the French Republic. Upon these topics, however, I have a right only to conjecture, and as such you will be pleased to consider what I have said.[1]

The day after my remarks upon the subject of a loan were handed in, I was favored with yours of the 25th. of September, and which I beg leave now to acknowledge. Finding that my idea of our situation

[1] The sum the French Republic wanted from us was about five millions of dollars; to be borrowed under the guarantee of the United States, but secured by a mortgage of an adequate portion of their national domains.

with Britain and Spain was correct, I was extremely happy that I had given that representation of it. The motive for a strong union here, on our part, is the greater, and nothing tends so effectually to promote that object as the belief that we are not cordial with England. In consequence I waited on the Committee again, and told them I had received a dispatch from you since our last conference and that our dilemma with those two powers was even more critical than I had before intimated. Facts of this kind[1] go further in removing doubts than any assurances I could otherwise give them. These discussions have enabled me to examine attentively whether it was their real wish that we should embark with them in the war, and I can assure you that whatever it may have been at any previous stage, upon which I can give no opinion, that at present I am persuaded they would rather we would not; from an idea it might diminish their supplies from America: But such is their disposition towards us that I am inclined to think, if the point depended on them they would leave us to act in that respect according to our wishes. And I am likewise persuaded, if we do embark in the war, that they will see us through it; and have some hope if we do not, and especially if we aid them in the article of money, that they will support, as far as they will be able, our demands upon Spain and England.

I intimated in my last that we could not have asked of fortune a more seasonable opportunity for possess-

[1] Meaning Wayne's movement on the frontier.

ing ourselves of those rights which have been so long usurped by Britain and Spain, and that if it was the sense of America ever to possess them, it should not be pretermitted.[1] Britain is certainly not in a condition to embark in a war against us, though we should dispossess her of Canada: She would of course be less apt to do it, if we only placed her troops beyond the lakes. Her own land force was scarcely felt in the present war against France: Nor has she been otherwise regarded than on account of her fleet and pecuniary resources by which she subsidized Prussia and other powers. But *that* force, small as it was, is greatly diminished, and the combination in which she has been associated appears, not only to be completely foiled, but in a great measure broken. The prospect now before her is that Prussia, Austria and all the other powers will extricate themselves from the war, upon the best terms they can and leave her singly to support it against France; and that the latter will be aided by Spain unless a particular combination against us should prevent it; and likewise by Denmark and Sweden, if not directly, yet in a manner to produce a serious effect. The preponderance of her fleet and the wanton and licentious use made of it, have excited the disgust of all nations against her; who would be pleased to see it reduced, and the present is considered as a favorable time to reduce it. She likewise knows or confidently believes that it is the intention of France to prosecute the war against her, for the purpose of breaking her maritime strength and ridding the ocean from such a tyranny. At home too

[1] Written "taken advantage of" in the Record Book.

she cannot be free from disquietude. The total failure of her operations in this quarter (what they are in the West Indies is better known to you) has excited some uneasiness in the public mind, and proportionately lessened the weight of the court. This was lately shewn in a prosecution against a Mr. Hardy, and in which the verdict was given for the defendant. And should the French take Holland (which nothing but an inundation already commenced can prevent, if even that can) this sensation will of course be increased. Thus circumstanced what have we to fear from her? Will she, in her decline, bring upon herself another enemy who can wound her so vitally; for let her merchants and politicians boast as they will of her resources, yet it is well known, if the American demand was cut off, upon which she thrives so much, that it would greatly diminish her revenue and impair her strength. How is she enabled to support her engagements and carry on her operations, but by commerce? and lessened as this already is by the war, how could she sustain such a stroke at the present crisis? From her friendship we have nothing to hope: The order of the 6th. November was war *in fact*, and that has since been modified according to circumstances. Be assured she is infinitely less disposed for such an event at the present, than at any preceding period. On the contrary, if we only took possession of what we are entitled to, she will readily join with us in reprehending the conduct of her own officers for having transcended their orders.[1] With

[1] My opinion was, that we should take a strong position in respect to England,

respect to Spain I have nothing new to add since my last, except that in two days' successive actions two complete victories were obtained over her troops by those of this Republic; unless, indeed, some ingenious sophist, jealous of the honour of Spain should contend, that as they were completely routed on the first, and maintained only a straggling battle on the second, it ought to be called but one. Certain it is that in the two days conflict, several thousands were slain and upwards of two thousand taken prisoners, with their camp on each day, and on one, tents for fifty thousand men.

I promised you, sometime since, my comments upon the subject of a Consular arrangement, for the ports of this Republic. The consuls have been here to confer with me upon the subject of trade, and I have obtained from them their ideas on that of the arrangement which I now enclose to you. I will add my own comments on it in my next, and will subjoin the names of some Americans now here, that may be deemed worthy of your attention. I think proper however now to mention that Mr. Skipwith will accept the office of Consul for this city, and that I think him worthy of it. He is in my opinion, a sensible man, of strict integrity, and well acquainted with the duties

and which would not only have put us at ease permanently with France, avoiding in consequence, all the variance and misunderstandings which have since taken place with that Republic; but, by obtaining from her the aid of her fortunes against England, have commanded from the latter power, and without any danger of war, our own terms. Nor would she in such an event have enquired too strictly into the propriety of our repaying *in kind* to France the obligation we owed her, by guarantying for her, four or five millions of dollars, to be laid out here in the purchase of provisions.—MONROE.

of the office. The duties of Consul here will be those of Consul-General, and in strictness the Commission should be correspondent. They may, however, be performed under that of Consul only; for I presume *those* in the ports will respect him equally in either character.

I have the honor to be with great respect and esteem Your obedient Servant

Ja^{s} Monroe.

TO JAMES MADISON.

Paris, Dec. 18, 1794.

Dear Sir,—I enclose you three letters one for Mr. R. and the other two for whomever you may think it best to direct them. You will in case they are delivered take a copy of one for y'rself, for I have not had time to write you nor indeed is it necessary on that subject as I send them open to y'r inspection. You will know whether there is any thing in the report & act accordingly either by presenting or suppressing all. I really wish mine to Mr. R. to be seen by the Pr: if expedient to be delivered. As to the persons to whom to be addressed I leave it entirely to you (advising that you consult with no one on that point lest it be known they were not addressed by me) but am inclined to think that one sho'd be addressed to Langdon, & the other either to Burr, Butler or Ross. As you will take a copy, you will be able to show it to our Virg'a friends and others as by my request & which will apologize for my not writing them. After all there is but one kind of policy which is safe, which

is the *honest policy*. If it was intended to cultivate France by sending me here Jay sho'd not have been sent to Engl'd but if indeed it was intended to cultivate Engl'd it was wise to send some such person as myself here, for it was obvious that in proportion as we stood well with France sho'd we be respected by Engl'd. I have not time to write you further at present than to assure you that the aff'rs of the Republick are in every respect in the most flourishing condition. Wise, humane & just in its councils, & eminently successful in its armies, & also that we are well. Affec'y I am y'r friend & serv't

JA^{s} MONROE.

As the letters are closed in great hurry, see that there are no inaccuracies. If Mr. Skipwith is confirmed, pray send Prevost off immediately———I repeat again that I put this business entirely under y'r care. You will readily conclude, if the report is entirely without foundation & which I most earnestly hope it is, that it will be best to suppress the whole.

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.[1]

PARIS, Decr 18th 1794

DEAR SIR,—Within a few days past English papers have been received here stating that Mr Jay had ad-

[1] The Original of this private letter to Randolph, which is in the handwriting of an amanuensis, but bearing the date and one or two interlineations with the signature by Monroe, remains among the Madison Papers. Under date of March 26, 1795, Madison wrote to Monroe: "My last was written about ten days ago for a conveyance intimated to be in the view of the office of State. I have since that rec^{d} yours committed to Mr Swan and two hours ago that of

justed the points in controversy between that country and the United States: in some of those papers it is stated that Canada is to be ceded with the ports, that privileges are to be given in the West Indies and other stipulations which imply an alliance offensive & defensive as likewise a commercial treaty. As this government has always felt uneasiness upon the subject of his mission, and which was greatly mitigated but not entirely done away by the solemn declarations I had made upon the authority of my instructions,

Dec. 18. covering the private one to Mr. Randolph. The other referred to as Secret by the way of Havre is not yet come to hand. . . . From as near a view as I have yet been able to take of your letter to Mr. R. I see no reason why I should hesitate to deliver it. I cannot forbear believing that the Report of the stipulations offensive and defensive is quite without foundation; but your view of things on the contrary supposition, involves a variety of interesting ideas; and your communications and reflections in general with regard to the Treaty, as proceeding from one in your position and of your sentiments, merit too much attention in the Executive Department to be withheld altogether from it. I mentioned in my last that the Treaty was come, but kept a profound secret. In that state it remains. Its contents have produced conjectural comments without number. As I am as much out of the secret as others I can say nothing that goes beyond that character. I should hope it to be impossible that any stipulation, if any should be attempted, inconsistent with the Treaties with France, can ever be pursued into effect. I cannot even believe that any such stipulation will be hazarded. The President, to say nothing of the people, would so certainly revolt at it, that more than wickedness would be requisite in the authors. At the same time it is possible that articles may be included that will be ominous to the confidence and cordiality of France towards the U. S. not to mention that any arrangements with G. B. (beyond the simple objects you mention) made at the present juncture and extorted by the known causes, must naturally appear in the light you represent. How the instructions to Jay" [*see* Johnston's *Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, vol. iv., p. 10] "may square with what he may have done; or both or either with the language you were authorized to hold, must await future lights. As I do not know how far official communications may not put you in possession of the contents of the Treaty before this arrives, and as it appears you had no previous or contemporary knowledge of the particulars, I ought not to decline the task of giving you what appears to me to be ye most probable account of them; premising that I speak without the least clue or hint from the official quarter, & what is truly

that he had no power other than to demand the surrender of the ports & compensation for injuries, this recent intelligence has excited a kind of horror in the minds of those acquainted with it. And as it will probably get into the papers I fear the same sensation will be universal for a while. As it is that this accomodating disposition in the Cabinet of St James, if it really exists, is owing to the successes of the French arms, the good understanding between the United States and this Republick, and the decisive temper of our government as shewn in the move-

to be taken for conjecture, or at most for inferences from circumstances mostly of newspaper publicity. 1. It is generally agreed that the ports are to be surrendered; but not before June 1796; and it is among ye reports that they are afterwards to be a sort of thoroughfare for both parties. This would be a very disagreeable and a very unpopular ingredient. 2. The compensation for losses are supposed to be in a train primarily judicial, eventually diplomatic. The sufferers I believe are very little sanguine, but they are in general silent from causes which you will readily imagine. 3. I should have mentioned the other stipulations in the treaty of peace, besides the delivery of ye ports. On this little is said except in general that they are to be executed on both sides. Perhaps the question of interest during the war & complaints on the British side from State laws affecting their debts, may be referred along with some of the American losses from privateers & admiralty courts, to the Commissioners. This however is purely conjectural. 4. A footing of reciprocity with respect to the trade directly with G. B. so far as to put British and American vessels on the same footing in American ports, & American and British on the same footing in British ports. As this w^{d} take from our vessels the advantage they now enjoy, particularly with respect to the difference of ten per Ct. in the duties, it would be injurious, and if not countervailed, unpopular. 5. An admission of American vessels to the British W. Indies, if under 100 or perhaps 75 tons. Whether the right be renounced of reducing British vessels to the same size is a question of some consequence in relation to this point. 6. The Treaty in relation to the commerce with G. B. to continue for 12 years: to that with *the W. Indies for 4 years*. I should be led from some particular circumstances not to doubt the latter limitation if the aspect & effect of it were not so strikingly revolting. Having had but a few moments notice of this opp^{y} I am obliged to conclude a very hasty letter with abrupt assurances of the affection with which I am," etc.

ments and letters of Wayne, and which were previously published in the opposition papers here, it might perhaps be expected from a just and generous people that we would pursue the adjustment of our controversy with that country in concert with this: in any event that we would not bind up ourselves in relation to the present war, in any manner to prevent us from fulfilling existing stipulations if called on to execute them, or rendering other service to our ally which a recollection of past and recent good offices might incline us to render. But to take advantage of the success of the French arms, of the good understanding subsisting between this. Republick and our own, and which was created by the dismission of a minister odious to all France, and the frank declarations which I made in obedience to my instructions in the presence of the Convention and in the view of Europe, of our attachment to their welfare and sollicitude for their success, to part the two countries and draw us into the bosom of our mortal foe, would be an act of perfidy the example of which was perhaps never seen before.

As yet I have not been spoken to upon this subject by the Committee nor do I expect to be, for *reserve* is the peculiar characteristic of that department, and from which it never deviates except in cases when the person in whose favor the deviation is, possesses their entire confidence. Notwithstanding the harmony of opinion which prevailed among all their parties here, in respect to my political principles and attachment to their nation for services in our revolution, yet this

impenetrable cloak was for some time after my arrival, assumed even towards myself. It was laid aside by degrees only and upon their own experience of the verity of these reports: for so common are the cases of political depravity in the Courts of the European world, that they act as if nothing else were to be found any where. If then this report should be entirely discredited, or if it should be credited, I think I shall not be spoken to. In the former instance they will not offend me, by letting it be seen that they had even noticed it. And in the latter as they will be mortified for having given me a rank in their estimation more elevated than that of other political agents whom they class generally or in the mass as rascals, and will consider themselves as duped they will endeavour to hide it from me. So that in either case 'tis probable I shall not be spoken to on the subject. If credited it will be seen only by their relapse into the former state of reserve and which the first interview will decide.

On my part I entirely disbelieve it. I can readily conceive that the British administration under the pressure of the French Arms, and the decisive tone of our government will yield the ports and pay us for our losses, or rather it would be the endeavour of that administration to make us pay for it if possible by betraying us into some stipulation which would weaken our connection with France and stain our national character, for they know too well the temper of the publick mind to think it possible to connect us with them. And I can also readily conceive that our agent there would be well disposed to harmonize with that

administration in an effort to weaken that connection, and that in the pursuit of this object he would not be over nice or scrupulous as to the means. But I rest with unshaken confidence in the integrity of the President and in the veracity of the instructions given me to declare that he had no such power. When I contemplate the fixed and steady character of the President, cautious in his measures, but immoveable after he has adopted them, jealous of his honor & regardful of his fame, the precious acquirement of great services and of a long and venerable life, I cannot hesitate for a moment in pronouncing that in placing me here he meant what he said, and that I should be the organ of an honest and not a double and perfidious policy. Upon this point I am perfectly at ease. The only point therefore upon which I feel any concern, is the apprehension of the dish which may be prepared for the palate of those who have particular interests with us & which 'tis possible may be contrived with great art by Messrs Pitt & Jay, the latter of whom would be useful in giving information how such interests might be acted on so as to make it irresistible. And what increases this apprehension is the report that several of the stipulations are provisional, to be executed hereafter whereby the hostage remains in the hands of Great Britain, it being only a project (and of course no violation of instructions in form tho' absolutely so in fact) to be offered for the approbation of the President and the Senate. By this he would keep his ground in England, harmonize with the administration, and aid it in the means of attacking the integrity of

our Councils. Upon this point I have my fears for I knew him play the same game upon the subject of the Mississippi. He was instructed to enter into no *stipulation* which did not open that river and fix the boundaries according to our treaty with Great Britain. He should therefore not have heard a proposition on that subject: on the contrary he absolutely entered into a stipulation which shut the river up, or according to his own language *forbore the use of it*, and left the boundaries to be settled by Commissaries to be appointed by both countries, as I understand is the case with some of the litigated points in the present case. The analogy in the project reported to be now depending with that I have here recited (and which I have often wished the President would peruse from beginning to the end) together with my own perfect knowledge of the principles and crooked policy of the man disguised under the appearance of great sanctity and decorum, induce me to pay more attention to those papers than I otherwise should do.

If any thing of this kind should have taken place I know the dilemma into which you will be all thrown. *The western ports are offered you—compensation for losses*—free *trade* to the *Islands*—under the protection of the all *powerful British flag—Canada is* or *will be* given up, whereby the fisheries become more accessible—Engl[d] will no longer support Spain in favor of the *Mississippi* &c. This will be resounded in the public papers and the impudence of the British faction become intolerable. But will it not be perceived that whatever is offered cannot be deemed the amicable concession of England but is already

your own, attained by the illustrious atchievments & prosperous fortunes of your ally, & the decisive of your own councils? Will you take therefore in breach of plighted faith, and expense of our national character, and of an amicable concession of England what may be obtained without loss, and is in truth due to the merits of our ally? I will candidly own that I do not think it in the power of Messrs Pitt. and Jay to succeed in any project they can contrive whereby to weaken our connection with France & put us again under the influence of England, for such would be the case provided that connection was weakened.

I have written you freely upon this subject as well to state the report and explain the light in which such an adjustment would be received here, as to put you on your guard in relation to transactions in England, a country which will never smile upon but to deceive you. Tis impossible to be closely connected with both these countries if no other considerations prevented from the animosity, and frequent wars that will take place between them, and which must terminate from the superior strength of this in the ruin at least to a certain degree of the other: unless indeed we should now abandon our ally to prop the declining fortunes of hers and our adversary. I write to you in confidence that you will make no improper use of this & that from the necessity of retaining a copy you will excuse its being dressed in the character of a friend. With great respect and esteem I am dear Sir very sincerely yours JA.S MONROE.[1]

[1] Randolph, in acknowledging this letter, referred to his of March 8th (State

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, December 27th., 1794.

CITIZENS,—I was favoured this morning with yours of yesterday, intimating that the report of a treaty, said to have been concluded by Mr. Jay, envoy of the United States of America to England, with that nation, derogatory to the treaties of alliance between those States and this Republic, had given you some disquietude and requesting information from me upon that point. I obey the invitation with pleasure because I well know that a candid policy is that alone which becomes Republics, and because it is likewise most correspondent with the wishes of the American government and my own feelings.

Having already communicated to you the limited object of Mr. Jays mission, it only remains for me to inform you what I know of the result. All that I know upon this subject is comprized in a letter received yesterday from Mr. Jay of November 25th., in which he says that he had fulfilled the principal object of his mission, by concluding a treaty, signed on the 19th. of the same month, which contains a declaration. "That it should not be construed, nor operate, contrary to our existing treaties, and that, therefore, our engagements with other nations were not affected by it." He adds that as the treaty is not yet ratified, it would

Papers, i., 699), as anticipating its subject. Mentioning the constant round of interruptions to which he was subjected, he adds: "I am resolved, however, to seclude myself from all, except the most indispensable business that I may devote my attention to such a view of our relation to France, as may ascertain the fact which is so firmly impressed upon me that we have behaved to her fairly and honorably."

be improper to publish it. I am altogether ignorant of the particular stipulations of the treaty, but I beg leave to assure you that as soon as I shall be informed thereof, I will communicate the same to you.

I take it, however, for granted, that the report is without foundation; for I cannot believe that an American minister would ever forget the connections between the United States and France, which every day's experience demonstrates to be the interest of both Republics still further to cement.

JA.S MONROE.[1]

[1] The following are from unsigned rough drafts; the first is in Monroe's handwriting; the second in that of an amanuensis. The latter is crossed out entirely, and in the first, erasures and interlineations occur, which are here indicated by bracketed words: (1) December 27, 1794. Citizens,—I consider it of great importance to y.r interest & my reputation that you apprize me of [whatever] the proposition if any which you may contemplate to make to the American gov.t You [are I presume sufficiently well acquainted with my character & principles to know] must be sensible that I will not only give you the best advice in this respect [in my power] but aid you in obtaining y.r wishes all in my power. On the other hand if you sho.d make a proposition to the gov.t [from existing circum] which it [would] might not be able to grant, & the belief existed that it was done by my advice it would do [me] an essential injury to you as well as myself. I wish therefore that you would commission one of your members to confer freely with me upon these points which may be done either [here or in some] in some room of the committee or here as shall be most agreeable to him. I think I can make myself understood without the aid of an interpreter. (2) In answer to your letter of this day I hasten to inform the Committee that I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Jay dated London 25 Nov.r in which he says "The principal business of my mission was concluded by a treaty signed the 19 Nov.r It contains a declaration that it shall not be construed nor operate contrary to our existing treaties; therefore our engagements with other nations are unaffected by it. As the treaty is not yet ratified it would be improper to publish it." Mr. Jay has not informed me of a single article the treaty contains, nor even the title of it—perhaps because that Gentleman and myself are not in habits of intimacy nor always united in our politics.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

[GEORGE WASHINGTON.]

PARIS, Jan'y 3. 1795.

DEAR SIR,—Your favor of the 5 of June did not reach me till a few days past or it sho'd have been sooner answered. I am happy now to answer it because I am able to give you details of the lady in question which will be very agreeable to you. I had advanced her near 2000 dol'rs when I was advised here by Jacob Van Staphorst that you had plac'd in the hands of his brother for Madame La Fayette the sum of two thousand, three hundred & ten guilders & which had never been rec'd. At this time she was soliciting permission to leave France with a view of visiting & partaking with her husband the fortune to which he was exposed. I had given her a certificate that her husband had lands in America & that the Congress had appropriated to his use upwards of 20,000 dol'rs, the am't w'h was due for his services in our revolution, & upon which basis her application was founded & granted. I made known to her the fund you had appropriated for her use & which she readily & with pleasure accepted, & which served to defray the expense of her journey. She pursued her route by Dunkirk & Hamburg to which places I gave & procured letters of recommendation, & at the former of which she was rec'd in the house & entertained by our consul Mr. Coffyn. I assured her when she left France there was no service within my power to render her & her husband & family that I would not with pleasure render them. To count upon my utmost efforts & command them in their favor. That it was

your wish & the wish of America that I should do so. To consult her husband as to the mode & measure & apprize me of his opinions thereon. She departed grateful to you & our country & since which I have not heard from her. She had thoughts of visiting in person the Emperor & endeavoring to obtain the release of her husband; but whether she did or not I cannot tell. It was reported sometime since he was released & afterwards that she was admitted with her family into the same state of confinement with him: the latter of which I believe to be true.[1] Before she left this I became responsible in her favor for 9000$ upon a month's notice (in specie) the object of w'h was to free a considerable estate from some encumbrance & which was effected upon my surety, as yet I have not been called on to pay it. As soon, therefore, as I rec'd the draft on Holland for six thousand dol'rs in her behalf, I wrote her by two different routes to assure her that I had funds for her & her husband's support & upon which she might for the present draw to the am't of £250. ster'g, & afterwards as occasion might require & to which I have rec'd no ans'r.

What may be the ultimate disposition of France towards Mr. Lafayette it is impossible now to say. His integrity so far as I can find remains unimpeached, & when that is the case the errors of the head are pardoned as the passions subside. It is more than probable I may be able to serve him with those by whom he is confined, & that I may do this without injury to the U. States here; acting with

[1] Madame de Lafayette, with her two daughters, joined her husband in the prison of Olmutz in October, 1795.—SPARKS.

candor and avowing the motive, since it is impossible that motive can be otherwise than approved, especially if the step be taken when their affrs are in great prosperity. For this, however, I shall be happy to have y'r approbation, since if I do any thing with the Emperor it must be done in y'r name, if not explicitly yet in a manner to make known to him the interest you take in the welfare of Mr. Lafayette. Young Lafayette is I presume now under y'r auspices.[1]

Within a few days past a truce or armistice was concluded between Pichegru & Jourdan on the one side & Clairfayt & Wurmser on the other as it is said for three months: this was of course subject to approbation or rejection of the gov't on each side. I hear that it was rejected on the side of France, orders being sent by the directoire to pursue the war without cessation. Both armies are in the neighborhood of Mayence where the country is almost entirely devastated. In Italy the Austrians are completely routed & their whole army nearly demolished. 'T is said that 8000 prisoners are brought to one of the French

[1] Young Lafayette arrived with his mentor, M. Felix Frestal, in August, 1795, and sailed from New York for France on the 26th October, 1797. On his arrival he addressed the following letter to Washington: "Boston, 31 Aôust 1795,—Monsieur,—Après bien des peines et des traverses, c'est en Amérique, c'est auprès de vous, que je viens chercher un azyle, et mon père j'avois aspiré depuis long-temps après cet heureux moment, qui toujours avoit fui devant moi. Je commence à espérer maintenant davantage. Comme c'est à votre nom, que je dois le bonheur de me trouver enfin dans ma seconde Patrie; ce sera sûrement encore à vous, que je devrai celui d'y voir aussi mon père, heureux et libre, ainsi que tout ce qui m'est cher. Voudrez-vous bien permettre au fils infortuné d'un homme que vous avez honoré de quelque amitié, et qui de bonne heure apprit de lui à vous regarder comme son père, de venir vous offrir l'expression de sa reconnoissance, et l'hommage d'un respect aussi profond que tendre,—oserai-je dire filial?—GEORGE W. MOTIER LAFAYETTE.

villages. Mrs. Monroe desires her best respects to be presented to yourself & Mrs. Washington, who we hope enjoy good health. If there is anything in which I can be servicable to you here, any article of curiosity or taste you wish to possess & which can be procured, I beg of you to make it known to me that I may procure it for you. With great & sincere respect and esteem I am, Dear Sir, your most ob't & very humble servant, JA^{s} MONROE.

P. S. There are many articles of tapestry the most beautiful that can be conceived, & w'h are intended for the walls of rooms, for chair bottoms &ca., some of which perhaps wo'd be acceptible to the Com'rs of the federal town, & which if permitted by you or them I wo'd immediately procure & forward.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, January 13, 1795.

SIR,—I have the pleasure to inform you that upon the report of the united committees of Public Safety, Legislation, Commerce and Finances, a decree[1] has passed the Convention since my last, whereby it is resolved to carry into strict execution the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and this Republic. I beg leave to congratulate you upon this event, and particularly the unanimity with which it passed the Convention, since it demonstrates the good disposition of that body and of the nation gen-

[1] Note page 144, *ante*.

erally towards us. I was always satisfied, as heretofore intimated, that if I could have brought the subject in the first instance, before the Convention, I should have succeeded immediately in the object in view: But as the Committee was the department organized for such business this was impossible, without commencing a species of warfare upon it, and which was equally improper, as it might tend to increase their own dissentions. Happily by pursuing the object patiently with the Committee, removing doubts, and obviating objections, aided by occasional changes of the members, this has not only been avoided, but I have the additional pleasure to assure you, that it was finally accomplished, without the least difficulty and without exciting the animosity of any one.

After my late communications to the Committee of Public Safety, in which were exposed freely the object of Mr. Jay's mission to England, and the real situation of the United States with Britain and Spain, I had reason to believe, that all apprehension on those parts was done away and that the utmost cordiality had now likewise taken place in that body towards us. I considered the report above recited, and upon which the decree was founded, as the unequivocal proof of that change of sentiment, and flattered myself that in every respect we had now the best prospect of the most perfect and permanent harmony between the two Republics. I am very sorry, however, to add, that latterly this prospect has been somewhat clouded by accounts from England, that Mr. Jay had not only adjusted the points in controversy, but concluded

a treaty of commerce with that government: Some of those accounts state that he had also concluded a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive. As I knew the baneful effects which these reports would produce, I deemed it my duty by repeating what I had said before of his powers, to use my utmost endeavours, informally to discredit them. This, however, did not arrest the progress of the report, nor remove the disquietude it has created: For I was finally applied to directly by the Committee in a letter which stated what had been heard, and requested information of what I knew in regard to it.[1]

As I had just before received one from Mr. Jay, announcing that he had concluded a treaty, and which contained a declaration that our previous treaties should not be affected by it,[2] I thought fit to make

[1] From the Committee of Public Safety to Monroe. "December 27, 1794. We are informed, Citizen, that there was lately concluded at London, a treaty of alliance and commerce between the British Government and Citizen Jay, envoy extraordinary of the United States.

"A vague report spreads itself abroad, that, in this treaty, the Citizen Jay has forgotten those things which our treaties with the American people, and the sacrifices which the French people made to render them free, gave us a right to expect on the part of a minister of a nation, which we have so many motives to consider as friendly.

"It is important that we know positively in what light we are to hold this affair. There ought not to subsist between two free people, the dissimulation which belongs to Courts; and it gives us pleasure to declare that we consider you as much opposed personally to that kind of policy, as we are ourselves.

"We invite you then to communicate to us as soon as possible the treaty whereof there is question. It is the only means whereby you can enable the French Nation justly to appreciate those reports so injurious to the American government and to which that treaty gave birth."

[2] "London November 24, 1794. Sir, It gives me pleasure to inform you that a treaty between the United States and His Britannic Majesty was signed on the 19th., instant.

"This circumstance ought not to give any uneasiness to the Convention.

this letter the basis of my reply. And as it is necessary that you should be apprized of whatever has passed here on this subject, I now transmit to you copies of these several papers and which comprize a full statement thereof, up to the present time.

I cannot admit for a moment that Mr. Jay has exceeded his powers, or that any thing has been done which will give just cause of complaint to this Republic. I lament, however, that he has not thought himself at liberty to give me correct information on that subject; for until it is known that their interest has not been wounded, the report will certainly keep alive suspicion, and which always weakens the bonds of friendship. I trust therefore you will deem it expedient to advise me on this head, as soon as possible.

I apprized you, in my two last letters, of an informal communication between the diplomatic members of the Committee and myself, upon an interrog-

The treaty expressly declares that nothing contained in it shall be construed to operate contrary to existing treaties between the United States and other powers.

"I flatter myself that the United States, as well as all their ministers will, upon every occasion, manifest the most scrupulous regard to good faith; and that those nations who wish us well, will be pleased with our preserving peace and a good understanding with others."

On November 25th, Jay again addressed Monroe: "By a letter written and sent a few days ago, I had the pleasure of informing you that on the 19th., instant, the principal business of my mission was concluded by a treaty signed on that day. It contains a declaration, that it shall not be construed, nor operate contrary to our existing treaties; as therefore our engagements with other nations remain unaffected by it, there is reason to hope, that our preserving peace and a good understanding with this country, will not give uneasiness to any other. As the treaty is not ratified, it would be improper to publish it. It appears to me to be upon the whole, fair, and as equal as could be expected. In some respects, both nations will probably be pleased, and in others displeased."

atory of theirs, whether it would be possible for France to obtain aid from, or within, the United States, for the purchase of supplies; and of my effort upon that occasion to interest this Government in support of our claims with Britain and Spain; and to which I was stimulated by intelligence that Mr. Jay's mission had failed; and that we were on the point of war, or actually engaged in it, with Britain; as likewise by the Knowledge that Spain was covertly seeking a separate peace. I was satisfied that if France would embark in our cause, in the present state of things, and which I found her well disposed to do, and without the prospect of much aid in return, that the object in each instance would be secure. I therefore thought it eligible in that state of things, and with that view, to leave the door open for a communication on the subject with you. But as soon as I understood that Mr. Jay had adjusted the points in controversy with that nation, the object on my part was at an end. I was aware that if the adjustment was approved, we could render no such service: Indeed I doubted whether in peace the government possessed the power to render it. I called, therefore, immediately upon those members with whom the previous communication had been and suggested the same to them. They had anticipated the idea, and were prepared to answer it by a peremptory assurance, that it was not their wish to create embarrassment in this or any other respect: On the contrary, that regard should be shown in all cases to our actual situation; and with respect to the point in question, that the minister about to depart,

should be instructed not even to mention it if you forbade it. So that this business stands upon a footing, as indeed it always did, whereby under a particular state of things, some benefit may be derived from it, and no detriment under any.

The operations of this government continue to progress in the same course they have done for some time past. During the time of Robespierre, a period of the administration which is emphatically called the reign of terror, much havoc was made not only in the rights of humanity, but great confusion was likewise introduced, in other respects, in the affairs of the government. It has been the systematic effort of the administration to repair this waste, and heal the bleeding wounds of the country, and, in this, great progress has been made. By the same report which proposed the execution of the violated articles of the treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, it was likewise proposed to open wide the door of commerce to every citizen (excluding them from navigation only) and which was adopted: So that, at present, any person bringing productions into the ports of this Republic, may sell them to whom he pleases, and generally with astonishing profit. The Agents of the Republic stand upon the ground of other persons: They are preferred only by out-bidding them. In my judgment no region of the world presents such an opening to the enterprize of our countrymen as this does. The restraints upon their own navigation, operate in the degree as a bounty to ours; and the government and citizens of France

seem equally pleased to see ours preferred to that of any other nation. The restraints, likewise, which are imposed in other countries, on account of the war, upon a commerce with the French citizens, produce, in other respects, the same effect. It is the interest of the latter to employ our countrymen in ordinary mercantile transactions, and especially with foreign nations; whereby they get into their hands a great proportion of the whole trade of the Republic. The profits which those on this theatre have already made, and continue to make, surpass what you have any idea of. I sincerely wish that this was more generally known, that more might be induced to embark in it, not only for the purpose of diffusing more generally the immediate emoluments, but for the more important one of gaining an interest in the commerce of this Republic, which may be of lasting advantage to the United States. Before the Revolution, the English possessed this advantage, as they did in most other countries: But now that interest is annihilated; and if the Americans step in, aided as they will be by the preference of the government and people in their favour, they may occupy the ground, and retain it for ever afterwards. Permit me to add that nothing will more essentially forward this object, than an extensive and numerous appointment of Consuls. In every port an agent should be placed: and I should suppose the object of sufficient importance to induce our countrymen to accept of these offices. If a prudent and creditable person, the appointment attaches to it confidence, and gives him the command of Capital. I am

satisfied that any young man of good character, having the appointment in any of the ports, might immediately connect himself advantageously with the first house there, and gradually command elsewhere what capital he pleased. I have examined into this subject and have thought proper to give you the result of my researches into it.

Nor has this wise and humane system been limited to this object alone. It has already been extended to many branches of national policy, and promises to embrace the whole. A decree was not long since passed by which the seventy-one members, formerly of the Brissotine or Girondin party, and who had been confined on that account, were all at liberty, and called into the Convention. And a few days afterwards our countryman, Mr. Paine, was likewise restored to his seat in that body, with marks of the most respectful attention. These events have given satisfaction to the community at large. A decree also, which had excluded the nobles and foreigners (the Americans excepted) from Paris, and the seaports, has likewise been repealed. This latter act, though comparatively of apparent little importance, has notwithstanding produced an excellent effect: For as it breathes a spirit of humanity and on that account captivates all, so it has contributed, by passing in review many members of the ancient order of nobility (and who have not forgotten, and never will forget, old habits) to present before the public, and much to the credit of the Revolution, the strong and interesting contrast between the manly character of the French nation at

the present day, and the miserable effeminacy, foppery and decrepitude of former times.

A decree has likewise passed, by which a general amnesty has been proclaimed in the Vendu; and a report has been since received from the deputies who were sent to carry it into effect, that all those to whom it was announced, had lain down their arms, and arranged themselves under the banner of the Republic; and that they were likewise satisfied it would terminate the war; a war heretofore, beyond example, bloody and destructive, and whose origin, support and means of continuance, appear even yet to be but little understood. Freed from this embarrassment, the Republic will acquire new vigor in all its enterprises; it will certainly have under its command, for other purposes, a considerable force which was heretofore employed there.

But in retracing the ground, to repair in detail the injuries which the reign of terror had inflicted, it was impossible to behold the havoc it had made, without feeling some indignation for the authors of so great and complicated misery. This propensity, however, and which was equally incited by the obligations of justice and humanity, was strongly opposed from the period of Robespierres death to the present time, by a sentiment of extensive impression, that it were better to prevent the further effusion of blood, and to cover with a veil the atrocities which had passed, so far as they could be covered, than to punish those of greatest enormity. For some time this sentiment prevailed, and though often irritated and

disturbed by the remaining leaders of the opposite party, who courted danger and provoked their own fate, yet it appeared probable it would finally preponderate and confirm the administration within that limit. The trial, however, of the *Nantois*, a long train of respectable citizens at Nantes, who were arrested under the administration of Carrier, in his mission there, and brought lately before the tribunal of Paris, opened the scene again, and revived the sensation of horror, which had before in some measure subsided.[1] Such enormities were disclosed in the course of this trial, that it was impossible otherwise to appease the public mind than by submitting Carrier, and his accomplices to the tribunal in their turn. Condemnation was the sure consequence of his trial; and it was expected, so clear was the case against him, that all those formerly of that party, would now separate from and yield him to his fate. From such a line of conduct some merit might have been arrogated, and the public censure thrown in a great measure on him alone; by whose punishment too the public resentment might possibly have been satisfied. But Billaud de Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and even Barrère, a man heretofore noted for skilful movements

[1] Of the horrors of the French Revolution, the massacres of the Federalists of Nantes were the most diabolical. This Carrier, says Scott, in his *Life of Napoleon*, might have summoned hell to match his cruelty without a demon venturing to answer his challenge. It is impossible for us, at the present day especially, to know without feeling keen indignation how James Monroe as America's representative was obliged to cultivate France's friendship and to conciliate her Councils in their every sensitive whim and disposition to take offence. The cruelties and the horrors of the French Revolutionists were alone sufficient to have absolved us from any allegiance to that Country, and especially so when it was to her murdered king that our gratitude was due.

in critical conjunctures, acted otherwise. They obviously and from the beginning, made Carrier's cause their own; not only by supporting him in the Convention, as far as it was possible, but by exciting the Jacobins to take part in his favour; thereby attaching themselves to the declining fortunes of that Club, and likewise making some unseasonable motions which bore on their face the complexion of that party. The separation required at best a dexterous management; but by these means they presented themselves out as an object, invited the public attention, and, in the degree, the public resentment. Whether they will finally escape is now doubtful. Lecontre, who has shewn himself sufficiently prone, upon a former occasion to commence the attack, took advantage of one of these moments of indiscretion to renew it, and with better effect. This motion was sent to the Committee of Twenty-One, heretofore organized to report, whether there was just ground of accusation, and there it now is.

Another signal victory was obtained over the Spaniards since my last, and in which the two commanding generals, with many men, were slain, and nine thousand taken prisoners. And in the north, since the ice, nearer approaches are made to Holland, which will most probably soon be taken. Within a few days past deputies arrived from the Stadtholderian party, to negociate a separate peace: But at the same time others came from the patriotic party to oppose it, and who pressed the Committee to order forward the troops immediately, to assail and enter Amsterdam;

and to which effect orders were accordingly issued. I am satisfied that peace will not be granted to the Netherlands, although a revolution should take place there, on any other condition than that of their uniting in the war against England. It is conceived that a peace to that power, on other terms, would be more favourable to England than its continuance in the war; for thereby the British troops might be withdrawn, and great advantage gained in other respects from its neutrality. This it is thought is the object of England in assenting to their peace; but in rejecting the offer, France opens a trait in her views that will add much to the weight of the ministerial argument for a continuation of the war. No argument is so strong as that of necessity, and if France will not make peace it will be impossible for England to do it. In my judgment it is the determination of this Republic to pursue the war, until the maritime strength of England is broken; and when the actual state of things is regarded, with that of the comparative population, force and enterprize of the two nations, I do not see how it can be prevented. A single victory at sea accomplishes the object, and the rapidity with which ships were built, and fleets equipped here is inconceivable. Within few weeks past, the Brest fleet has been out twice (indeed it is now out) consisting of thirty-six ships of the line, fifteen frigates, fourteen sloops of war and cutters, giving the defiance to its antagonist, which continues close locked to the land. More latterly, however, some indications were seen on that coast of a disposition to take the sea, and hazard the fate of the Island on a

battle, so that it is probable something decisive may take place soon.

With respect to the other powers nothing definitive has yet been done in regard to peace. It is certain that several wish it, and particularly Spain and Prussia; but yet some difficulties have occurred in regulating the commencement and manner of the negociation. England opposes it, because she knows she will not be included; and they on that account wish it to be private, merely to avoid the imputations that would arise if it were known; and this cannot well be accommodated under the present organization of the French Government. It is said that a Minister from Prussia is at Basle, in Switzerland, with power to treat; and that they all have agents there for the same purpose is likewise probable.

I will endeavour, if possible, to forward by this opportunity a report rendered me by Mr. Skipwith, upon the subject of American claims. Be assured that every possible attention has been, and shall be paid to this subject. With great respect and esteem I have the honor to be, dear Sir, your very humble servant.

JA^{S} MONROE.

P. S. I had omitted to mention the official communication by the Committee of Public Safety, of the decree of the Convention for carrying into effect the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and France: The polite terms, however, in which it is expressed merit attention.

TO JOHN JAY.

PARIS, January 17, 1795.

SIR,—Early in December last, English papers were received here, containing such accounts of your adjustment with the British administration, as excited much uneasiness in the councils of this government, and I had it in contemplation to dispatch a confidential person to you, for such information of what had been done, as would enable me to remove it. At that moment, however, I was favoured with yours of the 25th., November, intimating, that the contents of the treaty could not be made known until it was ratified; but that it contained nothing derogatory to our existing treaties with other powers. Thus advised I thought it improper to make the application; because I concluded the arrangement was mutual and not to be departed from. I proceeded, therefore, to make the best use in my power of the information already given.

To day, however, I was favoured with yours of the 28th of the same month,[1] by which I find you consider

[1] "London, November 28th 1794. SIR,—Within this week past I have written to you two letters to inform you that on the 19th. instant a treaty between the United States and his Britannic Majesty was signed. The design of this letter is chiefly to introduce to you Mr. Pleasants of Philadelphia, whose connections there are respectable, I have not the pleasure of being personally acquainted with this gentleman, but as a fellow citizen I wish to do him friendly offices; and I am persuaded that a similar disposition on your part will insure to him such a degree of attention as circumstances may render proper.

As Mr. Pinckney has a cypher with our other ministers in Europe, either he or I will shortly use it in communicating to you the principal heads of the Treaty *confidentially*. You need not hesitate in the mean time to say explicitly that it contains nothing repugnant to our engagements with any other nation. With the best wishes for your health and prosperity I have the honor to be, Sir, your

yourself at liberty to communicate to me the contents of the treaty, and as it is of great importance to our affairs here, to remove all doubt upon this point, I have thought it proper to resume my original plan of sending a person to you for the necessary information, and have in consequence dispatched the bearer, Mr. John Purviance for that purpose. I have been the more induced to this from the further consideration that in case I should be favoured with the communication promised in cypher, it would be impossible for me to comprehend it, as Mr. Morris took it with him. Mr. Purviance is from Maryland, a gentleman of integrity and merit, and to whom you may commit whatever you may think proper to confide with perfect safety. It is necessary, however, to observe, that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to so it will be useless for me to make to it any new communication short of that. I mention this that you may know precisely the state of my engagements here, and how I deem it my duty to act under them in relation to this object. I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Purviance for whatever other information you may wish on this subject, or the affairs more generally of this Republic. I have the honor to be with great respect your most obedient servant.

JA^{S} MONROE.

most ob^{t} and h^{ble} servant.—John Jay." Monroe in his *View* notes that this letter was received on the 16th. of January, or about that time by Mr. Pleasants. Jay transmitted a copy of this letter with his reply, to the Secretary of State, February 5, 1795. *See* American State Papers, vol. i., pp. 5, 7.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, January 25, 1795.

CITIZENS,—I have thought proper to present to your view, in the enclosed paper, the situation of the United States in relation to the situation of the river Mississippi, and respecting which a negociation is now depending with the Court of Spain. This paper opens fully this interesting subject in its relation to both Republics, and which it is proper you should be correctly informed of, at the present time. France can only assist in opening the river, by inviting the American Minister, Mr. Short, to act in concert with her when she shall conclude her treaty with that power, and which by her permission, I can easily accomplish; or by comprising it in her own treaty. I have no power to treat upon this subject otherwise than by bringing it thus before you for the purpose of ascertaining what your disposition is upon it; and which with any comments you may be pleased to make, I shall be happy immediately to communicate to the American government.

JA^{s} MONROE.

NOTES RESPECTING THE RIVER MISSISSIPPI; COMMUNICATED TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, January 25, 1795.

The river Mississippi extends from about the forty-eighth degree of north latitude to the twenty-ninth, where it empties into the Gulph of Mexico, running nearly a north and south course and through a tract of the most fertile country in the world.

It bounds the United States to the west, from latitude thirty-one, to its source; an extent, pursuing the course of the river, of about two thousand miles.

Many rivers empty into the Mississippi on the east; the principal of which are the Illinois and the Ohio, and which with their branches, spread through the whole of the western interior of the United States, and make it a most delightful region. Other rivers empty into it from the west, of which the Missouri is the most important. This latter has never been traced to its source; although voyagers have passed up it above one thousand five hundred miles: It is however believed that it penetrates further into the bosom of the continent than the Mississippi itself.

The whole of that portion of the United States lying westward of the Alleghany Mountains, and which comprizes about one half the territory within the said States depends upon this river for the export of its productions to foreign markets. It comprehends a portion of the territory of several of the existing States: Perhaps one third of Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia; the whole of Kentucky and an immense tract of vacant territory, lying between the Ohio and the Mississippi, and which has already been laid out into five separate States, and which are to be admitted into the Union with the same rights as the old States, when they shall respectively attain a certain number of inhabitants. Of these it is proposed to settle one only at a time, and of which the first has already been commenced.

When we examine the extent of this territory; its fertility, superior to that of the old States; the felicity of its climate, lying all within the temperate zone; the kind and quality of its productions, such as hemp, flour, corn,—in short everything necessary in human life—protected in its infant settlements by the government of the United States, and admitted as soon as it shall attain a certain degree of maturity to equal membership with them,—we are compelled to appreciate it more highly than any other vacant tract known upon the globe.

Its settlement is of importance to all those European countries whose inhabitants are engaged in manufactures; because it will furnish in abundance rude materials for every species of manufacture: To those which have occasion at times for the supply of provisions; because it will furnish an exhaustless source of every species of provision; but it is of peculiar importance to those which have islands in the West Indies; because it lies in the neigh-

bourhood of those islands, the mouth of the Mississippi being nearly in the same latitude; and will furnish everything in demand there, such as lumber, provisions, &c.

But the commerce of this country when settled, will depend upon the navigation of the Mississippi, and of course the settlement itself will depend upon the same cause. This was secured by a treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain in 1783, but has hitherto been prevented by Spain from motives equally unjust and illiberal. A negociation the object of which, on our part, is to open it, is and has been depending with that power since that time.

At the time our peace was made with England, the importance of this country was little known in her councils: It is said that her negociators did not even know on which side of the lakes, and of course within whose jurisdiction, the forts, which have since been the subject of contention, lay. But its importance was soon afterwards understood, and from which time it is certain that Britain has regarded it with particular attention, in hopes either of gaining it to herself, or otherwise making it subservient to her schemes of policy. With this view she refused to surrender the posts, excited the Indians to make war on our frontiers, encouraged Spain to refuse our right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and did us other injuries of the same kind.

It is certain that the western people will sooner or later open this river, either by negociation or by force, and more than probable that England, retaining as she still does her resentment against the old states for their independence and against France for the aid given in that war, will watch the uneasiness of the western people, on account of the obstruction of the navigation of the river, and improve it into an opportunity of separating the new from the old States, and connecting them with her interest in Canada, by undertaking to open the Mississippi to both countries. And with that view it is said that she has long had agents there to treat upon this subject; and that nothing has prevented her success, but the attachment the people have to their brethren in the old States; their repugnance to become the sport of foreign politics, and which would follow their separation; and the particular enmity they bear to that power. Next to Conquest

Separation would be the most advantageous arrangement for Britain; for in consequence, and especially if opened under her auspices, she would become the ally of the western States and play them off against the eastern; whereby their importance and weight in the scale of nations would be diminished, if not destroyed. Many believe, and with this view, that she was at the bottom of the late insurrection on the frontier and which grew out of the discontents proceeding from the occlusion of the river.

But the same motive which inclines England to promote the separation of the new from the old States should dispose France to prevent it. As they now stand, the whole are the allies and the friends of France, and whilst they remain united they will continue so: By the separation, therefore, Britain might gain but France could not.

It is then the interest of France to keep the whole of this territory under the same government: But this cannot be done unless the intrigues of England be defeated, and the Mississippi be opened under the patronage of the United States. It is therefore the interest of France to yield her aid to her ally, to open this river, and which at the present crisis would most probably produce a decisive effect. Nor would her retribution be limited to those considerations only, which have been already mentioned. Experience has shewn that those alliances are not only the most beneficial but likewise most durable, which are founded equally in the affection and the interests of the parties, and by this act of friendship France would establish a claim to the gratitude of the American people; which by pervading every quarter would reach the heart of every citizen. It would be known to the present race and remembered by posterity, that by the aid of France, the old States were enabled to gain their independence, and that likewise by her aid the new States commenced their settlement, grew up to the enjoyment of their rights, and attained their maturity.

In the present state of the war with Spain, it is presumed, that France may obtain what is here proposed; and indeed, infinitely more, either in the Islands or even in South America, and without the least difficulty. Her system is a system of freedom to the world, as well in respect to the rights of nations as of men: It is

therefore hoped she will avail herself of the present opportunity, not only to verify that fact; but to manifest at the same time the pleasure with which she embraces every opportunity that occurs to promote the interest of her ally.[1]

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, February 1st, 1795.

SIR,—I was lately informed by Mr. Jay that it was his intention to communicate to me the contents of his treaty with the British administration, and as I knew the good effect which correct information upon that point would produce upon our affairs here (admitting it to be as heretofore represented) I thought it my duty to endeavour to avail myself of it as soon as possible. But as the communication promised was to be in cypher, and Mr. Morris had taken his copy with him, I knew that I should not be able to comprehend it in case it was received. I therefore deemed the acquisition of it an object of sufficient importance to authorise the expense of an especial dispatch to London to obtain it, and have, in consequence, committed that trust to Mr. Purviance of Baltimore, who left this immediately after the receipt of Mr. Jays letter and who was likewise instructed to

[1] Monroe received the following acknowledgment from the Committee of Public Safety: "We acknowledge by the solicitude which you show in the negociations of this affair, that nothing which can tend to confirm the bond of friendship and harmony between the two first republics in the world, is strange or indifferent to you. We thank you for the ideas you have communicated to us: We will examine them profoundly, and we will communicate to you without delay our observations upon your note. But we appreciate beforehand the motives of this loyal communication."

bring me a copy of Mr. Pinckney's cypher for future use. By his return I hope to be able to remove all uneasiness upon that head and in which I am the more confident from a knowledge that the government here is well disposed to view it with the utmost liberality.

I was also lately informed by a letter from Mr. Fenwick that he understood that Mr. Muscoe Livingston who had lately arrived from Lisbon that Colonel Humphreys had sailed thence for Algiers upon the business, as was presumed, intrusted to him with that Regency; and that prior to his departure he had committed to him a message for me, to be communicated in person. Mr. Fenwick adds that Mr. Livingston was taken sick and in consequence deprived of his senses just as he was about to set out from Bordeaux for Paris; whereby he was not only rendered unable to proceed on his journey, but even to communicate to him the purport of his message to me. Thus I am left in perfect ignorance equally of Colonel Humphrey's wishes, the time of his departure and plan of operation. I intimated to you before that although I had written to Colonel Humphreys for information upon that point and with the view of forwarding his wishes to the utmost of my power; yet I am fearful in consideration of those embarrassments which were inseparable from the war, it would be difficult to concert any plan of harmonious operation which should commence and proceed from such distant points whereby the aid of this Republic could be yielded us in that negociation. Under present circumstances

therefore you will readily perceive that it has become altogether impossible.

The French troops have at length entered Amsterdam whereby the whole of the province of Holland was brought immediately under the power of this Republic, as, indeed the whole of the seven United Provinces most probably soon will be. This was announced a few days past to the Convention by a letter from the deputies in that quarter; two of whom, it is said, are on their way to render an account in detail of this very important acquisition. It is reported that Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom have surrendered: Indeed the general idea is that no further opposition will be made there to the French arms, and of course that this Republic will become possessed of the fleet and immense stores of every kind. The Prince of Orange, with his family, accompanied by several members of the States General, had made their escape; but by what route and whether for London or Berlin is unknown.

After the entry of the French into Amsterdam was certain and in consequence the entire conquest of the Seven Provinces more than probable an effort was made by the States General to yield the same thing upon terms for the purpose of putting the Republic in possession of the country by treaty instead of conquest; and with this view an agent who arrived here about a fortnight before that event was dispatched, and who offered, as I am well assured to surrender all the important fortifications of the country and to provide at their own expense and for the residue of

the war quarters and provisions for such force as should be deemed adequate to hold them. To yield immediately twenty-five sail of the line, and likewise to pay at stated times convenient for both parties the sum of three hundred millions of florins. But it was known by the Committee that without an accident as much might be gained and perhaps more by conquest: That the latter mode which knew of no condition, freed them from fetters, and of course from the possibility of any future breach of treaty and of violated faith. The agent however, who was an ancient minister of that government here, was suffered to remain and treated with respect, whilst orders were issued to the troops to advance, and which were obeyed.

There arrived at the same time a deputation from the patriots who associating with Mr. Van Staphorst, and one or two others of those who were banished from their country in 1787, endeavoured to counteract the movements of the agent from the States General and to attract to the patriotic body the attention of the Convention. Before the entrance into Amsterdam they wished admittance to the bar, as well for that purpose, as to sound the disposition of the Convention in regard to the future state of Holland. But in *that* stage it was evaded, perhaps from policy; perhaps from the real impropriety of expressing any opinion upon that point in the then state of affairs, or perhaps indeed from the impossibility of forming one. But, since that event, they were admitted, and with an address founded on it, though in other respects adapted as was before intended. The answer

of the President was respectful, but cautious; for whilst it breathed a spirit of patriotism, and of particular regard for the *ancient* virtues of the Belgic Confederacy, and of course, left them no cause of complaint, it carefully avoided all compromitment of the government itself.

What will be the future fate of those provinces is altogether uncertain, and must be in a great measure dependant on events. At present I am satisfied there is no settled plan on that head, nor indeed, is it possible there should be, within so short a space of time. Many members and among them some of distinguished weight in the Convention seemed disposed to extend the future boundary of the Republic to the Rhine; and, of course, to comprehend within its limits all that part of those provinces lying on this side of that river. This idea was lately avowed by Boissy d' Anglas, a member of the Committee of Public Safety in a speech delivered apparently by authority of that body, and for the purpose equally, of sounding the Convention upon the conditions of peace, to ascertain what terms they would approve of; as to announce in that informal, and of course not obligatory, manner, to the parties concerned, the ultimata upon which they might expect it. In this he proposes that the Republic shall be hereafter bounded only; "by the ocean, the mountains and the great rivers." Be this, however, as it may, I think it certain unless the fortunes of war should inspire other councils, that the whole of these provinces will be retained in the hands of this Republic

until its termination, and be made, in the progress, as instrumental to that event, in its favour, as circumstances will admit of.

But even in case they be not dismembered, a revolution in their government seems to be unavoidable. Their strong posts, their harbours, perhaps their fleet, will be under the control of France, and, of course, their councils likewise will be so. Ancient forms may for awhile remain, but it is not possible, under circumstances of this kind, that they should be more than forms. Half the political regulations of the country, perhaps the whole, will proceed from the representatives of this Republic with the army: Nor will any of its inhabitants, other than those of decided patriotism, be employed by them in any office of trust or profit. Thus the weight and authority of the government will be gradually transferred to the popular scale. The people at large will soon take the admonition, and from that moment the ancient fabric, which was before tottering, will be levelled to the ground. The ordinary allurements of freedom are sufficiently great to the mass of mankind to require no additional recommendation in its favour, and the hand of power must be strong where it is not pursued with effect; but in the present instance, the additional inducement will be great; for as it is well known, that this Republic can repose no confidence in the existing government, and especially in the house of Orange, and which might not be the case, and most probably would not, with *that* which would succeed a revolution; so it must be equally obvious that its contin-

uance will furnish a strong argument here for the dismemberment. This consideration, therefore, will add a new stimulus to all those who incline rather to preserve the independence of their country, than become reduced into a few departments of France.

Before this great atchievement, and which resembles more an exploit of the ancient Roman empire, than those of modern princes, there was a collection of diplomatic characters, formal and informal, from several of the powers at war, and others friendly to some of them, at Basle in Switzerland, and who expected to be met there by some agent or agents from this Republic, to commence negociations for peace. But as soon as they heard of this event, that prospect vanished, and it is said that some of them have retired home, and others arrived here to confer more directly with the government itself. Count Carletti, from Florence, and Baron Stahl from Sweden, men, said to be friendly to the French revolution, are those only who are known, and the latter is supposed rather to expect, than to have brought his credentials with him.

I herewith transmit to you some communications received from Mr. Skipwith, and which will shew the state of the Bordeaux and St. Domingo claims, and I beg of you to be assured of the unremitted attention which I shall continue to pay to these concerns, and indeed to every other in which my countrymen are interested. With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be your most obt and very humble servant,

JAs MONROE.

5th February, P.S. Since the above was written, some details have been received of the success of the French in the United Netherlands, and by which it appears that every thing which was predicted in that respect has been verified. Williamstadt, Breda, Gorcum, Bergen-op-Zoom, and the fleet, the held by ice in the Texel, are all taken. I inclose, however, the papers containing those accounts.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDM. RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, February 12, 1795.

SIR,—I was honored with yours of the 2nd. December, three days since, and by which I find that my third letter only had then reached you, although the two preceding, with duplicates, were forwarded according to their respective dates, and by opportunities which promised security and dispatch.

I read, with equal surprize and concern, the strictures you deemed it necessary to make upon some particulars of my conduct here[1]; because I think it

[1] "With the frankness of friendship," wrote Randolph, "I must discharge the obligation of my office, by communicating to you the opinions which we entertain here concerning the speech which you made on your introduction into the National Convention.

"When you left us, we all supposed, that your reception, as the minister of the United States, would take place in the private chamber of some Committee. Your letter of credence contained the degree of profession which the government was desirous of making; and though the language of it would not have been cooled, even if its subsequent publicity had been foreseen; still it was natural to expect that the remarks with which you might accompany its delivery would be merely oral and therefore not exposed to the rancorous criticism of nations at war with France.

"It seems that upon your arrival the downfall of Robespierre, and the sus-

did not merit them, and trust upon a further view of all circumstances, you will entertain the same opinion. Of these, by this time, you will possess a general view: A more particular detail, however, I think proper now to communicate.

It is objected that I addressed the Convention with a glow of sentiment not warranted by my instructions. Secondly; that I made public what was intended and policy dictated, should be kept private.

pension of the usual routine of business, combined perhaps with an anxiety to demonstrate an affection for the United States, had shut up for a time the diplomatic cabinet, and rendered the hall of the national convention the theatre of diplomatic civilities. We should have supposed that an introduction there would have brought to mind these ideas. 'The United States are neutral: the allied powers jealous: with England we are now in treaty: By England we have been impeached for breaches of faith in favor of France: Our citizens are notoriously Gallican in their hearts: It will be wise to hazard as little as possible on the score of good humour: And therefore, in the disclosure of my feelings something is due to the possibility of fostering new suspicions.' Under the influence of these sentiments we should have hoped that your address to the national Convention would have been so framed as to leave heart-burnings nowhere. If private affection and opinions had been the only points to be consulted, it would have been immaterial where or how they were delivered. But the range of a public minister's mind will go to all the relations of our country with the whole world. We do not perceive that your instructions have imposed upon you the extreme glow of some parts of your address; and my letter in behalf of the House of Representatives which has been considered by some gentlemen as too strong, was not to be viewed in any other light than as executing the task assigned by that body.

"After these remarks which are never to be interpreted into any dereliction of the French cause I must observe to you that they are made principally to recommend caution; lest we should be obliged at some time or other, to explain away or disavow an excess of fervor, so as to reduce it down to the cool system of neutrality. You have it still in charge to cultivate the French Republic with zeal but without any unnecessary eclat; besides the dictates of sincerity do not demand that we should render notorious all our feelings in favor of that nation."—*American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, vol. i., p. 689.

A little later Randolph took a more conciliatory tone and Monroe believed that he would never have written so severely if all the dispatches had reached him in due order.—GILMAN.

And thirdly, that I compromitted the government, by saying, that it was willing to tolerate injuries, which it was not disposed to tolerate; whereby an important interest to our country was slighted or given up.

Whether my address contains a single sentiment or expression different from what my instructions and the declarations of the legislative branches contain, is to be determined by comparing the one with the other. I had them before me at the time and drew it by them; of course I thought it did not, and I now think so. The force, however of this objection is, I presume, comprized in the second; for if the communication had been in private and not in public, the objection most probably would not have been made. Upon this point, therefore, a more thorough explanation is necessary, and for this purpose a full view of the circumstances and motives which influenced my conduct equally so.

Upon my arrival here, I found our affairs, as it was known they were before I sailed, in the worst possible situation. The treaty between the two Republics was violated: Our commerce was harrassed in every quarter, and in every article, even that of tobacco not excepted. Our seamen taken on board our vessels were often abused, generally imprisoned and treated in other respects like the subjects of the powers at war with them: Our former minister was not only without the confidence of the government, but an object of particular jealousy and distrust: In addition to which it was suspected, that we were about to abandon them

for a connection with England, and for which purpose *principally*, it was believed that Mr. Jay had been sent there. The popular prepossession too in our favor had abated, and was in some measure at a stand; for the officers of the fleets from America had brought unfavourable accounts of our disposition towards them. Thus the connection between the two countries hung, as it were, upon a thread; and I am convinced, that if some person possessing their confidence had not been sent, it would have been broken.

My first reception was marked with circumstances which fully demonstrated these facts, and shewed how critical the ground was on which we stood; for it is unquestionably true, that notwithstanding my political principles were subscribed to, the Committee, or the governing party in it, were disposed to delay my reception, throw me entirely out of view, and destroy altogether the effect of my mission. It was said that as my principles were with them, I ought on that account to be the more dreaded; for if they confided in me, I should only lull them asleep as to their true interest, in regard to the movements on foot; and under this impression I was viewed with a jealous eye, and kept at the most awful distance. This deportment towards me was so observable, that it attracted the attention of the representatives of the other powers here, and was most probably communicated elsewhere.

Into what consequences this policy, which was hostile to us, might lead, I could not readily perceive; but I was alarmed on that head; for I well knew that

an avowed enmity by this government, against our executive administration, and in which shape it threatened to break out, pursued with passion as I had reason to apprehend it would be, would not only injure our national character, but likewise disturb our internal tranquility, and perhaps involve us in war. The interval between such a step and the existing state of things was small, and in the tide of their fortunes which were prosperous, I was fearful it would be taken. Thus circumstanced what course did policy dictate that I should pursue? Did it become me to look on as a tranquil spectator of machinations that portended so much mischief to my country; or was it more wise, more consistent with the obligations of the trust I had accepted to make a decisive effort to defeat them? And, in adopting the latter counsel, in what line should that effort be directed, or by what means enabled to succeed? The doors of the Committee, as already mentioned, were closed against me: And had it been otherwise, knowing as I did the disposition of that body towards us, would it have been prudent to have deposited those documents under its care, since they furnished the only means by which I could counteract its views? Or was it to be presumed, that the declarations of friendship which they contained, would produce in the councils of that body any change of sentiment, advised as it had been, and armed as it was, with a series of contrary evidence, and in which it would place a greater confidence? I can assure you and with great sincerity, that after taking in my mind, so far as I was able, and with perfect

calmness (for the imputations against me were not of a nature to inspire zeal) that range of our affairs in their general relation to those of other powers, and in which you deem my conduct defective,—that the measure I adopted appeared to me not only the most eligible one; but that in the then juncture of affairs, I thought it my indespensable duty to adopt it. Nor was I disappointed in any of the consequences upon which I had calculated; for by this public demonstration of our regard for this nation and its *revolution* (though indeed the word was not used) the people at large were settled on the right side. The abettors of a contrary doctrine were in a great measure confounded; and as soon as the impression upon the public mind had time to react back upon the public councils, aided by the little incidents I caught at to inspire confidence, together with a change of the members of the Committee, was the object, even in that body, though slowly, yet finally, completely accomplished.

But you intimate that I ought to have shunned this publicity, from the fear it might injure our depending negociations with Britain and Spain. Had I seen cause to apprehend that consequence, I should certainly have been more averse to the measure: But there was none; on the contrary that it would produce the opposite effect, was in my opinion certain. In demonstrating this, permit me to develope, according to my idea of it, the object of Mr. Jay's mission, and the contingencies upon which his success depended. This will shew the relation which mine had

to his, and more satisfactorily than I can otherwise do, the motives in that respect of my conduct.

I understood that the sole object of Mr. Jay's mission was to demand the surrender of the posts, and compensation for injuries, and was persuaded that his success would depend upon two primary considerations; the success of the French arms and the continuance of a most perfect good understanding between the two Republics. If we were disappointed in either of these events, I concluded that his mission would fail; for we knew that a long and able negociation for the first object had already proved abortive, and we saw that in the preceding year, when Toulon, was taken and fortune seemed to frown upon the arms of this Republic, that an order was issued for those spoliations of which we so justly complain. We likewise saw afterwards when the spirit of this nation was roused and victory attended its efforts, that that order was rescinded and some respect was shewn to the United States. Thus it appeared that our fortune, at least so far as depended upon Britain, and of course the success of Mr. Jay's mission, depended upon that of France.

But the success of France could not redound to our advantage, and especially in the negociation with Britain, without a good understanding and concert with the French government: For without that, we could neither count upon success in negociation, nor in case it failed, upon the fortunate issue of arms, if war should be appealed to. By negociation we could not hope with success otherwise than

from the apprehension in the British cabinet, than if we were not accommodated, we would join in the war against them: We could not accept it at the price of an equivalent, and thus pay again for what was already our due: Nor could we expect it from the affection, the justice or the liberality of that court; for we well knew that if it had possessed those virtues, we should have had no cause of complaint. But we could not join in the war, nor even avail ourselves of that argument in negociation, without a concert with France; for without such concert, we might commence at the moment she was about to conclude; whereby we should be left alone to contend with that power; who would probably be supported by Spain. If then our good understanding with France was broken, or the necessary concert between us incomplete, Britain would only have to amuse us 'till the crisis had passed, and then defy us.

If this doctrine is true, and it is admitted, that the success of Mr. Jay's mission depended upon a good understanding with the French Republic, it follows, that the more cordial it was, and the more generally known, the happier the effect would be; and of course, that by exhibiting this public proof of it, instead of retarding, I forwarded essentially the object of that negociation: And such, indeed, was my idea at the time; for I knew that the movement would be so understood on the other side of the channel; and in consequence, believed it would produce a good effect, and in which I was the more confirmed by the information of several of my countrymen, who

were in England when the embargo was imposed, and who assured me that if it had been continued, Mr. Jay's success would have been immediate.

That the English administration would complain of this movement, and of me, was what I expected; but I knew that I was sent here not to subserve the views of that administration, and trusted that whilst I rested on my instructions, and performed my duty with integrity, although my judgment might occasionally err, as those of most men sometimes do, that no concession would be made to my discredit, in favour of that administration: On the contrary, that I should be firmly supported against its attacks by those who sent me here. I trust that this has been the case in the present instance, and upon which point I am more anxious, upon public than upon private considerations; because I well know, that if any such concession has been made, it was immediately communicated by its instruments here, and for the purpose of weakening the confidence of this government in our own; a practice systematically pursued heretofore, and with the hope of separating, or at least of preventing any kind of concert between the two countries.

Had the fortunes of France been unprosperous upon my arrival, the motive for greater caution would have been stronger. But the case was in every respect otherwise. Her fortunes were at the height of prosperity, and those of her enemies decisively on the decline. It was obvious that nothing was wanting to preserve tranquillity at home, and to

ensure success in our foreign negociations, but the good wishes and the good offices of this Republic towards us. By the measure therefore, I thought that every thing was to be gained and nothing to be lost.

Upon the third point little need be said. I have some time since transmitted to you a decree which carried the treaty into effect, and yielded the point in question. Satisfied I am, too, it was greatly forwarded if not absolutely obtained, by the manner in which it was urged: For a generous policy is better calculated to produce to good effect here, than a strict one: And other than in that light my declaration cannot be considered. Surely I did not concede the point, nor intimate an indifference upon it: On the contrary, I laboured, with the greatest force of which I was capable to demonstrate the interest we had in it as well as themselves: Nor did I condescend in that or any other transaction. In general I know I am more apt to err on the other side; and I am persuaded, that in the present instance you will find, upon a reperusal of the paper in question, that although it contains expressions of friendship, it certainly betrays none of condescendsion.

I have thus answered the objections contained in your strictures upon my conduct, by stating the circumstances under which I acted, with my motives of action; and I presume satisfied you that I did not merit them. But I cannot dismiss the subject without observing; that, when I review the scenes through which I have passed, recollect the difficulties I had

to encounter, the source from whence they proceeded, and my efforts to inspire confidence here in our administration, and without which nothing could be done, and much mischief was to be apprehended,— I cannot but feel mortified to find that, for this very service, I am censured by that administration.

You have already seen by the course of my correspondence, that however difficult it was to succeed, yet at certain times, we were completely possessed of the confidence of this government; and that, at those times, I had the good fortune to accomplish some objects of importance to us. But it is likewise my duty to inform you, that I was at the same time enabled to penetrate more accurately into what would most probably be its policy towards us, in case we continued to possess that confidence unimpaired: And I now declare that I am of opinion, if we stood firmly upon that ground there is no service within the power of this Republic to render, that it would not render us, and upon the slightest intimation. In the interval between the period of those communications which were made by me to the committee, explanatory of our situation with Britain Spain, &c., and the arrival of the intelligence of Mr. Jay's treaty, the indications of this disposition were extremely strong: for at that time I had reason to believe, that it contemplated to take under its care, and to provide for our protection against Algiers; for the expulsion of the British from the western posts and the establishment of our right with Spain to the free navigation of the Mississippi, to be executed in the mode we should prefer, and

upon terms perfectly easy to us; terms, in short which sought only the aid of our credit to obtain a loan from our own Banks for an inconsiderable sum, to be laid out in the purchase of provisions, within our own country, and to be reimbursed, if possible by themselves. But by *that* intelligence, this disposition was checked, but not changed; for it is with the course of opinions as with that of bodies, and which are not easily to be forced in an opposite direction, after they have decisively taken a particular one. I mention this for your information, not indeed in relation to the past, but the future measures of the Executive; for I am still inclined to believe that if the arrangement with England, or the negociation with Spain should fail, it is possible, provided a suitable attempt be made here before a peace is closed with those powers respectively, to accomplish the whole through the means of this government, and upon terms which would perhaps require on our part no offensive movement, or other act which would rightfully subject us to the imputation of a breach of neutrality. Well satisfied I am that the full weight of its fortunes might be thrown with decision into our scale and in a manner that would enable us to turn those fortunes to the best account in negociation.

I am happy to inform you that Mrs. Lafayette was lately set at liberty; and although I could not make a formal application in her favour, yet it was done in accommodation with that which was informally made. She attended immediately at my house, to declare the obligations she owed to our country, and of which

she manifested the highest sensibility. Unfortunately she is, and has been for some time past, destitute of resource, and in consequence required aid not only for present support, but to discharge the debts that were already due, and for which she applied to me and was accordingly furnished with a sum in assignats equivalent to about one thousand dollars in specie. I made this advance upon the principle it was my duty to make it, as the representative of the United States, and in the expectation, that the like sum which should be paid to my order by our Bankers in Amsterdam, would be taken from the fund appropriated to the use of her husband by the Congress in the course of the last year. Is this approved, and may I upon that fund make future advances adequate to her support, and for which the interest will perhaps suffice? [1]

A treaty of peace or rather of Amity with Tuscany with the progress of a revolution in Holland, and which has been more rapid than I expected it would be, are the only events worthy notice, that have taken place since my last, and for more particular details respecting which I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Adet, to whose care the present is committed.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, dear Sir, Your. most obt servant.

JAs MONROE.

P. S. I herewith inclose you a report from Mr.

[1] This was approved. Six thousand dollars were taken from Lafayette's fund in the hands of Thomas Pinckney and sent to Monroe for the use of Madame de Lafayette. See Randolph to Pinckney, June 5, and to Monroe, June 7, 1795.

Skipwith upon some cases, that were noticed in your last despatch; as likewise upon some others upon which application will most probably be made to you, and whereby you will be enabled to give satisfactory information to the parties concerned.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, February 17, 1795.

CITIZENS,—I accept with great pleasure the opportunity offered, of writing to the American minister at Madrid, and with equal pleasure transmit the letters inclosed me in your last to his care; never doubting that whatever comes from you to me will equally promote the interest of both republics.[1]

JA^S MONROE.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Feb. 18, 1795.

DEAR SIR,—I was yesterday favored with yours of the 4th of Dec'r the only one yet rec'd. I had per-

[1] From the Committee of Public Safety to Monroe. "Citizen Minister, the Citizen Bourgoin, formerly minister of France at Madrid, informs us that he has asked of you to transmit into Spain, under your cover, two letters which he wishes to send there upon his own affairs. He also informs us that you are willing to render him this service, provided it is desired by the Committee of Public Safety. We have in consequence examined the letters in question, and are satisfied that they contain nothing contrary to the interest either of the French or American people. It therefore appears to us that you may without difficulty transmit under your cover these letters of the citizen Burgoin, and which we now send you. We undertake to forward them to the frontiers with your dispatches by the first courier extraordinary which we shall expedite to the army of the Western Pyrenees. Cambaceres, Merlin et Pelet." In connection with this letter to him, Monroe notes that it was the commencement of the negotiations for peace between France and Spain.

fectly anticipated the secret causes & motives of the western business[1] and was extremely happy to find that the patriotism of the people in every quarter, left to its own voluntary impulse and without any information that was calculated to stimulate it, was sufficient to triumph over the schemes of wicked and designing men. I have been always convinced that this was a resource to be counted on with certainty upon any emergency, & that the more frequent these were, the sooner wo'd the possibility of success in such schemes be destroyed, & our gov't assume a secure and solid form. I likewise perfectly comprehended the motive and tendency of the discussion upon the subject of the societies,[2] but was persuaded that the conduct of the societies themselves upon that occasion, together with the knowledge diffused every where of the principle upon which they were formed, would give that business likewise a happy termination. This was the case in *one* house and will I doubt not likewise be so in the publick mind if the discussion sho'd be provoked. The fact is, such societies cannot exist in an enlightened country, unless there is some cause for them: their continuance depends upon that cause, for whenever you test them by the exigence and it is found inadequate they will fall: and if there is one an attack upon them will encrease it, for they are not even to be put down by law. I was fearful the conduct of the Jacobin society here would injure the cause of republicanism every where by dis-

[1] The Whiskey Rebellion.

[2] Scheme to correct the Democratic Societies with the Whiskey Rebellion

crediting popular complaints and inclining men on the side of government however great its oppressions might be. But that society was different from those that ever existed before; it was in fact the government of France, and the principal means of retarding the revolution itself; by it all those atrocities which now stain & always will stain certain stages of the revolution were committed, and it had obviously become the last pivot upon which the hopes of the coalesced powers depended. This society was therefore the greatest enemy of the revolution, and so clear was this that all France called for its overthrow by some act of violence. It is easy for designing men to turn the vices of one society, somewhat similar in its origin, and which became such only in the course of events by degenerating and losing sight of the object which gave birth to them, ag'nst all others, altho' the parallel may go no further than that stage in which they all had merit. As the conduct of the Jacobin society made such an impression upon Aff'rs here it became my duty to notice it in my official despatches: I accordingly did so by giving an historic view of its origin, progress, & decline, truly & of course under the above impression, & which I think will be found marked upon the statement to an observant reader: for in one stage viz. from the deposition of the king I say that the danger was from confusion alone, since the old government was overset & the new one intirely in the hands & exerted virtuously for the sole benefit of the people, and it is intimated in the close that however enormous the vices may be, provided

treasonable practices be not discovered, that its overthrow must be left to publick opinion only. It became my duty to notice this subject & I think I have done it with propriety, however examine it & write me what you think of it.

I rec'd some days past a letter from Mr. Randolph containing a severe criticism upon my address to the convention & the publication of the papers committed to my care, and which justified that address & makes its defense ag'nst the attacks of that party with you. I was hurt at the criticism & equally surprised, for I did not expect it would be avowed that it was wished I sho'd make a secret use of them, giving them weight by any opinion which might be entertained of my own political principles, or in other words that I would become the instrument of that party here, thereby putting in its hands my own reputation to be impeached hereafter in the course of events. They were deceived if they supposed I was such a person. On the contrary I was happy in the opportunity furnish'd not only on acc't of the good effects I knew it would produce in other respects, but likewise as it furnished me with one of presenting to the eyes of the world the covenant which subsisted between them and me: by the publication they are bound to the French nation & to me to observe a particular line of conduct. If they deviate from it, they are censurable and the judicious part of our countrymen as well as posterity will reward them accordingly. The fact is I would not upon my own authority make those declarations of their sentiments, & therefore I was glad to embrace

the opportunity to let them speak for themselves. I felt some concern for Mr Randolph because I feared it would expose him to some attacks but I concluded he would despise them : for in truth I do not apply to him the above comments. I have answered those criticisms with suitable respect but as becomes a free and independent citizen whose pride is to do his duty but who will not yield where he is undeservedly attacked. I have reviewed the state of things upon my arrival & showed the necessity of some bold measure to retrieve it. What I have stated in my reply is true, I have many documents to prove it in each particular. 'T is possible this business may end here, for I have since rec'd a letter in answer to my 2 first, which were not then rec'd by Mr. Randolph, in a different style ; and to which latter I shall likewise write a suitable answer : but it is also possible it may not. I have therefore tho't proper to transmit to you a copy of it, that you may perfectly comprehend the state of this business with the ground upon which I rest. Perhaps it may be proper for you to show it in confidence to others but this is entirely submitted to you. I wish it seen by Mr. Jefferson & Mr. Jones.[1]

The state of parties in America is as well known by

[1] In his letter to Monroe, Madison had written,

" The account of your arrival and reception had some time ago found its way to us thro' the English Gazettes. The language of your address to the Convention was certainly very grating to the ears of many here ; and would no doubt have employed the tongues and the pens too of some of them, if external as well as internal circumstances had not checked them ; but more particularly the appearance about the same time of the President's letter and those of the Secretary of State. Malicious criticisms if now made at all are confined to the little circles which relish that kind of food."

the Committee of publick safety & other leading members as it is there. It was mentioned by some person to Merlin de Douai that Hamilton & Knox were going out of office & he instantly replied he would have it inserted in the Bulletin & communicated to the Departments, as an event auspicious to France as well as America. This, however was prevented, because the comm^{n} had been rec'd by one person only.

Fortunately the successes of this republick have been great even beyond the expectation of every one. The entire conquest of the 7 U. provinces closed in the midst of winter for a few months the last campaign: indeed so great has the success been that they have scarcely an enemy before them and I believe they may march whither they please in the course of the next. Their conduct in Holland too in other respects has done as much service to the cause of liberty almost as their arms—a revolution which was immediately commenc'd has made a rapid progress there & will no doubt be soon completed. I think if our sage negotiator in London had waited a little longer till the victories of France were more complete (& it was certain they would be so) he might have gained terms satisfactory to all his countrymen: but perhaps being a *conciliating* negotiator, he could not take advantage of that argument—perhaps he wished for the honor of Engl'd to deprive the republican party in America of the opportunity of saying *his success* was owing in any degree to *that cause.*

I think upon the whole y'r prospects independent of foreign causes are much better than heretofore: the

elections have been favorable: but with the aid of foreigners they are infinitely so. We are well—our child is at school in a French family & already speaks the language tolerably well. Joe is also at school & rather in a line of improvement. I have little leisure & of course am but little improved in the language. We desire to be affec'y remembered to y'r lady whose esteem we shall certainly cultivate by all the means in our powers. If a loan is obtained can it be laid out to advantage? inform on this head—remember me to Mr. Beckley, to Tazewell, Mason & all my friends & believe me sincerely y'rs.

JA^{S} MONROE.

P. S. Pinckney is ab't sitting out for Sp'n—suppose the peace with France is made before his arrival, what success will he have?

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, February 18, 1795.

SIR,—I have just been honored with your favor of the 5th. of December,[1] and am much gratified by its

[1] "Philadelphia, December 5th. 1794. Sir,—Since my letter of the 30th. ultimo, which will be conveyed by the same vessel with this, I have had the honor of receiving your very interesting letters of August 15th and 25th. They are the more acceptable, as affording an earnest of your attention to the kind of intelligence which is to us very important.

We are fully sensible of the importance of the friendship of the French Republic. Cultivate it with zeal, proportioned to the value we set upon it. Remember to remove every suspicion of our preferring a connection with Great Britain or in any manner weakening our old attachment to France. The caution suggested in my letter of the 30th. ultimo arises solely from an honorable wish to sustain our character of neutrality, in a style which may be a pattern

contents. The preceding one of the 2nd. had given me great uneasiness but this has removed it. I sincerely wish my two first letters had reached you in the order they were written, as they would have prevented yours of the 2nd. of December by preventing the impression which gave birth to it.

Be assured, I shall continue to forward by all the means in my power, the objects of my mission, and I am persuaded with the success which might be expected from those efforts, addressed to the Councils of a nation well disposed favourably to receive them. The object of this is to acknowledge the receipt of your last letter, and in the expectation that it will accompany, under the care of Mr. Adet, my last dispatch which was in answer to the preceding one.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be your most ob^{t} and very humble servant.

Ja^{s} Monroe.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

Paris, February 19, 1795.

Citizens,—It is with infinite pleasure I communicate to you the grateful impression which the kind and fraternal reception given me upon my arrival here by the National Convention, as the representative of

for the morality of nations. The Republic, while they approve of the purity of your conduct, cannot but be persuaded of the purity of our affection.

The President approves your conduct as to the national house, offered for your residence. Your interpretation of the Constitution is correct. But you are charged to make known his sense of this evidence of respect.

The affair of the Consul is noticed in my letter of the 30th. ultimo.

I am &c. Edm. Randolph, *Secretary of State.*"

your ally and sister republick the United States of America has made upon our Government and my compatriots in general. You, citizens of France, who have proved to the world by a series of the most illustrious exploits how highly you estimate the blessings of liberty, can well conceive with what a degree of sensibility the account of this reception was welcomed by a free government & by a free people. I hasten in obedience to my instructions to make this communication, and which I do with the greater pleasure, because it furnishes me with an additional opportunity of declaring to you the affectionate interest which the United States take in whatever concerns the liberty prosperity & happiness of the French Republic.[1]

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Feb. 25, 1795.

DEAR SIR:—Being under the necessity of explaining the motives of my conduct upon my arrival, to the Executive, & in consequence of presenting a statem't of the circumstances under which I acted, I have thought I could not better convey my ideas to you on that head than by enclosing a copy of the paper. This will of course be kept from Mr. R. because of his official station & all others from whom it ought to be kept. I have sent a copy under the care of the minister, Mr. Adet, who was to depart some days since; but as he did not & probably will not in some days, I have deemed it expedient to send a duplicate

[1] From an unsigned draft.

to the executive & likewise to yourself by Bordeaux to be forwarded by some American vessel. Three days after the letter above referred to was written, a second was likewise, & in a different tone. But being on the Executive Journal, my vindication ought to be there too. It is proper to observe that my first & second letters were intermediately rec'd by Mr. Randolph.

The revolution in Holland progresses with great rapidity & will most probably comprise the 7 provinces under a single gov't founded of course on the sovereignty of the people. Here greater tranquillity continues to reign—indeed it has never been otherwise since my arrival than during the same space I presume it was in Phil'a. Bread is scarce in some quarters but the people are beyond example patient under it. I do not think a real distress is to be apprehended, but if such were to happen, I am convinc'd the yeomanry wo'd emulate by their fortitude, the bravery of their compatriots in the army.

Nothing is done yet with Prussia,—the death of Gottz in Switzerland interrupted a negotiation which was depending—'tis reported that France demanded of that power the abandonment of Poland, & for which she proposed to give Hanover.

With Sp'n a negotiation is said to be depending—I am persuaded if Jay's treaty is rejected provided it contains anything improper that we can not only get a decision of this Gov't to suppo't our claims there but with Sp'n—'T is possible this latter point may be aided from this quarter independent of the contents

of that project, provided they are not very exceptionable—but the thing wo'd be certain in the opposite view of the case.

I trust he has gain'd all that we claimed, for that nothing could be refused in the present state of things, or indeed when the treaty was formed, must be certain, provided he did not convince the adm'n, that as he had adopted the conciliatory plan he would in no possible event change it.

We had some idea of procuring a loan in Holland to a moderate am't to be vested in land. Is this still y'r wish? I am persuaded it may be done; inform me, therefore, whether it is desirable, to what am't, and whether it would suit you to draw for it on such persons as I sho'd designate? What I intimated some time since is not meant to be derogated from here: for I can by loans, answer y'r drafts upon three months' sight for one, two & even three thousand pounds sterl'g payable in Hamburg or Holl'd—I have rec'd but one letter from you to the present time—I wish the paper enclosed to be shown Mr. Jones & Mr. Jefferson—we are happy to hear you have added a particular associate to the circle of our friends & to whom you will make our best respects[1]—Sincerely I am y'r friend & servant.

JA^{S} MONROE.

Colo. Orr promised to procure my patent for a tract of land on Rock Castle, Kentucky of Capt'n Fowler for me. Will you be so kind as remind him of this & endeavor to get it to be deposited with Mr. Jones,

[1] Alluding to Madison's announcement of his marriage.

or sent here, as I mean to sell it after I shall have quitted this station—the latter is preferred—

I have written by Adet to Burr, Langdon, Brown & some others—

The liberation of our country from the counsels of H. & K. had like to have been announc'd in the Bulletin—Be assured characters are well understood here.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, March 6, 1795.

SIR,—I avail myself of the opportunity by Mr. Adet, who leaves this to succeed Mr. Fauchet, of transmitting herewith some communications which have lately passed between the Committee of Public Safety and myself, upon the subject of our interfering claims with Spain; and which will serve not only still further to illustrate my former dispatches upon that point, but likewise to shew the precise ground upon which it now rests. I had thoughts of declining any further effort upon that head, until I was enabled to lay before the Committee the project of Mr. Jay's treaty with the English government, and which was and still is daily expected by the return of Mr. Purviance; but from this I was swerved by a report then current that the outlines of a treaty were nearly adjusted between the Representatives of this Republic with the Army, and some agent of Spain on the frontier; from the fear that the peace would be closed with that power before our differences were com-

promised. Thus circumstanced I deemed it my duty, in conformity with my instructions (and the more especially as they had no right to make any inference with respect to that project other than I had stated) to bring the subject more fully before them than I had before done. Among the papers inclosed, and which comprise the whole of what passed between us upon this subject, you will observe a note of Merlin de Douai,[1] and which though given by a single member, and in reply to an informal application,—yet as it marks a remaining solicitude upon the transaction to which it refers, I have thought it equally my duty to transmit for your information.

No peace is yet made with Spain, nor indeed with any other power, Tuscany excepted, and which was before communicated: But it is still probable that one will be made with that power and likewise with Prussia. It is, however, well known that England is against it, and that she exerts all the address which ingenuity, prompted by interest, can suggest to prevent it; and it is possible that those arguments which are used by the Minister in the House of Commons, to forward the preparations for war, may have weight in the

[1] From Merlin de Douai, Representative of the People, to Citizen Skipwith, Consul of the United States of America, Paris, 3rd. Ventose, 3rd year of the Republic [February 22, 1795]. "I have received, Citizen, the observations you have addressed to me, upon the navigation of the Mississippi. The ideas which they present are not new to me, nor the Committee of Public Safety; and I have reason to think they will be taken into profound consideration, in suitable time and place. I ought not to dissemble, that this may depend much upon the conduct which the American government will observe in regard to the treaty, which its minister Jay, has concluded with England. You know in effect, that there ought to be a reciprocity of services and of obligations between nations, as between individuals. I speak however, here as an individual."

cabinets of other powers, and incline them to protract any definitive arrangement with this Republic, until just before the commencement of the campaign, in the hope of profiting in the interim by such events as the chapter of accidents may throw in their way. But I cannot think, if the tranquillity which now reigns here, should remain undisturbed and the incidents of the interval, in other respects prove favourable to the revolution, that either of them, and especially Spain, will hazard the probable evils of another campaign, for any benefit she can possibly expect from it. In truth the objects of the war, so far as they were ever understood, are now entirely changed: If a dismemberment of the Republic was among them, that must of course be considered as abandoned. Or if the restoration of the ancient monarchy was the sole one, the hope of accomplishing it by arms must now likewise be considered as gone. Nations acting entirely on the defensive never dream of conquests. The only remaining source from whence the coalesced powers can derive the least hope of success, is founded in the possibility of some internal commotion being excited by the scarcity of provision; the derangement of their finances, or the divisions of their councils: Calamities it is true or either of them singly, provided it attained to a certain height which it is admitted would be sufficient to destroy any government. But whether France is threatened with real danger from this source, in either of those views, is the problem to be solved. Upon the two first points I do not

pretend at present to be able to decide with certainty: Indeed the best informed can only conjecture. Bread I know is scarce in some parts; and it is possible much distress may be experienced in those quarters if foreign supplies are not obtained, and in great amount: But these are expected from the North and from America. 'Tis probable too that this scarcity has been increased by the speculation of individuals, and in which case it will diminish as the exigency presses.

Nor am I skilled in their financial policy. When I arrived the assignats were depreciated in comparison with specie, as three to one, and now they have declined to about five and a half for one. The amount in circulation, and the sums occasionally emitted, are wonderfully great, and the depreciation must follow as a thing of course. What measures will be taken with the paper is yet doubtful. Formerly it had depreciated in equal or greater degree, and then it was elevated to par, by striking out of circulation all the bills of a certain description; securing the payment of the liquidated amount by the mortgage of the National property, aided by the maximum law which regulated the price of every thing. Whether some measures of the like kind will be again adopted or whether any attempt will be made to appreciate the paper, is equally uncertain. Many consider the appreciation as an evil to be avoided, preferring a gradual decline till it shall finally expire, and adopting then a scale suited progressively to private contracts, and redeeming the whole at the rate it passed

in the last stage of circulation. I think it probable this latter policy will finally prevail, as it is advocated with ability and zeal by some who were tutored in our own school. The subject is, however, still under discussion and nothing absolutely decided on it. If this latter plan should be preferred, although no step be taken to appreciate the paper, or even prevent its decline, a considerable time will probably elapse before the final suspension; and after this the Republic will stand nearly upon the same ground on which it commenced. Its debt will be but small, and it will possess besides the ordinary resource of taxation, &c., national domains to an immense amount; equal by estimation to at least two hundred millions sterling, in specie; supported in its credit by Holland (from whence too other aids are to be expected) and by the reputation of its arms. I will, however, take a more accurate survey of this subject, and give you the results as soon as possible.

And upon the subject of those dangers which are presumed to menace the safety of this Republic from the division of its councils, I have but little to add at present to the details already furnished. The papers, herewith forwarded, contain the report of the Commission of Twenty-one, upon the denunciation of Barrère etc., and which finds cause of accusation. As soon as the report is printed the denounced will be heard before the Convention, who will decide, by what is called the *appel nominal*, for their acquittal or trial; and in the latter case they will, in a convenient time, be sent to the Revolutionary Tribunal,

and in my opinion finally to the guillotine, unless they should previously abscond, as one of them (Vadier) has already done, and which it is wished, even by those most active in the prosecution, they all may do. This particular incident will not be new to you, and in other respects the councils of the country bear the same aspect they have done from the time of my arrival.

In contemplating the possible effects of this prosecution, on what may be called a division of the public councils, the friends of the Revolution have cause to regret that since a decision upon the conduct of these members was to be taken, it was not sooner taken. If it had followed immediately after the execution of Robespierre, it would have occasioned less noise, and borne less the aspect of party collision. Its protraction too has exposed the government to dangers which would not otherwise have existed: For by the delay the two-fold crisis of the trial, and of famine, or rather the scarcity of provisions, will take place precisely at the same moment, than which there certainly could not be a coincidence of events more favourable to the views of the coalesced powers, or unfavourable to those of the Republic. But you have already seen by the course of this transaction, that although the preponderating party has denounced and may finally execute these members, it has, notwithstanding acted rather upon the defensive than otherwise. Had the prosecution been undertaken with that degree of zeal and vigour, of which so decided a majority is always capable, they must long

since have been carried to the scaffold. On this side then, there was obviously no plan; nor indeed is it probable there was any on the other: For I am convinced that the real object of at least four out of five, on both sides, has been to complete the revolution. The coincidence, therefore, must be deemed one of those unlucky, but fortuitous arrangements, forced by the course of events, not to be controuled, and under which the friends of republican government must console themselves with the reflection, that although in a possible view, it may prove injurious to their cause, yet if it glides smoothly by, it will produce a correspondent benefit, by demonstrating to the world, how deeply rooted the principles of the revolution are in the hearts of the people.

But does no danger threaten the Republic from this source? In my opinion (I speak of the present moment more particularly) none: For, from all those circumstances which have passed under my view since my arrival, I am satisfied that whilst the majority of the Convention is on the side of the revolution it will be supported by the people, and I am even persuaded that even if the majority was against it, although, in consequence, it would be able to occasion great confusion, and do in other respects much injury; yet it would not be able to restore the ancient monarchy. In advancing this position I reason not only from recent incidents, but from past events; and by which I see that the great mass of the French nation through all the vicissitudes of the war, and succession of parties, was always on the side of the

revolution; supporting the Convention with an undeviating perseverance; not because it possessed their unbounded confidence, but because they believed it to be true to the main object, and was, of course, the only solid rock upon which they could rest with safety. A variety of circumstances, marked in strong characters and by great events in the course of the revolution (heretofore communicated and which on that account I forbear to repeat) tend to demonstrate the truth of this position. Nor have the citizens of this Republic merited, in other respects, the reputation for turbulence and licentiousness, often ascribed to them in foreign countries: For it is unquestionably true, that the great atrocities which have stained the different stages of the Revolution, and particularly the massacres of the 2nd. and 3rd September 1792, and the invasion of the Convention on the 31st May, 1793, which terminated in the arrestation and destruction of the Girondine party, did not proceed from a licentious commotion of the people. On the contrary, it is believed that many of the immediate agents in the first were not inhabitants of Paris; but brought from a considerable distance, Marseilles, and some even from Italy, put in motion by some secret cause not yet fully understood. It is also affirmed that the great mass of the people of Paris were ignorant of what was perpetrating at the time of the transaction, and that those who knew of it were struck with the same horror that we were when we heard of it on the other side of the Atlantic. And the movement of the 31st of May, when they were embodied and arranged

against the Convention, was a movement on their part in obedience to the law and for which they were regularly summoned and commanded by the ordinary officers. 'Tis said that the great mass knew nothing of the object for which they convened, or the purpose to which they were to be made instrumental: That the secret was deposited with a few only in the Convention; such as Robespierre, Danton, &c., who governed the operation, and the Mayor of the city; the General and some principal officers of the guards, and who marshaled the citizens out as upon an ordinary parade. The party in the house which controuled the movement knew how to turn it to good account. The Mayor, (a partizan of Robespierre, Danton, &c.,) had a few days before presented a petition demanding the arrestation of the twenty-two members, and it was now urged in the house by Couthon, a leading member of the same party, that the *present discontents*, and which he said occasioned the movement in question, and threatened the annihilation of the Convention, could not be satisfied unless those *obnoxious* members were arrested. And as the Girondine party did not control the movement, or know anything about it, otherwise than as appearances announced, and which were tremendous, for Henriot was then also at the head of the guards,— the declarations of the other party were believed to be true, and the members in consequence arrested. Thus by mere finesse, and under a dexterous management, the Girondine party was completely overwhelmed, and the mountain party as completely

established on its ruins, and by means of the people; who being exhibitted in dumb-show by the latter were the object of terror, and the cause of the overthrow of the former, notwithstanding it was, at the time, the preponderating party in the Convention, and equally so in the public estimation.

These latter details may perhaps appear inapplicable to the subject: But as I consider them of some importance, as well to enable you to judge of the future fortune of the Revolution, as of those dangers which are supposed by many, more immediately to threaten the welfare of the Republic, I have thought proper to communicate them to you. The success of the Revolution depends of course upon the people: Whatever, therefore, unfolds the character and disposition of the people and especially in relation to that object, must be useful.

I was advised by your favor of the 2nd. December that Mr. J. Pitcairn of New York[1] was appointed Consul for this city, and upon which appointment some considerations have occurred which I have thought it my duty to suggest. Permit me to ask: Is he an American citizen, and if so, whether by birth or naturalization; and, in the latter case, whether he became such since the Revolution? If of the last description his arrival will subject me to great embarrassment, and for reasons given in my fourth letter of October 18th. last; and to which, with those from the Commissary of Foreign Affairs to me, transmitted

[1] Joseph Pitcairn, of New York, was nominated vice-Consul at Paris, vice Alexander Duvernat, superseded, November 21, 1794.—*Ex. Journal*, i., 163.

at the same time, I beg leave to refer you. I candidly think, if his situation is known, being a person deemed by the English law a subject of that crown, he will not be recognized, or if recognized, not without great reluctance. Shall I announce him then, withholding a communication of the fact, admitting it to be a fact? In case I do, and it is afterwards discovered, what will be the impression of this government towards myself, and especially after what has passed between us on the same subject; finding that I had placed, without their knowledge, in office, and immediately in the presence of the public councils, a person of a description against which they had particularly objected? And that it will be discovered, and immediately, is most certain; for there are already letters for him here from England, and these will most probably be multiplied tenfold after his arrival: Besides, the character &c. of every foreign agent, and of every grade, being an object of systematic political enquiry, is always well known. In other views this subject merits attention: admitting the acquiescence of this government in his favor, it is to be observed that a great proportion of the business of our countryman here is transacted with the government: The adjustment frequently requires my official support: If he does not possess the confidence of the government, he will not only be unable to render that service to our countrymen which might otherwise be expected from one in his station; but as he will be brought officially into frequent and familiar communication with me, it will follow that precisely that portion

of distrust to which he is subject will attach itself to me and produce a correspondent effect, to a certain degree, upon every subject depending here in which we are interested. I know well that if my fourth letter had been received, I should not have been placed in this dilemma: But how to act in case he arrives I do not know. I console myself under the hope he will not arrive; but by delaying his departure until that letter was received, put it in your power to reconsider the appointment.

With great respect and esteem I have the honor to be, Sir, Your very humble and most obedient servant. JAS MONROE.

P. S. March 9. Since writing the above, I have been explicitly assured by Mr. Pelet, a member of the diplomatic section of the Committee of Public Safety; that in confidence Mr. Jay's treaty contained nothing which would give uneasiness here, they had expressly instructed their agent, now negociating with Spain, to use his utmost efforts to secure for us the points in controversy between the United States and that power. In consequence I thought proper to send in a short, supplemental note, explanatory of the several objects of that controversy, and which I likewise enclose with the report of Mr. Mountflorence by whom it was delivered.[1] What the success of

[1] J. C. Mountflorence to Monroe. "SIR, I delivered your note to Mr. Pelet at the diplomatic room of the Committee. After he had perused it, I told him that I had it in my charge from you to explain to him the nature of our demand on Spain, in case at a future period that overture should be made by that power, the French government should find it convenient to accommodate us. I then represented to him that the free navigation of the Mississippi

their endeavours in our behalf may be is uncertain; but we cannot expect the conclusion of their own treaty will be long delayed on that account.

I had forgotten to notify you officially of the present I had made to the Convention of our flag. It was done in consequence of the order of that body for its suspension in its hall, and an intimation from the President himself, that they had none, and were ignorant of the model. I herewith send you a copy of my note accompanying it.[1]

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, March 17th, 1795.

SIR,—I have just received a letter from Mr. Jay of the 5th of February,[2] in answer to mine of the 17th January preceding, and by which he declines to com-

without a port for our vessels, would be of little or no advantage to us, there being no anchorage in that river, and that the Spaniards holding both sides of it by the possession of West Florida as high up as the most northern extremity of the 31st degree of N. Latitude, we would have no place for storing our goods or to refit our vessels, and even no means of coming up the river from its entrance with our ships. He seemed to be perfectly well acquainted with the situation of the river, and to be sensible of the necessity of our having the freedom of New Orleans. I explained to him the limits we claimed by the Treaty with England of 1783, and the ridiculous pretensions of Spain respecting her territorial rights.

He asked me the present situation of our Government's negociation with Spain, and whether that last power had given us reason to expect a favorable issue. I answered him that I was perfectly ignorant of what had been done. He concluded by desiring me to assure you that should a negociation take place with Spain, France would not forget the interest of America and would render her every good office in her power."

[1] Page 54, *Ante*.

[2] Johnston's Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, iv., 157. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, i., 517.

municate to me the purport of his treaty with the English government; although he had previously promised it. As he has explicitly declared himself to this effect, I consider the business of course closed between him and me; nor should I make a further comment upon it, were I not otherwise impelled by the style of his reply; which is obviously addressed more for your consideration than mine. To you therefore my comments upon that reply shall also be submitted.

Mr. Jay says: That he has no right to communicate the treaty since it belongs exclusively to the Governments which form them, and by which I understand that the Minister has no discretion on the subject, being bound to communicate with his Government only. If this proposition is true and which (especially if no latitude is given him by his instructions) I am willing to admit, it follows that as the injunction of secresy applies to the whole instrument, it must of course to every part. It were absurd to say that in the gross or as an entire thing it must be kept secret, but yet in the detail it may be divulged. How then does his conduct correspond with his own doctrine; having in his three several letters communicated a particular article, and *promised* in the second the whole.

But he likewise says that the communication was intended to be *confidential*, or in other words to be kept secret; for such is the ordinary import of the word. But will his letters bear that construction? Does it appear as if the communication was intended merely

to gratify on my part private curiosity ; or for the benevolent purpose only of announcing to me an event favorable to our country ? On the contrary, does it not appear from each of his letters that he had anticipated the disquietude of this government upon the subject of his treaty and wished to remove it ; and that the communication promised was intended for me in a public capacity, and to be used for public purposes ? In short had I been in a private station, is it probable he would have written or communicated any thing to me on the subject ? In no view, however, could I consider the communication promised, though termed a *confidential* one, as imposing on me any other restraint than that of *caution ;* whilst it *exonerated him*, and made *me responsible* for the blame of a disclosure, in case it was made, and produced any inconvenience.

As I really believed at the time I wrote to Mr. Jay, that he intended to make to me the communication in question, and likewise concluded from his own assurances, as well as from other circumstances, that the treaty comprized in it nothing that could give just cause of complaint here, I thought I could not better forward his own views, or the interest of our country (especially as Mr. Morris had taken his copy of the Cypher with him) than by sending a confidential person for it. You will, therefore, judge of my surprize when instead of the communication expected, I received his letter of the 5th of February, containing an absolute refusal to make it.

But in reviewing now his several letters, it is diffi-

cult to ascertain what he intended to do, or what his real object was in writing them: For he says in these that he was not at liberty to disclose the purport of his treaty, and yet promises it: That he will give me the contents or principal heads, to enable me to satisfy this government; but yet will give them only in *confidence*, and of course under an injunction that will put it out of my power to give the satisfaction intended: And, finally when the application is made, upon the basis of his own letters for the information in question and for the purpose contemplated, as appears by the three letters then written, he not only refuses to comply with what he had promised, but criminates this government for entertaining any uneasiness or making any enquiry on the subject.

When one party offers a thing upon the principle the other has a right to it, as was the case in the present instance, the justice of the demand on the part of the latter is of course admitted. There may indeed be some merit in offering it before the demand is made; but to make the offer and then recede from it subjects the party thus acting to an additional proportional reproach. Had Mr. Jay, however, chosen to place himself in this dilemma, from me he would have heard nothing more on the subject. I should have lamented, it is true, as I now do, that I was not possessed of information that might be useful to our affairs here; but there the business would have ended, for both *his promise* and *my application* were, and still are unknown to this government. But to recede in the manner he has done, putting

his refusal upon the ground of *national dignity*, &c., is neither consistent with candour nor the true state of things.

Had Mr. Jay confided to me the information in question and in due time, and which, it is obvious, he thought himself in duty bound to do, I should then have become responsible for a proper use of it: And, I am satisfied, admitting it to be as by him represented, good use might have been made of it: For I should not only have been enabled thereby to quiet their fears, and whose legitimacy he acknowledges by his efforts to remove them; and silence a thousand unfavourable insinuations whispered about by the enemies of both countries; but by making a merit of the frankness of the communication have conciliated rather than weakened, the friendly disposition of this government towards us. I am likewise persuaded that if I had been authorized to declare generally from my own knowledge (being the minister on the ground and responsible for the truth of the declaration) that the treaty did not interfere with our engagements with this republic, but that being a mere project, subject to rejection &c., it ought not to be published,—it would have been satisfactory. And had the communication been sent to me even in this last stage, such would have been my conduct, and most probably such the effect: In any event had I gone further against his request, upon me and not upon him, would the responsibility have rested. But this was not Mr. Jay's object: On the contrary, it is obvious, that he wished me to compromit my character, and through

me, that of the United States with this nation upon the contents of his treaty, without letting me see it; or placing in this government or myself the least confidence in regard to it; and which I would not do, nor, in my opinion, ought not to have done.

Whether this government acted with propriety in asking for information upon the point in question, is a subject with which I have nothing to do. I am responsible only for the answer given and which you have. My application to Mr. Jay was certainly not founded upon theirs to me; for I had contemplated it before theirs was received. I had then gained such an insight into their councils, as to satisfy me, that all our great national objects, so far as they were connected with this country were more easily to be secured by a frank and liberal deportment, than a cool and reserved one: That if we wished to preserve our neutrality with strict integrity, and avail ourselves at the same time of the fortunes of this country, without the least hazard on our part, in the negociation with Spain as likewise in that with England (in case Mr. Jay's treaty was rejected) that this was the way to do it. In short that if it was necessary to gain the approbation of this Government to any thing in that treaty, which it would otherwise disapprove, that this was the way to do it. Nor can I see any condesension in such a line of conduct; On the contrary, between nations allied as we are, and especially, when past and recent circumstances are considered, I deem it the most magnanimous as well as the soundest policy. Mr. Jay, however, is *now* of a different opin-

ion and for the future I shall not disturb him in the enjoyment of it.

The Vendée war is considered as completed. Charette, the commanding general, has surrendered with all the forces immediately under his command; and likewise undertaken to quell a small remaining body of about one thousand which yet holds out. 'Tis said the liberty of religion granted by a late decree terminated this war. A short time, however, will now disclose whether this compromise, or the general favourable aspect of the present moment, is real or delusive; since, if there is a force in the nation opposed to the revolution of sufficient strength to make head against it, and which I do not think there is, I doubt not it will soon shew itself.

You intimated to me in your last that Mr. Pinckney was commissioned as Envoy Extraordinary for Spain, upon the subject of the Mississippi; and you have seen by my last, how far I had succeeded in calling the attention of this government to that object. It is probbable Mr. Pinckney will pass through France, and of course by Paris, on his mission. In case he does I will most certainly open to him every thing that has taken place here on that subject, and endeavour, according to the plan he shall prescribe to render him in every respect all the services in my power. I have already intimated to Mr. Short, by a confidential messenger from Lisbon, the good understanding which subsists between this government and our own upon that point; so that there is in every view the most favourable prospect of a successful termination of this inter-

esting business, the completion of which will reflect so much honour upon the administration by which it is accomplished.

With great respect and esteem I have the honor to be, Sir, your very humble and obt serv^{t}

JA^{s} MONROE.

TO JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

PARIS, April 2, 1795.

DEAR SIR,—I have been honored with your two favors of the 12 & 23 ulto.[1] and should have answered the first sooner had I known the post was established between this and Amsterdam, or had I not been disappointed by the Dutch Commissaires who promised soon after its receipt to make known to me the period when their next courier should be dispatched. For the future however these difficulties will not intervene.

The situation of Holland being exclusively neither an independent or conquered country, and subject in the interim in certain respects to the controul of two authorities, is a novel one in the political system: nor is it easy to decide by any circumstances known to me how soon it will be changed. As it is reasonable however to presume that the spirit of harmony which you intimate now subsists will continue to prevail reciprocally, it is, likewise so to conclude that the final adjustment will be formed upon principles equally satisfactory to both parties.

[1] Adams writes on the friendly disposition of the Dutch government towards the United States and on its maritime power which is not sufficient, he thinks, for the protection of the North Sea.

It was to be expected that whilst those provinces remained in their present situation, your duties would partake of the quality of the government and be as complicated as it might be.

In removing the embarrassment to which our Commission was subjected, it became indispensably necessary that application should be made to the competent authority, and to which your powers were certainly competent, whether French or Dutch; for unless that government was totally & permanently absorbed in this, it followed that you were the party thro' all the intermediate modifications, to whom it belonged to take cognizance of the affairs, and redress the grievances, if any there be, of our countrymen there. It gives me pleasure to hear that you have experienced no difficulty upon this head, because thereby the interest of the United States will be greatly promoted: I take it for granted you will experience the like facility in future, but if the contrary should be the case and any arrangement on the part of this government here appears to you necessary, to facilitate your operations & you will be pleased to communicate the same to me & point out the line in which I may be serviceable, be assured that I shall be happy to cooperate with you in obtaining it.

The trial of Barrere, Collot D'Herbois & B. Varennes ended yesterday by a decree of banishment: A party from the suburbs of the city, calling itself the same which caused the revolution of the 31. of May attended in the morning & entered the convention *en masse* with a view probably of making a like revolu-

tion on the 1st of April. But the convention was firm. The alarm was sounded thro' the city & the citizens in general commanded by Pichegrue attended by the Deputies, Barras & Merlin Thionville, immediately arranged themselves in order & repaired to its Hall in defense of the national representation. By surrounding the palace, inhibiting the admission of others and cutting off the retreat of those within, thereby shewing that punishment was certain, in case they should proceed to extremities, the commotion was terminated without the effusion of blood. Several (8) of the mountain party were arrested after the hall was cleared, upon evidence furnished in the course of the day of being accomplices in the plot. Everything is now tranquil, and so far as it is possible to estimate the consequences of an event so recent, by the attending circumstances, it must be deemed favorable to the revolution.

With great respect & esteem I am Dear Sir

y^r^ most ob^t^ & very humble servant

JA^s^ MONROE.

I beg of you, to command me in all cases wherein I can be serviceable.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, April 14th, 1795.

SIR,—I was lately favoured with a letter from Mr. Jay, of the 19th of February[1]; by which I was informed that the bearer, Colonel Trumbull, who had

[1] *See American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, i. 518.

copied and knew the contents of his treaty with the English government, was instructed to communicate the same to me, because I was an *American Minister*, and in which character it might be *useful* to me; but that I must receive it in *strict confidence*, and under an injunction to impart it to no other person whatever. As I had explicitly stated to Mr. Jay, in my letter by Mr. Purviance, the only terms upon which I could receive the communication; and which I had done, as well for the purpose of covering my engagement with the committee, formed after the receipt of his first letter, and when I expected no further information from him on the subject, as of preventing the transmission of it, in case it contained the slightest circumstance which might be objectionable here,—I could not otherwise than be surprized by the contents of this letter. To withhold the communication at the moment when it was presumable the report of the contents of that treaty would excite a ferment here, and offer it, after the expiration of some months, and when it was expected from America, and upon terms upon which I had assured him I could not receive it, (to say nothing of the impossibility of comprehending how it could be useful to me, if it was to be kept a profound secret,) was unexpected: It was the more so, since it was obvious, that whilst the condition insisted on precluded the possibility of enabling me to promote thereby the public interest, it would unavoidably tend, in some respects, to subject me to additional embarrassment in my situation here.

I was likewise soon apprized, that Colonel Trumbull did not consider himself at liberty to make the communication in question, unless I asked for it; and by which it was understood, that I bound myself to accept it on the terms proposed, adding thereby to the injunctions of Mr. Jay, the additional obligation of private stipulation. The dilemma, therefore, with which I was threatened, was of a peculiar kind: For if I accepted and withheld the communication from the committee, I should violate my engagement with that body; and if I gave it, I subjected myself not only to the probable imputation of indiscretion, but likewise certainly to that of breach of promise. The line of propriety, however, appeared to me to be a plain one. I was bound to use such information as Mr. Jay might think fit to give me in the best manner possible, according to my discretion, to promote the public interest: But I was not bound to use any artifice in obtaining that information, or to violate any engagement by the use of it. My duty to the public did not require this of me, and I had no other object to answer. As soon, therefore, as I had made a decision on the subject, I apprized Colonel Trumbull, that I could not receive the communication proposed, upon the terms on which it was offered.[1]

But the mission of this gentleman here, though according to my information of him, a worthy and a prudent man, produced an effect of a more serious kind. I was soon advised by a person friendly to the United States, and heretofore friendly and useful to

[1] See Johnston's *Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, iv., 179.

me ; that his arrival had excited uneasiness in the public councils, and would probably eventually injure my standing with the government, especially if I should be able to give the committee, in consequence, no account of the contents of that treaty : For it would hardly be credited after this, considering the relation between Mr. Jay and myself, that I knew nothing of those contents. Upon what other motive, it would be asked, could the secretary of Mr. Jay come here ; since the pretence of private business in Germany, which lay in another direction, would be deemed a fallacious one ? He added, that the wisest precautions were necessary on my part, to guard me against any unjust imputation ; since through that the interests of my country might at the present crisis be essentially wounded. As I had anticipated in some measure the effect, I was mortified but not surprized by the intimation. It became me, however, to profit by it, and as well from the delicate regard which was due to my private as my public character, to place the integrity of my own conduct upon ground which could not be questioned. There appeared to me to be but one mode by which this could be done, and which was by making known to the committee what had passed between Mr. Jay and myself ; to state the terms upon which he had offered the communication, and my refusal to accept it on those terms ; with my reason for such refusal. This you will readily conceive was a painful task : But as I had no other alternative left, but that of exposing myself to the suspicion of having known from the

beginning the purport of Mr. Jay's treaty, and uniting with him in withholding it from them, whilst I was using all the means in my power to impress them with a contrary belief, I was forced to undertake it. In consequence I waited on the diplomatic section of the committee, and made the representation as above, repeating Mr. Jay's motive for withholding the communication, as urged by himself: "That it belonged to the sovereign power alone to make it, *&c.*" It was replied that it could not otherwise than excite uneasiness in the councils of this government, when it was observed that in the height of their war with the coalesced powers, and with England in particular, America had stept forward and made a treaty with that power, the contents of which were so carefully and strictly withheld from this government: For if the treaty was not injurious to France, why was it withheld from her? Was it prudent for one ally to act in such manner in regard to another, and especially under the present circumstances, and at the present time, as to excite suspicions of the kind in question? I assured them generally, as I had done before, that I was satisfied the treaty contained in it nothing which could give them uneasiness; but if it did, and especially if it weakened our connection with France, it would certainly be disapproved in America. They thanked me for the communication; assured me they wished me to put myself in no dilemma which would be embarrassing, and thus the conference ended.

A few days after this, I was favoured with a letter

from Mr. Hitchborn, an American gentleman of character here (from Massachusetts) of which I inclose you a copy,[1] stating the contents or outlines of the treaty in question; as communicated to him by Colonel Trumbull, and with a view that he might communicate the same to me, for the information of this government. I was surprized at the incident; because I could not suppose that Colonel Trumbull would take this step, or any other, without the instructions of Mr. Jay, and it seemed to me extraordinary, that Mr. Jay should give such an instruction, or mark to him such a line of conduct. I was not surprized that Colonel Trumbull should confide the purport of the treaty to Mr. Hitchborn, for he merited

[1] From Mr. Benjamin Hichborn, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America. PARIS, March, 31st, 1795. SIR,—In some free conversation with Colonel Trumbull, on the subject of the late treaty between Great Britain and America, I could not avoid expressing the uneasiness I felt at the disagreeable effects, which had already shewn themselves, and the still more serious consequences which might result from that negociation. And I must confess, I experienced a very agreeable surprize, when he assured me upon his honor, that the treaty had for its object, merely the adjustment of some matters in dispute between the two nations,—that it secured to the Americans some rights in commerce which might have been doubtful by the laws of nations, and by which their intercourse with this country would be facilitated during the war,—that it provided a compensation with those of either nation who had been injured,—and finally settled all controversy respecting the boundary line and the western posts.

He further declared.—That the treaty did not contain any separate or reciprocal guarrantee, of any rights, privileges or territory, or an engagement on either part to afford aid or supplies of any kind to the other, under any circumstances whatever. The treaty, he says, simply declares,—that the parties shall remain at peace, and points out the mode, in which the matters of controversy between them shall be finally settled.

If this information can be of any service to you in your public capacity, you may make use of it in any manner you may think fit. I presume the authenticity of its contents will not be called in question.

the confidence; but I was surprized that Mr. Jay should write me it was to be communicated to me only as a *public minister*, &c., to be *imparted to no one else*, and that Colonel Trumbull, however deeply impressed he might be after his arrival here with the propriety of removing the doubts of this government upon that point, should consider himself at liberty to communicate the same to a third person, to be communicated to me, under no injunction whatever. I was, however, possessed of the paper in question; and it was my duty to turn it to the best account for the public interest, that circumstances would now admit of. It was, it is true, the most informal of all informal communications, and one of course upon which no official measure could be taken; yet the character of the parties entitled it to attention. Upon mature reflection therefore, and the more especially as I did not wish to meet the committee again on that point, until I heard from you, lest I should be questioned why this new mode of diplomatic proceeding was adopted, I thought it best to send the paper in by my secretary, Mr. Gauvain (a young gentleman who has acted with me, since the provisional nomination of Mr. Skipwith to the consulate) instructing him to assure the members, on my part, that they might confide in the credibility of the parties. The paper was presented to Merlin de Douay, with the comments suggested; and since which I have neither heard from the committee, Colonel Trumbull, nor Mr. Jay on the subject.

I intimated to you in my last, that I was persuaded

if there was a force here able and willing to make head against the revolution, it would soon shew itself; but that I was of opinion none such existed. This presage has been since verified by a great and interesting example. The storm which I thought I then saw gathering, after rising to its height and expending its force, has past, and without doing any mischief. On the contrary, I am inclined to believe, from present appearances, it will be productive of good.

It was natural to expect, that the trial of Barrere, Collot d'Herbois, and Billaud de Varennes; three men, who were in the early stages, the associates, and in the latter, in some degree, the rivals of Robespierre's power, and who were, after his fall, unquestionably at the head of the mountain party, would excite some ferment. It was equally so, to presume, that if that party was not so completely crushed, as to preclude all hope of success, it would in some stage of the proceeding, make an extraordinary effort to save them. The epoch of this trial was, therefore, deemed by all an important one to France; and its several stages were marked by circumstances, which were calculated rather to encrease, than diminish, the general solicitude.

Under the banner of this party, and apparently in favour of the acquittal of these members, the discontented of every description were seen rallying; forming in the whole an extraordinary assemblage; being gathered from the various, and heretofore opposite, classes of society, but united now for the common

purpose of disturbing the public tranquillity. The prisons, which were filled in the time of Robespierre, and opened under the more humane administration of the present day, had discharged upon the city an immense crowd of the ancient aristocracy, and who soon gave proof, that the severe discipline they had undergone had not eradicated the propensities that were acquired under the reign of the ancient court. As the present administration had rescued them from the guillotine, and to which they were otherwise inevitably doomed, it was at least entitled to their gratitude. This slight tribute, however, was not paid for that important service. On the contrary, these were among the most active in fomenting the present discontents. Another group, not less numerous, or turbulent; composed of the refuse of the lately disfranchised, or rather routed, Jacobins and their adherents were seen marshalled by its side, and acting in harmony with it. These two classes of people, and who were heretofore at endless war with each other, now combined, formed a force of some strength, and excited in the minds of many well disposed persons, serious apprehensions for the public safety.

The increasing scarcity of bread, and which menaced an unavoidable diminution of the ordinary allowance, contributed much to increase the apprehension of danger. A deficiency in this article in Paris, under the ancient government, generally excited a tumult. It was, therefore, a primary object in every reign, and with every administration, to guard against such deficiency, as the greatest of pub-

lic calamities. Abundant stores were, in consequence, always provided, when it was possible to provide them; and let the scarcity or price be what it might, in other quarters, the ordinary allowance, and nearly at the ordinary price, was distributed, as in times of greatest plenty, among the inhabitants of this city. Such, likewise, had been the practice since the change of government; so that a state of affairs which announced the approach of a deficiency, announced likewise that of a crisis extremely important in the history of the revolution. The most firm knew it was an experiment yet to be made; and from which, whilst they counted upon no possible benefit, they had many reasons to apprehend some real inconvenience.

It was foreseen, that if any movement was set on foot, the deficiency of bread, if that was the fact, would be made the pretext; and as the complaint, being addressed to the wants of all, would excite a general sympathy, it was feared that such deficiency would tend much to encrease the strength of the insurgent party. In every view, therefore, the crisis which approached was an interesting one: It was, however, at hand, and no other alternative remained, for those whose duty it was to sustain it, than that of yielding under, or meeting it with firmness, and passing through it as well as possible.

As soon as it was known that a diminution of the ordinary allowance was unavoidable, it was resolved to make it known likewise to the people, that they might not be taken by surprise; and for this purpose

Boisy d'Anglas, of the section of subsistence committee of public safety, appeared at the t some days before it took effect. His discourse, was short, but explicit, began by exposing free enormities and vicious arrangements of the a committees; whereby, he said, France had al been visited with many calamities, and was threatened with others; and concluded by obser that even famine was likewise one proceeding that source; which neither the wisdom nor the dustry of the present councils had been able altoge to avert: That he was happy, however, to assure convention, that as the most prudent measures long since taken to correct the abuses of that adm istration, the distress of Paris would be for a short term only. The communication was received by Barrere, Billaud de Varennes, &c. and by the members of the mountain party in general, with a smile of approbation. It was obvious they considered Boisy, as a welcome messenger, announcing to them joyful tidings. A few days afterwards, the deficiency so much dreaded took place, and, at the same time, the intrigues of the discontented began more fully to unfold themselves.

The movement was commenced by about four hundred citizens, from a section heretofore noted for its turbulence; and who, appearing without the hall, demanded admission to the bar of the convention. A deputation from the party, consisting of twenty members, was admitted, and who addressed that body in a style unusual; complaining of the want of bread,

and declaring also, that they were upon the point of regretting the sacrifices they had made to the revolution. The answer of the President (Thibeaudaut) was firm and decisive. To that part of the address which complained of the scarcity of bread, he replied, by stating the measures of the government to remedy it: And to that which exposed the temper of the party in regard to the revolution, he answered explicitly, that he knew the disaffected were at work to excite trouble, but that their efforts would be fruitless; for, enlightened by experience, and strong in the power of the whole nation, the convention would be able to controul their movements; and in closing, he addressed himself more particularly to the memorialists, saying, that the efforts of the people to recover their liberty would not be lost, whilst good citizens seconded the labours of their representatives; that despair belonged only to slaves; freemen never regretted the sacrifices they had made in such a cause. The answer, which was received with general applause, checked for awhile the turbulent spirit of the disaffected.

But this party had too much at stake, and its measures were probably too far advanced, to be abandoned in this stage. About a week after this, and which was on the 1st of April (12 Germinal) a more numerous body, consisting principally of workmen from the Faubourg of St. Antoine, presented itself likewise before the hall, demanding admission to the bar of the convention, and upon some pretext, and in violation of the usual forms, immediately forced its

way into the hall of that assembly. The crowd increased, so that in the course of a few hours, there were in the hall, perhaps, three or four thousand; and in the vacant external space around it, as many more. The proceedings of the convention were suspended: The President, however, and the members kept their seats, declaring, that as their sitting was violated, they would do no business: Indeed it was now impossible to do any had they been so disposed: for the general and tumultuous cries that were raised by the invaders "for bread" for "liberty to the patriots," meaning some of the accomplices of Robespierre, could alone be heard. They continued thus in the hall about four hours, from two to six in the evening, offering in the interim no violence to any of the members; but behaving, in other respects, with the utmost possible indecorum. When they first entered, some circumstances were seen which caused a suspicion, that a good understanding subsisted between the leaders of the mob and some members of the mountain party: And it was likewise observed, that their final retreat was made upon a suggestion from that quarter; for as soon as an admonition to that effect was given from that quarter it was obeyed. Many believed it was intended to lay violent hands upon all the leading members of the preponderating party, and either murder them in their places, or send them to prison, to be murdered afterwards, under the form of a trial; as was the case in the time of Robespierre; whereby the preponderating scale would be shifted to the other side, and the reign of terror revived again for awhile. Be

the plan, however, what it might, it was soon frustrated; for, as the movement was that of a mob against the civil authority, its operations were irregular and disorderly: It had no chief to lead it on to acts of violence: The time was therefore, whiled away in senseless uproar, till at length the putative authors of the movement were as uneasy about the issue, and as anxious to get rid of it, as those at whom it was supposed to be pointed. In the interim too, the means that were adopted without, tended not only to secure the general tranquillity of the city; but most probably to influence in a great measure the proceedings within. By order of the committees the tocsin was sounded, and the citizens in every section called to arms; so that the appeal was fairly made to the people of Paris, whether they would support the Republic, or rally under the standard of those who were for a change. Nor was the question long undecided; for as soon as the government acted in its various functions it was obeyed: The lapse of a few hours gave it the preponderance, and the lapse of a few more, not only freed the hall of the convention from the invasion with which it had been seized, but dispersed the crowd from its vicinity.

At six in the evening the convention resumed its deliberations; beginning by declaring its sitting permanent, and progressing by a review of the movements of the day, which were well understood and freely discussed. By this time too, it was fortified by accounts from every quarter, that the sense of the city was decisively pronounced in its favor, and against

the rioters, and that the inhabitants of those sections, whence the disorder proceeded, were returning to their duty. The sitting continued until six in the morning: in the course whereof a decree of banishment was passed against the accused members, and of arrestation against eight or nine of the mountain party: which latter list was afterwards increased to about eighteen: and both of which decrees have since been carried into effect, by sending the former to the Isle of Oleron, and the latter to the castle of Ham in the department of Somme: and thus ended the commotion which was so long gathering and which menaced at one time, not to arrest the progress of the revolution (at least such was my opinion) but to occasion much trouble and stain its page with new atrocities.

In the course of this day, the services of General Pichegru, who happened to be in Paris, and was appointed commandant of the national guard, were of great importance to his country. His activity was great, for he was always on horse, and passing from one quarter of the city to another; and his arrangements in disposing of the cannon and military force were wise: His name too was of great utility, for it tended equally to elevate the hopes of the friends, and depress those of the enemies of the public tranquillity. I do not think if he had been absent, the event would have been different; but I am satisfied, that his presence contributed much to hasten the restoration of order, and to preserve it afterwards.

By this event, which is called the complement of

the 9th of Thermidor, and which forms the catastrophe of the mountain party, tranquillity appears to be established, not only in this city, but throughout the Republic in general. The scarcity of bread, it is true, still continues, but yet, no murmuring has been since heard on that subject. The moderate party, and which, in principle, I deem the same with that which was overwhelmed on the 31st of May, will therefore commence its career under auspices extremely favourable to its own reputation, and to the liberty and prosperity of France. The fate of its late antagonist, if there was no other motive, and which was precipitated by the general wish of France, and of all other nations, not in league against the French Republic, must furnish a solemn and lasting admonition to shun its example. The opposite principles too, upon which it is founded, being the avowed patron of humanity, justice and law, and equally at variance with the opposite extremes of aristocracy and anarchy, whose partizans were lately combined in an effort to crush it, promises to secure in its measures some stability in the observance of those just and honourable principles which it professes.

For some time past, the views of this party have been directed towards the establishment of the constitution, and some motions to that effect are now depending before select committees appointed to prepare the several organic laws necessary to introduce it. An opinion is likewise entertained by many, that the constitution in question is very defective, and ought to be amended before it is put in force. A discourse

to this effect was lately delivered by Pelet, a respectable and well informed member, and the same sentiment was then avowed by others. But whether an attempt of this kind, should it be formally made, will succeed or whether the general solicitude to put the constitution in force, however defective it may be in the hope of amending it afterwards, will prevail, is yet uncertain.

Since the fortunate issue of the late commotion, a treaty of peace was concluded with Prussia, at Basle, in Switzerland, of which I inclose you a copy. The import of the fourth and fifth articles, give cause to suspect, that some stipulations exist which have not been communicated, and it is believed by many, that it is agreed between the parties, that France shall retain the Prussian territory on the left of the Rhine, in lieu whereof, she is to take and cede Hanover. Should this be the case, it is probable, if the war continues another campaign, that Prussia will be seen arranged as a party in it on the side of France. The latter considers the old connection with Austria as broken, and wishes to supply it by one with Prussia; and provided satisfactory arrangements are or shall be hereafter formed for that purpose, will become interested in raising the latter power at the expence of the former, as well as that of England. The negociation with Spain is also said to be far advanced, and will most probably soon be closed. 'Tis likewise reported, that a person, or more than one from England is now in Paris, upon the pretext of treating for an exchange of prisoners, but in truth, for the more substantial

one of treating, or at least of sounding the disposition of this government for peace. Upon this point, however, I hope to be able to give you in the course of a few days more correct information than I now can.

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Jas Monroe.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[Edmund Randolph.]

Paris, May 17th, 1795.

Sir,—I was yesterday honoured with yours of the 8th of March,[1] the only one received since that of the 5th of December, and was at the same moment favored with the company of Mr. Pitcairn, who having just arrived, had called to present his commission of vice-consul for this city, to be recognized as such.

I informed you in my letter of the 6th of March, and for reasons that were in part before explained, that the arrival of this gentleman would subject me to an unpleasant dilemma, for if it was known that he was a British subject, although he had likewise become an American citizen, I doubted much whether he would be received: That in strict propriety I ought to communicate the fact if it was so, for after what had passed between us, upon a subject analogous to this, if I announced him with-holding the fact, and it was discovered afterwards, I should expose myself to the imputation of the want of candour, and that in

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, i., 699.

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any event, if he were established, however correctly I might personally act, the circumstance of his being a British subject, would not only lessen his weight and to the prejudice of our commercial affairs here, but to a certain degree, and from causes that are obvious, lessen mine likewise, the ill effects of which might be felt, and especially at the present moment upon concerns of more general importance. By his arrival, therefore, this embarrassment was realized: The commission of the President is the law to me, and upon every principle it is disagreeable to suspend its force; but yet the nature of the trust reposed in a public minister, seems to imply in him a discretionary power, to controul according to his judgment, incidents of this kind, wherever it appears that thereby he may promote the public interest, and which becomes of course the stronger, when necessary to prevent the public detriment. Upon mature consideration, therefore, I thought it best to withhold the official communication of his appointment from the government, until I should hear from you in reply to that letter; and the more especially, as it might now be expected in the course of a few weeks. In consequence, I communicated this decision to Mr. Pitcairn, with the motives upon which it was founded, and was pleased to observe, that he appeared to be perfectly satisfied with the propriety of it.

I observe by this letter, that the treaty concluded by Mr. Jay with Great-Britain, did not arrive before the 5th of March, and in consequence would not be submitted to the Senate before the 8th of June, and

in the interim would be kept secret. I regret equally this delay and secrecy; the *delay* because if it is not approved, it may become more difficult in the probable course of events on this side the Atlantic, to obtain a remodification of it: and the *secrecy* because the jealousy which was at first imbibed by this government of its contents will of course remain for the same space of time, and which cannot otherwise than be somewhat hurtful in the interim of our affairs depending here. Having too explained the object of that mission, whilst its issue was uncertain, they think it strange that the result should be now withheld. Upon this point, however, I have nothing new to add. I have already communicated to you whatever I had to communicate upon it, and waiting the issue, I shall continue by my assurances to endeavour to inspire this government with a confidence, either that the treaty in question contains in it nothing improper, or that it will not be ratified in case it does.

Your last letter gave me the first intelligence upon which I could rely, that Colonel Humphreys was in America. He will of course return fully possessed of your views with respect to the piratical powers on the African coast. I assure you long since that it would be easy to obtain from this government its aid upon that point, and it is certain that its aid with each, and especially Algiers, with which regency this republic is in the strictest amity, would be of great effect. Those powers hear that France is at war with Austria, Spain, England, Portugal, &c. and defeats them all, and in consequence conclude that she is more power-

ful than all united, and respect her accordingly. I have frequently been told in private conversation by the members of the committee, that they were ready to render us all the service in their power in that respect, and I should long since have requested the government to make our peace there in pursuit of the plan commenced by Mr. Morris, had I not been instructed that the business was in the hands of Colonel Humphreys, and feared by such interference I should embarrass the views and measures of our own government. I shall be ready however, to act in whatever line you may think proper to direct, and shall endeavour, and without any particular compromitment on our part, to keep the committee in the same state of preparation.

In general our commercial affairs progress as well, all things considered as could be expected. Transactions of old standing, I have not lately formally pressed, because I know that the government is embarrassed at present on the score of finance, and because I think it would be better to wait the issue of the business depending with you in June next. Mr. Skipwith, however, does every thing in his power to forward those objects, and perhaps with as much effect, as would be possible under any pressure that could now be made. But in the direct or current commerce, our countrymen enjoy all the privileges that the government can give them; and although delays are sometimes experienced, and especially in the payment of contracts, that were formed in America, yet the transactions are generally closed in a manner

satisfactory to the parties. The profits which some of them have made, and continue to make, according to report, are great, beyond example. In truth our countrymen are generally planting themselves in commercial houses throughout the Republic, and engaging in the commerce of France to an extent which, whilst it promises to be profitable to themselves, will likewise be of great and permanent utility to both nations: for by means thereof not only personal acquaintance and connections are formed by the citizens of each with those of the other respectively, but their common wants and common capacities will be better understood.

The claim of 15,000 dollars I mentioned long since would be admitted without a word, and that it ought to be so understood at the treasury. I omitted it in my more early applications to this government, because I wished to progress with the greater objects first, and more latterly, for the reasons above suggested. I conferred, however, on the subject with Mr. Adet, and presume he will allow it as a thing of course; but if he does not, upon notification thereof to the committee, and which I will immediately make when so advised by you, he will certainly be instructed to do it.

Since my last, Paris, and the Republic in general, have enjoyed a state of perfect tranquillity. Every little disturbance which ensued for a time the movement of the 2d April (12th Germinal) and there was one or two of the smaller kind which did ensue, subsided almost of itself, and in each instance without

force, and of course without bloodshed. Thus the authority of the convention prevails, although it is supported by the common sense, and the common interest of the citizens of Paris only; a thing heretofore deemed impracticable under similar embarrassments. Certain it is, that if the government had been in the hands of a king, or any other description of persons than that of the people themselves, we should have seen in the course of a few weeks past, a succession of many revolutions of the ministerial kind, and which perhaps would have dethroned eventually any king that ever reigned here. The distress of the people on account of the scarcity of bread, since that time, has been like that of a besieged town. They have been constantly upon allowance, and which was latterly reduced to two ounces and sometimes less per day. My family which consists of 14 persons is allowed two pounds of bread per day. I mention this that you may have a just idea of the distress of others, and particularly the poor; for at a great expence (nearly 40 dollars specie per barrel) I am supplied. The accounts which we have of the distress of the aged, the infirm, and even of children are most afflicting; yet calmness and serenity are seen everywhere; complaints diminish, and that ferocity which was observable on the 12th of Germinal, on the part of those who forcibly entered the convention, and which was excited by the animosity of contending parties, and most probably encreased by foreign influence, has entirely disappeared. In this moment they all look to America for bread, and most fervently do I join them

in prayer, that our countrymen may speedily bring it to them. If they can make out for six weeks they are safe; for by that time the rye will ripen, and from present prospects they may be in a better situation in the interim than they now are, and most probably not in a worse.

In the line of negociation, nothing has been concluded since the treaty with Prussia, and which was ratified by both parties soon after it was signed. Sir F^k^ Eden [1] came to Rochefort, from whence he notified his arrival to the committee and requested permission to come to Paris. They had him conducted to Dieppe, where he was kept under guard until the arrival of an agent from the committee, who was instructed to receive and report his propositions to that body, provided they embraced any other object than an exchange of prisoners; but in case they did not, to request his departure in twenty-four hours. The agent attended, asked his business, and was answered, he came to treat for an exchange of prisoners. Have you no other power? Let us settle this point first; we shall be together, and may afterwards talk on what we please. But have you no other power? Your answer to this question may settle this and every other point in a word: If you have I will receive what you will be pleased to communicate; if you have not, our business is at an end. Mr. Eden replied, he had none; and thus they parted, the agent for Paris, and Mr.

[1] Sir Frederick Morton Eden, the eldest son of Sir Robert Eden, governor of Maryland. His mother was Caroline Calvert, sister and co-heiress of the last Lord Baltimore.—*Dictionary of National Biography.*

Eden for London, the latter being apprized what the wish of the committee was in that respect.

The negociation with Spain is still at a stand. The Spanish court is strongly inclined to connect itself with this Republic; but in so doing it foresees the necessity of an accommodation with us in respect to the boundaries and the Missisippi; and against which it thinks itself secure by adhering to England, who it is believed gives assurances to that effect. Of the views of England, however, Spain is and always was jealous, so that it is not improbable an accommodation will soon take place. 'Tis said that the king of Spain makes a provision for the children of the late king, the object of his care: That he wishes to have them delivered up to him, with the view of giving them an establishment in property somewhere in his kingdom, and to the boy the title of Duke, and that this point in some form or other will probably be agreed.

'Tis said that a treaty is lately concluded with the commissioners from Holland, by which the independence of that country is acknowledged, and an alliance offensive and defensive formed, upon terms which promise to be satisfactory to the parties. I will inclose a sketch of these which has been published.

General Pichegru has crossed the Rhine and with a considerable force; but probably at present for the purpose only of quartering his army in the enemies' country. He is now in the neighbourhood of Mayence, which is still besieged. The campaign, however, cannot be considered as fairly opened: Perhaps

it is not definitely settled, against whom in the Empire, the forces of the Republic will be directed; for the door which was opened to receive propositions from the Princes of the Germanic body, through the king of Prussia, was not an idle provision. Advantage, I am told, has already been taken of it, and that it will most probably prove the means, and to the credit and interest of the king of Prussia, of promoting in the Empire the views of France.

At sea, in the excursions which were made in the course of the winter, by tempest great loss was sustained, and considering that the war will hereafter be directed principally against England, less attention was for some time paid to the navy than ought to have been expected. At present, however, the attention of the executive branch seems to be turned more to that object than heretofore; so that 'tis probable the waste of the winter will soon be repaired.

The assignats continue to depreciate, and the frequent discussions which take place upon the various propositions made to raise their credit, always produce the opposite effect of depressing them. Many, however, think the depreciation a blessing to the country, and that their total fall would be among the happiest of political events; especially if they can be kept up through the summer. At present their depreciation is by the standard of gold, or foreign exchange, as fourteen to one.

The mass of wealth in national domains, is affirmed by those who ought to know, more than double what I supposed; being, after restoring the property of

to this effect was lately delivered by Pelet, a respectable and well informed member, and the same sentiment was then avowed by others. But whether an attempt of this kind, should it be formally made, will succeed or whether the general solicitude to put the constitution in force, however defective it may be in the hope of amending it afterwards, will prevail, is yet uncertain.

Since the fortunate issue of the late commotion, a treaty of peace was concluded with Prussia, at Basle, in Switzerland, of which I inclose you a copy. The import of the fourth and fifth articles, give cause to suspect, that some stipulations exist which have not been communicated, and it is believed by many, that it is agreed between the parties, that France shall retain the Prussian territory on the left of the Rhine, in lieu whereof, she is to take and cede Hanover. Should this be the case, it is probable, if the war continues another campaign, that Prussia will be seen arranged as a party in it on the side of France. The latter considers the old connection with Austria as broken, and wishes to supply it by one with Prussia; and provided satisfactory arrangements are or shall be hereafter formed for that purpose, will become interested in raising the latter power at the expence of the former, as well as that of England. The negociation with Spain is also said to be far advanced, and will most probably soon be closed. 'Tis likewise reported, that a person, or more than one from England is now in Paris, upon the pretext of treating for an exchange of prisoners, but in truth, for the more substantial

one of treating, or at least of sounding the disposition of this government for peace. Upon this point, however, I hope to be able to give you in the course of a few days more correct information than I now can.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect and esteem your very humble servt

Jas Monroe.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[Edmund Randolph.]

Paris, May 17th, 1795.

Sir,—I was yesterday honoured with yours of the 8th of March,[1] the only one received since that of the 5th of December, and was at the same moment favored with the company of Mr. Pitcairn, who having just arrived, had called to present his commission of vice-consul for this city, to be recognized as such.

I informed you in my letter of the 6th of March, and for reasons that were in part before explained, that the arrival of this gentleman would subject me to an unpleasant dilemma, for if it was known that he was a British subject, although he had likewise become an American citizen, I doubted much whether he would be received: That in strict propriety I ought to communicate the fact if it was so, for after what had passed between us, upon a subject analogous to this, if I announced him with-holding the fact, and it was discovered afterwards, I should expose myself to the imputation of the want of candour, and that in

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, i., 699.

article which stipulated our other engagements sho'd not be affected by it: and some time after this, he wrote me that he intended to communicate to me in *confidence* the principal heads of the treaty for my use as a *publick minister*. Upon this, as I found we were losing ground in consequence of that event, I sent to him for it, stating my promise to the gov't to shew to it whatever he sent me: hoping that in case it cont'd any thing improper he wo'd not send it. Upon this application he was greatly wounded upon the score of national dignity &c[a], said we were an independent people &c[a] and sent nothing, but wo'd write to the Executive & take its orders,[1] it being obvious that before he could receive which, he wo'd embark for America, as it really happened. After this again he sent Colo. Trumbull here (the Colo. having in truth some private business also in Germany) to offer a verbal communication of the contents of the treaty upon condition I wo'd not disclose it. As I had promised to communicate what I sho'd receive upon the subject & when I sho'd receive it, and which promise was made after my first letter from Mr. Jay & which stated that he co'd not communicate it, and of course in the expectation that I sho'd hear nothing on the subject till I heard from America, it followed that I co'd not accept it upon the terms offered by Colo. Trumbull—His mission here, however, excited the displeasure of this government & encreased my embarrassment, for it was suspected that he came upon some business of the English administration (as was

[1] See Johnston's *Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay*, iv., 162.

published in the Engl'h papers) and was calculated to create a belief that thro' him I was possess'd, if I had not been before, of the contents of Mr. Jay's treaty: so that I was plac'd in a dilemma of not only not being able to remove the doubts of the gov't as to the contents of this treaty, but likewise of defending my own character from the suspicion of having been acquainted with the negotiation from the beginning & of being of course in great political harmony with Mr. Jay. As I had always fortified myself ag'nst this very unjust suspicion by frank communications, so I deemed it equally necessary in this instance, & in consequence exposed to the Committee the proposition of Mr. Jay thro' Mr. Trumbull & my refusal to accept it. By this line of conduct together with the concurrent report of all Frenchmen who now are or have been in America, I believe I am free in the estimation of the gov't from unjust suspicions: and I likewise believe I shall be free from them let the issue in America (now depending) be what it may. Whether I shall have any weight, in case the thing is approv'd & is improper, upon the sentiment & measures of the gov't here is doubtful.

I find by Mr. Randolph's letter that mine of the 18th of Dec'r has reached him: I hope you rem'd in Phil'a till the 8th of this month & were possess'd of the other letter alluded to above explaining more fully the impression of this gov't towards us, for certainly your counsel in that interesting business wo'd be of great use to our country, and especially as you would be confided in by many from the Easterward. I will

possess you by some safe hand of the correspondence with & respecting Mr. Jay. I will now send you a letter from Mr. Short showing that if we stood well here we have every thing under our control with respect to Sp'n as we certainly had with respect to Engl'd had it not been thrown away as I fear it has been. This letter is an important document, and oversets all the reasoning of those who are opposed to the necessity of harmony here to give effect to our negotiations elsewhere.[1]

The movements of the 12 of Germinal & 1st of

[1] From Mr. Short to Mr. Monroe. ARANJUEZ, May 4th, 1795. DEAR SIR,— I should have waited for your answer to my late letters, and particularly that of the 11th of April, before writing to you again, if it had not been for the particular circumstance which makes the subject of this. I have already mentioned to you the desire of this government to open the way to a pacification with the French commonwealth, and also my persuasion that some kind of negociation, although perhaps an unofficial one, was on foot. I am confirmed in that opinion, and you may consider as certain, that overtures have passed between one of the persons here to whom you sent me a letter inclosed in yours of the 6th of February last, and the person by whom those letters were written.—I have good reason to believe that this business has met with some kind of delay as to the articles of pacification,—or at least, that it is conceived here there would be some delay when these articles should come to be discussed.—You will readily conceive from the situation of this country in respect to England, that they would be afraid to enter openly on negociation without being previously sure of its success, lest they should find themselves between two fires.—The apprehension of England has certainly retained them lately, and not any aversion to peace with the French commonwealth; which, on the contrary, they desire most sincerely and ardently.—Under these circumstances the friendly interference of the United States has been wished for by this government. I have already explained to you the difficulties which presented themselves to me, from the points in litigation between the United States and this country having not been yet settled, and from the circumstances of Mr. Pinckney's appointment for that purpose rendering it necessary that they should be delayed for his arrival here.—Although I have the fullest assurances from this government, that all matters shall be settled to the satisfaction of the United States; and although present circumstances insure whatever the United States may now desire here; yet under

Prairial have terminated favorably to the objects of the Revolution by strengthening the hands of Gov't & promising some change in the constitution of 1793, upon our principle, a division of the legislature into two branches, &ca. which it is expected will be reported by the Committee of 11 who now have that subject under consideration.

I beg of you in particular to show my communications always to Mr. Jefferson, who I suspect declines

my circumstances I should have chosen not taking an active interference, until I should have conferred with Mr. Pinckney, and he with this government. For a long time I had no doubt Mr. Pinckney would have been here long ere this. I suppose he must be, at present, somewhere in France on his way hither; but I have received no letter from him since that of the 6th of March. Things would have probably gone on in this way until his arrival, viz. this government contenting themselves with the *pourparlers* on foot between the two persons mentioned above, and perhaps also between the generals of the two armies, if nothing had occurred to make them more anxious to accelerate the business. But this has taken place in consequence of the treaty concluded between the French commonwealth and the king of Prussia.

The duke de la Alcudia has now mentioned to me his desire that no further time should be lost, and that an active negociation should be immediately opened; declaring to me confidentially and authorizing me to mention to you, his real and sincere wish to conclude immediately a treaty with the French commonwealth; desiring, however, that it may be so conducted, that there should be no suspicion of it on the part of England, or the least possible ground for suspicion, until the conclusion and ratification of the treaty. He has, therefore, requested me to communicate this to the Minister of the United States at Paris, and to add his desire to receive here, for the purpose of concluding such a treaty, any person whom the French government might send for that purpose, and remain here in a secret way, until the business should be concluded and ratified. The desire of secrecy as you will observe, proceeds from the apprehension of England.—This he wishes you to propose to the French government, if you find it will be acceptable to them. This is the nature of his request to me, and which I have not thought it proper, for several reasons, to decline. Several of these reasons will naturally present themselves to you.

Having thus stated the request of the duke in the simplest form, it is for you to decide thereon what you may think advisable to do; and in which you will, of course, be guided by what you conceive to be for the interest of the United

intentionally a correspondence from a desire to enjoy free from interruption the comforts of private life; and likewise to Mr. Jones & with respect to others I leave you to act as you please. We are well & desire

States, and conformable to the wishes of the government where you reside; whose interests are co-incident with those of the United States.

It may not be improper to subjoin here some incidental remarks which took place between the minister here and myself, on the above occasion. In stating to me his wish that this business should be concluded as soon as possible, he observed, that if he had a person of confidence at Paris, he would give him the conditions on which the king wished this treaty to be grounded;—but that he had no such person there, and that it would be impossible for him to send one without its being found out here or at Paris, by England. On my mentioning the probability of the same discovery being made, if the French government should send a person here, he said there would be much less difficulty, if that person were charged not to discover himself,—or to pass for an American; and that the communications between him and the ministry here might pass through my hands, so as to remove all suspicion of his being a person charged with a negociation.

Should you think it proper to communicate this desire of the duke de la Alcudia to the French government, you will observe that nothing in writing has passed between us, and that his request to me is made only verbally. Although I have not the smallest doubt myself of the full and unequivocal sincerity with which he has thus opened himself to me; yet I would not chuse to induce the French government to adopt the measure proposed, without, at the same time, stating that the ground is as yet merely verbal.—If, however, the Republic is willing, as I have no doubt, to enter into negociation for peace, and should chuse to have some written ground, I suppose it probable the minister would not refuse to communicate to me in confidence, in writing, his desire above mentioned; if he should be assured of its being complied with by sending an agent here as stated already. From the footing on which you stand, of course, with the French government, you will be able to judge what is the mode that would be most agreeable to them in the conducting a negociation with this country, if they do not approve that suggested by the duke; and if they think it proper to communicate it to me, I will ascertain here the sentiments of the minister respecting the mode that shall be proposed.

So much for the mode of the negociation.—It may not be improper to add something respecting the substance of it.—It would seem natural that the duke should have given me some intimation of the conditions on which he wished the peace to be settled with the Republic; but I did not chuse to press on this head, because it did not seem to be the proper time to be asking for particulars, and also because, as he knows my attachment to France in common with that

to be affec'y remembered to Mrs. M. y'r father & his family.

The derangm't of Holland by the conquest puts it out of Von Staphorst's power to advance me money

of every other American, he might chuse not to put me further in possession of his sentiments than might be absolutely necessary.—From our conversation, however, as well on this, as on preceding occasions, I find his desire would be to avoid, if possible, contracting any article which might force this country into an immediate war with England. He is determined to risk that event, however, if the simple deviation from the convention of May 25, 1793, and the treating separately for peace with France, should render it inevitable. He flatters himself, however, that Spain's making a separate peace would not induce England to declare war against her under present circumstances. He would desire, therefore, to conclude a peace as simple as possible. He would chuse to avoid guarantying to France the island of Corsica, and such parts of the East and West Indies as England has taken during this war; because he conceives that would necessitate an immediate war with England: But the desire of this country is, that France should reconquer those places, as it is the real interest of Spain that they should belong to France rather than to England. I mention these things, merely as the first desire of the minister. How far he might be induced to deviate therefrom, for the object of a pacification with the French Republic, will appear in the course of the negociation, if it should be opened. The greatest difficulty will be as to the parts of Spain conquered by France; and I apprehend, as I have mentioned above, that some difficulty has already shewn itself, as probable, as to the place of Figueras. It is the business of negociation, of course, to remove difficulties.

Should the French government chuse to have something more certain fixed before sending an agent here, and will inform you how far they wish previously to be made acquainted with the outlines of the sentiments of this court, it is probable the minister would communicate them. At the same time, he would probably expect an equal mark of confidence through you and myself, of the sentiments, on the same head, of the French government.

This letter will be forwarded by the minister through the frontiers by a flag; you will therefore soon receive it. I will thank you immediately to acknowledge the receipt thereof, and to let me know, as soon as possible, whether you have judged it proper to take any step in consequence thereof, and what shall have been the result thereof. Send your letters on this subject by the same way by which you sent that of the 6th of February, the last I have received from you. I have as yet no answer from the President, as to the absence from hence which I have asked. I hope ere long to have the pleasure of renewing to you, in person, the assurances of my being sincerely your friend and servant.

tho' I am convinc'd a loan may be obtained to purchase land if any bargain offers & of w'h you will advise me. Sincerely I am y'r friend & servant

Ja^{s} Monroe.

A treaty with Holland is made whereby those states are independent, paying 100,000,000 of florins for the expenses of the same &ca.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

Paris, June 14th, 1795.

Sir,—It seemed probable, after the movement of the 12th Germinal (2nd of April) and which terminated in the banishment or rather deportation (for the hand of government was never withdrawn from them) of Barrere, Billaud de Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, and the arrestation of several of the leading members in the mountain party, that the convention would be left at liberty to pursue for the future the great object of the revolution, and without further molestation; and the calm which ensued, for a considerable time, that movement, although the scarcity of bread continued, gave strength to this presumption. But a late event has shewn that the victory which was gained upon that occasion by the convention, over the enemies of the present system, was not so decisive as there was reason to presume it would be; for within a few days after my last, which was of the 17th of May, another attempt was made

upon that body, and which menaced for a while at least, in respect to the personal safety of the members, the most alarming consequences. I am happy, however, to be able now to assure you that this has likewise failed, and without producing, according to present prospects, and in regard to the main course of the revolution, any material effect.

The circumstances which characterize this latter movement were in general the same with those of that which preceded it; except that it was attended with greater violence and its views were more completely unfolded. On the 20th of May, a party from the Faubourgs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau, armed, and consisting of several thousands, approached the convention early in the morning, having previously circulated a paper that their object was a redress of grievances; of which the scarcity of bread was the principal, and which could only be accomplished by the establishment of the constitution of 1793, and the recall of Barrere and his colleagues; or, in other words, the revival of the reign of terror. As these measures could not be carried into immediate effect, without the overthrow of the preponderating party, so the movement appeared to be directed unequivocally to that object. The centinels of the convention were forced upon the first approach, and in an instant the party, preceded by a legion of women, entered and spread itself throughout the hall of that assembly. The sitting was broken and every thing in the utmost confusion. In a contest which took place between Ferraud, one of the deputies, (a gallant and estimable

young man) and some of the party, for the protection of the chair and person of the President, which were threatened with violation,—the former was slain, and soon afterward his head, severed from his body, was borne on a pike by the perpetrators of this atrocious crime, in triumph, into the bosom of the convention itself. It really seemed for some time, as if that body, or at least the leading members in the preponderating party, were doomed to destruction, or safety to be secured only by disguise and flight. During this conflict, however, the whole assembly behaved with the utmost magnanimity: No symptoms of fear were betrayed: No disposition to yield or otherwise dishonor the great theatre on which they stood; and Boissy d'Anglas, who happened to preside, not only kept his seat, but observed in his deportment a calmness and composure which became the dignified and important station which he filled. This state of confusion lasted until about twelve at night; when it was terminated by the decisive effort of a body gathered from the neighbouring sections, planned by the united committees of public safety, sureté generale and militaire, and led on by several deputies, among whom were most distinguished, Kervelegan, Anguis, Mathieu, Delmas, Freron and Legendre. They entered precipitately the hall, attacked the intruders, sabre and bayonet in hand; nor did they cease the charge until they had rescued it from the profanation. A little after twelve the convention was re-established, and proceeded, as upon the former occasion, to a review of what had passed, in the course of the day.

Whilst the insurgents were in possession of the reins of government, and after Boissy d'Anglas had retired, they placed the President Vernier, in the chair by force,[1] and began an organization upon the principles that were first avowed. They repealed in a mass all the laws that were passed since the 9th Thermidor; recalled Barrere, Billaud de Varennes and Collot d'Herbois; took possession of the tocsin and the telegraph; ordered the barriers of the city to be closed, and were upon the point of arresting all the members of the committee of the executive branch, having appointed a commission of four deputies, to take their places and with full power to act in their stead; so that in truth the reign of terror was nearly revived, and with accumulated force. At this moment, however, the plan of the committees, who had continued their sitting, was ripe for execution and fortunately the stroke was given before the system was completed.

But the commotion was not ended by the expulsion of the insurgents from the hall of the Convention itself. They retreated back to the faubourgs to which they belonged, and where, for a while, they opposed its authority. In the course, however, of the succeeding day, a considerable force was collected, under the authority of the Convention, from those sections who voluntarily offered their service, amounting, perhaps, to 20 thousand; and which being marched

[1] This is a mistake; Vernier relieved Boissy d'Anglas upon his own pressing solicitation; it appearing that Boissy d'Anglas was exhausted.—MONROE'S *View.*

against them in different directions, surrounding, in a great measure, both faubourgs, reduced them immediately to order, and without the effusion of blood.

On the same day an insurrection took place at Toulon of the same kind, and with the same objects in view, and which for several days wrested that port and its dependencies, the fleet excepted, from the authority of the government. Upon that theatre too, some outrages were committed, and fatal consequences in other respects were apprehended. But this was likewise lately suppressed by the efforts of good citizens, drawn by the representatives in mission there, from Marseilles and the neighbouring country; a report to that effect being yesterday presented to the convention by the committee of public safety: So that order may be considered as completely established, the authority of the convention being triumphant every where.

As soon as the Convention resumed its deliberations, the punishment of those who had offended in the course of the commotion was the first object which engaged its attention. Whilst the insurgents were in possession of the hall, and enacting their short but comprehensive code of legislation, several members of the mountain party not only retained their seats, but joined in the work. Four were appointed to the commission, which was designed to supercede the executive administration, and who accepted the trust. These circumstances, with many others which occurred, created a belief that the movement was in harmony with that party. It was therefore concluded,

that more decisive measures ought to be taken with those members, and with the party generally, than had been heretofore adopted; and in consequence, about 30 of them were arrested on that and the succeeding days, within the course of a week, and who are to be tried according to a late decree, in common with others charged with offences, said to be committed in the course of the commotion,—by a military commission appointed at the time, and invested with full power for that purpose.

It is to be observed, that the character of this movement was decisively anti-monarchical. Its success, if it had succeeded, would have revived the reign of terror, and most probably carried all the aristocrats, with the leading members of the prepońderating party, to the scaffold. *Bread and the Constitution of* 1793, were written upon the hats of many of the insurgents; and whilst the hall and its vicinity resounded in favor of the patriots, meaning Barrere, *&c.* the feeble voice of one solitary aristocrat only was heard in favor of the constitution of 1789. Indeed the aristocrats, who had before the 12th Germinal contributed much to foment the discontents which broke out on that day, in the hope that if a commotion took place and the Convention was overthrown, the standard of Royalty would be erected, and the monarchy re-established,—and who were in the interval, from the dubious character of that movement, which was crushed before it had fully unfolded itself, of neither side, for, nor against the Convention,—were observed in the commencement of this, to remain in the same state

of inactivity, greatly agitated, but taking no part. As soon, however, as the object of this latter movement was understood, and it became obvious, that in case it succeeded, terrorism, and not royalty, would be re-established, the disposition of this party towards the Convention changed. It no longer shewed an indifference to its welfare; on the contrary, it became active in its support. But in truth, the force of this party in this City, and especially upon the late emergencies, did not appear to be great. The most gallant of its members are either upon the frontiers, at war against the republic, or have fallen already in the cause of royalty. These, too, consist of those who were of sufficient age to take their part in the commencement; for the young men of Paris, who are descended from it, or from others of the more wealthy inhabitants of the city, and who have attained their maturity during the revolution, or are now growing up, have imbibed the spirit which it was natural to expect such splendid examples of patriotism would create upon young and generous minds, and are in general on the side of the revolution.

That there should be a party of any force within the republic, or rather of sufficient force to disturb the government in the manner we have seen, disposed to subvert the present system, and establish that of terror, must excite your surprise. You will naturally be inclined to ask of what character of citizens is it composed; what their numbers and ultimate views; since it is to be presumed that a system of terror, as a permanent system of government, cannot be wished

by any one? You have seen that the movements in question proceeded principally from the two faubourgs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau; the enquiry, therefore, will be satisfied by exposing the character of those two sections. In general, I am told, they are artisans, and among the most industrious in Paris. Many of them are said to be foreigners, Germans, and which explains the motive of their partiality for the constitution of 1793, which naturalizes them. That they are opposed to monarchy is certain, for such has been their character from the epoch of the destruction of the Bastille, in which they had a principal hand, to the present time. Indeed, upon this point, the late movements speak with peculiar force; for if those movements were spontaneous, and commenced by the people themselves, it follows, as they cannot be suspected of any deep political finesse, and of aiming at royalty through the medium of terrorism, that the latter, and not the former, was the object. And if they were set on by foreign influence, as is believed by many, the conclusion must be the same; for as royalty is unquestionably the object of those persons who are suspected of such interference, it is to be presumed, that, if practicable, they would have taken a more direct course to promote it, by an immediate declaration in its favour, since thereby they would rally under its standard all those who were the friends of that system: Whereas, by declaring in favour of terrorism, the opposite effect was produced; for the royalists themselves were thereby driven into the expedient of using their utmost endeavours to save the Convention,

as the only means whereby they could save themselves. In every view, therefore, they must be deemed enemies to royalty, and as such it is natural to expect they will feel a great sensibility upon all those questions, which, in their judgment, have a tendency to promote it. Whether any such have been agitated or contemplated is, perhaps, doubtful: I have thought otherwise, and still think so. But that many circumstances have presented themselves, in the course of the collision of parties, that were sufficient to create a suspicion with persons of that portion of discernment, which laborious artizans usually possess, that the leading members of the preponderating party were prepared to abandon the republican scale, and incline towards monarchy, is certain. The inhabitants of these faubourgs having sided always with the mountain party, have of course, brought upon themselves the particular enmity of the royalists. They have, therefore, or rather their leaders have been, in their turn, persecuted by the royalists. But they have likewise thought themselves persecuted by the present preponderating party, with whom they were engaged in uninterrupted warfare, before and since the time of Robespierre. In this respect, therefore, they saw the present preponderating party and the royalists acting apparently in harmony together, and concluded that the former were likewise royalists. They have likewise seen, under the administration of this party, the royalists enlarged from prison, and other measures of that kind adopted, which have probably fortified them in this belief. A report, too, which has been circulated

through the city, that under the name of organic laws, it is contemplated by the committee of eleven, to introduce some important changes in the constitution of 1793, has, no doubt, tended in a great measure to increase their disquietude. In an attempt to explain the cause of these movements, the above circumstances have appeared to me to merit attention, and, with that view, I have presented them.

But that there was no real harmony of political views between the present preponderating party and the royalists, even with respect to the terrorists, is a fact of which I have no doubt. The reign of terror continued until it could last no longer: It was necessary to suppress it, and it was suppressed. That the royalists wished this event, and gave it all the aid they could, is certain; but that their efforts were of any service in that respect is doubtful: Indeed, I was persuaded that for some time they produced the opposite effect, and for reasons that are obvious: For as the preponderating party sought the establishment of the Republic, and knew that the mountain party had the same object in view, it was reasonable to expect, that after the former had gained the ascendency it would be disposed to exercise towards the latter some degree of moderation and humanity; and equally so to presume, that the same spirit of magnanimity which inculcated this disposition towards its antagonist, chiefly from a respect for its political principles, would dispose it to reject with disdain the aid of the royalists who were enemies to both. This sentiment I think is to be traced through all the measures

of the convention, from the 9th of Thermidor to the 1st of Prairial; for we behold, through that interval, the preponderating party rescuing from the guillotine and prison, the royalists, whilst they reprobated their principles, and terminating in other respects the reign of terror; whilst they avoided, as far as was possible, the punishment of those who had been the principal authors and agents under that reign. Indeed this party has appeared to me to be, and so I have often represented it to you, as equally the enemy of the opposite extremes of royalty and anarchy; as resting upon the interest and the wishes of the great mass of the French people, and who I have concluded, and from those data the revolution itself has furnished, as well as from my own observations since my arrival (the latter of which, it is true, has been confined to a small circle) are desirous of a free republican government; one which should be so organized as to guard them against the pernicious consequences that always attend a degeneracy into either of these extremes.

You will likewise ask; what effect have these movements had upon the public mind, in regard to the present system? Is it not probable they have already wearied the people out, and in consequence inclined them to royalty merely from a desire of repose? That they are all wearied is most certain, and what may be the course of events, in the progress of time, I do not pretend to determine: These lie beyond my reach, and indeed beyond the reach of all men. I only undertake to deduce immediate consequences from the facts which I witness;

and when I see that these movements have produced upon the royalists themselves the opposite effect, and forced them, at least for the present, to renounce their creed and cling to the convention for their safety, I cannot presume that the moderatists, who are republicans, will quit the safe ground on which they rest, their own ground too, and become royalists. Royalty, therefore, I consider at present as altogether out of the question. But that these convulsive shocks, and which proceed from the opposite extreme, may produce some effect, is probable. In my opinion they will produce a good one; for I am persuaded they will occasion, and upon the report of the committee of eleven, some very important changes in the constitution of 1793; such as a division of the legislature into two branches, with an organization of the executive and judiciary upon more independent principles than that constitution admits of: Upon those principles indeed which exist in the American constitutions, and are well understood there. Should this be the case, the republican system will have a fair experiment here; and that it may be the case, must be the wish of all those who are the friends of humanity every where.

On the day that this late commotion commenced, Mr. Pinckney arrived here on his way to Madrid, and was a spectator of the great scene it exhibited to the close: A few days after which he pursued his route, by the way of Bourdeaux, where before this he is probably arrived. Whilst here, I presented to his view what had passed between this government and myself, upon

the subject of his mission, assuring him from what I had heard and seen, that I was of opinion, that in case he would explain himself to the committee upon that subject, and express a wish they would give what aid they conveniently could, in support of his negociation; satisfying them, at the same time, that they were not injured by Mr. Jay's treaty, they would do it. I likewise shewed him a letter I had just received from Mr. Short, written at the instance of the Duke de la Alcudia; to request that I would promote, by certain communications to this government, a negociation between Spain and this Republic; he having previously and positively assured Mr. Short, that our demands should be yielded and adjusted at the same time. Mr. Pinckney was sensible of the benefit which the aid of this Republic could yield in his negociation, and wished it; but, upon mature consideration, was of opinion he could not request such aid without having previously exposed to its view Mr. Jay's treaty, and which he did not chuse to do, for considerations delicacy forbade me to enquire into. It was, however, equally his and my wish, that his journey through the country should be marked with all those circumstances of reciprocal civility between the government and himself, which are always due, and generally paid, when the minister of a friendly power passes through the territory of another; and in consequence I announced his arrival to the committee,[1] and obtained

[1] To the Committee of Public Safety. "PARIS, May 22nd, 1795.—I have to notify the committee of public safety, that Mr. Pinckney, minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, and envoy extraordinary to the court of Spain, is now in Paris, on his way to Madrid, upon a particular mission from

for him an amicable interview with the members of its diplomatic section, and by whom he was received with the most perfect attention.

You have already seen that England and Spain are each, and without the knowledge of the other, seeking a separate peace with this republic. What the motive for such secrecy on the part of the former is remains to be hereafter unfolded: But what it is on the part of the latter is easily understood; for, as she apprehends, in case a peace is made with France, a declaration of war from England, and, of course, in case the attempt to obtain a peace is known, some new pressure from that power,—it follows, that she must wish the arrangement to be complete, to guard her against the ill consequences which might otherwise attend such an event, before any thing upon that head transpires. As soon, however, as it is known to Spain, that England seeks a separate peace, her jealousy of the views of England will be increased; as, likewise, will be the motive for an immediate accommodation with this Republic. The period, therefore, when a good understanding, embracing, perhaps, the ancient connection between the two nations, will be revived cannot be considered as remote. Whether our claims upon Spain will be attended to, under existing circumstances, in that adjustment, is a point upon which it is impossi-

the United States to that court. He intends to pursue his journey by land, and wishes the passport of the committee, to secure him that safety and protection which is due to the minister of their ally, whilst within the jurisdiction of the French Republic. Mr. Pinckney will be happy to bear any commands which the committee may have for the quarter to which he is going." Pinckney's passport was certified and delivered by the Committee of Public Safety May 31st.

ble for me to determine: for, as I was not possessed of Mr. Jay's treaty, and could give no other information on that head, than I had before given, I have latterly forborne all further communication with the committee upon that subject. Mr. Pinckney will be able, soon after his arrival at Madrid, to ascertain the temper of the Spanish court in regard to our demands, and the means by which his negociation may be forwarded; and, as he likewise knows the state of things here, he will be able also to point out the line in which, if in any, I may be serviceable; and, in the interim, I shall not only be prepared to co-operate with him in whatever movement he may suggest; but to obey, with promptitude, any instructions you may be pleased to give me in this, or any other, respect.

Since my last, the treaty with the United Provinces has been concluded and ratified, of which I send you a copy, and the garrison of Luxembourg, consisting of 12,000 men, with an immense amount in military stores, cannon, &c. has surrendered. The achievement of this post, one of the strongest in Europe, has opened the campaign on the part of France with great brilliancy: As it was taken, too, after a long siege, and when all possible efforts to raise it had proved abortive, it not only demonstrates the superiority of the French arms in the present stage of the war, but furnishes satisfactory ground whereon to calculate, according to the ordinary course of events, its ultimate issue.

You will, perhaps, have heard before this, that the British have recommenced the seizure of our vessels

laden with provisions, destined for the ports of this republic.[1] An American, just from Hamburg, charged with other articles, informed me the other day, that he was boarded on his way by two frigates, whose officers informed him, they were ordered to take in all vessels thus laden.

Within a few days past, the son of the late king departed this life. A minute report will be published by the government of his decline, having lingered for some time past, and of the care that was taken to preserve him. They are aware of the criticisms to which this event may expose them, and suffer, on that account, an additional mortification. His concession to Spain, as was contemplated, made his life, with the government, an object of interest; since it would have forwarded, in some respects, its views in the depending negociation.

I have just been honored with yours of April 7th, and shall pay due attention to its contents.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect and esteem your very humble servt. Js. Monroe

P. S. I am sorry to inform you of the death of Mr. Coffyn, consul for the port of Dunkirk. His loss is to be regretted, as he was able, diligent and faithful in the discharge of the duties of his office. His son is very desirous of succeeding him, and certainly if any one, not an American, is appointed, it will be impossible to find for it a more suitable person.[2] In

[1] A "weighty obstacle" to the ratification of Jay's treaty. See note, p. 340, post.

[2] Francis Coffyn, the son, was nominated by Washington to be Consul at Dunkirk, May 19, 1796, and was confirmed by the Senate, May 20th.

my opinion, however, Americans only should be appointed. In any event, I think the merits of the father, who was distinguished for his services and attachment to our country, entitle his memory to some attention, and doubt not your letter of acknowledgment, addressed to his son on that head, through me, will be gratefully received.

TO WILLIAM SHORT.

PARIS, May 30, 1795.

SIR,—I was favoured, about ten days past, with yours of the 4th instant, and should have answered it immediately, had I not previously done so by anticipation, in some measure, in one of the same date through the armies, or had I not waited for the arrival of Mr. Pinckney, who was then on his way from Dunkirk for this place. By him this will be forwarded; indeed, by him alone would I hazard what I deem it necessary to communicate to you. Previously therefore, permit me to assure you, that this government will admit of no intermediate or third parties in its negociations, but will only treat with its enemies themselves, or directly. The only power whose good offices they ever thought of accepting was the United States; but the negociation of Mr. Jay with England has, by its manner, and particularly by withholding with such care the result, inspired such distrust in our friendship for them, that they are disposed not even to accept of ours. This is a fact of importance, which I did not chuse to hazard through the route of the

armies; since if it was known to the Spanish government it might lessen our weight in our negociation with that court; for I always knew that an opinion of a good understanding between us and this government would greatly forward our own depending negociations elsewhere. You must therefore (or rather Mr. P.) must press the object of your negociation to a close as soon as possible, counting with certainty, that although, in general, we stand well here, yet we are to have no agency in the affairs of France, and of course are to derive, from that consideration, no aid to the advancement of our own.

It is proper to inform you, that just before the report of Mr. Jay's treaty reached us, this government, whose attachment to us was daily increasing, had it in contemplation to extend, by all the means in its power, its fortunes to us, in our depending negociations elsewhere; and that even since that report, upon the presumption every thing is right, they have instructed (as I am told) their minister, negociating with Spain, to secure in their treaty the points insisted on by us.

This instruction was given just before the report of Mr. Pinckney's appointment was known, and I am inclined to think, that although it was not in Mr. Pinckney's power (not being able to explain Mr. Jay's treaty to them without which it would have been indelicate) to ask their aid, that the instructions still continue in force. In any event Spain will have all possible proof, and from this government itself, that they wish us well, and rejoice in our prosperity, and

therefore, although they keep their own affairs to themselves, yet the Spanish Court will find, that a good understanding with France is not to be expected or preserved without a good understanding with us.

I have heard that Mr. Jay has stipulated something in his treaty respecting the Mississippi; whereby upon the ridiculous pretence of a guarantee to us, an extension of territory is substantially given to Britain, and she in consequence admitted to the Mississippi. The fact of a guarantee by Britain to us must excite the indignation of Spain towards her, though ready to yield the point to us: But the extension of her territory so as to comprehend the source of that river, and thereby entitle her to its navigation, will produce a more serious and alarming effect. I think it will tend greatly to separate Spain from England, and to force the former into a more intimate connection with France and the United States; the first step towards which, is an accommodation to their present demands.

Another circumstance which will facilitate this object is, that England, through Sir F. Eden, has absolutely and very lately attempted, upon the pretext of an exchange of prisoners, to open a negociation for peace with this Republic. I suspect Spain knows nothing of this, but I am assured, by authority in which I confide that it is the truth. He was received at Dieppe, and detained whilst his terms were sent to the committee, and an answer received peremptorily rejecting them. If true, I presume the fact will be

made known to Spain; so that the latter power ought to reject all delicacy towards the former in its transactions with it.

I have one other observation to make, which shews the necessity of dispatch, if possible, in our negociation with Spain. Suppose her peace made with this Republic; she is of course, relieved from the pressure which disposes her to accommodate us. Shall we not afterwards stand of course nearly upon the same ground that we stood in that negociation, from the epoch of the one which was conducted by Mr. Jay with Mr. Gardoqui, which had well nigh ended (though managed by the former with great skill, and according to the rules of ancient diplomacy) in the occlusion of the river and dismemberment of the continent; which negociation has certainly deluded the Spanish government, from that time to the present day, into an opinion, that half America wish it shut: At least to me (who was in the Congress during the pendency of that negociation, and who have since seen your correspondence) such appeared to be the case.

The above are hints upon the real state of things here, upon which Mr. Pinckney and yourself will take your measures. If I could satisfy this government that Mr. Jay's treaty contained nothing with which they have a right to complain, every thing would be easy here; we might forward the views of the two countries in which we reside, which in respect to this, I ardently wish to forward, making previously those of our own secure. But can any motive of interest, on the part of France, induce her to accept such offers

from us, until she shall receive such satisfaction? Where the interest of our country can be advanced, or there is a possibility it may, I am willing to attempt anything in concert with you, and shall, therefore, be always happy to hear from you in these respects.

I inclose you a letter from a friend of yours in this country, being assured it contains nothing of a treasonable nature: No intelligence of the march of armies or preparations against Spain, which it is the interest of this government to keep secret.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.[1]

PARIS 23, June 1795.

DEAR SIR,—Your first enquiry will be, upon what basis does the revolution rest? Has it yet weathered the storms that have beaten against it, and taking all circumstances into view that merit consideration, is there ground for a well founded hope that it will terminate happily for France & of course for mankind? I will give you concisely the actual state of things, by comparing which with those great events which have preceeded and are known every where, you will be enabled to form as correct a judgment upon that point as can now be formed upon it.

To say that the Convention maintains its authority over the whole interior of the republick, notwithstand-

[1] From the copy inclosed by Monroe in his letter to Jefferson of June 27. I find but the last page of the original among the Monroe Papers. This page bears, however, the following indorsement: "Original of June 23, 1795. Copies to Dr. Logan, Aaron Burr, John Beckley, R. R. Livingston, Thos Jefferson."

ing its late difficulties, would give you but a superficial view of the subject, without developing in some degree the nature and probable consequences of those difficulties. Internal convulsions where they happen try the strength of parties, and demonstrate what their real object is, as well as that of the society in general, in regard to the points in controversy. Fortunately such have happened here, and of a character to furnish respectable data whereon to calculate not only the strength of parties, but likewise the probable issue of the revolution itself. Fortunately, permit me to say, for as political truths depend upon experiment, so we have reason to rejoice in those experiments which prove what it is the wish and the interest of mankind to see proven.

Within less than two months past I have seen the Convention twice assailed by a considerable force and which was in the latter instance armed, & upon both those occasions, have seen that force foiled, in the first without the effusion of blood, and in the second by the death of one man (Ferrand, a deputy) only. Many circumstances too were combined to make those movements formidable and to create a belief that they would shake the revolution; if there existed in the society a force able and willing to shake it: for the first took place at the moment when the city was agitated by a twofold crisis of famine, & the trial of Billaud de Varennes, Collot d' Herbois & Barrere, leading members of the mountain party: and the second, when the famine was at the height and the distress of the people beyond what was ever

seen on our side of the Atlantic. For several hours on both days, the proceedings of the Convention were interrupted, & on the last the rioters were in absolute possession of the hall and in a great measure of the government itself: so that in truth the superiority of active force was on their side, and danger only on the side of the members and the friends of the government. At such a moment as this, when the functions of the government were suspended, or exercised by the insurgents only, there was surely a fair opportunity for those who were in favor of a change, to pronounce themselves on that side: and the presumption is reasonable that all those who were in favor of it, or at least who were willing to hazard any thing in support of it, did pronounce themselves on that side. It was the epoch upon which foreign powers and the royalists had fixed their attention & upon which it was understood they would unite their efforts to bring about a counter-revolution nor was there any army at hand or other force to oppose the enterprise than the citizens of Paris itself. Upon a fair appeal, therefore, to the interest and the wishes of the inhabitants of this city, the issue was put, and the experiment in both cases and particularly the last proved that the strength of those who were for a counter-revolution was, comparatively with that of those against it, like that of an infant against Hercules. Upon the first occasion the commotion was crushed, before the movers in it got the ascendancy, but upon the second it was otherwise, so that their force was fairly ascertained & shewn to be nothing.

Nor was the issue more unfavorable to royalty, if we may judge from what appeared, than the success of the party would have been if it had succeeded: for the principle upon which the movement was undertaken by the great mass of those who acted in it, was not to favor royalty but to oppose it, being impressed with an opinion that the prevailing party were disposed to re-establish that species of government, and against which they declared themselves affirming that their object was, liberty to the patriots (the members of the mountain party who were under prosecution) & the establishment of the constitution of 1793 & which certainly has in it none of the attributes of royalty.

In the course of these commotions the royalists did not display themselves to advantage: they shewed neither enterprise nor decision. In the commencement they were active by intrigue only, fomenting, by all the means in their power, the discontents of the laborious poor, and which proceeded from the famine which oppressed them, contrasting their present distress with the abundant ease of former times &c. &c., but when the moment of danger arrived, they took no part so as to make themselves responsible in case the effort failed. And upon the latter occasion, when the party got possession of the convention and began for a while to rule, & were about to re-establish terrorism and not royalty, the royalists shifted their ground in a moment and became very vociferous against popular commotions, & equally pathetic in support of the Convention & of the law,

which a few hours before they disdained and endeavoured to subvert. In truth they saw that their own safety was involved in that of the Convention, and in consequence became interested in the welfare of that body from the strongest of all possible motives, a regard for themselves.

Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that these movements have tended rather to strengthen than to weaken the foundation of the revolution, for they have shewn that the mountain party which so long governed France, altho' it has latterly lost its influence, has not abandoned its principles, and that if it had recovered its authority, it would not have introduced royalty but on the contrary a greater degree of rigor against the royalists than humanity allows, or the present preponderating party is disposed to exercise. Of this truth even the avowed royalists are already admonished; is it not, therefore, reasonable to conclude that those who were before wavering what part to take will for the future, cease to hesitate.

But you will ask is there not a party in the Convention itself favorable to monarchy, are not some of the leading members in the preponderating party inclined to that system of government? If the fact were so, these late movements would have a tendency to check that bias: but I have no reason to think that the fact is so, with many I am personally acquainted, and from what I have seen of their conduct, for some time past, in publick and in private life, I can assure you that whilst I have nothing to say against any of these members, I consider many of them as among the

most enthusiastic admirers and advocates of the publick liberty that I have ever known. I have seen them too in situations where it was impossible to dissemble. Time & circumstances, it is true, may produce changes, & against which I do not pretend to reason: I only argue from data within my view, & deduce those consequences from them which according to the ordinary course of events are probable. So much then upon the state of parties and their respective views, & by which it appears that the publick liberty will not be endangered under the auspices of either.

In other respects the prospect has become more favorable to a happy termination of the revolution than was heretofore promised. The people of France may conquer their liberties & merit to be free, but without a good government it will be impossible to preserve them. This truth has latterly been more deeply impressed upon the Convention than it formerly was, and in consequence the attention of that body seems now to be principally turned to that object, a committee consisting of 11 members having been appointed for more than six weeks past, to report what changes it will be necessary in their judgment to make in the existing one of 1793 & whose report is daily expected. It is believed that this committee will propose some important changes in that constitution and that the Convention will adopt them, such as a division of the legislature into two branches &c. after the model of the American constitutions. I have heard many deputies confer on this subject &

who were unanimous in favor of this change, & which is certainly of greater importance to the preservation of their liberty than any other that has been spoken of. As soon as this report is presented, I will transmit it to you.

The external view is still more favorable. The achievements of the last campaign surpassed everything that the modern world has witnessed: in every quarter their arms were triumphant, but where the greatest danger pressed there the grandeur of their exploits was most conspicuous. Spain and Holland bear testimony in favor of this assertion, for the close of the campaign left the republick in possession of extensive territories belonging to the former & of the whole of the latter. The armies of the Emperor, too, were often beaten & finally forced to abandon the field. Those of Prussia experienced upon several occasions the like fate; & as for the British, they retreated till they came back upon sea, where hurrying on board the ships that were prepared to receive them, they took their flight upon the element upon which alone they could hope for safety. From these successes you have already seen that France has gained the most solid and durable advantages. From an enemy Holland has become a friend and ally. In that country the government only was conquered & by whose conquest the people became free: for upon the ruins of the miserable oligarchal tyranny which reigned there, we find a sister republick reared, marshalled by the side of France, & preparing to fight with her for the common liberty of the two people.

Prussia has withdrawn from the war and is now in the closest amity with France. Spain is negotiating & will probably soon have peace. Austria is known to wish it, & England has absolutely made overtures secretly thro' the medium of Sr. Fk. Eden, whilst the ostensible object of his mission was an exchange of prisoners only. Exploits like these become a free people, nor are any but a free people able to perform them.

Such was the actual state of things when the campaign was lately opened on the part of France by the achievement of Luxembourg one of the best fortified and strongest posts in the world. The siege was closely continued for more than six months, and finally succeeded after the provision was exhausted & it was seen that the coalised powers could not raise it. At this post 12,000 men were taken with great amount in cannon & other warlike stores. Upon Mayence the whole pressure now is, nor is it probable that that garrison will long be able to sustain itself. Upon Spain also some recent advantage has been gained: indeed it is well known that the troops of this republick can make what impression they please in that quarter.

Under these circumstances it is not probable that the war will be long continued upon the continent. The coalised powers have latterly placed their only hope, in the possibility of a counter-revolution here, upon account of the dissentions in the publick councils, & the scarcity of bread: but the late events & which I have already communicated, will shew how

unproductive a resource the former has been and promises to be; and the revolution of a few weeks only, within which space the harvest will ripen, will I think likewise demonstrate that the latter was not less so. The war then will soon be narrowed to a contest between this republick and England, I mean such is the present prospect, & this will of course be a maritime one only, unless the former succeeds & in which case, the government of England will be conquered as that of Holland was. Among the maritime powers there is not one (unless Russia forms an exception & which is not absolutely certain) which does not wish to see the naval force of England broken or at least greatly diminished: whereas on the side of France there is Holland already embarked and Denmark & Sweden are unquestionably in the same interest; nor is it improbable that past and present injuries may force them to declare in support of it, for latterly the orders of the 6th. of Novr. have been revived by the Ct. of St. James, for seizing all neutral vessels laden with provision for France & under which many have been seized of theirs as well as ours. It is likewise probable that Spain will eventually be on the same side, for as she wishes not only to get rid of the war, but to revive with France her ancient connection, and which contains on the part of France a guarantee of the Spanish possessions in So. America, and which it will otherwise be difficult to accomplish, I cannot well perceive how Spain will be able to avoid declaring herself on the side of France. Such is the external & internal state of

things, & upon which you will be able to form your own conjectures of the probable issue.

But you demand what ground does America occupy upon this great and interesting scene of affairs? How does she stand in the estimation of her generous & victorious ally? As we were never called on to bear a part in the controversy upon the issue of which ours as well as her liberty was dependant, but were left to enjoy in peace the abundant fruits of our industry, whilst she defied the storm alone, I am not surprised that you should feel solicitous upon this point. A few lines will give the sketch you wish. Preceding unfavorable impressions, and which were known to exist, were erased by the declarations of the present minister when he was introduced into the Convention, supported by the documents which he presented, and upon which basis the ancient and close amity which had formerly subsisted was rapidly reviving and growing up. Some changes of importance were accomplished in our commercial affairs with this republick, and in particular the treaty of amity & commerce, which in pursuit of the policy of England had been violated, was put in activity, & whereby our trade is not only free in every article (strict contraband excepted) & to every country even to England herself, altho' it furnished her with the most productive means for the support of the war, but likewise the trade of England is protected under our flag, & whilst it yields no protection to that of France. Such was the actual state of things when the report of Mr. Jay's treaty with the English government

transpired, and by which it was circulated that a new connection was formed between the United States & that power, beneficial to the latter & probably hurtful to France. This report operated like a stroke of thunder & produced upon all France amazement. What the treaty really is, is not yet known, but most certainly the bias in our favor has been greatly diminished, nor is it possible that the cordiality should be great under such circumstances. If the treaty is rejected, or contains in it nothing strictly objectionable, in either case we shall stand well here: but if it is adopted and does contain any thing which a just criticism can censure, be assured we shall hear from this government in terms of reproach. By this time you know what the treaty is, and therefore know according to its fate in what light we shall be considered here. If the treaty is not precisely what we wished it to be, most certainly the most favorable opportunity that was ever offered to make a good one, has been thrown away: for as France was successful, & a good understanding subsisted between us and France, it was really in our power to dictate what terms we pleased, provided we could make the English government believe that in any event we would take part against it. Accomplishing that point, every thing would have been accomplished; for of all possible calamities with which they are threatened, a war with us is that which they most dread: not so much indeed from the fear of our maritime force, as the effect it would produce upon their commerce by which alone they are enabled to support a war. Such was the actual state

of things at the time this treaty was formed, but a new scene has since been opened and which will shew how little confidence we ought to place in treaties with that power. For latterly and as I presume in violation of that treaty the same system of depredation & of plunder has been recommenced.

By the above hasty but true picture of affairs here you will perceive that this republick is rapidly rising or rather has already obtained a decided preponderance not only in the scale of Europe but indeed in that of human affairs. Having combatted alone and with success all the great powers of Europe, the superiority of her strength over theirs, at least whilst that of the latter is weilded by the heavy and expensive governments which exist there, is well established. Nor is it probable that this superiority will be soon diminished especially when it is considered that the revolution of the one is approaching fast to a happy close, under a government founded upon principles which when completed and resting firm, must cause a similar revolution every where. To stand well with this republick is therefore now the interest of all nations, nor indeed do any of them seem at the present moment to entertain a contrary opinion: for they have all made approaches and shewn their solicitude for peace, notwithstanding they know the danger that will probably overwhelm them in that event and especially if France gets a good government, since they deem that danger more remote and less terrible than the one which immediately threatens under the pressure of the French armies. Upon every principle,

therefore, it were greatly to be regretted if America should lose in any degree the ground upon which she hath heretofore stood in the estimation of her ally.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, June 26th, 1795.

SIR,—Since my last, it is reduced to a certainty, that the British government has revived its order of the 6th of November, 1793, and commenced, on this side of the Atlantic, the same system of warfare and pillage upon our commerce, that was practised on it by that government, at that very calamitous æra. Between 30 and 40 sail destined for the ports of this Republic, charged with provisions, have been already taken from their destination, and carried into those of that Island: and: as the period has arrived, when the invitation which the distresses of this country gave to our merchants *here* and at *home*, to embark their fortunes in this supply, is likely to produce its effect, it is more than probable that other vessels, and to a great amount, will share the like fate. Among those of our merchants who are here, this measure has created a kind of panic; for they think they see in its consequences little less than the ruin of their trade; and under which impression many are about to abandon it for the present, and send their vessels home in ballast.

What effect this measure will produce upon this government, under existing circumstances, I cannot pretend to determine. Formerly it adopted the same

measure, for the purpose of counteracting its enemy; but the impolicy of that procedure was afterwards discussed and demonstrated, and the measure itself, in consequence, abandoned. At present, the distress of the country is great, and the government will, no doubt, be mortified to find, that, whilst our flag gives no protection to *its* goods, nor even to *our* goods, destined for the ports of this Republic, the whole of which become the spoil of its enemy; that it does protect not only *our* goods destined for the English ports, but likewise British goods destined equally for those, and the ports of other countries. The measure has obviously excited a kind of ferment in their councils; but which, I presume, will be directed against their enemies only. Be assured I shall do every thing in my power to give it that direction, and to enforce those arguments which were used upon the former occasion: But, should they fail in producing the desired effect, and a less amicable policy be adopted, which, however, I think will not be the case, I shall deem it my duty immediately to advise you of it, by a vessel (in case none other offers) to be despatched for the purpose.

It will obviously attract your attention, that this measure was so timed by the British cabinet, that it might have no influence in the decision of the senate upon the treaty of Mr. Jay; nor can the motive for such an accommodation be less doubtful; for in case it be rejected, they will deem the stroke a lucky one; since thereby, they will say, they had fortunately gained so much time; and if it be adopted, they will

probably presume, that so much time will be consumed in convening the Congress, should that measure be deemed expedient, that the course of events here may render it impossible for our efforts to produce a favorable effect; and which consideration, they will likewise infer, will be an argument against convening the Congress. This kind of policy, however, shews not only the profligacy, but the desperation of that government, and will probably precipitate the crisis, which, notwithstanding all its follies and enormities, might yet have been postponed for some time to come. I think the measure will give new vigor to the French councils, and will probably bring immediately upon its authors, Denmark and Sweden: Upon this latter point, however, I am authorized to say nothing; for, as I was not instructed to confer with the representatives of those powers here, I have carefully avoided several conferences, that were sought of me by Baron Stahl from Sweden, soon after his arrival; because I knew nothing could result from them, and was fearful, as I presumed the result would be known to the committee, it might produce an ill effect there.

Your measures will, no doubt, be greatly influenced by the probability of the early termination or continuance of the war with this Republic, and upon which some information will of course be expected from me. You will, however, perceive the disadvantage under which I must give any opinion upon that point, and estimate it accordingly; for as I am authorized to say nothing to this government of what we will prob-

ably do, in case the war continues (for the revival of the order of the 6th November could not be foreseen) you will of course conclude it is impossible for me to sound it upon that topic. Indeed I was fearful that, by my former communications upon a similar occasion, slight and informal as they were, I might embarrass you, and was therefore extremely uneasy on that account, after I heard of Mr. Jay's treaty, and until I had obtained a conference with the committee on the subject. My judgment must, therefore, be formed upon general and external circumstances, and by which I perceive no prospect of an early accommodation of the war between France and England. On the contrary, the preparations on both sides seem to go on with all possible activity, for its continuance. The fleet of England is said to be raised to a height beyond what it ever attained before, and efforts are still making to keep it there, if not to increase it: And France is exerting her utmost endeavours to increase hers, and which are the more necessary, in consequence of the improvident excursions of the last winter, by which it was greatly injured in the Atlantic, as well as the Mediterranean sea. 'Tis expected, that by a continuance of those endeavours, the Brest fleet will be ready to take the sea by the fall: The Mediterranean is said now to be at sea, and in good order. 'Tis likewise expected that the Dutch fleet, at least to the amount stipulated, will be in readiness in time to co-operate with that from Brest; for great efforts were latterly made, and are still making, by that government, to equip it. Add to these the fact (and I

am assured by unquestionable authority that it is one) that the overtures made by Sir F^k^ Eden were repulsed, and in a manner which immediately closed, under the powers possessed by the parties respectively, all further conference on the subject. From consideration, therefore, of these circumstances, I am led to conclude that the war between these powers will be continued for some time to come, and most probably till some change, by battle or otherwise, is wrought in the fortunes of one or both, so as to dispose them for peace.

If Denmark and Sweden, and especially if they are joined by Spain, unite with France and Holland, they will probably have the preponderance and must bear hard upon England. In any event, the enormous expence to which she is unprofitably exposed, if continued for any time, must not only exhaust her resources, but excite great discontents among the people. They have been allayed latterly, by the assurances of the minister, that the people of France would be starved, and that the government must in consequence accommodate, and which were countenanced by the movements which took place here some time after those assurances were given. But when it is seen that the crisis has passed, and that the people after bearing unexampled distress, and upon the whole with unexampled patience, are quiet and in the possession of the fruits of a plentiful harvest, as promises soon to be the case, it is doubtful whether a change will not soon take place in the temper of those on the other side of the channel.

What part it becomes our country to take at this crisis belongs not to me to say. Peace is a blessing which ought not to be wantonly thrown away. But whether sufficient sacrifices have not been already made to preserve it, and the time arrived, when the duty we owe to ourselves, and the respect which is due to the opinion of the world, admonish us that the insults and injuries of Britain are to be no longer borne, and that we ought to seek redress by again appealing to arms, and putting the issue of our cause upon the event of war, is a point which will no doubt be wisely decided by those who have a right to decide it. Permit me, however, to express a wish, that in case any active measure is taken, or likely to be taken, in consequence of these aggressions, that you will immediately apprise me of it; that I may, without delay, begin to make a correspondent impression upon the councils of this government.

I omitted in my last to transmit to you a copy of the letter from Mr. Short, which I mentioned was shewn to Mr. Pinckney; and which, as it demonstrates how completely we may command success in our demands upon Spain, provided France aids us in that respect, ought not to be withheld, and especially in the present state of affairs. I make to you the communication with greater pleasure; because at the same time that it furnishes a document of importance for you to possess, it will reflect honor on Mr. Short, upon account of the able and comprehensive view he has taken of the subject.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that the com-

mittee of 11. have at length reported a plan of Government, of which I herewith inclose you a copy. The discussion upon the merits will commence in a few days, and as soon as the question is finally decided I will transmit to you the result.

With great respect and esteem I have the honour to be, Sir, your very h^ble^ and ob^t^ ser^t^

JA^s^ MONROE.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

PARIS, June 27. 1795.

DEAR SIR,—Of the above hasty view I have sent a copy to one or two other friends.[1] Since it was written the Committee of 11 have reported a plan of govt. as suggested of 2 branches, the one to be called a council of 500, consisting of so many members, the other of 250, called the council of ancients. The age of the 1st to be 30 & of the 2d 40. They are to be chosen each for 2 years but to be supplied annually by halves. The Executive to be composed of 5 members to be elected for 5 years, but so arranged that only one withdraws annually. Each member is to have a salary of abt. £5000 sterg. pr. ann. the object whereof to receive & entertain foreign ministers &c. The council of ancients cannot originate a bill. If possible I will procure & send you a copy of the plan——

The British have recommenc'd the seizure of our vessels as formerly under the order of the 6th of Novr. 1793, near 40 being carried in by our last &

[1] See note p. 292 ante.

which were the first accts. This has produced an extreme ferment here, & it will be difficult under the irritation existing in consequence of Jay's treaty, to prevent a revival of the same practice on the part of France. And if we do nothing when it is known in America, but abuse the English and drink toasts to the success of the French revolution, I do not know what step they will take in regard to us. My situation since the report of Mr. Jay's treaty has been painful beyond any thing ever experienc'd before, and for reasons you can readily conceive—I have, however, done everything in my power to keep things where they shod. be, but how long this will be practicable under existing circumstances I know not. Denmark & Sweden will I think be active.

I have just received a letter from Mr. Derieux[1] with one for his aunt—if possible I will now answer it; but in case I cannot, I beg you to tell him that I waited on her last fall with Mrs. Monroe, having previously written her repeatedly in his behalf, & after a long and earnest solicitation in his favor & returned without obtaining any thing for him—She had promised something before I went, & the dinner she gave us, was to pave the way for retracting & which she did—The old lady has about her (as I suspect) some persons who are poor, & who prefer their own welfare to his. By the law of France the property cannot be devised from her relations, but 'tis possible these

[1] J. Peter Derieux, Mazzei's son in law, seems to have been pursued by misfortune. Mazzei does not appear to have acted with justice towards him. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were equally interested in his welfare and made many appeals in his behalf.

people will help to consume the annual profits; wc'h. latter, however, she says in consequence of the depreciation are nothing.

We wish most sincerely to get back & shall certainly do it, as soon as a decent respect for appearances will permit, especially if the present system of policy continues. I wish much to hear from you having written you several times but recd. not a line since my appointment here. Is there anything in this quarter you wish to command of books or any other article; or can I serve you in any respect whatever? you will of course command me if I can be serviceable.

I have requested Mr. Madison to shew you some letters of mine to him. I wish to know much in what state my farms are—we are well: our child speaks French well & she & Mrs. M. desire to be affectionately remembered to yourself & Daughters, to whom as well as to Mr. R. & Mr. C. as likewise to my brother & neighbours be so kind as remember me. With great respect & esteem I am, Dear Sir, yr. affectionate friend

JA^{s} MONROE.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, June 30, 1795.

DEAR SIR,—I send herewith a copy of the constitution reported by the committee of 11 & which will be discussed in the course of a few days. A doubt arises with many upon the propriety of the Excutive organiz'n, & some wish and with a view of strengthen-

ing it that the number be reduc'd to 3—but this wo'd certainly produce the opposite effect, for the annual rotation by the withdrawal of one & the speedy shift of all, w'h wo'd follow the change, wo'd in a great measure prevent the existence of an esprit de corps & that system of Executive operation, w'h the plan in the draft admits of: for with only three the preponderance of the legislature wo'd be complete, especially when it is considered that they are to be elected by the legislature. For my own part, however, I do not think either plan really dangerous—but I wo'd prefer having 6 members, changing 2 annually, the presiding members losing the right of voting. This wo'd be safer upon every principle—But I have no time to criticise——

You will be surprised to hear that the only Americans whom I found here were a set of New Englandmen connected with Britain and who, upon British capital, were trading to this country: that they are hostile to the French revolution is what you well know: but that they sho'd be thriving upon the credit which the efforts of others in other quarters gain the American name here you could not expect: that as such they should be in possession of the little confidence we had and give a tone to characters on our side of the Atlantic was still less to be expected. But such was the fact. With a few exceptions the other merchants are new made citizens from Scotland. Swan who is a corrupt unprincipled rascal had by virtue of being the Agent of France and as we had no minister & he being (tho' of the latter description)

the only or most creditable resident American here, had a monopoly of the trade of both countries. Indeed it is believed that he was connected with the agents on one side and the Minister on the other. I mention this as a trait worth your attention. You will confide the view to Mr. Jefferson only. But good may come from it, and especially if the allurement here will draw them off from the other side of the channel.

I candidly think if we bear this aggression from Engl'd without an immediate decl'n, at least by the seizure of all her property, ships, certificates &ca., that our reputation is gone beyond recovery, most certainly it will be difficult & the work of time to recover it. We shall certainly lose our estimation here. If we were to take the measure suggested, of seizing British property, prohibiting the importation of her goods & which I wish was perpetual, laying hold of the ports, fitting out privateers &c we sho'd indemnify ourselves & incur but a trifling expense: for Brit'n wo'd not land a single soldier on our coast & wo'd be driven to extremities. But if we are amused, we are deceived & will be despis'd. I am told that the most humiliating explanation & apology was made to Bernstoff for the measure at the moment the order was issued. But it is thought he will show more decision & respect for the character of his country than to be the dupe of such finesse. Probably the same thing is done with us, but surely we are not sunk so far as to bear it. With great esteem & respect I am y'r friend & servant

JA^{S} MONROE.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

PARIS July 3, 1795.

DEAR SIR,—Having written you very fully three days since I have nothing to add at present to the details then given except that in an unexpected rencounter the other day the French have lost 3 ships & by the shameful misconduct of the officers commanding them, or some of them, they have in consequence dismissed the comy. of Marine which I think converts the loss of the ships into a signal victory, in such regard do I estimate his merits.

By Mr. De Rieux I hear that poor Gilmer declines & that B. M. has been sick, that Mrs. Marks is dead —that Miss Gilmer is about to be married—that Wardlow and Robt. Jewett are. This short note from Goochland which opens the interior of a place extremely dear to me contains every thing that I have heard from that quarter since my arrival here. Be so kind as forward the enclosed to him and assure my neighbours I have not forgotten them, altho' they may have forgotten me. Is there anything here you wish me to procure for you. I beg you to give me a note of it if there is. Our best respects to Mr. & Mrs. R. both yrs. & his families. Very sincerely I am

Yr. affectionate friend & servt.

JA.S MONROE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

PARIS, July 5, 1795.

CITIZENS,—The injuries which the piratical powers on the African coast have rendered and continued to

render to our commerce, are known to this Republic; because it takes an interest in our welfare, and because those injuries cannot otherwise than be eventually hurtful to the commerce of France likewise.

It was foreseen, at the moment when we became an independent nation, that we should be exposed to the piracies of those powers; and the spirit of amity which disposed the then councils of France, in obedience to the wishes of the people, to aid us in that struggle, disposed them likewise to assure us of their support in our negociations with each respectively. But unfortunately no treaty has yet been formed with any of those powers (Morocco excepted) and in consequence our commerce has been interrupted by their cruizers and especially those of Algiers; whereby many of our citizens were also taken, and who are now detained in slavery.

It is the wish of the United States to make an effort, at this present moment, to conclude a peace with those several powers, and to pursue that object in harmony with this Republic, that its aid may be extended to them in their negociations with each; and for which purpose I have now the pleasure to inform you, that Mr. Humphreys, minister of the United States at Lisbon, has just arrived here with full power to commence and conclude such treaties. It may be necessary further to premise, that suitable provision has been made for those treaties, according to our idea of what would be suitable, and so far as we were able to make it; and of course, that the only aid which we wish from this Republic is that of its good

offices and influence in the councils of those powers.

If the committee is disposed to render us this aid, our future measures will be in concert with the committee; because it best knows how it may be most efficaciously rendered, and with least inconvenience to itself.—In that view we will be happy to open to the committee our funds, &c. that by knowing completely our real situation, the concert and harmony may be perfectly complete; and in consequence the best arrangements taken, that circumstances will admit of, to ensure success in the negociations contemplated.

As we have reason to apprehend the interference of some other powers, who would not be pleased to see us at peace with those regencies, permit me to suggest the propriety of great secrecy in respect to the present, and such future, communications as may take place between us, upon this interesting subject.

JA^{S} MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[Edmund Randolph.]

PARIS, July 6th, 1795.

SIR,—About three or four weeks past, one of our vessels[1] which touched at Havre from England, was taken in charge by the government, and the captain and passengers confined, upon a suspicion they had brought false assignats with them, with a view of circulating them through the country, and thereby subserving the views of its enemies. Complete search was made upon the vessel, but no assignats were

[1] The *Jane*; Captain Cowell.

found. As I knew that the suspicion which was entertained, ought not to be extended to three young men who were passengers, I immediately applied to the commissary of foreign relations for their discharge, and obtained an order for it, though fortunately they were released by the municipality at Havre before it reached them.[1] But as I was not acquainted with the character of the captain, or any others belonging to the vessel, and was aware of the right the government had to protect itself from injuries of every kind, and from every quarter, and of course to search the vessel, and as I also hoped in case the suspicion proved to be groundless, it would prevent the like in future, and especially upon frivolous suggestions, I did not chuse, in that stage, to apply likewise in their behalf. After the search was made, and the government satisfied it had suspected without cause, the Captain was put at liberty, and the vessel offered back to him. But, being mortified in having been suspected, and as his vessel and cargo were somewhat injured by the search and neglect which ensued his arrestation, he seemed disposed rather to throw the whole upon the government, and demand an indemnity for it, and with which view he lately came here to confer with me. I advised him to gather up what he could of his own property, and pursue his voyage according to the original destination, limiting his claim merely to the damage sustained, and leaving that to be pursued by the consul

[1] William Bache (Franklin's grandson), William Boys, and Adam Leyberts, who had gone to France for the purpose of pursuing their medical studies.

here under my direction. As yet he waits his protest and other documents from Havre, reserving to himself the liberty of acting after their receipt as he pleases, and according as the light of preceding examples of the like kind, and whose details he will in the interim acquire, may admonish him will be most for his interest. I shall endeavour to obtain justice for him upon sound principles, and have only mentioned the case, that you may know such a one has happened, and what the circumstances of it are.

The jealousy which is entertained by this government, of the commerce carried on by our countrymen between the ports of this republic and those of England has latterly shewn itself in a more unpleasant form than heretofore, and I am fearful will yet produce some more disagreeable effect. A Mr. Eldred was lately apprehended at Marseilles, and sent here under guard, upon a charge of having given intelligence to the British of some movement in the French fleet. Upon enquiry I found he had my passport, granted too, upon the most substantial documents, proving him to be an American citizen: But I likewise found that, in truth, he was not an American citizen; for, although born in America, yet he was not there in the course of our revolution, but in England; nor had he been there since. From what I hear of him, he is not a person of mischievous disposition, nor one who would be apt to commit the offence charged upon him, but yet I do not see how I can officially interfere in his behalf; for when once a principle is departed from it ceases to be a principle.

More latterly I was requested by the commissary of foreign affairs, to prohibit our consuls from granting passports, and which was immediately done. I was afterwards requested by him, to furnish a list of the Americans actually in Paris, and to render a like list every decade of those who should in the interim arrive, and which was promised, and will be punctually executed. I herewith send you a copy of my instructions to the consuls, and correspondence with the commissary on this subject.[1]

[1] THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS TO MONROE:—The commission have had repeated opportunities of being convinced, that American consuls in France, and even sometimes their agents, grant passports or certificates, giving the qualification of citizen of the United States to the bearers of them, and by means of which these travel through France, and even go out into foreign countries.

I cannot help observing to you, that, according to our laws and the laws of nations, foreign ministers having alone the right to grant such passports, and to attest the political existence of the individuals born in their repective countries, those given by the consuls or their agents are totally useless; since, to travel in the interior of the Republic, the passport of the municipality of the place of landing is sufficient, and that to leave the territory, the only admissable passport is that given by the minister of their nation.

I must add, that if the individual who wishes to leave the territory of the Republic has come in consequence of ordinary commercial transactions, he does not need a passport for that purpose; if, on the contrary, he has been brought in by the ships of the Republic, having been found in an enemy's vessel, in that case, his position, which is almost always dubious, deserves attention, and ought to be submitted to the examination and determination of the minister alone.

Persuaded, Sir, that you will find these observations just, and that you will please to communicate them to the consuls of your nation, recommending it to them to conform to them, it is with the fullest confidence that I submit them to you.

MONROE TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. PARIS, June 19th, 1795. Your letter of the 22d Prairial communicates to me your observations relative to the passports and certificates granted by different consuls of the United States, and their agents in the ports of the Republic; and agreeable to your desire, I have informed them thereof in my circular letter of the 18th in-

You will readily perceive, that this jealousy proceeds from the circumstance; that many of those, who are actually engaged in this trade, are of that description of persons, who, having latterly become citizens of the United States, are likewise subjects of England; nor can you be surprised when that circumstance is considered, without any imputation on the character of the parties, that this jealousy should exist: They are English themselves, their connections are so, and in England their profits will probably

stant, of which I enclose you a copy. I beg you to be persuaded, citizen, of my sincere desire to adopt all such measures as may be deemed necessary to the welfare of this Republic; confident that in so doing, I shall always have the approbation of the government of the United States.

CIRCULAR TO THE CONSULS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FRANCE. PARIS June 18th, 1795. Complaint has been made to me by the commissary of foreign relations, that our consuls, and in some cases their agents, have granted passports and certificates, under the authority of which, the bearers are permitted to travel through the interior of France, and likewise into foreign countries. He observes, that by the law of France, and of nations, no person, other than the minister of a foreign power, has a right to grant such passports; and that it is likewise unnecessary, since, for the interior passage, the passport of the municipality of the port where such persons land is sufficient, and for the exterior, or to go without the Republic, that of the minister alone ought to be granted: For, if the party desirous of withdrawing enters the ports of the Republic in the ordinary course of trade, none is necessary to enable him to withdraw from it; and if he was brought in by the ships of the Republic, taken on board those of its enemies, then his case, which is always doubtful, merits attention, and should be examined, and determined upon the evidence furnished by the minister alone, who is more immediately responsible to the government in that respect. These observations appear to me to be just, and according to the law of nations: I have therefore thought it my duty to make known to you the desire of this government upon that subject, and to request your punctual observance of it.

In those cases where our fellow-citizens are permitted to depart from the Republic, by existing decrees, in the ordinary course of trade as above-mentioned, but are improperly impeded by some circumstance or other, you will of course observe, by application to the municipality, or other suitable authority, that the benefit of those decrees be extended to them; and in all those cases

ultimately settle. It is natural that a communication of this kind should draw after it suspicion, or rather it would be unnatural if it did not produce that effect. To the people of America this is an evil of serious

where my passports are necessary, and the parties are not able to attend here in person, you will be pleased to represent to me their pretensions, provided you think them well founded, with the evidence to support those of each applicant. In such cases it will not be necessary to transmit copies of such certificate or other document laid before you. It will be sufficient that you state in a certificate, under the seal of the consulate, the purport of such item of testimony; by whom furnished, and whether by Americans or foreigners. The former of which are always to be preferred: because, as the citizens of the United States have an interest in the character of their country, so it is to be presumed they will always be on their guard not to injure that character, by imposing on its representative here.

In describing the pretensions of those who ask for passports, you will be pleased to state how they came into the Republic, and what their occupation is: You will likewise observe that as there are two descriptions of persons whose claims are deemed inadmissible by the government here, so it will in general be unnecessary to bring them forward. The first of these consists of those, who having become citizens of some state since our revolution, have left us, and now reside in the country from whence they emigrated: for such persons, being likewise subjects of the power where they were born, ought to be deemed here citizens of that country only to which they have given the preference by residence. The second consists of those who were refugees in the course of our revolution, and who having never returned, or acquired the right of citizenship since, cannot be deemed citizens, whether born in America or elsewhere. In all doubtful cases, however, you will be pleased to submit the pretensions of the parties to me, that, regarding principles, I may pay all possible attention to them, that circumstances will admit of.

Your ordinary commercial concerns, in which my support may be deemed necessary, I will thank you to communicate with me as heretofore, through Mr. Skipwith the consul in this city. For as he is charged with those concerns, and obtains redress if possible, without my intervention, he is thereby enabled officially to report to me correctly those cases in which he cannot succeed, and of course, in which my interference may be useful: which report forms generally the basis of my application.

The Commission of Foreign Affairs to Monroe. June 21st, 1795:—The commission has received with your letter of the 1st of this month, the copy of the circular you have been pleased to address to the consuls of the United States in the ports of the Republic. I must beg you to accept my thanks for the attention you have paid to the observations which I thought it my duty to

import: For by it, it is obvious, that the confidence which is due to our national character is daily diminished. Nor can the mortification which is incident to such a situation, be otherwise than heightened,

present to you. The manner in which you develop in that circular the principles concerning the preservation of good order, are a new security of your care to maintain it. I could only have wished, that in establishing, as you do, that persons arrived in the ports of the Republic in the common course of commercial transactions, and who wish to leave it, need no passport for that purpose,—you had added this restriction,—if they are not at a distance from the ports where they landed.

THE COMMISSION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO MONROE. June 24th, 1795:—The commission knowing your readiness to concur in whatever tends to preserve good order, propose to you with confidence the measures which may contribute to that object. They beg you consequently, to be so good as to communicate to them, each decade, a certified list of your fellow citizens arrived in Paris. It is important to the government to know the foreigners who reside in this commune; and it must be advantageous to themselves, that their abode here be known.

MONROE TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. June 27th, 1795:—Being extremely solicitous that the rights which my countrymen enjoy here should be strictly confined to themselves alone, I shall be happy at all times to adopt such measures as may be deemed necessary to make known to your government those who are my countrymen. With this view, therefore, I shall, with pleasure, cause to be furnished you every decade the list of those to whom passports or certificates are granted, according to your request. In guarding the welfare of the Republic, I pray you to propose to me always, with freedom, those measures in which my co-operation may be useful; since you may always calculate upon my concurrence, in forwarding an object, which it is upon all occasions my most earnest wish to forward.

THE COMMISSION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS TO MONROE. July 1st, 1795:—The commission has received your letter of the 9th instant; by which you inform them, that, adopting the measure they proposed to you by theirs of the 6th, you are willing to transmit to them each decade the list of your fellow citizens who may have obtained passports. They beg leave to observe to you, that by means of the certificate which they annex to the passports given by the foreign ministers, they have full knowledge of those delivered; but that the request they have made you has for object to know the Americans arrived at Paris, and who cannot but present themselves to you. They beg of you, therefore, to send them a list of these each decade.

The commission has communicated to the committee of public safety, the readiness which you have shewn in whatever tends to preserve good order. The

when it is considered, that we are most a prey to this evil, at the moment when the government to which these persons belong insults our national dignity, and tramples on our rights. Be assured I shall do every-

committee fully convinced of your active attention in this respect, has not doubted but that you would favourably regard every means of concurring in it. They consequently direct the commission, to invite you to communicate to them a list of all your fellow citizens now in Paris. The government being thus made acquainted with the Americans that are within this commune, and with those who may arrive hereafter, will be better enabled to secure to them efficaciously the protection which the American government extends to them.

MONROE TO THE COMMISSARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. July 3d, 1795:— I have received yours of the 13th Messidor in answer to mine of the 27th of June, and to which I beg leave now to reply.

The note which I wrote to you ought to have comprized those to whom certificates are granted, as well as passports; for to many certificates are granted merely to authorize a residence in Paris, and its vicinity. This change will comprize all those of whose arrival I have, or can have, any knowledge.

It is true, that all the Americans who arrive in Paris ought to call immediately upon me and take the protection to which they are entitled from the minister of their country. But the fact is otherwise; for many never call until they are about to depart, some of whom have thus remained for five, six and eight months. In the interim they are protected by the passports they have from the municipalities in the sea ports, and other authorities which they find adequate: For if they were not adequate, they would of course apply to me, for the protection they otherwise did not enjoy. You will readily perceive that it is my business only to give protection to my countrymen entitled to it; beyond which my authority cannot extend: That it is the business of the government to see that those who are not possessed of that protection, shall not be deemed such, and of course be treated accordingly. I suggest this idea for your consideration, that weighing it you may shew what step I shall take to avoid the inconvenience complained of, if possible on my part; or propose to the committee such measure as will remedy it on theirs.

In case any new regulation is adopted, I beg of you to apprize me of it, that I may give the necessary notice thereof to my countrymen, that they may sustain no injury from a measure which is calculated to secure them the enjoyment of their just rights, by preventing others from imposing themselves upon this government as their compatriots, to the injury of France and the dishonor of America.

I will see that the list of those in Paris be made and furnished you as soon as possible.

thing in my power to guard us against injuries of this kind, by excluding all who are not, and upon the principles agreed upon my first arrival here, strictly entitled to our protection ; and by which line of conduct I hope I shall succeed, in a great measure if not altogether, in the accomplishment of an object so important to our welfare.

As connected with this subject, permit me to mention another, which I deem equally important, and more remediable. We have at Hamburg, as consul for the United States, a Mr. Parish [1] and who has held that office for some years past. This gentleman is an English subject, and was, as I am assured, never in America. All the Americans who have been at Hamburg and who come here unite in representing him to be (comparatively with England) as unfriendly to America ; as absolutely unfriendly to France and the French revolution, and which traits are said to be often discernible in his public conduct. It is affirmed, that he is likewise an agent of England, and that, in particular, the Prussian subsidy passed through his hands. Upon these facts you may rely (and especially the latter, into which I have made more pointed enquiry) for they are agreed in by all the Americans, and, I am sure, have been stated to me by at least 50. Without observing how wide a door is here opened for England to benefit herself, and injure France through us, even whilst its use is confined to that range, which, without any imputation on

[1] "John Parish, native of Great Britain," confirmed by the Senate February 20, 1793.

the morality of this gentleman, national prejudice alone would allow, there are other considerations, which, at the present moment, make this appointment worthy your attention. Since the commencement of the present war, a great proportion of the commerce of the north, and from every quarter of the world, has centered at Hamburg, and will probably continue to center there, till its close; from whence it issues again in different directions,—France, Holland, England, &c, &c. That this commerce is capable of a serious impression by the public agents of different countries there, and especially by those of the neutral powers, whose conneccion is sought with great avidity by the subjects of the powers at war, cannot be questioned; nor can it be questioned, when it is considered who this gentleman is, that the impression which he makes upon it is a British and not an American one. In addition to which it may be observed, that as he resides in the dominions of an independent power, and where we have no Minister, it is in some measure his duty to grant passports to Americans travelling elsewhere. This circumstance, therefore, and especially at the present moment, increases the importance and delicacy of the trust. In justice, however, to this gentleman I must add, that I do not know any instance in which he has betrayed it in this respect, and that, in others, I only apply to him general principles, and bring to your view the complaints of our countrymen. Personally, I never saw or had any communication with him. There are at present at Hamburg several Americans

worthy of this trust, among whom are Joel Barlow and William S[t] John, son of him who, by his writings, is well known; but, in truth, so profitable is the post, that there are but few American merchants in Europe who would not accept it. In general, permit me to suggest for your consideration; when ever a vacancy takes place, or when ever it becomes necessary to supercede an existing Consul, whether it would not be advisable to advertise the fact, that candidates might offer for the post; for sure I am, that it would rarely happen that suitable candidates, American citizens, did not offer. In Europe such may generally be found.[1]

Since my last, the French have sustained a loss at sea of three ships, which arose partly from accident not to be guarded against, and partly from misconduct. It occasioned the immediate dismission of Dalbarade, minister of marine, who gave way to a successor believed to be better qualified for the post. The British have likewise landed on the French coast near Nantes, about 6,000 emigrants, and who being joined perhaps with some of their own troops, and since by some fanatic priests, are said to make up a force of about 10,000 men. It is supposed the British government might hope, that by putting these people in the neighbourhood of the Chouans or Vendeans, they might, by encouraging a rebellion there,

[1] "On full consideration of the case of the Consul at Hamburg the President has determined to make a change, as soon as a proper person can be found to supply the place of Mr. Parish; the substitute if possible to be an American citizen."—The Secretary of State to Monroe, June 13, 1796.

combine a force capable of making some impression: But a wish to rid themselves of these unfortunate men, whose support became daily more burdensome, is believed to be the more influential motive. All parties unite here in the sentiment that they are sacrificed, and consider the act of landing them, as an act of barbarity, excelled only by those which were formerly perpetrated in the same neighbourhood by the infatuated Carrier.

It is believed that a treaty has taken place between England and Russia, in which the former has stipulated not to take the side of Poland against the latter; in consideration whereof, Russia is to furnish England a certain number of ships during the residue of the war. It is likewise believed, that England has announced to Spain, that in case the latter makes peace with France, she will commence immediate hostilities upon her. This may possibly keep Spain in a state of suspence some time longer. On the other hand it is obvious, that the connection between France and Holland, Denmark and Sweden becomes daily stronger; whilst Austria, paralized by the peace and movements of Prussia, which threaten an entire change in the Germanic system, and such an arrangement of its parts as will give an entire preponderance to Prussia, scarcely knows what part to take; whether to make peace or continue the war. It is the interest of Prussia that Austria should continue the war; for the pressure of France upon the Empire, which is the consequence of it, tends to favour the views of Prussia, by throwing the members of the Empire into her

arms, with a view of securing their peace with France, through the intercession of Prussia.

In conversation a few days past with Baron Stahl, Ambassador from Sweden, he informed me of a communication formerly made by the court of Sweden to Mr. Pinckney at London, for our government, and upon which no answer was given, although it was much wished. I desired his communication in writing, that I might forward it to you, and which was accordingly given, and is herewith transmitted. I have no doubt that whatever he says to me is known to the committee, as I was informed by some of its members in the beginning of the winter, and before the Baron arrived, that such an application had been made to us from that quarter. It belongs to me only to forward this paper, and which I do, not doubting that I shall be instructed, relative thereto, in the most suitable manner.[1]

Colonel Humphreys has just arrived, and, upon due consideration, I presented last night a paper to the committee, opening, as far as was expedient, the

[1] Randolph retired from the office of Secretary of State, August 19th, 1795: Pickering (Secretary of War) *ad interim* Secretary of State from August 20th; Commissioned Secretary of State, December 10th. His response to the above was "Department of State, October 9, 1795. Sir,—This serves merely to acknowledge the receipt (on the 7th instant) of your letter of the 4th [6th] of July with its inclosures.

"The President is now at Mount Vernon. This forbids my saying anything on the subject of Baron Stahl's application. Besides, I do not conceive that the Executive could even attempt to negotiate about it until Congress should provide the means of rendering an agreement efficient. The proposition with a copy of the Convention between Sweden and Denmark I find were transmitted from London by Mr. Pinckney in his letter of the 8th of last May: it does not appear when they were received at this office." Relative to joining the convention between Denmark and Sweden of March 27, 1794 "for the maintenance

object of his visit; and upon which subject generally I shall be more full in my next, when I hope to be possessed of an answer to it.

With great respect and esteem I have the honor to be, Sir, your very humble servant,

Jas Monroe.

TO JAMES MADISON.

Paris, July 26, 1795.

Dear Sir,—I had begun a long letter to you in cypher, it appearing the British have commenc'd seizing my letters, but which not being complete I forward the enclosed[1] by the present private opportunity, & which being on the moment of departure prohibits more being added than that the com'n is intended as a friendly deposit in your hands & for the purpose of guarding my reputation from unjust attacks whether published or private, always observing that whatever you receive is to be shown, when opportunity offers, to Mr. Jefferson & Mr. Jones. We are well & desire to be affec'y remembered to Mrs. M. Jas Monroe.

of the rights of neutral navigation," Washington submitted the question to his Cabinet in July, 1794. Randolph was in favor of it, Hamilton, Knox, and Bradford against it. "There may be a state of things" wrote Knox in his answer, "operating upon Denmark and Sweden, essentially different from that operating upon America. States as well as individuals often have secret motives for their conduct. I dread being linked in with the follies or vices of European powers. In my weak judgment, our bark is in a fair train of reaching her destined port, unless by some error of our own she should be thrown out of her course. The mass of the people of England are now our friends, and they will probably prevent their government from making war upon us. But let us combine with the European powers, the case will be different. National pride will be excited in England, to which Justice and even their own interests may be sacrificed."

[1] Correspondence between himself and Jay on the subject of the treaty.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, August 1st, 1795.

SIR,—I was sorry to find, some days after my last, that the disquietude which I intimated existed in the councils of this Republic, and to which the communication between its ports and England had given birth, assumed a form still more unpleasant, in regard to us, than I then apprehended it would do; for, whilst the subject was under discussion between the commissary and myself, and, as I thought, approaching towards a close, the committee interposed, and taking the business out of his hands, addressed me on the same subject, and to the same effect, laying, at the same time, the draft of a decree before the Convention, the principal object of which was, to preclude all those, who were not born within the jurisdiction of the neutral powers, from the protection of the ministers of those powers here. The decree, you will observe, was made general, as was the letter which preceded it from the committee. I had, however, seen too much of the business, not to know, that in regard to others it was formal only, whilst it was, in reality, pointed against a particular description of our own citizens, and of Englishmen, who, by means of American passports obtained elsewhere, and, no doubt, by fraud, sometimes passed for such.

As I presumed it was not the intention of the Committee or Convention, that the decree should be construed and executed strictly, because I knew upon principle it could not be supported, and because I

likewise knew, that many of those whom it would thereby comprehend, were resident, and valuable members of our community, and had been, and now were, by their commerce, useful to France,—I demanded immediately an explanation from the committee[1] of the decree, and soon afterwards obtained an interview with that body; in which I was explic-

[1] TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY. PARIS, July 14th, 1795. "CITIZENS,—I sent you yesterday a list of my compatriots in Paris, according to your request of the 20th instant (Messidor) and shall continue to furnish a like list every decade whilst you deem it necessary.

In rendering this list, it becomes necessary for my future conduct, that I should ask of the committee an explanation of a decree of the convention of the 23d instant (Messidor) upon this subject: For I observe by that decree, that such citizens as are born within the jurisdiction of the powers in alliance and friendship with the French Republic, and who are acknowledged by the representatives of such powers here, are designated as entitled to protection, and by which it may be inferred, that all those who are not *born there*, are to be excluded from such protection. Permit me to ask; whether such is the import of the decree? The following considerations incline me to believe that it is not.

1st. Because it denies the right of expatriation, admitted by this Republic, and which cannot be denied without supposing a man attached to the soil where he was born and incapable of changing his allegiance.

2d. Because it denies the right to all governments to confer the privilege of citizenship, and incorporate into its society any person who was born elsewhere, and which is admitted and practised every where.

3d. Because, as the first member of the fourteenth article of that decree allows even the subjects of the powers at war with the Republic, who came in before the 1st January 1792, to remain here,—it would follow, if such were the construction, that many of the subjects of those powers would be put on a better footing than many of the citizens of those who are your friends and allies.

From these considerations I am inclined to think, that such is not the import of the decree, and that the term was intended to mean *political* as well as *natural birth*; but as it is capable of a different construction, I have thought it my duty to ask of you an explanation on that head: For, at the same time that it is my wish to extend protection to all those of my countrymen, who are deemed such by the laws of my country, it is likewise my wish to do it in such manner and upon such principles as will be satisfactory to the French Republic."

itly assured, that they did not mean to call in question any principle insisted on by us; that their only wish was to exclude Englishmen and such as by their residence ought to be deemed Englishmen:[1] and that, in regard to myself, they meant to impose on me no restraint, in granting passports, I had not already observed. Thus, this business has happily terminated precisely where it ought to do, without producing any real change here, or other effect any where, which can be hurtful to us.

[2] I have the pleasure to inform you, that the full aid of this government will be given in support of our negociation with Algiers, *&c.* Upon this you may, I think, count with certainty, as I have been assured of it by the committee, and am furnished with all the light which their past negociations with that regency enable them to give us on the subject. Difficulties, however, of a new kind arise, and which may possibly create some serious embarrassments. The fund destined for this business is, I understand, in England, and the English intercourse law prohibits, as I hear, and under the penalty of death, the payment of drafts from this country, in favor of any person in France, or who has been in France since the commencement of the war between the two nations. Perhaps this law may not be deemed applicable to this case: Perhaps, if it does, the inconvenience may yet be remedied somehow or other, so as to prevent

[1] The material addition is omitted in the print as given in Monroe's View and in American State Papers.

[2] This paragraph, is in the original, in cipher.

the failure of the treaty on that account. Colonel Humphreys is still here upon this business; and, as we devote our unremitted attention to it, you may be assured that no measure, necessary to its succes, will be omitted, that we are capable of.

Within a few days past, the emigrant army, which lately landed in the Bay of Quiberon, under the auspices of Great Britain, has been completely defeated, and its whole force, amounting to about 10,000 men, either slain or taken prisoners; of which about 4,000 were slain. Many of those who composed that army are said to have been raised by compulsion, from among the French prisoners, and who were of course set at liberty when taken. By the law, all the others are doomed to suffer capital punishment; but it is to be hoped, as many of them are weak and misguided men, its rigour will be moderated, at least in regard to them.

Within a few days past, also, a peace was concluded with Spain; whereby the whole of the Island of St. Domingo is ceded to France, the latter yielding her conquests made in this quarter since the war. That there are some secret articles is more than probable. I herewith send you a copy of the treaty,[1] as likewise of the details which attended the defeat and destruction of the emigrant army, according to the report thereof rendered by Tallien, who was in mission there.

[2] You will perceive that our claims have not been

[1] Treaty of Basel, July 22, 1795.

[2] This paragraph in cipher in the original.

provided for in this treaty with Spain : relative to which claims I have heard nothing, since mine to you of the 14th of June last. 'T is possible I may soon hear something on that subject, either from this government or from Mr. Pinckney and in which case I will immediately advise you of it. 'Tis likewise possible, a war may soon take place, in consequence of that treaty, between England and Spain, and in which case it will, no doubt, be the wish of the former to involve us in it on her side : But this, I hope, will not take effect ; because, under existing circumstances, it would not only produce many unhappy consequences ; but because I am of opinion, if Mr. Pinckney finds difficulties, that the object may yet be attained, by the intercession of this government, as soon as I am enabled to shew, that Mr. Jay's treaty stipulates nothing injurious to this Republic. Doubtless France will now have great weight in the councils of Spain ; and, most certainly, if we continue in friendship with France, and of which there can be no doubt, it will be possible to avail ourselves of it, in support of our claims there.[1]

These two great events must certainly produce the most important consequences, as well in securing

[1] The state of this business appears to me to stand thus. Whilst Spain adhered to England, she rejected our pretensions to the Mississippi, &c. and listened to them only when she was about to secede from England, and connect herself with France. As this latter policy gained strength in her councils, her disposition to accommodate us likewise increased, as appears by Mr. Short's letter, referred to in mine of the 26th of June, 1795, and many other circumstances; since at that period she solicited our aid to promote her peace with France, promising that our claims should be adjusted at the same time. Standing well then with France, it followed that our controversy with

tranquillity at home, as in cutting off all remaining hope of success, on the part of the powers still at war with this Republic. Indeed, the probability is that peace will soon be made with the Italian powers, and even with Austria: But with England, so peculiar is the relation between the two countries, that it is impossible to say when peace will take place between them, or even to hazard any plausible conjecture upon that point. An adjustment, however, with all the other powers, may possibly induce an accommodation between these, sooner than present circumstances authorize the expectation of.

About the time of the debarkation of the emigrant army, some symptoms were seen here, which gave cause for suspicion, that there was a party in Paris, which *felt* at least in unison with that army. Lately, a song called the "Reveil du Peuple," composed in reproach of the reign of terror, had become very fashionable among those who had suffered under that reign, and by some accidental circumstances was placed in a kind of rivalship or of rather opposition to the Marseillese Hymn. The young men of Paris, the relations of many of whom had suffered under

Spain was permanently at an end, and upon our own terms. Mr. Pinckney arrived at Madrid precisely at the moment when things were thus circumstanced, and commenced and closed his negociation, whilst that state of things lasted; the Spanish government being impressed with a belief that we were not only well with France, but that France supported our claims against Spain: And to which accommodation it is probable her then separation from England, and the danger of a war with that power, likewise contributed. Had Mr. Pinckney arrived a few months later, after France had seen our treaty with England, and adopted her present policy in consequence of it, I think his mission would have failed.—*Monroe's View.*

the reign of terror, formed a party who were in general in favour of the "Reveil du Peuple;" often calling for it at the theatre in preference to the Marseillese Hymn, and which circumstance never failed to give uneasiness to many who were present. Light as this circumstance was, yet it seemed, at one time, to menace some serious ill consequences: The presumption whereof was indeed so strong, that the enemies of the revolution, who were said to stimulate the young men on, seemed to count upon it as a source from whence something in their behalf might be expected. Occasionally some excesses were committed by the young men, and in which they thought they had a right to indulge, even in contempt of the authority of the Convention itself; upon which body they presumed they had some claim, for services rendered in the late commotions. It was, in truth, obvious that the range which they took at this time, when tested by the standard of strict propriety, or indeed of law, could not be justified. It might, on the contrary, have been called an insurrection, and a little rigor would have made it one. The Convention, however, acted more wisely, by considering it for a while as a frolic; and finally, by issuing a proclamation telling them calmly of the folly and impropriety of their conduct, since thereby they exposed to danger the revolution, and of course their own safety; neither of which could it be their interest or their intention to endanger. This mode of proceeding produced the happiest effect; for even before the reduction of the emigrant army and peace with

Spain, tranquillity was in a great measure established; but since those events, it has been completely so.

The Convention is still employed upon the subject of the constitution, which will probably be gone through in the course of two weeks more. As soon as it is adopted, and of which there can be no doubt, and upon the principles generally proposed in the project reported by the commission, I will forward you a copy.

I have lately received a letter from a Mr. Cazeau, an unfortunate Canadian who attached himself to our cause when we invaded Canada, whose name you will find in the journals of the Congress of 1783 or '4, at Annapolis, and which letter I now transmit to you. The journal of that day explains the nature of his demand touched on in this letter. As I was of the committee upon this memorial, I am well acquainted with the nature of his claim, and think, in the issue of the business, that justice was not rendered to him; as the order of Congress in his behalf was not executed. He is here, and I believe supported by the nation, in the expectation we will do something for him: The minister of this Republic with our government having been instructed to patronize his claim there.—May I request your attention to it?

I likewise enclose you a letter from Mr. Leach, with one from several respectable Americans here, recommending him for the consulate at Dunkirk, and to which I likewise beg that attention to which you may deem it entitled. My acquaintance with him is

of late only ; but he appears to me to be an honest and deserving citizen.

I am, Sir, with sincere regard your

very h^ble^ & ob^t^ serv^t^

JA^s^ MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[EDMUND RANDOLPH.]

PARIS, August 17th, 1795.

SIR,—I have not been honoured with any communication from you since that of the 2nd May last ; though, doubtless, others are on their way, and which I shall soon receive.

Within a few days past, Philadelphia papers were received as late as the 3d of July, containing Mr. Jay's treaty, together with such proceedings of the Senate upon it as were then published. As the gazettes are circulating every where, I conclude some of them are in possession of the committee of public safety, and that the details they contain will likewise soon find their way into the papers of this city : Indeed, it is said, they are already published at Havre. As yet I have heard nothing from the committee upon the subject of this treaty ; nor do I expect to hear any thing from that body upon it, let the impression be what it may, otherwise than in reply to such communication as I shall make in regard to that transaction, and in respect to which it may be proper to add, that I shall take no step without your particular instruction : For as I presume that some ulterior plan is or will be adopted in regard to that treaty, and

upon which, in its relation to this Republic, my conduct will be particularly marked out; so I deem it my indispensable duty to avoid in the interim, any, the slightest, compromitment either of you or myself upon that subject. I mention this that you may distinctly know how completely the final result of this business, so far as it depends on me, is, as indeed it ought to be, under your controul.[1]

As I have had no communication with this government upon the subject of this treaty since its contents were known, it is of course impossible for me to say what the impression it has made is. It is as easy for you, with the lights you have, to form a correct opinion upon that point in Philadelphia, as for me to do it here. One circumstance, however, I think proper to bring to your view: Soon after the British government had recommenced the seizure of our vessels, destined for the ports of France, it was notified to the committee by a secret agent of this government, who had just returned from England; that he had been advised there, through a channel to be relied on, that

[1] At this time the treaty was not ratified by the President, nor was it known that it would be: And, if ratified, I expected to be able to state (if complained of by the committee) how long the commercial part would remain in force; whether we were willing to make a new treaty of commerce, and upon what principles, with France, with a view to conciliate; but no such instructions were given me. As to my calling the attention of the committee to it (now that they were possessed of it without my aid) without orders from the administration, it appeared to me to be an act of folly which nothing could justify.—*Monroe's View.* The Treaty, wrote Randolph, on July 14, is not yet ratified; nor will it be ratified I believe until it returns from England, if then. . . . The late British order for seizing provisions is a weighty obstacle to a ratification. I do not suppose that such an attempt to starve France will be countenanced.—*State Papers, Foreign Relations*, i., 719.

the English administration had said, they knew that measure would not be offensive to our government; or, in other words, that it was a case provided for between the two governments. I treated the communication with contempt, and was happy to hear that it was considered nearly in the same light by the committee itself.

But since the arrival of the treaty, I have understood that, in connection with that report, the attention of many has been drawn with some degree of solicitude to the contents of the second paragraph of the 18th article,[1] and who say, that as that article leaves the law of nations unsettled, and provides payment for seizures in cases of contraband, and of course for those which are not contraband, whereby the complaints of our citizens are prevented, and the British construction by implication countenanced,—this Republic has a right to complain of it. I mention this objection to you, that you may be aware of it, in case it should ever be brought forward on this or your side of the water; and that it will be brought forward, I think probable, if those seizures are not noticed in some very pointed manner. 'Tis painful for me to

[1] "And whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases in which alone provisions and other articles not generally contraband may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise: It is further agreed that whenever any such articles so becoming contraband, according to the existing laws of nations, shall for that reason be seized, the same shall not be confiscated but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or, in their default, the Government under whose authority they act, shall pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the full value of all such articles, with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and also the demurrage incident to such detention."

give you a detail of this kind; but being an interesting fact, I do not see with what propriety it can be withheld.

It is said that the constitution will be complete in the course of a few days, and of which I will immediately afterwards forward you a copy. The discussion upon this very important subject has been conducted with great temper, and the harmony of opinion throughout greater than could have been expected.

The report of Pichegru having crossed the Rhine, as heretofore intimated, was without foundation: The height of the water occasioned by continual rains has hitherto prevented it: 'Tis however said, that he has orders to cross it, and is now making the necessary movements for that purpose. The enemy are on the opposite side, watchful of his measures; but from his skill, the strength and enterprize of his army, success is counted on as certain.

No indication presents itself of an approaching peace between England and France, or even of a negociation for it. The only indication is to be found in an English ministerial paper, which speaks of the convention in very respectful terms, and of peace as a desirable object. 'Tis probable, however, when a negociation commences, it will be short: For as I presume the overture will come from England; so it is equally presumable that none will be made 'till her administration is disposed to accede to the terms of France. These, I presume, are in some measure known to England, at least I expect so; a consideration which I particularly suggest at present, with a

view of turning your attention to those symptoms which may be discoverable on the other side of the channel, as data by which you may estimate either remote or immediate approaches towards this important event.

I have the honour to be, with great respect and esteem, Sir, your very obedient and humble servant,

JA.S MONROE.

TO THE COMMISSARY OF MARINE.

PARIS, August 30th, 1795.

CITIZEN,—I observe by yours of the 7th Fructidor (24th August) that you complain of an intercourse which is said to be carried on by some Americans from the ports of this Republic, to those of England; whereby a correspondence by letters is kept up, money exported and English people carried out of the country: You likewise complain, that the captains of those vessels ask exhorbitant prices for the transportation or passage of French citizens from England here; whereby they subject themselves, in addition to the suspicion of intelligence with your enemies, to the charge likewise of extortion from the unfortunate; and in remedy of these evils you request of me,

1st. To instruct the consuls to prohibit the captains of our vessels from landing either men or cargoes, until a return of both is given to the maritime agents of the ports where they touch; as likewise a declaration of the port from whence they came.

2d. That I will arrange it so, that every captain shall take from me or the consuls his register, or

other adequate proof of his vessel being American; by virtue of which alone, she shall be deemed such, and he entitled to the privileges of an American citizen.

Permit me to assure you, that whatever regulations this Republic finds it for its interest to adopt, and which allow to my countrymen the rights of nations and of treaties, in common with the citizens of other neutral powers, I shall not only be satisfied with; but endeavour, by just and suitable representations thereof to produce a similar impression upon the American government; being persuaded, that as well in the character of nations as republics, it is the mutual interest of both to cultivate each the friendship of the other. With the same view and upon the same principle I shall be always happy to adopt, so far as depends on me, such regulations as may be calculated to promote that desirable end.

The several particulars of your complaints are comprised in that of the intercourse between the two countries; if this were done away the others would cease; no correspondence of the kind could afterwards be kept up; no money could be exported, or English subjects carried out of the country; nor could any extortion be practised upon the unfortunate French citizens, who were imprisoned there. Is it in my power to prevent this intercourse? If it is, and this government wishes it to be prevented, then I should think I merited censure if I did not. But you will admit, that this is a measure to which I am not competent, and that it belongs to the French government

alone to do it, as to regulate in all other respects its commerce: Regulations of mine upon that point would be disregarded by our mariners, who would consider me as usurping a power I had no right to exercise; they might likewise be censured by this government whose interest it might be to encourage such trade.

If then I cannot prohibit this intercourse, it follows, that I can subject it to no restriction. The same power which has the right to prohibit, has likewise the power otherwise to regulate it; and this belongs of course to the French government, and to it alone. Nor have our consuls any such power; their duties are regulated by a convention between the two nations, and which excludes every authority of the kind: Indeed the exercise of such an authority by a consul of either nation, within the jurisdiction of the other, would be deemed a derogation from the sovereignty of such nation, and therefore could not be tolerated. Our consuls are placed here, as yours are placed in America, for the advantage of our citizens respectively; to see that they enjoy the benefit of treaties, and the rights of nations; not to impose on the citizens any new and oppressive regulations.

If it is the interest and wish of this Republic to prevent such intercourse, admitting that it does exist, but of which I know nothing otherwise than by your letter and the public gazettes, which latter speak equally of the vessels of other neutral powers, as of those of the United States, and it does prohibit it,—provided the prohibition be general I shall never

complain of it, however decisive the regulation, or severe the penalty for infracting it. Whatever laws this government makes upon that subject, it is the duty of my countrymen to obey, and if they violate them, they must submit to the punishment such violation merits.

With respect to the two regulations which you mention; permit me to observe, that I deem the first, proceeding from your government, by arreté of the committee or decree of the convention, to be published and sent to all the ports, as a very suitable one, whether the intercourse is prohibited or not. Such a one exists in all cases with us: No vessel can land its cargo in the United States, without rendering an account thereof to the *authority* of the port; nor ought it to be done here, either in the case of cargo or passengers. With respect to the second, I have to add; that by the laws of the United States, it is already the duty of every captain of a vessel, to have a register from the government of the United States or some consul, describing his vessel, her burden, etc., and of course the object, which is herein sought, is already provided for: For you are not bound to consider any vessel as American, unless she produces some such adequate proof that she is such. I have thus answered, Citizen, the particulars of your letter with the same freedom with which it was written, and beg, likewise, to assure you, that if any further explanations are deemed necessary, I shall be happy to give them.

JA.S MONROE.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS Sepr 8th 1795.

DEAR SIR,—Yours of the 2^{d} of May is the last with which I have been fav^{d}, tho' most probably this is owing to the seizure of our vessels by the British & the full use I hear they make of my correspondence.

Since my last to you Mr Mason's copy of the treaty[1] with such proceedings of the Senate upon it as were published up to the 3. of July have arrived here: and since which we have seen the discussions at Charlestown, Boston & New York, & which comprize all that I have seen on it.

Comments upon this instrument from me will I know be useless to you; but as they can do no harm I will suggest those that have occurred, beginning with the 9th. article & which not only relaxes or cheapens the character of citizenship among us & introduces a new & contradictory (at least with the existing law) principle in our law of descents, but tends in the degree to incorporate the two countries together & to the benefit of England only; for I presume we have little land there & shall have less daily, whereas by the stock jobbing measures of many individuals among us they have much with us. The 10th. disarms us of a principal weapon of our defence & perhaps the best security we have in peace agnst the commission of those outrages heretofore practiced upon us: We have no fleet or other means of preventing the B^{h} from robbing us at sea, than by retaliating upon land; but this deprives us of that resource:

[1] See Rives, *Life and Times of Madison*, iii., 503.

In the principal there is no difference, indeed most people had rather be robbed on land than sea, the former being a civil operation carried on like any other civil process & the latter a hostile one. Besides when plundered at sea, the parties, privateers or others, as the treaty acknowledges & provides agnst, may become insolvent & which most probably would not be the case with a State. The 12th. was still more extr? for by it we sho^d^ be associated with the coalesced powers in the plan of starving this nation & likewise give a deep stroke to our own navigation, for it is a fact that at the present moment we are the principal carriers of W. India produce not only for France but for Holland and all the countries depending upon Hamburg & which you know are of great extent: indeed if this article was in force not a ship of ours co^d^ cross the ocean without submitting to a search from the B^h^ cruisers. The 13th. gives nothing we do not now enjoy, & which of course it is to be presumed their interest prompts them to grant. The 14. 15. & 16. fetter us without a motive. The 17. confirms by positive stipulation the old law of nations & is the more odious at present on acc^t^ of the opposite principles contained in our treaty with France & which is completely in force or rather activity. The 18. enlarges I think in the 1st paragraph the scale of contraband & in the 2^d^ by admitting the law of nations to be doubtful when provisions were so & providing for payment of such as are seized on that principle, and of course for such as are seized against that principle, for it was not intended to put the latter on a worse

footing than the former, and provision being made in no case agnst seizure, it seems as if the point insisted on by England was fairly yielded, and that she was authorized to seize when she pleased, paying us "a reasonable mercantile profit with the freight—&c": At least I think it wo^{d} be difficult to resist the argument w^{h} this article furnishes her in fav^{r} of that right. It may be said, it is true, that this article authorizes seizure only according to "the existing law of nations"; but from a view of the whole, ought not this phrase to be considered as inserted rather as a palliative to silence complaints agnst. the true import of the stipulation & which it required little sagacity to foresee wo^{d} be raised in America & here, than as controuling or forming the import itself: for if it was not intended to give the complete controul of this business to the B^{h} gov^{t} with right to seize at pleasure & for the consideration stipulated wo^{d} it not have been more correct to have begun with a specification of those cases, in which provisions either were or were not contraband, providing for such payment in cases where they were & leaving out of the provision cases where they were not? The 19th. is not worth mentioning either way. The 20th. serves to introduce the 21. which is another stroke at France & derogates from the rights of our citizens. The 22^{d} is like the 10th. as it gives Engl^{d} time after seizing all our vessels to withdraw her property from the U. S. while we are negotiating for reimbursement. It will not be easy to point out any benefit we are to get from the 23. 24. & 25. articles. Whilst the two latter are certainly

calculated to irritate if not to injure France. The privilege given British subjects to remain with us in case of war by the 26. is calculated to keep alive in that State the British party, whose influence in peace was perhaps the principal cause of the war. The 27. is not worth a remark & the 28. merits one only on acc^{t} of the limitation given by it to the 12. & which proves that the construction insisted on above of it, was properly conceived. You will observe that in the above comments I began with the 9th. article; but I will likewise add something now on those which precede. The permission to hold the posts till June 1796 & as it was to be presumed till the pressure of the present war was over—was a great attainment for Engl^{d} for it not only secured her from any trouble on our part & on that acc^{t} during that time, but enabled her to refuse to surrender them afterwards upon the slightest pretext & especially if the experiment made by the other articles to weaken our connection with France sho^{d} prove unsuccessful. The cession of the free use of our portages to the British of Canada &c. are sacrifices on our part without any consideration on theirs. I was in Canada in 1784 & assured by the merchants of Montreal that if the treaty was executed & we were admitted to free use of the Lakes, they wo^{d} abandon the former & move within our jurisdiction, for comparatively between a commerce thro' the Hudson & the St Lawrence the difference was at least 25 per cent: & w^{h} they wo^{d} not encounter. You will observe that this opinion was founded upon the idea each country was to enjoy exclusively the benefits of

its own situation, & to turn them to the best acc^{t} for its citizens alone: for at that time all intercourse between Canada & the States was prohibited & so it was expected it would remain afterwards, especially in the respect above mentioned. But by this stipulation that difficulty wo^{d} be at an end. & enjoying all the advantages of our situation, the B^{h} gov^{t} wo^{d} easily be enabled to make up for the difference to their merchants by bounties &c. which the mere circumstance of residence in Canada might occasion. Indeed to the province of Canada 'tis difficult to estimate at present the extent of the benefit w^{h} wo^{d} be hereby gained: it wo^{d} however certainly be great. The extension of the line from the Lake of the Wood, so as to admit the B^{h} into the Mississippi is calculated to admit her into the carriage of the immense export from our western country by means whereof as by extending her settlements westward upon that line, she wo^{d} encircle us almost completely & thus communicate in some degree to our western settlements the same influence w^{h} she now enjoys upon our eastern. The concession in the 6th that we had violated the treaty of peace & the assumption to pay for the injuries supposed to result therefrom by delay &c. to be assessed by Com^{rs}, whilst the violation on her part in detaining the posts & carrying off the negroes was unprovided for and unnoticed, was still more extraordinary. The only remaining trait to be noticed in this project is, that by omitting to adjust principles by w^{h} the courts of admiralty were to be gov^{d}; if indeed a submission to such courts was to be tolerated at all,

all reparation for spoliations seems to be abandoned. Had Mr. Jay been promised that those cts shod decide as he wished, yet accepting a treaty without such stipulation, gave it up, or provided in case the decision was otherwise any compl:—and even if the decision shod be according to his views yet the omission to stipulate it, sacrificed our honor to preserve that of Engld In examining therefore this project from the beginning to the end & impartially I do not find one single stipulation in our favor, or which certainly improves our condition from what it was before. Whilst on the other hand it most certainly contains a series of stipulations many of which are extremely unfavorable & disgraceful, & others at best indifferent. When therefore I consider the circumstances under which the negotiation commenced, sometime after the Battle of Fleurus when the preponderance of the French arms was established & the troops of the coalesced powers flying in every quarter before those of the republick; when the dominion of the sea was contested by the French & after a severe contest in wh proofs of prowess were given by the latter that struck terror into their enemies, tho' rather the superior in that contest & when every day to the moment of the close of this negotiation improved the fortunes of France, I must confess I think this treaty in which it terminated, one of the most extraordinary transactions of modern times. No body will I presume attempt to vindicate the head which dictated it: the heart however may be free from taint or that pollution which is too often found among political

agents: of this however the people of America, who are a just & a benevolent people, ought to be satisfied; and I doubt not will be satisfied.

If this treaty had parted us from France the views of Engl^d wo^d have been completely answered; and believe me there were moments when I had the most disquieting apprehensions upon that point, for the opinion of its contents, with a variety of other circumstances, which inspired here a belief we were about to abandon this republick for a connection with Engl^d excited at different times a degree of irritation or rather indignation in their councils of a very menacing aspect. A single unfriendly act being committed by this gov^t towards us wo^d have led to others: this wo^d have produced recrimination from our quarter & which might have ended in we know not what. Gov^ts too in a course of revolution as they act much from the heart of those who fill them, are susceptible of more sensibility than in other times; this made the danger under existing circumstances the greater. Believe me that since the reports of that treaty transpired I have rested on a bed of thorns: I was often fearful the subject wo^d be taken up in the Convention, & thus progress from one thing to another—I am however happy to inform you that none of these evils have happened—on the contrary the storm appears to have passed, leaving us the prospect of a fair and durable calm. This republick has not only refrained from degenerating into the unfriendly policy formerly practiced agnst. us, but has in this interval done us some acts of service,—one in particular is just on

the point of being placed in a train hence & which if it succeeds will be sensibly felt by all our countrymen. As this has been discussed and arranged,

Jay's nomination;—the business of al- gi- er- s
145. 670. 812. 376. 1352. 450. 822. 1645. 7.

Since the intelligence above referred to from Philadelphia arrived, it furnishes cause to hope (that notwithstanding the extreme dislike they have of the Treaty) they will continue to observe the same friendly policy towards us, in the hope we will sooner or later return it.

I consider this treaty as forming an important epoch in the history of our country. It fully explains the views of its author and his political associates; views which were long known to many and charged upon him & them, but denied, & by one artifice or other discredited. But this is an act which speaks for itself, & fortunately it is one in which not he alone is compromitted. This however is not the only benefit resulting from it, for having the sanction of the Senate & being presented for ratification to the President, whilst by Mr Mason it was submitted to the people at large, the opinion of the latter will be before him at the same time, whereby he will be enabled to act as the voice of his countrymen admonishes, assisted too in his reflections by the light they may throw on it. If he rejects it & which I conclude he will, the publick opinion will afterwards perhaps be pronounced with still greater decision on that side. This therefore will form a basis upon which our republican system & connection with France may not only rest with safety, but hereafter in the latter instance be greatly im-

proved. This is a reflection which will naturally occur to you & wh. will doubtless be held in view in the measures of the ensuing session.

You will have seen by my past communications
the affair of the Missippi. was lo- st or
that 812. 433. 1352. 812. 52. 1293. 1424. 1543. 324.
rather take- n from this govern- ment by the mission
672. 475. 640. 252. 1160. 1517. 664. 1461. 812. 826.
of Pi- nk- ne- y That before he past
1352. 1635. 454. 1439. 1247.—698. 572. 182. 209.
here the French Minister was in- struct- ed to
1525. 812. 780. 1515. 1293. 149. 608. 1359. 770.
se- cure it in the treat- y with Spain
479. 291. 410. 149. 812. 986. 1247. 1687. 384. & which has been since confirmed to me by the minister
as P thro. here without mention-
himself. But 764. 941. passed 612. 1525. 1469. 342.
ing the sub- ject and which he could not do
607. 812. 1128. 748. 673. 1287. 182. 778. 549. 1180.
without she- w- ing the treat- y above mention- ed
1469. 1070. 1141. 607. 812. 986. 1247. 1159. 342. 1359.
their inter- fer- ence contest [would] be
it was concluded 1096. 167. 604. 212. 1294. 1569.
deem- ed im- per- tin- ent his
483. 1359. 406. 576. 945. 630. & so given up to 1108.
car- e The fri- end- ship she- wn in the
1069. 8.—812. 948. 790. 1411. 1070. 1256. 149. 812.
other in- sta- n- ce pro- ve- s it would have
1327. 149. 477. 640. 276. 248. 1058. 7. 410. 1254. 216.
been in this if ask- ed Indeed
307. 149. 1160. 1333. 462. 1359.—530. the manner in
this al- ge- ri- ne business is con-
which 1160. 450. 757. 1592. 1437. 376. 1341. 1527.
duct- ed take the aid of France
448. 1359. is calculated to 475. 812. 550. 1352. 841.
without gi- ving her the credit of it
1469. 822. 1465. 1631. 812. 956. 1352. 410—for altho'
we her plan in ever- y thing and our
1583. pursue 1631. 1124. 149. 641. 1247. 877. 673. 266.
agent go- es with her pass- port and under
206. 695. 649. hence 1087. 1631. 678. 1690. 673. 1054.

her pat- ro- na- ge and I am
1631. 490. 168. 302. 757. 673. 145. 1046. authorised to
and have dec- lar- ed in my communica-
declare 673. 216. 1514. 702. 1359. 149. 951. 32.
tion- s that without her aid we have no pros-
761. 7. 698. 1469. 1631. 550. 1583. 216. 222. 185.
pec- t of suc- ces within our rea- our- ces
1151. 865. 1352. 1490. 159. 1578. 266. 1483. 266. 159.
our agent Mr Hi- ch- bur- n his
Yet 266. 206. 1324. 278. 1354. 113. 640. takes 1108.
com- mission from our Minister at Portugal now here
399. 826. 252. 266. 1515. 301. 50. (536. 1525.)
whom at Portugal he will rend- der an
and to 1576. 301. 50. 182. 1268. 179. 1318. 157.
ac- count of his mission suc- ce- ed- s
1700. 1173. 1352. 1108. 826. if it 1490. 276. 1359. 7.
rat- if- ied condition- ally Minister there
to be 610. 1333. 921. 47. 975 by that 1515 596.
sub- ject to the ap- pro- bat- ion of the
1128. 748. 770. 812. 782. 248. 1642. 918. 1352. 812.
President and Sen- ate
15. 673. 777. 1000. Thus it will appear as if the
proceed- ed from him at Portugal France
whole 752. 1359. 252. 935. 301. 50. and 841.
will appear
1268. 579. to have had as little to do with it, even by
as if it had proceed- ed from
circumstances 764. 1333. 410. 560. 752. 1359. 252.
the mo- on is a pi- ec-
812. 419. 1179. This however 1341. 101. 1635. 1186.
e our other Europe- an trans- action- s We
8. with all 266. 1327. 917. 157. 1107. 744. 7. : 1583.
str- i- ve to fil- ch the aid of this
1081. 145. 1058. 770. 348. 1354. 812. 550. 1352. 1160.
govern- ment we can without let-
1517. 664. in all cases where 1583. 1678. 1469. 309.
tin- g the wor- ld know it de- ceive ing
945. 236. 812. 1581. 1598. 1689. 410. 385. 830. 607.
the la- t- ter by po- m- po- us mission-
812. 1197. 865. 881. 1461. 122. 1324. 122. 1162. 826.
s on our sel- ve- s al-
7. which appear to rest 1179. 266. 718. 1058. 7. 450.
one above fact however suc- ce- ed- s
567. The 1159. 1450. 74 if it 1490. 276. 1359. 7.

with respect to al- gi- ers made know-
1687. 789. 770. 450. 822. 126. ought to be 305. 1689.
n in America to
640. 149. 1519. You will agree with me that 770.
ask a favor and
462. 101. 396. under existing circumstances 673.
without be- ing able to exp- plain the cont- ent-
1469. 1569. 607. 939. 770. 223. 151. 812. 1277. 630.
s of a cer- tain treat- y dig-
7. 1352. 101. 1163. 390. 986. 1247.[1] is not a very 1281.
ni- fi- ed sy- s- te- m of poli- cy
1451. 837. 1359. 393. 7. 947. 1324. 1352. 1083. 1121.

What course will be taken with respect to England 45. under
I
existing circumstances it is difficult to foresee. 145.
have long since made it know- n that in ca-
216. 592. 1393. 305. 410. 1689. 640. 698. 149. 518.
se the treat- y dis- ap- pro- ved
479. 812. 986. 1247. was 1166. 782. 248. 783. it wo^{d} be
to se- cure the aid of this govern- ment
easy 770. 479. 291. 812. 550. 1352. 1160. 1517. 664.
sup- port our demand- s upon England
in 520. 1690. of 266. 716. 7. 1168. 45.—Nay I
if our dep- or- t- ment
am convinced that 1333. 266. 1423. 324. 865. 664.
was reg- ard to England
1293. such in 1427. 1331. 770. 45. as to inspire
con- fi- den- ce in France no
1527. 837. 554. 276. 149. 841. she wo^{d} make 222.
peace which go hand hand a pro-
1370, 1287. did not 695. 1123. in 1123. with 101. 248.
ved ground our claim- s and in- jur- ie- s
1018. 714. for 266. 466. 7. 673. 149. 1130. 581. 7.—
The negociation however should be a
812. 87. 74. 1480. 1569. in the hands of 101.
person whom this govern- ment can confide
211. in 1576. 1160. 1517. 664. 1678. 427. and be
where the French negociation was con- duct-
conducted 1696. 812. 780. 87. 1293. 1527. 448.
ed either here or at Bas- le
1359. 676. 1525. 324. 301. 1453. 1406.—Suitable

[1] Jay's treaty.

measures too sho^d be taken at home 1461. 1212. 607. 1279. 1352. 1096. 922. 788. 1058. 7. 7. 295. 7. &c. 673. 1461. 475. 607. 812. 125. 7. 1333. not 149. 998. 506. 236. 439. This wo^d be acting 1097. 101. 275. 673. 1583. 1480. 781. 1569, 789. 1359. as such 1525. 673. 149. 45.—Nor wo^d such 101. 156. 149. 951. 1680. 1651. 707. to 1085. 1179. 812. 1607. 145. 957. 454. 1174. 1254. 1596. 1055. 101. 1383. 1370. by forming a seasonable 979. 827. 914. 149. 396. 1352. and which wo^d not be 130. 429. 1359. 301. 78. If 812. 15. 1254. 101. 1253. 941. 865. 156. 7. 1352. 1160. 1532. 1111. 479. 927. 610. 607. 935. 440. completely from 812. 1267. 1391. 518. 947. 7.—1352. 812. 986. 1247. 641. 1247. 877. 219. 1681. 1569. 990. 1185. 581. 783.

The Constitution reported by the Committee of Eleven is finally adopted & on the principles of the report. It is now before the primary assemblies which were opened three days past & will be closed tomorrow. It will pass with almost an unanimous vote. The Convention in a decree subsequent to the constitution required that 2/3^ds of the Convention should be reelected, a principle incorporated in the constitution for the future. Tis probable this injunction will be disregarded & that in consequence some

difficulty & delay may take place before the Constⁿ is put in force: for if some adopt that plan and others do not it will take some time to arrange matters as to get these in the same line again. & which I presume will be that wʰ the majority approve. The deliberations in Paris are conducted with calmness & perfect good temper—and every circumstance that I have heard of promises the happiest result, tho the royalists have looked to this epoch as one from which they were to hope a revolution in their favour.

The negociation with the empire is going on & which perhaps is the cause Pichegru does not cross the Rhine. A peace is made with the Prince of Hesse whereby his troops, 6000, in Engʰ pay are withdrawn from the army of the Emperor—very sincerely I am dear Sir yʳ friend & servant

Jᵃˢ Monroe.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING, ACTING.]

PARIS, September 10th, 1795.[1]

Sir,—A private letter of the 31st of May, is the last with which I have been honoured from you, and as more than three months have since elapsed, I am inclined to believe that some of your despatches are carried into England, and treated with the same violence that mine were by the admiralty at Halifax. It was, doubtless, an object of importance with the British government to know what were the ulterior measures of the President in regard to England, after

[1] The original is in cipher.

the decision of the Senate upon the treaty of Mr. Jay, and as I presume you wrote me fully upon that head, and immediately after the decision was taken, so I cannot otherwise account why your letters have not yet reached me.[1]

I sincerely wish to hear from you as soon as possible upon that subject; because if in the further pursuit of our claims upon England, it is wished to derive any aid from this Republic, either by harmonious co-operation or otherwise, it is obvious from a variety of considerations that the sooner an attempt is made to adjust the mode whereby such aid is to be rendered, the better the prospect of success will be. You know that France viewed with anxiety the late negociation with that power, and waited the result not without unpleasant apprehensions of the consequences: and you likewise know that the moment when that anxiety ceases, and especially if there is any thing mingled in the cause producing the change, which argues an attachment for France, is the moment to make a suitable impression on her councils. Oftentimes incidents of this kind in private life encrease the friendship and cement the union between the parties; and the principle is the same with nations as with individuals, where the government is in the hands of the people. But the moment must

[1] On September 12, 1795, Pickering informed Monroe that the office of Secretary of State was vacant. Monroe received this information December 6, 1795, so that until this latter date, he was not aware "officially" of Randolph's retirement. September 6, Jefferson wrote him of Randolph "retiring perhaps from the storm he saw gathering." From his letter to Madison of October 24, it appears that he then had received private information of Randolph's retirement.

ed, otherwise the prospect diminishes, and y becomes more remote; for where a cool- ch has once taken place is suffered to remain time, after the cause which gave birth to that circumstance becomes a new motive n, and which, especially if afterwards en- mutual slights, often ends in mutual en- ddition to which, it may be observed, that s wished from France, the state of the war o require, on our part, dispatch; for it is umable, when its substantial objects are the one side, and the hope of gain in sure abandoned on the other, as is actu- e case, that its close is not very distant.

l of opinion, that if a timely and suitable made to engage the aid of this government of our claims upon England, it may be ac- , and upon fair and honourable terms. But ting circumstances, peculiar and extraordi- becomes necessary in the arrangement to be otherwise the attempt will fail. Our nego- ust be in harmony, and possess the confi- this government, or it will not support it; vernment will support a negociation it sus- l terminate in a treaty injurious to itself. purpose, then, the person to whom we com- rust, should possess the confidence of this nt, and, in my opinion, the negociation e carried on at the place where the French on is carried on; either here or at Basle, tter place it is reported, Mr. Eden has

lately presented himself,—the same person who was not long since at Dieppe for an exchange of prisoners, as it was said. On the contrary, suppose any person was sent directly to England on this business, what would be its effect here? It is admitted that such a person might be sent, as would create no alarm here, of injury to this Republic from the consequence of such negociation; but the manner would be deemed inharmonious, and would, of course, be considered as declining all claim upon this government for its support. England would know this, and profit by it. Indeed, no co-operation, under such circumstances, could be pursued. What are the objections to such an arrangement? I can see none. If we were at war with England none would be urged by any one; for such was the case when we were at war with her. If, then, remaining at peace another country is willing to give us the fortune of its arms, in support of our claims against a common enemy, ought we to decline an arrangement which would be adopted in war, especially when it is considered, that peace is the lot we prefer, and that our success depends upon its success, unaided by any effort of our own? Would it excite disgust in England? On the contrary, it would command her respect. Without compulsion we know we shall not gain from her what we are entitled to; and if this compulsion is to be procured from France, will it not be more efficacious, when she sees that our harmony with France is complete, and beyond her reach to disturb it? But can we accomplish what we wish by the fortunes of France, by any kind of nego-

ciation we can set on foot, without any effort of our own; and if any such effort is to be made, of what kind must it be? To this I can give no answer, other than by referring you to my former letters on that head; for latterly I have had no communication with this government on it. If it can be done, the above is the way to do it; but to secure success, by our embarking this government with full zeal in our behalf, and striking terror into England, it will be necessary to lay hold of her property within the United States, take the posts, and even invade Canada. This would not only secure to us completely our claims upon Britain, and especially if we likewise cut up her trade by privateers; but by making a decisive and powerful diversion in favour of France, promote, and very essentially, a general peace.

The state of the war is the same as when I wrote you last. Pichegru is still on this side of the Rhine, and the pressure upon Italy is less forcible since, than it was before the peace with Spain; a circumstance which gives cause to suspect, that negociations, promising a favourable issue, are depending with the powers in that quarter. A similar consideration may likewise impede the movements of Pichegru; for it is generally understood, that not only the Empire as a body, but several of its members separately, are negociating for a peace with this Republic; of which latter fact we have lately seen an example in a treaty with the prince of Hesse Cassel; whereby six thousand of his troops in English pay, are withdrawn from the army of the emperor.

I lately sent you, by Bordeaux, a copy of the Constitution which was adopted by the convention, and which is at present before the primary assemblies for ratification, and I now send another copy of that act by Havre. The attempt which was hereby made, not simply to amend, but absolutely to set aside the former constitution, and introduce a new one in its stead, differing, too, from the former, in many of its great outlines, and especially in the character of its legislative and executive branches, under the circumstances which existed when it was commenced, being at the moment when the trial of Barrere and his associates was depending, and Paris afflicted by famine,—was an enterprize, you will admit, of great moment. So far as it was a dangerous one, it proves that such danger was encountered, from motives equally benevolent and patriotic. And as the constitution which this attempt has produced, comparatively with the other, is infinitely preferable to it, and forms, of course, in case it be adopted, a new bulwark in favour of republican government, it is fair to conclude, that such, likewise, was the object of it.

The primary assemblies were convened to deliberate on it five days, and this is the fifth; and in those quarters from whence accounts are already received, it appears that it is adopted, in some cases unanimously, and in all by great majorities. It was likewise submitted to the armies, and by whom it is said to be adopted almost unanimously. In the prospect, therefore, in this respect, before this Republic, one circumstance only presents itself, which darkens, in

any degree, the political horizon. In putting the new constitution in motion, the Convention wished to transfer from its own body two thirds of its members to the legislative branches of the new government, and for which a decree was passed. A motive for this was, the advantage the republic would gain from keeping in office many of those in whose hands depending negociations were, and who in other respects are acquainted with the actual state of things. There may be, and doubtless are, other motives for this measure, and which will readily occur to you. This arrangement is, however, disliked by many, and, particularly, by the inhabitants of this city, by whom it is generally rejected. The presumption is, that a great majority of France will approve the decree, and in which case Paris will yield; but, should the majority prove to be on the other side, the presumption is equally strong, that the convention will yield; so that, from this source I do not see cause to apprehend any serious evil. Many, however, are of a different opinion, and count upon the division which exists upon this point, as the commencement of a counter-revolution. It is well known that the royalists are active, and using their utmost efforts to improve it in their favor, and it is also believed, that England and some others of the coalesced powers view it with the same anxious and favorable expectation. But it is usual for the royalists and those powers to catch at every circumstance which turns up, whereon to rest a hope; in general, however, their calculations upon the fortune of the revolution, have not been

verified by events, and I shall be deceived if this is not the case in the present instance. Indeed, a sound reason may be given why Paris differs in this respect from the majority of the other departments, and without impeaching her attachment to the republican government. All the great atrocities which have stained the different stages of the revolution, were perpetrated here. Under every convulsion and change some of her citizens have suffered; and, with the preponderating party in the Convention, she is not popular as a department; so that it is natural she should wish a complete change of the members who are to compose the new government. With great respect and esteem I have the honor to be Sir your most obedient and humble servant.

JA^{s} MONROE.

P. S. Respecting Algiers I will write you in my next.

Since writing the above, it is announced in the Convention that Jourdan, who commands the army of the "Sambre and the Meuse," has crossed the Rhine, at the head of about 50,000 men, and in the face of about 40,000, well posted, and strongly fortified on the opposite shore. It is also said, that he attacked and took by storm, immediately afterwards, the city and castle of Dusseldorf. Much applause is bestowed on the general and his army for this bold exploit, and which is deemed, under the circumstances attending it, among the most brilliant of the war.

TO DAVID HUMPHREYS.

PARIS, October 3d, 1795.

SIR,—By the inclosed extracts, if what they state is correct, it seems as if Mr. Donaldson had acted from himself, and without the aid of the French consul. If this be the case, he will doubtless explain to you the cause. The price is higher than I expected it would have been. I could not call on Jean de Bry; but Mr. Purviance did, the day before yesterday, on this business in my name, and was informed, that he had heard nothing from Herculais on the subject, and that the only instructions heretofore sent him (being, indeed, those only which they could send him) were, to use the influence of this Republic with the Dey, to obtain a suspension of hostilities, on his part, against the United States. However, this you will understand better when you arrive at Lisbon. I shall notify the event, or rather the report, to this government, that it may, at least for the present, take no further measure in it.

With great respect and esteem,

Your obedient servant,

JA^S. MONROE.[1]

[1] Colonel Humphreys to Monroe: "Havre Oct. 4th. 1795. Dear Sir,—I have no doubt that you will have received the same intelligence, respecting the Peace which it is said to have been concluded between the U. S. and the Dey of Algiers, which has been communicated to M^r. Delamotte by M^r. Cathalan of Marseilles. That letter of which I have inclosed a Copy to the Secretary of State and another to M^r. Barlow is the only information I have on the subject. I have written to M^r. Barlow, that, in all events I thought it would be expedient for him to go on to Alicant, with the presents which have been purchased in Paris for Barbary negociations. Because if they are not wanted at Algiers, I make no doubt they will be extremely convenient for Tunis and Tripoli. I

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING, ACTING.]

PARIS, October 4th, 1795.

SIR,—I herewith enclose you extracts from several letters from Mr. Cathalan, our consul at Marseilles,

have intimated the same thing to the Secretary of State, for it appears to me of the highest importance to the interests of the U. S, that the most unremitting measure should be pursued on our part for accomplishing a pacification with all those powers. I have at length received the letter from Mr. Deas which he had written with a design of forwarding it by *Mr. Andrews*. It is *very explicit and satisfactory* on the subject of that gentlemans journey and I beg leave to give you (in confidence) an extract of a subsequent letter from Mr. Deas which came together with that above alluded to: the following are his words, 'This merely serves to inform you that the letter which accompanies it was intended by Mr. Andrews, who promised to call for it, but left London without either doing so, or giving me any information that his engagements would prevent him, which had he done it, would with perfect convenience have been put into his hands at his lodgings.' I have not yet received the copy of Messrs. Barings for [mer] letters to me which Mr. Deas refers to as having been forwarded. The Captain and Mate of the vessel in which I am to embark, being recovered so far as to venture to sea, I expect to sail this day." "Havre, October 7th. Having lately written so fully to Mr. Barlow and yourself on the discretionary and conditional measures which it appeared to me must be left to your judgments, respecting Barbary Affairs, that I have nothing farther to add on that subject. I would not, however, take my departure without first leaving a line for you. The wind being now favorable I hope to embark today. Previous to which I thought it was expedient to inform Mr. Donaldson that our funds are actually in readiness, that I propose to send the vessel in which we came from America directly to Gibraltar to await his orders; that we had certain articles purchased in Paris which might perhaps be useful for Tunis and Tripoli, and that he was at liberty to write to you if there should be occasion for them in order to concert the means of having them conveyed to the proper place. I recommended to him likewise, in all events, to open a correspondence with you. That letter is covered by one to Mr. Montgomery which I pray you to forward under cover to Mr. Short or in any other way you judge proper. On the other hand permit me to suggest whether it might not be useful for the Public, for you to commence the correspondence with him? By which means perhaps you will sooner learn the real state of affairs. If the articles at Paris should be wanted for Tunis and Tripoli (as it appears to me will be the case) perhaps they might be forwarded more conveniently by Marseilles than Alicant, but of this you will be able to judge on better grounds, than I can. As also whether

and by which it appears, that a treaty in behalf of the United States is made with Algiers.[1] I have likewise since conferred with Jean de Bry, of the committee of public safety, who is charged with the American affairs, and by whom I am informed, that like intelligence is received by the Committee from their consul

Mr. Barlow's services therein may not be usefully employed. I am clearly of opinion we must have one Consul or Agent for each one of the Barbary States. There must be a sufficient number of Persons employed to perform the public services. The speedy conclusion of the negociations with Tunis and Tripoli is of great importance. Pray then let us not suffer the business to languish or to be procrastinated, for want of Agents, means or expences. But I must hasten to conclude with assurances of the real sentiments of esteem and respect with with I remain, dear Sir, your sincere friend and humble servant, D. Humphreys.—P. S. Since writing the foregoing I have rec^{d} your favour of the 3rd & can only say that my opinion coincides with your own as to suspending farther purchases & retaining the articles on hand."

[1] Marseilles, September 24, 1795.—"A French vessel arrived yesterday from Algiers which left it the 16th. instant. The House of Baery (very rich Jews, who have their main establishment at Algiers are in the highest favour with the Dey,—they have a brother at Paris and a brother here) sent me advice that peace was made at Algiers between the United States of America and the Dey of Algiers." Sept. 25th.—"This is to give you a new confirmation of the peace between the United States and Algiers. The Swedish consul here has communicated to me yesterday a letter he has received by the same vessel from the Swedish Consul at Algiers, saying 'The peace between the Dey and the U. S., has been signed on the 5th. instant. This peace cost to them near one million of dollars.'" September 26th. "The agent of the exterior relations in this place has delivered me yesterday an abstract of a letter he has received from M. Vallière, Consul General of the French Republic at Algiers, as follows: 'L'Amérique vient de conclure sa paix avec cette regence; elle paye un tribut de 122 mille livres, et le prix de la paix; le rachat des esclaves et les divers présens s'élèveront à environ 4 millions! M. Donaldson a été le negociateur.'" The same Consul writes: "Through the channel of the agence of Affrick in this town, I dont know exactly the whole terms of the treaty made by Mr. Donaldson; but these are the principal conditions, vizt. $200,000 for the Dey; $100,000 for the Vekie (chief minister); $200,000 for the ransom of the 100 slaves; $24,000 as annual tribute; a considerable furniture of articles for the navy; immense presents of bijoux and in money to the family of the Dey; to his ministers and officers of that regency."

About the commencement of the year 1791, Mr. Jefferson, the Secretary of

at Algiers; so that the verity of this report cannot be doubted. By these extracts, as by the communications of the consuls to the committee, as I am advised, it is to be inferred, that the movements of Mr. Donaldson were unconnected with the French consul, and, of course, that the aid of this Republic was not ex-

State, reported to President Washington that there were held captive as slaves in Algiers two American Masters, for whose ransom 3,000 sequins each were demanded; two mates, for whom 2,000 sequins each were asked; and ten sailors, held at 750 sequins each; and he reported to Congress that the navigation into the Mediterranean had not been resumed at all since the peace; and that the sole obstacle had been the unprovoked war with Algiers, and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects.

On the 8th of May, 1792, President Washington asked the Senate whether, in case a treaty should be concluded with Algiers for the ransom of the thirteen Americans for a sum not exceeding forty thousand dollars, the Senate would consent; and whether they would consent to a treaty of peace stipulating for the payment of $25,000, on the signature of the Treaty, and a like sum annually? The Senate answered each question in the affirmative, and the President appointed Admiral John Paul Jones a commissioner to negotiate a treaty, with Thomas Barclay as a substitute, in case Jones should not act. Jones died before the appointment could reach him, and Barclay died soon after, without going to Morocco. Col. David Humphreys, then the Minister of the United States at Lisbon, was thereupon appointed a Plenipotentiary in their place. Eight hundred thousand dollars were placed at his disposal, and he was instructed that "the President has under consideration the mode in which the eight hundred thousand dollars may be expended in the purchase of a peace; that is, how much shall be applied to the ransom, and how much to the peace."

More precise instructions followed on the 25th of August, 1794. A Swede named Skjoldebrand, brother of the Swedish Consul at Algiers, interested himself in the unfortunate captives, and informed Humphreys (who remained at Lisbon) that a peace could be obtained for the United States for about the following sums (in dollars), viz.: "For the Treasury, in money or timber of construction, fifty thousand; For the great officers and relations of the Dey, one hundred thousand; Consular present, thirty thousand; Redemption of slaves, from two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand; in all between six and seven hundred thousand; together with an annual tribute of from twenty-five to thirty thousand; and a Consular present every two years of about nine or ten thousand dollars." Humphreys sent this communication home, and received instructions "that Skjoldebrand's terms are to be acceded to, if better cannot

tended to us in that negociation. From what cause this proceeded, if such is the fact, I cannot at present divine; but presume it will be fully explained to you by colonel Humphreys from Libson; where he doubtless is before this, having left Paris on his return there about three weeks since. It is, however, neces-

be obtained." Only a few days before this instruction was written, the Secretary of State had informed Col. Humphreys of the wishes of the Government and the country on this subject: "You are by this time," he said, "apprized of the expectation of the President, that you will continue your labors on this head, and of your title to draw for eight hundred thousand dollars, to soothe the Dey into a peace and ransom. The humanity of our countrymen has been long excited in behalf of our suffering fellow-citizens." In March, 1795, Donaldson, the Consul to Tunis and Tripoli, was associated with Humphreys, and the latter was also authorized to employ Skjoldebrand in negotiating the Treaty with the Dey. Joel Barlow was added to the negotiators by Monroe and Humphreys in Europe. Donaldson arrived in Algiers on the 3d of September, and concluded the Treaty on the 5th, on which day Barlow arrived, and they joined in their report to Humphreys.

Congress was informed by President Washington, in his speech at the opening of the second session of the Fourth Congress, of the probability that the Treaty would be concluded, "but under great, though inevitable disadvantages in the pecuniary transactions occasioned by that war." A few days later the House called for information as to the measures taken to carry the Treaty into effect, which was communicated confidentially on the 9th January, 1797. The Bill making appropriations for these objects was discussed with closed doors, and was passed February 22, 1797, by 63 ayes to 19 nays. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated the whole expense of fulfilling the Treaty at $992,463.25. In March, 1802, President Jefferson was able to advise Congress that "the sums due to the Government of Algiers are now fully paid up."

In 1808, an enquiry being made by Congress respecting the payments to Algiers, the Secretary of State reported that they were "of two kinds: 1. That stipulated by Treaty, viz.: Twelve thousand sequins, equal to twenty-one thousand six hundred dollars, made annually in naval stores. 2d. Those made in conformity with what is called 'usage' at Algiers, by which it is understood we are bound. These are—1. The present on the presentation of a Consul, $20,000. 2. The biennial presents to the officers of the government, estimated at $17,000. 3. Incidental and contingent presents, as well on the promotion of the principal officers of the Dey and regency, as for the attainment of any important object. Of these no estimate can be made."—*Notes, Treaties and Conventions, Department of State.*

sary for me to state to you what took place here in that respect, in consequence of colonel Humphreys' arrival, prior to the receipt of the above intelligence; as likewise what has been since done in consequence of that intelligence.

I was informed by Colonel Humphreys upon his arrival, that you wished to obtain the aid of this government in support of our negociations with the Barbary powers; for which purpose, indeed, he had come, and that you wished me to ask for it, in case I thought it attainable. From particular considerations, and which will occur to you, I felt some embarrassment in making an application for aid of any kind at the present juncture; but as I was persuaded you had weighed these, and deemed them no obstacle, and knew that the object was equally pressed by interest and humanity, I immediately resolved to bring the subject before the government, and ask for such aid; stating it was not the aid of funds that we wanted, but simply the aid of the amicable mediation and interference of this government, and which was promised by our treaty of alliance, but never performed. Colonel Humphreys and myself were agreed, that as credit for the service was to be a principal motive on the part of France for embarking in it, so it would be expedient on our part to make our arrangements such, as to give full force to that motive; since thereby she would engage in it with greater zeal, and, in consequence, with proportionably greater effect. It readily occurred, that the more direct our measures were from this quarter, and the more united and harmonious our councils were in

this respect, with those of this government, the greater its confidence in us would be, and of course, the better our prospect of success. Besides, to give full effect to the influence of France in the councils of the Dey, and thereby obtain the peace at the cheapest rate, it appeared advisable; that our agent should be cloathed with a French passport, and be if possible a French citizen, and even appear to be an agent of France, exhibiting ultimately our power when necessary to conclude. By this mode it would seem as if France interfered as our friend and chiefly from motives of humanity in regard to our prisoners; whereby we should avoid inculcating any idea of wealth on our part (for wealth and imbecility are with them strong temptations for war) and which would be further supported by the long imprisonment of our people. In presenting, therefore, the subject before the government, I left the mode or manner of the negociation open for subsequent and less formal discussion; seeking in that step a decision only upon the first point *of aid*, and which I was explicitly promised by the committee and the commissary. I soon found however, in touching on the other part,—the execution, that our anticipation was correct, and that it was expected our agent would depart hence by the route of Marseilles; shunning the countries with which this Republic was at war, and at which place the government would have a vessel provided for him to proceed to Algiers. In furtherance of the object, I was furnished by the commissary with a list of such presents as would be suitable for Algiers, *&c.*, a literal copy of what they had

last presented themselves, with a specification of what suited the Dey and his ministers in particular, and which presents, as introductory, he advised us to commit to the agent, to be presented in the commencement according to the usage of the place, and as their consul should advise. But Colonel Humphreys observed to me, that he had left Mr. Donaldson at Alicant, with power to correspond with the French Consul at Algiers, and act in harmony with him; being further authorized, in case he was invited over by the consul, to proceed to Algiers and conclude a treaty with that power. Here then an embarrassment occurred; for it was to be feared, and for the reasons above stated, that a mission from that quarter, under the circumstances attending it, would be less likely to succeed, than if it proceeded directly hence; and, on the other hand, it was likewise to be feared, that if we adopted the latter plan and despatched a person hence, the two agents might interfere with, and embarrass, each other. Upon mature reflection, therefore, and especially as Colonel Humphreys had instructed Mr. Donaldson not to act otherwise than in strict harmony with the French consul; nor then without an assurance of success, since he, Colonel Humphreys was coming to Paris to secure the aid of this government, it seemed as if the two modes might be incorporated into one; or rather as if we might proceed with the business here, counting upon no interference from Mr. Donaldson; providing however, in the arrangements, in case he acted before Colonel Humphreys returned, and which we concluded he would not do in

such manner as to admit his falling in, incidentally, and harmonizing with the other agent; and to admit likewise, let him act as he would, provided he harmonized with the French consul, such an explanation as would be satisfactory to this government. Upon this principle therefore, and with the approbation and concurrence of Colonel Humphreys, I notified to the commissary of foreign relations,[1] that we had committed the trust to Joel Barlow, who was a citizen of

[1] To the Commissary of Foreign Relations, Paris, September 1st, 1795.—Having at length completed the arrangements which appeared to us necessary, with respect to funds, presents, &c., for prosecuting our treaties with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, so as to be in readiness to dispatch the persons to whom the negociation with each is intrusted,—I take the liberty to communicate the same to you, that the aid of this Republic may be yielded us in our efforts to accommodate this very important object. As soon, therefore, as your instructions are prepared for your agent, or agents with those regencies, with necessary passports for the protection of those whom we send, the latter will depart hence in discharge of the trust reposed in them.

As I have heretofore mentioned to you, that the only aid we wanted from this Republic was that of its friendly mediation and influence with those powers, and have also apprized you of the extent of our funds, and the kind of treaties we wish to make; being simply treaties of peace: It only remains for me to mention the persons to whom the negociation is to be committed on our part, and with whom your agent will have to co-operate; as likewise those who must be covered by your passports. I think proper therefore now to inform you, that we have appointed Mr. Hitchborn,[2] at present in Paris, with full powers to commence and conclude such treaties, and who will set out in discharge of that trust, as soon as he is favoured with your instructions for your agent there. But as it would not be in his power to proceed further than Algiers, and it is equally necessary to form such treaties with Tunis and Tripoli, we have thought it advisable to associate with him Mr. Donaldson, who will, after the treaty with Algiers is completed, pursue the business with those other regencies alone, and who has from our government the appointment of consul to reside with the latter, in case treaties are made with them. We wish you therefore, to apprize your agent accordingly, and to instruct him to co-operate with both, or either of those citizens; as both or either may be present, and circumstances require. For these two, as *agents*, we wish the protection of your passports, as likewise

[2] He declined, and Mr. Barlow was then appointed in his stead.—MONROE.

both Republics, and requested the passport of the government in his behalf, and also in behalf of Mr. Donaldson, who was eventually to be consul at Tunis and Tripoli, and whom we should associate with Mr. Barlow, to guard against accidents in the negociation with Algiers; requesting likewise, that the committee would, in the most suitable manner, yield all the support in its power in favour of this negociation. I stated also, that Mr. Barlow was here and would proceed by the most direct route in the discharge of his

for citizen Andrews, who will leave this in company with Citizen Hitchborn, particularly charged with the care of the presents, and for ————————, who goes as servant to Citizen Hitchborn; so that we wish passports for four persons, in the characters above described.

As we are inclined to think, as well from past difficulties as more recent advices, that the success of the mission, if it does succeed, will depend principally, if not altogether, upon the friendly aid we shall derive from this Republic, so we think it advisable that the United States should appear to have as little to do in the negociation as possible; or, in other words, that they should not appear at all in it, until it be necessary to conclude: For if their agents are known to be their agents, or rather if they are not considered as your agents, with our powers, it will follow that the Dey will immediately come to them to treat with them on the part of the United States, and of course your mediation and influence will be lost. It will therefore be advisable to keep the United States as much out of view as possible; for the purpose of giving full weight to your influence and the assistance of France there. I mention this that you may give a correspondent instruction, if you approve thereof, to your agent; and particularly instruct him in rendering us all possible aid, to concert his measures in strict harmony with our agents.

It will likewise be expedient for you to leave your agent ignorant of the extent of our funds, referring him to our agents for information upon that point, and for reasons that were before explained. One other difficulty only yet remains to be provided for. Our agent will probably embark from Alicant, and of course must carry the introductory presents into Spain. It will be improper that these should be searched, or known to that government: Can you protect them by a passport or otherwise, from such search; as upon that, in some measure, will the dispatch if not the success, of the mission depend.

I have only to add, that as all the preparations on our part are complete, we shall be happy to have those on yours as soon as possible.

trust, with the presents we had bought, and were buying, according to the list furnished me, for the said treaty; and was promised, that what I had asked should be strictly complied with: And thus stood the business when the accounts above referred to were received, and which I have thought it my duty to communicate, that you may be accurately informed of what was done here in relation thereto.

Perhaps you will ask, why Mr. Barlow or some other agent did not depart hence sooner, after the plan of sending one was agreed on? The fact is, it was impossible; for, owing to the state of things here at the time, about three or four weeks elapsed, after I applied to the government for the aid, before I obtained an answer; and after which, when it appeared expedient to purchase introductory presents, and for which purpose money was necessary, a doubt arose, and for reasons heretofore explained, whether Colonel Humphreys' draft from France would be answered, and which it was thought advisable to remove in the first instance. This consumed about three weeks more, and since which, every possible attention has been made to provide the presents, and forward the business, that circumstances would admit of.

When the news above noticed arrived, Colonel Humphreys was at Havre, on his return to Lisbon; and the first point to be decided on, was whether Mr. Barlow's offices should cease; and secondly, what should be done in that case, with the presents already purchased. We were both of opinion, and for many reasons, that it was advisable he should notwithstand-

ing, proceed, and take the presents with him. If any errors had been committed at Algiers, and which it is possible to rectify, we knew he would be able to do it; and we were also persuaded, that in other respects, a trip to that coast, whereby he would be enabled to gain an insight into the policy of those powers, could not otherwise than be of great advantage to the United States. Upon this principle I have asked his permission to intimate to you his willingness to accept the office of consul for Algiers, to which he has consented; and which I now do in a confidence, that no person can be found willing to accept that trust, in whom it can be so happily vested; and in which opinion I doubt not Colonel Humphreys will readily unite. Mr. Barlow leaves this place upon the plan above stated, in the course of a few days, and with the presents in question; and for further particulars respecting this interesting concern, I beg to refer you to Colonel Humphreys, who will, doubtless, be more particular in his details.

Since my last Pichegru has also crossed the Rhine, and taken Manheim, and in consequence whereof, the siege is more closely pressed on Mayence. Since my last too, the Belgic is united by a decree to this Republic; in addition to which the mission of Mr. Monneron to England, ostensibly for an exchange of prisoners, but perhaps for other objects, is the only circumstance which merits attention.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

JA.S MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING, ACTING.]

PARIS, October 20th, 1795.

SIR,—The breach which I lately intimated to you had taken place between several of the Sections of this city, and the Convention, respecting two decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, and whose object was to transfer from the Convention so many of its members, as would constitute two thirds of the legislature of the new government, continued daily to widen afterwards till at length all hope of amicable compromise was gone. A final appeal, therefore, was made to arms; and which took place on the 5th instant (13th Vendemiaire) and in which the Convention prevailed. The details of this contest, though very interesting, are not lengthy. In the morning of the 5th, a force was marshalled out by the revolting sections upon their respective parades, in concert, and under officers already engaged, and who led it on by different avenues towards the national palace; so that by four in the evening the Convention was nearly invested on every side. Within the garden of the Thuilleries and around the national palace were collected the troops destined for the defence of the Convention; and which were advantageously posted with cannon to guard the several avenues by which approaches might be made. The members remained within the hall, prepared to await the issue of the day. The disposition, therefore, was that of besiegers against besieged, and which grew out of the disparity of numbers on each side; for on that of the Conven-

tion, taking the whole together, there were not more than 6,000; whilst on the side of the sections, there were in activity at least 10,000, and a still greater body in arms, which was supposed to be on the same side, or at least neutral. The countenance too of the parties bespoke a strong sympathy for their respective situations; that of those without exhibited an air of cheerfulness and alacrity, and which nothing but the confidence of success could inspire, whilst that of those within was dejected and melancholy. The action commenced a little after five in the evening by the advance of the troops of the sections, and ended about ten by their retreat. Wherever they approached they were repulsed by heavy discharges of artillery and musketry, which ranged and cleared the streets of their columns, as soon as presented. For some time, towards the close, the contest was sustained on the part of the sections, from the windows of the neighbouring houses; and from whence, perhaps, more of the troops were slain than from any other quarter. The loss on either side is unknown, and perhaps will continue so, and the reports are so various and contradictory, that they furnish but little data whereon to found a conjecture. Judging, however, from what I saw of the disposition of the troops who were presented at the corner of streets, or when advancing by the head of the column only, and of the time and nature of the action, which was by intervals, I cannot think that more than 500 were killed and wounded on both sides; though some of the reports make it as many thousands. It was gen-

erally understood by the assailants, that little or no opposition would be made, and that two of the regular regiments, in particular, were on their side, and that they would so declare themselves when the crisis approached. But in this they were mistaken; for all those troops behaved with great bravery and intrepidity, acquiting themselves as they had done before on the Rhine; having been drawn from the army of the north. Indeed, the probability is, the report was only circulated to inspire the troops of the sections with confidence, and to produce a suitable impression on the citizens of Paris in general. Many circumstances occurred in the course of the commotion, to countenance this opinion, of which the strongest is that, although it lasted until about 10 at night, yet by the citizens generally it was abandoned or feebly supported after the first onset, and repulse which immediately followed; and after which it was sustained principally by those who were really and truly the parties to it; for as such the great bulk of those who were in the rank ought not to be considered. This opinion is likewise countenanced by a train of incidents which attended this movement, from 10 at night to its close, and which was about 12 the next day. The troops of the Convention kept their ground all night, being unwilling to press as far as they might have done, the advantage gained; since it appeared, that by such pressure they might slay more of their countrymen, but not gain a more complete victory. On the other hand, the troops of the sections filed off gradually in small parties, as the darkness of the

[illegible] or other circumstances favoured: till finally none were left, except those who were not properly of that description. By the morn every thing was tranquil, as if nothing had passed. At the entrance of every street you saw the pavement taken up, and waggons and other impediments obstructing the passage; but not a centinel was to be seen. The only armed force remaining in opposition to the Convention, was of the section of Lepelletier, consisting of a few hundred only, and which had in part retired and was retiring to its commune as a place of retreat, rather than of defence. But now the scene began to change and exhibit to view precisely the reverse of what was seen the day before,—the besieged becoming the besiegers: for by this time the troops of the Convention were advancing towards the commune of this section, under the command of Barras, who had commanded formerly on the great epoch of the 9th Thermidor, and of Berruyer, who made regular approaches and by different routes, till finally this corps was completely surrounded. A peremptory summons was then sent to it to surrender, and which was immediately obeyed, by laying down their arms and submitting to the will of the conquerors; and thus was this movement crushed; the authority of the Convention vindicated, and Paris restored to complete tranquillity, and within less than 24 hours after the action commenced.

Such was the order, and such the issue of this contest: A contest, in many respects, the most interesting and critical that I have yet witnessed, and

which promised, had the assailants succeeded, not perhaps essentially to impede or vary the direct course of the revolution ; but, most probably, to involve the nation in a civil war ; open a new scene of carnage more frightful than any yet seen, and deluge the country by kindred arms with kindred blood. In this view the character and object of the movement, on the part of the insurgents, merit some attention.

You have already seen that the decrees above mentioned were the ostensible, if not the real, cause of this controversy, and these you have. But to enable you to form a just estimate of its merits in other respects, and thereby of the probable views of the insurgents, it will be necessary for me to state other facts, and which preceded the final appeal to arms. These decrees, as you likewise know, were submitted with the constitution to the people, and according to a report of the convention by them adopted. But the verity of this report, of which I herewith send you a copy, was denied by the sections. By the report, however, you will perceive that the names of the departments voting for and against the decrees, were published some time since, and to which it may be added, that no department or commune has since complained ; that the statement given of its vote was untrue. Still a doubt arises upon it, admitting that a majority of those who voted, was in favour of the decrees, whether those who did vote for them constituted a majority of French citizens entitled to vote, and upon which I cannot yet positively decide. The sections affirm the contrary, and likewise contend,

that all who did not vote ought to be counted against the decrees. It is probable that some of the communes, foreseeing a storm gathering from that source, did not choose to vote for or against them, and therefore evaded the question by design, and it is certain that in others, it was understood by the people, that the question was taken upon the constitution and the decrees together; for latterly this was notified to the convention by several who had voted for the decrees, and particularly Nantes, to prevent a misapprehension of what their real intention was. I send you, however, the several papers which illustrate this point, and by which you will be enabled to form as correct an opinion on it, as present lights will admit: Observing further, that the report made by the convention respecting the decrees, was made, as you will perceive, at the same time with that upon the constitution; and that another report, containing a complete detail of the proceedings of every commune, is making out for the satisfaction of the community at large, and which was commenced by order of the Convention, immediately after the first one was rendered. It is to be wished that this had been some time since published; but when it is recollected that the publication must contain the proceedings of upwards of 7000 primary assemblies, many of which are, perhaps, lengthy; impartial people will perceive, that it could not be soon done, especially when it is also recollected, that the whole of the interval since the order was given, has been a time of unusual fermentation and trouble.

Under these circumstances, the electoral assemblies were to meet, and the day of meeting was not distant. The decrees, and the evidence of their adoption were before France, and would, of course, be before these assemblies: Nor were the electors bound by any legal penalty to regard them, if they thought they were not adopted, or even disapproved them. The presumption, therefore, was (and especially if they discredited the report of the convention) that every assembly, whose constituents voted against the decrees, would disregard them; and, rejecting the two thirds of the present Convention, vote for whom they pleased; leaving it to those who were elected, by the several departments, to the legislature of the new government, whether they were entirely new men, or partly such, and partly of the Convention,—according to the mode that each department might adopt, to settle the point among themselves, and with the Convention, who should constitute the legislature of that government; or whether the whole proceeding should be declared void, and a new election called for; and which, in that event, would most probably have been the case. But the party opposed to the Convention, preferred a different series of measures, whereby to forward its views; the details whereof, so far as I have any knowledge of them, I will now communicate.

The primary assemblies were by law, to meet on the 10th of Fructidor, and dissolve on the 15th. In general, however, those of Paris prolonged their sitting beyond the term appointed; and many of them declared their sessions permanent, and exhibited, in

other respects, a tone of defiance and great animosity towards the existing government. Finally, however, the primary assemblies were dissolved; and after which the sections of Paris, to whom the same spirit was now communicated, became the channel, or rather the instruments, of the same policy; many of whom likewise declared their sessions permanent, and assumed, in other respects a tone equally unfriendly and menacing towards the Convention. The section of Lepelletier in particular, which is in the centre of Paris, and which always was, and still is, the theatre of its greatest gaiety and dissipation, took the lead in these councils. At one time it presented an address to the Convention, copiously descanting upon the horrors of terrorism, demanding that those who were called terrorists, should not only be inhibited the right of voting, but forthwith punished; and that the troops in the neighborhood of Paris should be stationed further off, although there were then in the neighborhood not more than 3,000 foot, and 600 horse, and which were there for six months before. At another time it placed, by its own arrêté, under the safeguard of the primary assemblies, all those who had delivered their opinions in those assemblies, and invited the other sections of Paris to form a meeting of 48 commissioners, to declare to all France the sentiments of this commune upon the state of affairs in the present juncture. On the 10th of Vendémiaire, this section resolved that a meeting of the electoral corps should be held at the Theatre Français on the next day, and admonished the other sections to a like

concurrence ; as likewise to escort the electors to the place of rendezvous, and protect the assembly whilst sitting, with an armed force, if necessary. A partial meeting was in consequence held there, and which continued its sitting for some time after a proclamation was issued by the Convention, ordering the electors to disperse. Indeed it was not without great difficulty that this proclamation was read before the door of that assembly. An armed force was then ordered out under General Menou, the commandant of the guard, to support the proclamation ; but they were gone before he arrived. On the 12th, this section issued other inflammatory arrêtés ; and on the night of the 12th, another fruitless attempt was made by the government to surround the commune of this section, and secure its members ; for which failure, Gen! Menou, who withdrew the troops after he had surrounded it, was degraded, and the command transferred to Barras. On the 13th, the catastrophe took place and ended as I have already stated.

That the party in question meant to subvert the revolution, and restore the ancient monarchy, and that the destruction of the Convention was the first step in the train of those measures, which were deemed necessary to accomplish it, cannot be doubted. A slight attention only to the above facts sufficiently demonstrates the truth of the assertion in all its parts. Even in the primary assemblies, a ground was taken incompatible with the present system : Some free latitude, it is true, the people have a right to take in those assemblies, however limited or special the ob-

ject may be, upon which they are convened to decide. But as soon as the sections took the same ground, acting in harmony with the electoral corps, in contempt of the law, and in defiance of the convention, the case was altered. From that moment rebellion was announced in form, and the sword of civil war was completely unsheathed; nor could it be restored whilst the convention survived, or without a counter-revolution, otherwise than by reducing the revolted sections to order. Fortunately the latter was the issue, and in consequence whereof every thing has since progressed as the friends of the revolution have wished. The revolted sections were immediately afterwards disarmed, and without opposition, and the electoral corps is now legally convened (those of it who have not, in dread of punishment, made their escape) and with a disposition to be more observant of the decrees, and accommodating to the existing government.

But, if this party had succeeded in its attack upon the convention, what would have followed? Would it likewise have succeeded in the other object, to which this was only a step? A conjectural answer can only be given to a suppositious case. My opinion then is, that although the impression would have been a deep one, yet the ultimate issue would have been the same. It is said, and perhaps with truth, that in case the attack succeeded, it was intended the electoral corps should immediately assemble, and place itself, in some measure, at the head of France. The overthrow of the Convention would have left the

nation without a government or head, to influence public measures; and in which case, this corps, being a legal one, and at the head of this great City, would have had stronger pretensions to the public attention, than any whatever. 'T is not, however, to be presumed, that it would have assumed the reins of government; but it would have doubtless undertaken to admonish, and the probability is, that in such a state of things, its admonition would have been regarded. With this view, it is believed that the crisis was brought on, at that precise point of time, before the meeting of the electoral assemblies, to admit, in the interval, the communication of the event (in case it were perpetrated) to all France, without allowing to the people sufficient time to recover from the dismay and confusion into which they would be thereby thrown. In such a state of things this corps might have made a great impression upon the whole nation, supported as it would appear to be, by all Paris; and as it really would be, at least to that stage, by a considerable portion. At the head of this corps was already placed the old ci-devant Duke of Nivernois, —a man not without some literary merit, and whose character had been so free from enormity, and his temper so dormant, that, although imprisoned, and in the list of those who are deemed, under what is called the reign of Robespierre, a fit subject for the guillotine, yet he survived that reign, and received his life as a boon from those who were now threatened with destruction. It was said he declined the presidency; but it is also believed, that his modest disqualification

was more the effect of an accurate calculation of chances in the great game they were playing, than of principle: and of course, that if the blow succeeded, he might be prevailed on to serve. A majority of the corps, many of whom were likewise ci-devant nobles, was believed to be of the same principles. The nation would therefore have beheld, on the one side, the Convention overthrown, perhaps massacred, and whose members were, in general, known to be attached to the revolution: and on the other, the electoral corps, with this person at its head, and which it would, of course, conclude was decidedly of opposite political principles: the latter advanced forward upon the ruin of the former, and in some sort possessed of the reins of government. Surely no opportunity more favourable to the views of the royalists could have been sought, than this would have presented. How they meant to improve it, had fortune placed them in that situation, is not known, nor is it probable it will be: for it is to be presumed, that whatever the plan was, admitting there was one already formed for such an event, it had been concerted by the leaders only, and was not to be unfolded, until after the sections were thus far plunged into the same atrocity with themselves. There were two ways by which this opportunity might have been improved: the first, by an immediate declamation in favour of royalty; the second, by electing their own deputies, and inviting the other departments to do the same, for the purpose of putting the constitution in motion. Had the first been adopted, the nation

would have, doubtless, have been greatly confounded, and in the moment of dismay, the royalists would, most probably, have come forward, and the patriots lain quiet. Soon, however, in Paris herself, symptoms of discontent would have been seen, and perhaps even in some of those sections which were foremost in the late revolt; many of whose citizens had joined the opposition from principle, in respect to the right of suffrage; some because they had been persecuted, or censured as terrorists, and only because they were patriots; and others because they doubted the political integrity of the present house, and wished it changed. All of these would have been struck with consternation, when they heard that a king was proclaimed, and would have looked back with horror at the scene through which they had passed.

By this time too, some one of the armies would have been seen advancing towards Paris, and which would most probably have had little to do: For I am persuaded, that as soon as the citizens recovered from the extravagance into which they had been betrayed, they would be among the first to fall upon their betrayers. Had the second been adopted, it is probable it would have secured the elections in favour of the royalists; the decrees would have been of course rejected; nor would any of the present members have been re-elected. Soon, however, this would have been seen by the people, and being seen, half the danger would have been provided against. In the memory of those who were friendly to the revolution, (and the catalogue of its friends must be a long one,

counting those only whose fathers and sons were slaughtered in its defence on the frontiers,) the destruction of the Convention, under whose banners they had bled, would form a moral cause that would hang heavy on the shoulders of the subsequent administration. The manner of the suffrage, though in form free, would be deemed an usurpation, and the slightest deviation afterwards become a signal for revolt. If they used their power with violence, the same effect would be produced as if a king were immediately proclaimed, and if they used it with moderation they might perhaps prevent the calamity of another crisis; and whiling away in office the time allotted by the Constitution, be enabled in the interim, so far to efface the memory of what had passed, as to secure to themselves afterwards a retreat which would exempt them from punishment. But in neither case would they be able to restore the ancient monarchy. You will observe that my reasoning is founded upon a belief that the army is sound; that the great bulk of the citizens of Paris are so likewise; and that the farmers or cultivators in general, if not decidedly in favor of the revolution, though in my opinion they are, are at least, not against it; and which belief, though perhaps erroneous, is the result of an attentive observation to such facts and circumstances as have appeared to me to merit attention.

But you will ask, if Paris is on the side of the revolution, how happened that such a force was formed there against the Convention, whilst so small a one was marshalled on its side? Let us first establish

facts and then reason from them. Paris consists of 48 sections; and of 8 only were actually in arms against the Convention, three for it, and the others neutral. Of those too, who were sent by the eight sections, it is presumable from the peremptory manner of their retreat, and the ease with which they were afterwards disarmed, as likewise by their uniform declarations, at the time and since,—that the greater number did not expect to be led against the Convention, or if they did, that they went with reluctance; so that, the real force which marched out for the purpose of actual hostility was in my opinion, inconsiderable: And this too, it is said, was in part composed of adventurers from other quarters, and in some instances even of foreigners. Still however, there was an actual revolt by those sections, and at best a neutrality on the part of the others; the three who declared themselves for the Convention excepted. How account for this? That the royalists had gained the preponderance in some few of the sections, and particularly that of Lepelletier, is certain. But that this was not the case with many is presumable. It is well known that the inhabitants of Paris in general, wished to get rid of their present deputies, and for reasons heretofore explained. The opposition to the decrees, therefore, may be thus accounted for; and with the greater propriety, because it is certain they were opposed and even by the royalists, upon republican principles; the unalienable right of suffrage, *&c.* and by which an impression was made in the primary assemblies upon the audience, and thence gradually

extended throughout the city. In the primary assemblies too every person was allowed to speak; and it happened, that among the royalists there were some good speakers, and who by taking popular ground, engrossed for the time the public attention; by means whereof they were enabled to practise more extensively upon the credulity of the less enlightened of their countrymen, than they were aware of. It often happens when a collision takes place between friends, and even upon a trivial cause, that one act of irritation begets another, till finally the parties become irreconcilable. How much more easy was it then for artful men, at the present moment, to prevail over the ignorant, and seduce them into error; especially when it is known that the latter already wished a change; that they thought they had a right to make it, and of which right they could not be deprived without the sacrifice of their liberty, in whose cause they had already so long contended, and so greatly suffered.

How explain the extraordinary phenomenon, why the very sections, who on the 4th of Prairial were on opposite sides, should now shift their ground,—so as that those who then supported the convention, should now be against it, and those who opposed should now be for it? Taking the convention as the standard, it remains only in any case to explain the motive of such party as wanders from it; for *that* circumstance alone creates doubt, and of course alone requires explanation. No one will ask why such a party supports the convention, because there can be no motive for such

an enquiry. In some cases a party yielding such support may have less honourable motives for it than another party had. I think I have seen such myself: But in no case can the object be a counter-revolutionary one. To this enquiry, then, in this view, I have already given a satisfactory answer, at least so far as I am able to do it; for I have already explained what I deemed in general the cause of the aberration of the sections upon the present occasion, as I did upon the former one; that of the Faubourg St. Antoine and whose present conducts warrants the opinion then given upon that head.

But how happened it, that so many of the disaffected were chosen into the electoral corps, as to give the royalists a preponderance there? How could a a people attached to the revolution commit the care of it to those who were its foes, especially to such as, by their station and character, were universally known to be such? This touches a subject extremely interesting; for it leads to facts over which a veil has yet been thrown, but to which history will doubtless do justice; and in which case it will present to view a scene of horror, in some respects, not perhaps less frightful than that which was exhibited under the reign of terror. Behind the curtain, as it were, for it has made but little noise in several of the departments, the terrible scourge of terror has shifted hands, and latterly been wielded by the royalists; who, beginning with the subaltern, and perhaps wicked agents of the former reign, had persecuted and murdered many of the soundest patriots, and best of men. To

such a height has this evil risen, and so general was the imputation of terrorism, that in certain quarters the patriots in general were not only discouraged, but in a great measure depressed. It is affirmed to be a fact, by those who ought to know, and who merit belief, that in some of those quarters, and even where the preponderance in point of numbers was greatly in their favour, none attended the primary assemblies; and that in others a few only attended, and who took no part in the proceedings. This, therefore, will account why the royalists took the lead in those assemblies, and why so many of them were chosen into the electoral corps.

But by what strange vicissitude of affairs was this effect produced? How could it happen under an administration unfriendly to royalty? In truth, the explanation is distinctly marked by preceding events, and has been in part unfolded, in preceding communications. Terrorism, or what was then called so, the persecution of the royalists, had gone to such a length, that it became indispensably necessary to end it. To this object, therefore, the whole force of the government was directed, and with effect, for it was accomplished. But in striking at terrorism, perhaps by the unguarded manner of the blow, perhaps by those consequences which are inseparable from such vibrations, and which I deem the most likely,—an elevation was given for a while to the opposite extreme. The terrorism of that day was the excess of the passion for liberty, but it was countenanced by those in office, as necessary in their judgment, to bring

about the revolution; nor were its acts displayed in private assassination. On the contrary, they were sanctified by public judgments and public executions. The most culpable, therefore, were those who expiated for their crimes on the 9th Thermidor. But with others in general, and even where the excess was criminal, the intention was otherwise. At that point, therefore, which discriminated between the vicious extravagancies of the moment, and the spirit of patriotism itself, should the scale have been suspended. And there by the law it was suspended; for I do not recollect any act of the Convention which passed beyond it. Special outrages were, it is true, specially corrected; but even in these cases I do not know an instance where the correction was disproportioned to the offence. But so nice was the subject upon which they had to act, and so delicate is the nerve of human sensibility, that it was perhaps impossible for the government under existing circumstances, to moderate its rigour towards the royalists, without giving, to a certain degree, an encouragement to royalty. In this view, therefore, it is to be presumed the late event will produce a beneficial effect; for as the views of the royalists were completely unmasked, and defeated, and which were always denied to exist, until they were thus unmasked, —it cannot otherwise than tend to open the eyes of the community in that respect, and in the degree to repress the arrogant spirit of royalty. To your judgment, however, these facts and observations, in respect to the late movement, are respectfully submitted.

I have lately been honoured with your several favours of May 29th, June the 1st and 7th, and of July the 2d, 8th, 14th, 21st, 29th and 30th; all of which came to hand almost at the same time, and generally by the route of England; and to which I will certainly pay the utmost attention. As, however, this letter has already gone to an unreasonable length, and especially as I wish you to be correctly informed of the character and fate of the movement in question, I think it best to despatch this immediately, reserving a more particular reply to those favours for a future communication. For the present, however, permit me to add, that as yet no complaint has been made to me against the treaty; nor have I heard any thing from the committee on the subject, since the application requesting information, in what light they were to view the reports respecting it; and which was made soon after the treaty was concluded. If any thing is intended to be said, I think it will not be said until after the new government is organized; nor then, until after it is known that the treaty is ratified; and in which case I have reason to apprehend I shall hear from them on the subject. I trust, however, let the event in that respect, or the opinion which the Committee may entertain of that event, be what it may, I shall find that the same amicable and dispassionate councils still prevail towards us, that have been shewn for some time past. To inculcate which disposition, not only by the documents and lights derived from you, but by such others as my own imperfect experience, and often too wandering judg-

ment, have supplied has been, and be assured will continue to be, equally the object of my most earnest wishes, and undeviating efforts.

With great respect and esteem I have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient and humble servant,

Ja^{s} Monroe.

P. S. October 25th As the vessel by which this will be forwarded will not sail until a gentleman, who is now here, arrives at Havre, I have kept the letter with me for the purpose of adding to it what might immediately happen before his departure. On the day after to-morrow, the new government is to convene, and the prospect is now favourable that it will then convene, and precisely on the ground stated in the preceeding letter. Some symptoms were latterly seen which gave cause for apprehension, that the expiring moments of the convention would be moments of great agony and convulsion. Some denunciations and counter-denunciations were made, proceeding from causes connected with the late movement; but happily they are over, without producing any serious effect. A commission of 5 was appointed to make a supplemental report, respecting that movement, and it was expected by many it would end in a proposal to annul the proceedings of several of the departments, whose primary assemblies were said to be under constraint by the royalists, and probably also in the arrestation of several deputies; but that commission has freed every one from uneasiness on that account, by a report just made; and which proposes only some new provisions for the trial of offend-

ers in that movement, and others in several of the departments, who have committed atrocities of various kinds, under the pretext of punishing the terrorists. Every moment must be deemed critical, in the existing circumstances of this country; being at the eve of a great revolution, a transition from one government to another; and especially when it is known, that there is a party, not despicable in point of numbers, and less so in activity and talents, always ready to seize every incident that occurs to throw things into confusion; and which party is connected, not only with the emigrants abroad, but with the surrounding powers, by whom the necessary means are furnished for the purpose. But yet it seems as if the Convention would retain its strength to the last moment of its existence, and transmit its powers unimpaired to its successors. The decrees are said to be universally observed, and the leading members of both sides of the house are in general re-elected; these are to elect the others, so as to make up the two-thirds of the new government.

Lately Jourdan received a check on the other side of the Rhine, and which occasioned his falling back to the Rhine, upon which river both his and the army of Pichegru are posted. The cause of this is not distinctly known; but certain it is, that the deputy of the military section of the Committee of public safety has been since arrested, upon a suspicion of treachery; as are three others, upon a charge of treasonable correspondence with their enemies; but with what propriety I do not pretend to determine. 'T is worthy

of remark, that it was known in England and in Basle before it happened, that there would be a movement here at the time it happened; at which time too, the count d'Artois landed from England upon the Isle Dieu, near the French coast, opposite the Vendée, where he still is.

A report was yesterday made to the Convention, of an important advantage gained in a rencounter in the Mediterranean, in which the French took a ship of the line and damaged greatly two others; and likewise took 14 merchant ships richly laden and estimated at an enormous sum. Two other advantages in other quarters are spoken of, still more signal than this, but not by authority.

Moneron is returned, but whether by order of the French government (as I suspect, and in consequence of the fortunate issue of the late movement) or the failure of his mission, be it what it might, is uncertain. Be assured if Mr. Jay's treaty is ratified, it will excite great discontent here. Of this, however, I shall be able to speak with more certainty, after the new government is organized.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Oct. 24, 1795.

DEAR SIR,—I wrote you yesterday with a view of sending the letter by the same vessel which takes the articles we purchased for you—but as an excellent opportunity, that of Mr. Murray,[1] a very worthy

[1] G. W. Murray, a merchant of New York.

young man, offers, I shall avail of it not only to send the letter of yesterday but to add something to it. Perhaps these articles may likewise be sent by the same opportunity, altho' the vessel sails for New York.

I herewith enclose you the copy of a letter to Mr. R—— in ans'r to one of his—as likewise of my correspondence with Mr. Jay relative to his treaty, with such comments as I deemed it necessary to make to Mr. R. on that gentl'n's conduct in relation to that transaction. I sent you some considerable time since by Mr. Perkins of Boston a similar communication, & hope it has reached you; or rather I sent by him what respects Mr. Jay, having previously sent a copy of the other paper. My object was and is to put in y'r possession facts which may be useful in a certain view of things, perhaps to the publick & certainly to myself. So far as it respects Mr. R. the object is at an end for 'tis said he is withdrawn, but if he were not I have no reason to expect an attack from that quarter—as it respects the other however it may yet be useful. In any event you will become acquainted with another instance of the duplicity & finesse of that man, and find, at least I think so, how desirous he was of embarking my reputation here in support of his, and with a view of sacrificing it, in case his merited to be sacrific'd, and of which I had little doubt even at that time. I endeavored to act for the best advantage of my country under the circumstances existing & without compromitting myself in behalf of what he had done or might do: and I now find the

benefit of that policy both in respect to the state of things here & with you.

I most sincerely hope the President has not & will not ratify this treaty, for if he does, I greatly fear the consequences here. From what I can learn we shall be deemed rather than otherwise in the scale of the coalis'd powers—and under such an impression it will require moderation in any gov't to withhold its resentment. How cautious, therefore, sho'd the President be in hazarding a step of this kind at the present moment, when the slightest circumstance is sufficient to excite indignation, & even to part the two countries for ever. If the treaty is ratified, y'r situation is a difficult one: but even in that case do you not think the seizure on the part of Engl'd of our vessels since, a sufficient ground to declare it broken & void? Perhaps a distinction may be taken that it was ratified after the seizure began, & of course that such seizure ceased to be a cause. But this is not sound, for if the President has ratified, I presume his motive was the advice of the Senate & w'h was given before the seizure was known. To that act therefore sho'd his ratification be referred & with it be dated. So that the Congress will be at liberty to act upon the seizure as a subsequent thing. In short you have a thousand grounds upon w'h you may get rid of this treaty, and I sho'd be satisfied with the slightest of these had I a vote to give in the case. But if the treaty is rejected, say its advocates, you have war, & to w'h I reply that if so our dilemma is an unhappy one in consequence of that treaty.—To be plundered with impunity was

a hard thing, but to bear this treaty also, altho' we universally deem it a calamity, merely because we fear Engl'd is still worse. Surely that nation will not insist on such terms. She has too much regard for us, for Messr's Jay, Hamilton & Comp'y, if not for our country to push us to such an extremity, especially when she knows we are so averse to fighting. But I think the conclusion by no means a sound one; for I cannot think it possible, let her menaces be what they may, that in the present state of things Engl'd will make war on us. We see that she is greatly exhausted, and it is the universal report of Americans & others from Engl'd, that there is no calamity yet to befall her which she dreads more than a war with us. Satisfied have I always been that, by a decent but yet determined pressure, we might not only obtain what we wanted & were entitled to, but likewise do it without war; indeed I have tho't it the surest way to avoid war. Still I am of this opinion.

The French have obtained a naval victory or rather advantage in the Mediterranean, in which a ship of the line was taken, & two others greatly damaged (indeed 't is said they are run on shore) with 17 vessels, merchantmen richly laden under their convoy. Two other similar advantages yet more signal are spoken of, but not authenticated. The late commotion was a terrible one, but it ended on the next day when every thing was perfectly quiet & in w'h state it has since remained: some denunciations have followed but they have vanished in smoke, as yet—two cases only excepted—you will be aston-

ished to hear that all Paris is disarmed, and by ab't 5000 men, & you will of course conclude that the sense of its citizens are for the measure, or it co'd not be done. Indeed it was by a decree only—for under it they disarmed themselves. If they were not for it the situation of the republick wo'd be an unpleasant one, for otherwise the citizens wo'd be deemed ag'nst the revolution, & w'h is certainly (I speak of a great majority) not the case.

I write now in the evening of the 24—on the 27 the new gov't assembles, & as every moment of the interval is of importance I take occasion to let you know that all is yet well & promises to be so. For a few days past there was a prospect of some terrible denunciation of Julien ag'nst Boissy D'Anglas & others upon a suspicion that the latter had fav'd the late commotion & to-day it was expected they wo'd be made in form as a Com^ee^ was appointed to rep't supplementally respecting that commotion—the report was made by Julien & I attended & heard it—but it contained nothing of the kind—indeed it was conciliatory—I know B. D'Anglas and think him true to the revolution, as I likewise think Julien, whom I also know—After this I am persuaded nothing will intervene,—& that the new gov't will commence under favorable auspices.

An American just from London tells me that Mr. Pitt was at Deal & along the Eng'h coast during the late troubles here—and just before the C't D'Artois was landed in the Isle Dieu close by the French coast opposite the Vendee where he now is—Very sincerely I am y'r friend JA^s^ MONROE.

P. S. I think it probable an attempt may be made to vindicate Mr. Jay ag'nst the imputations raised ag'nst him for his misconduct in the negotiation with Gardoqui. If such attempt is made it will be made by a publication of his reports in the office of State which contain his justification: but the true view is in the secret journal of Congress & which ought likewise to be publish'd in case the others are. There is no objection to publishing the journal (or so much as respects this topic) w'h does not apply to the publication of the reports with equal force: and to publish the one and not the other will be a partizan manœuvre not very honorable to those who do it. They were in the Senate (I mean the reports) when I left it, & Mr. K[1] wanted them published, but I wanted the others also, & this put a stop to the business—I beg of you to attend to this for me, & give suitable notice thereof to my friends in that body.

The present is indeed an awful moment here; the change of the gov't & the momentary suspension of aff'rs makes it greatly so, especially when it is known, as it is, that foreign powers are, if not at the bottom, yet deeply concerned in every mov'ment. Gardoqui when he returned to Spain settled a secret service account for six hundred thousand dollars laid out in America; and a short time after our peace a man (an ancient Tory) but a friend of his, & who came from France for the purpose offer'd Mr. Hichburn five thousand pounds sterling from Lord D—r[2] not to in-

[1] Rufus King.

[2] Dorchester. The "ancient Tory," probably Dr. John Connolly. Cf. Green's Spanish Conspiracy: a review of early Spanish movements in the South-west.

fluence his opinion but presuming it w'd be right as a proof of friendship and who likewise told him similar tokens were intended for others whom he named to him also afterwards. The first fact depends on the authority of Littlepage who told it to J. Barlow some time since on his return from Spain whither he was sent by the King of Poland. Barlow adds that Littlepage appeared to know nothing of the negotiation which had been on foot in America. The other fact is from the person himself. The French have received a check upon the Rhine w'h has caused a retrograde manœuvre to the Rhine. It appears that the neutrality of some of the Eup. powers with whom peace was made, was broken by the opposite party & by wh. a wing of the French army was turned & w'h occasioned this mov'ment. 'T is not deemed a serious thing; two deputies, however, one of whom was in the military sect'n of the Committee of P. S. & the other suspected likewise of unf'r practices with their enemy, are arrested, as likewise is General Miranda.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING ACTING.]

PARIS, November 5th, 1795.

SIR,—On the 27th ultimo, the convention ended its career, by declaring that its powers ceased; and immediately afterwards the installation of the new government began in the same hall, by a verification of the powers of its deputies, and their distribution into two branches, according to the mode prescribed

in the Constitution; and which was completed on that and the succeeding day. It was found upon inspection, that the decrees heretofore noticed, were universally obeyed; and that of the two-thirds of its legislative branches, who were to be taken from among the members of the Convention, more than a majority were elected by the department; so that the duty imposed on those who were elected, of supplying the deficiency by their own suffrage, became proportionably more easy and less objectionable. This, therefore, was immediately executed by ballot; and and after which the interior organization of each branch followed, and which took up a day or two only; then the members of the Directoire, or executive, were chosen, and which was done on the 31st ultimo, and whereby the new government was completely installed.

When I observe that the scene, which was exhibited upon this great occasion, resembled in many respects what we see daily acted on our side of the Atlantic, in our national and state assemblies, you will have a better idea of the tranquillity and serenity which reigned throughout, than I can otherwise describe.—Nor shall I be accused of an unbecoming partiality, if I draw from the increasing similitude in theirs and our political institutions, the most favourable hopes of the future prosperity and welfare of this Republic.

The adoption of a new constitution, founded upon the equality of human rights, with its legislative powers distributed into two branches, and other improvements in the executive and judiciary depart-

ments, though still perhaps imperfect, yet certainly far beyond what past experiments here gave reason to expect,—is an event of great importance, not only to France, but perhaps to mankind in general. Its complete inauguration too assures us that its merits will be tried. Though, indeed, under the existing circumstances of a war with the neighbouring powers, who are interested in its overthrow; of a strong party within, incessantly labouring to promote the same object; together with the derangement of the finances and other embarrassments which were inseparable from the difficulties they had to encounter;—the experiment ought not to be called a fair one. If, however, it does succeed, and the republican system is preserved here, notwithstanding the various and complicated difficulties which opposed its establishment, and still shake its foundation,—it will certainly furnish a complete refutation of all those arguments, which have in all ages and nations been urged against the practicability of such a government, and especially in old countries.

Reveillere Lepeaux, Ruebell, Sieyes, Le Tourneur and Barras are elected into the Directoire; and who are all distinguished for their talents, and integrity, as likewise their devotion to the revolution; a circumstance which not only furnishes reasonable ground whereon to estimate the principles of those who chose them, but which likewise tends essentially to give stability to the revolution itself.

I write you at present only to communicate this important event, and will hereafter, as heretofore,

keep you regularly apprized of what shall appear to me to merit communication.

I have the honour to be with great respect and esteem, Sir, your very obedient Ser[t]

Ja[s] Monroe.

P. S. Sieyes has declined accepting his seat in the Directoire, and Carnot is appointed in his stead. Mr. Fauchet has lately arrived, and as he appears to be extremely dissatisfied with Mr. Jay's treaty with G. Britain, and is apparently well received by his government, I doubt not his communications on that head will be attended to.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Paris, Novr. 18, 1795.

Dear Sir,—Your favor of the 26 of May did not reach me until lately, owing as I presume to its having been committed to some private hand and by whom it was retained to be delivered personally until that prospect was abandoned. I was extremely gratified by it as it led me into a society which is very dear to me & often uppermost in my mind. I have, indeed, much to reproach myself for not having written you and others of our neighbours more frequently, but I have relied much on you not only to excuse me personally, but to make my excuse to others, by assuring them how little of my time remains from publick & other duties, for those with whom by the strong claims of friendship I have a right to take liberties. Before this, however, you have doubtless recd. mine

of June last and wch. gave a short sketch of affrs. here, so that culpable as I am, still I am less so than I might have been.

I accept with great pleasure your proposal to forward my establishment on the tract adjoining you, in the expectation, however, that you will give yourself no further trouble in it than by employing for me a suitable undertaker who will receive from you the plan he is to execute, that you will draw on me for the money to pay him, & make my plantation one of the routes you take when you ride for exercise, at which time you may note how far the execution corresponds with the plan. With this view I shall look out for a model to be forwarded you as soon as possible, subjecting it to yr. correction, & give you full power to place my house orchards &c. where you please, and to draw on me by way of commencement for the sum of 1,000 dols. to be paid where you please 3 months after it is presented. If to be paid without this republick 't is probable the draft will be most easily disposed of in sterg. money. This sum is all I can answer in the course of the ensuing year calculating always on the possible contingence of a recall & upon which I have always calculated from the moment of my introduction into the Convention, & still calculate depending on the course of events on yr. side of the Atlantic. With this sum a suitable number of hands may be hired & oxen bought to draw the stone, which with you I prefer, put the ground in order &c. &c. to be in readiness to proceed with greater activity the year following. These hands

may plant the trees, enclose & sow the ground in grass which is laid off & destined for the buildings of which, however, you will best judge observing that Hogg be instructed to give occasional aids with the other hands when necessary. Believe me there is nothing about which I am more anxious than to hear that this plan is commenc'd and rapidly advancing, for be assured, admitting my own discretion is my only guide much time will not intervene before I am planted there myself. I have mentioned the proposal you are so kind as make me to Mr. Jones, but as 't is possible my letter may unfold that item in my private affrs. not to him, but to some of my good friends in a neighbouring country, as my official dispatches have those of a publick nature, I beg of you likewise to communicate it to him as of my wishes in that respect.

I have written La Motte & directed him to draw on me for what you owe him & have his answer saying he has drawn, for 3 or 4.00£ but yet his bill is not presented. I likewise think him an honest man and deserving more than a mere official attention. I found him on my arrival in arrestation not because he had committed any positive crime but because the whole commercial class had drawn upon it, & often not without cause, the suspicion of being unfriendly to the revolution, & which in his instance was increased by the circumstance of his having married an Engh. woman. He was, however, shortly afterwards set at liberty & since he has exercised his consular functions. I will also procure you the books & other

articles mentioned but shall not forward them till the spring for the reason you mention. I will likewise seek out those of yr. friends who have survived the storm, remind them of yr. inquiry after their welfare & apprise you of the result. A terrible storm, indeed, it has been & great its havoc especially among those in a certain sphere of life, but still I doubt not I shall find many have survived it among yr. friends.

I rejoice to hear that Short is to be our neighbour. By his last letter I am to expect him here in a week or two & with Mr. Pinckney, the latter having as I presume adjusted the affr. of the miss: & the boundaries. I suspect the relict of Mr. Rochfct. forms the attraction. If the Carters will take me for their paymaster for what lands they have for sale & fix a price which you approve I will most willingly purchase the whole. I have western lands in possession of Mr. Jones for a part of which only he has been offered £2000 Pennsa currency & which I shod. be happy to vest near me: an idea equally applicable to the case of Collé.

You have I presume seen the new constitution & will I doubt not concur with me that altho' defective when tested by those principles which the light of our hemisphere has furnished, yet it is infinitely superior to any thing ever seen before on this side of the Atlantic. The division of the legislature into two branches, one to consist of 500 & the other of half that number, will secure always in both due attention to the interest of the mass of the people, with adequate wisdom in each for all the subjects

that may occur. The mode of election, too, & the frequency of it in both branches seems to render it impossible that the Executive shod. ever gain such an influence in the legislature, as by combination, corruption, or otherwise, to introduce a system whereby to endanger the public liberty: whilst on the other hand the Executive by its numbers & permanence, one of 5 yielding his place to a successor annually only, seems in regard to this theatre, where the danger is always great & suspicion, of course, always at the height, well calculated to unite energy & system in its measures with the publick confidence, at the same time that it furnishes within itself a substantial guarantee in favor of the publick liberty. The judiciary too is better organized than heretofore. About 10 days past, the constitution was completely installed in all its branches & since each has been in the exercise of its respective functions. The effect which the change has produc'd is great indeed. The council of ancients occupies the hall lately held by the Convention, & the contrast which a tranquil body, in whose presence no person is allowed to wear his hat or speak loud, a body who have little to do, & who discuss that little with temper & manners, is so great when compared with the scene often exhibited by its predecessor, that the Spectators look on with amazement & pleasure. The other day a demand was made by the Directoire on the 500. for a sum of money & which was immediately granted & the bill in consequence sent to the 250, who upon examination discovered there was no appropriation of it & for that rejected

the bill. The Directoire then accommodated its demand to the article in the constitution as did likewise the council of 500 & whereupon the other council passed the bill. I mention this circumstance to shew the change in legislative proceedings whereby calm deliberation has succeeded a system which was neither calm nor deliberative. Since the govt. was organized, not more than two or three laws have passed & those of no great importance and the people go to rest of a night in tranquility consoling themselves with the grateful reflection, that now a strong impediment is opposed to the rage for legislation. They rejoice to find that their legislators have supplied the place of action by reflection. Under this govt. too the spirit of faction seems to be curbed. Formerly when a member of any note rose and denounced another, it put his life in hazard, let his merit or demerit be what it might. But latterly some denunciations were threaten'd in the 500, & to which the parties menac'd rose and demanded that their accusers shod. put in writing the allegations & sign them that they might prepare for & appear in defence, but this silenc'd the others, & thus tranquility seems to be established & confidence daily increasing.

The paroxysm which preceded the final dissolution of the convention & particularly that of the attack upon it on the 13 of Vendn. or of Octr you will have heard long before this reaches you. In a few words, however, I will give you a general idea of it. The change of the govt. or transmission of the powers of

govt. from one system to the other was a great experiment in the present state of affairs & which could not be made without some danger to the revolution; but yet such was the general solicitude to get rid of the revolutionary system that a refusal to make the experiment wod. likewise be attended with danger. All France seemed to call out for a stable government & this call was finally answer'd by presenting before the nation the constitution in question. But experience had shewn that each succeeding assembly had persecuted the members of the preceding one: a constituent especially was an object not less attractive of the rage of Rob. spr. than a ci-devant Bishop or even a chouan.[1] And reasoning from experience it was to be feared, that the deputies of the late Convention would be exposed in like manner to the resentment of those who took their places, & this creates in them a desire to keep their places & which was attempted by two decrees whose object was to provide for the restriction of 2/3^{ds} of the legislature of the new govt. from among the members of the Convention, according to a principle of the constitution wch. applies hereafter & requires an annual change of 1/3^{d} only, and which decrees were submitted with the constn. for the sanction of the people. By some of the primary assemblies these decrees were adopted & by other rejected: the Convention, however, reported & in my opinion with truth that the majority was for them & of course that they were obligatory on the Electoral assemblies. This was

[1] The brothers Cottereau or Chouan. *See* Thiers' *French Revolution*, iii., 34.

denied by the opponents to the decrees by whom a systematic effort was made to defeat them, first by newspaper discussion, next by section: arrets which defied the authority of the Convention, & finally by assembling in arms in great force to attack that body and which done on the day above mentioned.

I candidly think that this attack upon the Convention, as it failed, was of great utility to the revolution. The system of terror was carried to such a height by Robespierre & his associates, that in the vibration back which ensued, some danger seemed to threaten, not the overthrow of the revolution, but to put it a greater distance than there was otherwise reason to hope its happy termination; for when this vibration had gained its utmost point, it so happened that the govt. was to be transferred into other hands. In this stage, too, the royalists who were formerly persecuted more than was upon any principle justifiable, & in whose favor & upon that acct. a general sympathy was excited, & which was of course due to humanity & had no connection with their political principles, had gained an attention which under other circumstances wod. not have been shewn them. The probability, therefore, is that if the election had come on unaided by that incident, more than a majority of that description of people wod. have been thrown into the legislature. But as the attack failed, it produc'd in a great measure the opposite effect, for in consequence the decrees were not only strictly executed, but the former censure agnst. the royalists whose views were now completely unmasked, proportionally

revived; many of whom and among those some who were candidates for the legislature & with good prospects of success, took refuge in the neighbouring countries or the Vendée, according as circumstances favored their escape.

On the side of the Convention there were 3000 foot & 600 horse of Pichegru's army & abt. 1000 or 1200 the citizens of Paris (the latter of whom were honored by their opponents with the title of terrorists) and on the opposite side there were perhaps in activity twice that number, whilst the other citizens of Paris were neutral. The battle was short for as soon as the assailants saw that opposition was made, their numbers diminished & continued to diminish by battalions till finally none were left but those who were too marked in their characters to hope for concealment; and which latter partly surrendered in a body on the next day at noon to the number of abt. 500. In the contest 4 or 500 on both sides were killed and wounded. It was extremely complained of on the part of the assailants that the Convention accepted of the *terrorists*, that it suffered cannon to be used in its defense, since they, the assailants, had none or but few, & whereupon they urged that the fight was not a fair one. You will observe that all Paris was agnst. the decrees, 2 or 3 sections only excepted, & because as many of their own Deputies were heretofore cut off, they wod. be forc'd to elect their members from among those of the Convention belong'd to other departments, & because they did not like to choose even those of them who remained. This be-

ing the temper of the city in the commencement the royalists took advantage of it first by opposing the decrees & which they did with great address, contending for the unalienable right of suffrage which they said was thereby infringed & demanding wherefore had the good citizens of France fought & bled so freely, & otherwise suffered so much if they were now to be enslaved, a slavery too the more odious because it was imposed by those who had assumed the mask of patriotism? One step led on to another till finally recourse was had to arms.

Before this event I doubted whether foreign powers had much agency in the interior movements & conventions of this republick, but by it I was satisfied they had, for it was known in Engld. Hamburg & Balse before it happened that there wod. be a movement here at the time it took place: at which time, too, the Ct. d' Artois approached the court from Engld. & between whom and the authors of that movement in Paris & the Vendee there was obviously the utmost harmony of measures. Something of the kind is to be trac'd in several pending events but not so strongly marked, at least not to my knowledge as in the present case. Yet the ordeal thro' which France has passed and is passing in the establishment of a republican system is called an experiment of that system, whose convulsions are contrasted with the gloomy & sullen repose of the neighb'ring despotisms, by the enemies of republican govt. & to the disadvantage of this latter species of govt. so often does it happen by the decrees of a blind fatality, that

the authors of crimes not only succeed in exculpating themselves from the reproach they justly merit, but even in fixing the imputation of guilt upon the innocent.

The French were lately checked on the other side of the Rhine & which caused their retreat to the Rhine: but yet they hold the two posts of Manheim & Dusseldorph on the other side. 'T is thought some serious rencounters will take place there soon & wch. may produce a serious effect likewise upon the war with the Emperor and on the continent. The late organization of the Directoire by wch. men of real talents & integrity, & in the instances of Carnot & Barras of great military talents, are plac'd in it, the former of whom planned the last campaign, & the latter commanded the National Gds. in the great epoch of the 9th of Therr. when the tyranny of Robespierre was broken, and on the last event of the 13th of Vendre. is well calculated to secure a wise arrangement on the part of France.

In negotiation nothing has been lately done. Many negotiations were depending—they were doubtless suspended to wait the issue of the late elections & the organizatn. which ensued, in the hope on the part of the coalised powers that something wod. turn up from the struggles that were then expected to favor their views. But now that that prospect seems to be over 't is probable they will be commenc'd & peace their early offspring. An event which will be greatly promoted if Pichegru succeeds agnst. the Austrians, and still more so if his majesty of Engld. is agn. in-

timidated by the unfriendly grunts of his discontented & afflicted subjects. Unhappy old man![1] his reign has indeed been a reign of mourning & of sorrow to the world: for we trace upon its several stages in America, the East & in Europe no other vestiges but those which are marked by the blood of the innocent, who were slaughtered in all those various climes of the world & without regard to age, sex or condition. And yet we are told by many that he is a mild, an amiable and a piteous man, and that the govt. in which he presides & by means whereof these atrocities were perpetrated, is that model of perfection of which, thro' all antiquity, Cicero & Tacitus had alone formed only a faint idea, but with which the world was never blessed before. But you know I must not speak irreverently of dignities & therefore I will add no more on this subject at least for the present.

I hear that the French have just gained a considerable advantage over the Austrians on this side of the Rhine near Manheim. The Austrians crossed the R. in its neighbourhood to make a diversion there, were met by a body of French, defeated & driven back. Other particulars we have not—Mrs. M. & our child join in affectionate wishes to yr.self & whole family & pray you also to make them to my brother Joseph & all our neighbours & that you will believe me most affectionately yours

(unsigned)

[1] George III.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
[TIMOTHY PICKERING, ACTING SECRETARY.]

PARIS, December 6th, 1795.

SIR,—I was lately honoured with originals and triplicates of your favours of the 12th and 14th of September last. The duplicates are yet to be received. By the first of these letters, I learn that the President has ratified the late treaty with England: And by the second, the measures taken to vindicate our territorial rights, that were violated by the captain of a British frigate, in an attempt to seize Mr. Fauchet, the French minister, within our jurisdiction,[1] on his return home; and to which communications due regard shall be paid, as occasion requires.

That the treaty was ratified, was a fact well established, before the receipt of your favour. It was, indeed, generally credited before the arrival of Mr. Fauchet; by whom it was confirmed, and afterwards doubted by none. As I had no reason to presume, from any communication from your department, that the contrary would be the case, so I had never calculated on the contrary; nor had I given this government any reason to calculate on the contrary; having left it to form its own judgment on that point, according to its own lights; so that, in this respect, I have nothing wherewith to reproach myself on the score of discretion.

The effect which this incident produced in the coun-

[1] Within the jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island. Governor Fenner's original letters and the proceedings of Captain House of the British ship *Africa*, may be found in "Letters from Governors of States, 1790–1812." MSS. Bureau of Rolls, Department of State.

cils of this country, through its several stages, may be traced in my former communications; and to which I beg to refer you. To these I have, at present, nothing material new to add. Symptoms of discontent, it is true, are still seen; but whether they will assume an aspect more unpleasant, I know not: If they do, or any thing else occurs of sufficient importance to merit your attention, I will certainly apprize you of it, and without delay.

You likewise saw, by my former communications, that I understood and acted upon that part of my instructions, which explained the object of Mr. Jay's mission to England, differently from what it appears, by your favour of the 12th of September, and by Mr. Randolph's of the 1st of June preceding, it was intended I should understand and act on it; and whereby I was placed, by the course of events, in a very delicate and embarrassing dilemma; from which, indeed, I am not perhaps yet fully extricated; though I hope and think I am. Upon this head, I have only now to observe, that as soon as I had reason to believe, that Mr. Jay's instructions embraced objects which I had before thought they did not, I profited of what I heard, and acted accordingly; keeping out of view, so far as depended on me, what had before passed between the government and myself upon that subject, and to which I with pleasure add, that I have never heard the least intimation on it since. In reviewing this particular trait in my conduct here, you will, I doubt not, do me the justice to observe, that when I made the suggestion alluded to, it was

not rashly done, nor without sufficient motive; on the contrary, that (paying due regard to the actual state of our affairs at the time) I was called on to make it by considerations the most weighty, and which ought not to have been dispensed with; considerations, however, which I now forbear to repeat, having heretofore sufficiently unfolded them.

I have the pleasure to inclose you the report of Mr. Skipwith, upon the subject of the claims of many of our citizens who were heretofore injured by the occurrences of the war, and in consequence intitled to indemnities; and by which you will find that many of those claims are settled; and derive useful information in respect to others.

I likewise send you a letter from Mr. Fenwick, explaining his conduct in regard to the charge exhibited against him in your department.[1] As Mr. Fenwick has always proved himself to be an useful, indeed a valuable, officer in the station he holds, and as the error imputed to him might be the effect of judgment only, and which I think it was,—I have thought I could not better forward your views or the interest of my country, than by continuing him in the discharge of the duties of his office, till the President

[1] Our Consul at Bordeaux was charged with having covered French property under an American name. The President thought it proper that he should *cease* from his consular functions until an enquiry could be made. Monroe prints in his *View* [p. 406] Randolph's letter on this subject, in connection with which he notes, in explanation of his giving it out of its proper date that being of a personal nature he, at first, thought best not to publish it, but upon reflection, as it respected the conduct of a public officer, that opinion was changed; adding that it was due, in justice to Mr. Fenwick, to observe that in consequence of the explanation which he gave of his conduct he was never suspended.

shall finally decide in his case. He will, doubtless, communicate with you on the subject; so that the interval will not be great before I have the decision in question, and which will, of course, be duly executed.

Two days since, count Carletti, minister from Tuscany, was, in consequence of some offence given by him to the government, ordered to depart from Paris in 48 hours, and the bounds of the Republic in eight days. 'T is said the offence consisted in a demand made to visit the daughter of the late king,[1] of whom he spoke in terms of extreme commiseration; and which was thought to be, not only an interference in concerns exclusively their own, but to have thrown some reproach on the French government. The count, I hear, departs to-night by the way of Marseilles.

Soon after the government was organized, the minister of foreign affairs announced a day on which the Directoire would receive the ministers of foreign powers; and who were requested to rendezvous for that purpose at his house, to proceed thence to that of the Directoire. We did so, and were presented, without regard to precedence, to that body, and whose President addressed the whole diplomatic corps in a short discourse; the principal object of which was, to assure it of the cordiality with which it was welcomed here by the representatives of the French people, and which it contrasted with the pomp and ceremony of the ancient court; which, he

[1] The Duchess d'Angoulême. The Chevalier Carletti, represented to have been of all the Archduke's diplomatists the most favorable to the French, had been sent to take the first steps towards a better understanding between France and Tuscany, thereby paving the way for a peace between Austria and France.

said, was neither cordial nor fraternal. I mention this latter circumstance merely to contradict the account given of the address by the journalists, and who made a particular speech for the President to each minister.

Manheim has certainly fallen again into the hands of the Austrians, with the garrison; the amount of which is not known, but presumed to be several thousands. But in Italy, the fortune of the war is on the side of France; for the same day which announced the surrender of Manheim, announced likewise a great and decisive victory over the Austrians, in the other quarter. The details of killed and wounded are also not yet accurately known; but it is understood that 4 or 5,000 are taken prisoners, many slain, and the whole army put completely to rout.

Since the organization of the new government, the character and deportment of all the departments are essentially improved. The legislative corps, in both its branches, exhibits, in the manner of discussion, a spectacle wonderfully impressive in its favour, when compared with what was daily seen in the late convention. And the executive departments begin to shew an energy which grows out of the nice partition of their duties, and the greater responsibility that belongs to each. In truth, the vibration from the system of terror had, by the force of moral causes, gone so far, and produced so deep an effect, as to have greatly relaxed the whole machine of government. It was certainly felt in the departments, in the public

councils, in foreign negociations, and in the armies. A short space of time, however, will now shew how far the change, which has taken place in the government, will furnish the means of an adequate remedy.

Mr. Pinckney has, I hear, closed his business in Spain to his satisfaction; and is now on his route back, intending to take Paris in his way. I trust this report is, in every respect, well founded; of which, however, you will doubtless be correctly informed, before this reaches you.

With great respect and esteem I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient and very humble Ser[t]

JA[s] MONROE.

P. S. Count Carletti has notified to the French government, that he cannot depart without the consent of his own.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
[TIMOTHY PICKERING.[1]]

PARIS, December 22d, 1795.

SIR,—Since my last, I was favoured with yours of the 9th of October, with a quadruplicate of that of the 12th of September; of which latter, the original and triplicate were before acknowledged.

Since my last, too, I have received a note from the minister of foreign affairs, complaining of the conduct of Mr. Parish, our Consul at Hamburgh, in granting passports for France to British subjects, equipping the emigrants, and acting in all cases as the English

[1] Commissioned Secretary of State December 10, 1795.

agent; a copy of which note, and of my reply, are herewith forwarded you. I hear, also, that his conduct was even more reprehensible than is stated by the minister; for that he not only equipped the emigrants, but did it in American bottoms, with a view of protecting them under our flag. In calling your attention to this subject, permit me to add, that two American citizens, Benjamin Jarvis and Thomas Randall, both of New-York, the former a respectable merchant, as has been represented to me, and the latter known to the President as captain of artillery in the late war, and lately as Vice-Consul at Canton in China,—have requested me to communicate to you their wish to obtain appointments in the consulate, in any of the respectable ports of France, or other European ports connected with the trade of France; and that I have reason to believe they would, either of them, be happy to accept the appointment in question. In case Mr. Parish is removed, permit me further to suggest the propriety of giving to his successor two commissions; one for Hamburgh, and the other for Altona, in the neighbourhood of Hamburgh, but under the jurisdiction of Denmark. Much business is done at Altona, on account of the greater freedom of its trade; for Hamburgh, though in some respects a free and independent city, yet in others it feels the influence of the Emperor; and is therefore a less eligible port for mercantile transactions, and especially those connected with France.

I sent you with my last a report of Mr. Skipwith,

upon the cases submitted to his care, for adjustment with this government; and shall continue to give him all the aid in my power in those cases which remain unsettled, and apprize you regularly of the progress. To that of Mr. Girard, due attention shall certainly be paid.[1]

At present no symptoms of an approaching peace are to be seen; unless, indeed, the most vigorous preparations for a continuance of war be deemed such; and which sometimes happens. The Directoire has called on the Legislature for a supply of 600 millions, in specie, and which was granted immediately by a law which proposes raising it in the form of a loan; of which I send you a copy. The greatest possible exertions are making by that body, and which seem to be supported by the legislature, in putting the armies, the fleets and the interior into the best possible order; and so far as I can judge from appearances, these exertions seem to produce the effects that are desired from them; for to those who are friendly to the revolution they give confidence; and from those who are not, they command respect. 'T is said that Pichegru and Jourdan have lately gained several important advantages over the Austrians, in actions which, though not general, were nearly so; and that, in the result, they have resumed

[1] Stephen Girard's claims under the several classes of "French Spoliation Claims" were numerous. Some were settled under the Convention of 1803 and the Treaty of 1831 with France; but some have descended to the present day, being among those presented by the City of Philadelphia to the United States Court of Claims under the Act of Congress approved January 20, 1885, and for which payment has been provided, among other French Spoliation Claims, in An Act of Congress approved March 3, 1899.

their station before Mayence. The former part of this report, I believe, to be depended on; the latter wants confirmation. In Italy the troops of this Republic continue to reap new successes; in which quarter indeed, since the victory mentioned in my last, they have met with but little opposition.

Latterly the views of Prussia have become more doubtful than they were before. The conduct of Prince Hohenloe, who commanded the Prussian troops at Francfort, in the neighbourhood of the French and Austrian armies, during the retreat of the former, and who were stationed there to preserve the line of neutrality in favour of Prussia, 't is said, could scarcely be deemed neutral. For the civilities which were shewn by him to the Austrians upon that occasion, 't is also said, he has been rewarded since by some complimentary attention from the Emperor. The Dutch appear apprehensive that the king of Prussia will seize a suitable opportunity, if any offers, to favour the restoration of the Stadtholder; and 't is possible the conduct of the Prince Hohenloe, above referred to, may have increased that suspicion, by giving at least an insight into what might be the views of the Prussian cabinet, in case the retreat had continued; or any great reverse of fortune should hereafter befall the French arms. 'T is certain, however, that moments of difficulty are always moments of great jealousy; and that sometimes, upon such occasions, suspicion is thrown upon those who do not deserve it.

The Count Carletti, late envoy, *&c.* from Tuscany,

left Paris for home 4 or 5 days since. He had refused going 'till he had heard from the Grand Duke; and remained notwithstanding the reiterated orders of the Directoire. Finally, however, he was ordered to depart in 24 hours (this was not done before, as I stated in my last) with intimation that force would be used to compel him, in case he did not. He still held out, however, the flag of defiance. The 24 hours expired, at which moment a commissary, with a carriage &c. from the government, waited to receive his orders for departure; or in other words, to take the Count by force, and conduct him safe beyond the bounds of the Republic; and which was accordingly done. The diplomatic corps was summoned, by a member either averse to this peremptory mode of proceeding, or friendly to the count, to interfere with the Directoire in his behalf: But several members of that corps were of opinion, that although sometimes a demand is made on the government of a minister who gives offence, to recall him; yet there is no obligation on the goverment offended, by the law of nations, to take that course; but that it may take any other, and even upon slight occasions, to rid itself of him, more prompt and summary, if it thinks fit; and in consequence no step was taken by the diplomatic corps, upon the subject.

I inclose you also a note from the minister of foreign affairs, complaining of the seizure and condemnation of the Corvette Caffius; which, he says, is in violation of the treaties between the two Republics; and to which I replied, that I would present the

subject to your view; and doubted not I should be enabled to give a satisfactory answer thereon.[1]

With sentiments of respect and esteem, I have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient servant

JA^{S}. MONROE.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Jany. 12, 1796.

DEAR SIR,—Yours of the 6th of april is the last I have rec'd, tho' since that period I have written you eight or ten at least. The Theatre too on which you are has been & probably will continue to be an interesting one, for it is presumable the same subject which creates such solicitude among the people at large will produce a like effect among their representatives.[2] Certain it is that the temper which was shown upon that subject by the people with you, has produced a happy effect here, & moderated greatly the resentment which began to display itself before

[1] The French Corvette *Cassius* detained in the port of Philadelphia; her captain cited before an American Court and arrested in virtue of a warrant. For correspondence, statements, and proceedings respecting the case, *see* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I., pp. 629–639.

[2] The Boston meeting of citizens was held at Faneuil Hall, July 13, 1795. In succession came the meetings at Philadelphia, New York, Richmond, Baltimore, Portsmouth, Trenton, Wilmington, Charleston, and other places. The original resolutions of remonstrance addressed to the President are in *Letters to Washington*, vol. 110. For Washington's reply, containing the principles on which he acted in giving his assent to the treaty, see Ford's *Writings of Washington*, xiii., 74. Randolph drafted that reply, Walcott and Bradford approving it; Pickering suggesting the following as an amendment to the original draft: "It is doubtless supposed that these two branches of government would combine, without passion, those facts & principles by which the propriety of admitting or rejecting any foreign relation should be determined: that they ought not to substitute," &c.

their sentiments were known, for as soon as this government saw that the people were dissatisfied with the treaty, and that a strong motive for their dissatisfaction proceeded from the interest they took in the welfare of France, from that moment it was obvious its chagrin diminished & that in sympathy with us again, it gradually lost sight to a certain degree of its own concerns, so far as they were supposed to be affected by that treaty & became instead of a party in, a spectator of ours. This is the external view of the effect which Mr. Jay's treaty & its incidents produced upon the councils & people of France, & more than the external view I cannot give you, for I deemed it upon every principle most suitable for me to stand aloof upon that subject, never touching on it except when mentioned informally to me, & then confining myself strictly within the limits observed by the other party, giving such explanations only as were sought & inculcating always good-temper and moderation on the part of this government towards us, as the surest means whereby to unite forever the two republics. Whether therefore the subject has been acted on by the Directoire, or will be, or what will be the result in case it is I cannot tell you.

The progress of this government is so far wise, steady and energetic. Its outset was distinguished by an effort to introduce into every department of the administration the most rigid economy & whereby many abuses were reformed & the publick expenditure greatly diminished. The finances were in the utmost confusion, the assignats having depreciated

almost to that point beyond which they would not circulate, & there was no other resourse. The Directoire exposed freely this state of the nation, demanding funds to carry on the war & adding without which it could not be carried on, recommending too at the same time the project of a forced loan whereby about 25 millions sterling in specie could be raised, & which was adopted. By this project the assignats were to be redeemed or taken in, in discharge of the loan at 100 for 1. & which would consume of it about 12 millions sterling rather less than one half. Specie & produce only are admitted for the residue. This loan however forms a fund upon which they will most probably, for a while & untill some more complete system is adopted, be circulated again. By this paper I am told a great portion of the antient debt is discharged, so that by it the war has not only been carried on to the present stage (deducting the amount of the national domains that are sold and paid for) for nothing, but the nation exonerated from a considerable portion of that debt which depressed it before the war. This loan is now collecting and without exciting any great murmur among those upon whom it falls. The forms of business too in both houses are correct and discreet according to our ideas on the subject, and their attention seems so far to have been bestowed on the most urgent topics & in general the result such as might have been wished. In short in every respect the character of the public councils has greatly altered for the better; the effect whereof is plainly to be

discerned in the publick opinions as well as public measures: for you observe among all classes an increasing opinion of personal safety, at the same time that the government displays a degree of energy that was never surpassed before. The royalists begin to despair for they know that the hopes of royalty are gone as their hopes were founded in the continuance of anarchy and confusion, to promote which of course all their efforts were united. Intemperate zeal too is restrained, but the restraint is always easy, indeed it is a self-one, or rather it does not exist, when the administration possesses the confidence of the people & wields the government according to their wishes. I give you the aspect up to the present time & to which I add with pleasure that the probability is it will continue.

You will doubtless hear before this reaches you that there is a truce between France & Austria & which was asked by the Austrian generals. When a truce is asked & granted it argues that neither party has essentially the advantage over the other, or it would neither be asked or granted, and such was I believe the fact in the present instance. The proposition from Austria was for a truce for three months, but admitted by the Directoire for one only. What the motives of Austria are is unknown: That peace is among them, perhaps the principal one is presumable. By some it is suspected that the message of the English King to his Commons, was the immediate stimulus, since as the same persons suspect, that measure was taken in haste, in accommodation with

existing circumstances on the spot & of course without the knowledge of Austria, whereby, and especially as the former objects of the war were abandoned a disposition for peace avowed the jealousy of that power was excited. Perhaps however, it may be a mere financing project on the part of Austria, in the hope that by appearing to seek peace a loan for the next campaign may be more easily obtained from England. But my opinion is there is a negociation for peace depending & which may probably have that issue with Austria, if not with other powers & the Southern more especially. The moment Austria makes up her mind to yield the Belgic the war with her is over, & the ruin of her army in Italy with other events may have inclined her to that measure, whilst the light advantages she has gained on the Rhine may have suggested the idea that now is the time to treat with some apparent credit. But with England there will probably still be difficulties, for I think France will never hear a proposition from her upon the subject of peace, that is not preceeded by a declaration that she will restore everything taken since the commencement of the war from herself & Holland, & which it is possible her present superiority at sea may prevent: certainly it would prevent it, if the discontents of the people there & which daily increase, on account of the scarcity of bread & the dearness of it, which latter proceeds not more from that cause than the superabundant circulation of paper, which raises the price of everything, & threatens more fatally to impair the manufactures &

commerce of that country than even long & destructive wars by all their other evils.

You will also have heard of the demand of Count Carletti minister &c from Tuscany to visit the *unfortunate daughter* of Louis XVI. who was on her departure for Basle to be exchanged for Barononville,[1] & several of the deputies who were surrendered to the Austrians by Dumourier & of the manner in which that interference was resented by the Directoire. Suspending all intercourse with him & ordering him forthwith without the bounds of the republic. The Count explained & expostulated but without effect. The Diplomatic Corps convened & by some of whom it was urged that the Count could not be suspended or ordered without the Republic by any but his own sovereigns except in case of conspiracy: that the order to that effect was of course a violation of the rights of nations, and by others it was urged that every Government had a right to rid itself of a minister who gave offense & by its own means: that to demand his recall was, upon trivial occasions the ordinary usage, but that it was not prescribed by the law of nations, but by that of civility & good manners only. Was this however a light occasion, a demand by the representative of a foreign power to visit the *unfortunate* & thereby stigmatizing the revolution & reproaching France for that effort which she deems a glorious one? If demands of this kind are

[1] Pierre Ryel de Beurnonville. He was employed in 1792 as a general under Dumouriez; was arrested and conveyed to the headquarters of the Prince of Coburg until exchanged; afterwards sided with Bonaparte and was his Ambassador to Berlin.—*Biographie Moderne.*

allowed from the representatives of other powers what kind of demands will be inhibited? And if it is meant to check such, is it not best to do it upon some such occasions & in such manner as the present, whereby the sense of the French Government being decisively pronounced, will be well understood at home & abroad.

The meeting broke up without a decision; notwithstanding which it was published in all the gazettes that the whole diplomatic Corps had united in a remonstrance to the Directoire against its procedure in this case & without effect. Upon which another meeting was called & held for the purpose of expressing to the government the reason which the members of that Corps felt of the injury which was done them by that misrepresentation, & to request of the minister of foreign affairs, since he knew that no such step was taken, that he would contradict the report. Upon this proposal too no decision was obtained. By it however the spirit of some of the members of that Corps was checked & the body itself perhaps forced from like attempts to involve it in the interior & revolutionary politics of France & against the spirit of the revolution for the future. But the Count replied to this Government that he would not withdraw till he had the order of his own, upon which it was notified to him if he did not commence his route within 24 hours he should be sent out by force & to which a like reply was given. The 24. hours expired, at which moment a commissary with a carriage attended to take his orders for Basle, & by

means whereof he was conducted to Basle & with all convenient speed. The communication of this event & its incidents was made by the French Minister to the Grand Duke & by whom it was well received, for instead of taking it in high dudgeon as was expected by many, he despatched immediately & upon the first intimation of it a minister plenipotentiary (the Prince ———) for the express purpose of disavowing the Demand of Carletti & declaring his respect for the French government, & so rapid were the movements of this Envoy, that he is already on the ground & has already made his disavowal to the minister of foreign affairs. By this measure therefore the French Government has lost nothing without & certainly *within* & especially by the manner in which it has terminated it will acquire great respect.

I am England does not
145. 1046. inclined to believe that 45. 188. 549.
mean to treat- y to ju-
570. 770. execute the 986. 1247 & intends 770. 639.
s- ti- fy her eva- sion any obstacle- s the
7. 507. 897. 1631. 425. 914 by 966 471. 7. 812.
h[ouse] of r[epresentatives] may thr- ow in it- s
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If then any thing is, 673. 410. 1341. 770. 1589. 175.
d the concili-[ing] [ad]-min- is- tra- tion im-
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of other council- s. It is late to
the effect 1352. 1327. 813. 7. 410. 1341. 489. 770.
do it but not too late.
1180. 410. 963. I think 549. 605. 489.[1]

[1] The following is crossed out in the original: "This leaves this on the 12th inst. and yet we know nothing of Mr. R.'s publication nor even that the Congress is convened." The endorsement indicates that on "Jany 13 copy of the above letter was forwarded to James Madison by way of Havre under cover to Consul Delamotte."

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, Jany 20 1796.

DEAR SIR,—I think I mentioned to you sometime since that Mr Paine was with me. Upon my arrival I found him in Prison, & as soon as I saw my application in his behalf would be attended to, I asked his release & obtained it. But he was in extreme ill health, without resources, & (affairs being unsettled) not without apprehensions of personal danger, & therefore anxious to avail himself as much as possible of such protection as I co^{d} give him. From motives that will readily occur to you I invited him to take a room in my house, & which he accepted. It was his intention at that time, sometime in Octr 94, to depart for America in the Spring, with which view in feb^{y} following, I asked permission of the Com : of p : safety for him to depart, charged with my despatches for the Department of State, a motive w^{h} I presumed wo^{d} authorize them to grant the permission asked : but was answer'd it co^{d} not be granted to a deputy ; tho' indeed he co^{d} scarcely be considered as such, having been excluded the Convention as a foreigner, & liberated upon my application as an American citizen. His disease continued & of course he continued in my house, & will continue in it, till his death or departure for America, however remote either the one or the other event may be. I had occasion soon after Mr Paines' enlargement to intimate to him a wish, that whilst in my house, he would write nothing for the publick, either of Europe or America, upon the subject of our affairs, which I

found even before his enlargement he did not entertain a very favorable opinion of. I told him I did not rest my demand upon the merit or demerit of our conduct, of which the world had a right to form & wo^{d} form its opinion, but upon the injury such essays wo^{d} do me, let them be written by whom they might & whether I ever saw them or not, if they proceeded from my house. He denied the principle, intimating that no one wo^{d} suppose his writings which were consistent, were influenced by anyone: that he was accustomed to write upon publick subjects & upon those of America in particular, to which he now wished to turn his attention, being ab^{t} to depart thither & reside there for the future. But as I insisted that I owed it to the delicacy of my publick & private character to guard myself even by erroneous inferences, agñst any improper imputation or compromittment whatever & especially as I did not wish any impression to be entertained of me which I did not create myself, being the arbiter of my own measures & the guardian of my own name, & which I knew wo^{d} be affected thro. that door if it were opened, with many if not generally & therefore entreated him to desist. He then accommodated, more however from an apparent spirit of accommodation, than of conviction that my demand was reasonable or my argument sound. Thus the matter ended and I flattered myself I shoud, for the future, enjoy the pleasure of extending to Mr. Paine, whilst he remained here, the rights of hospitality & without exposing myself to the inconvenience I so much dreaded and laboured to avert. Latterly

however an incident has turned up which has again disquieted me on the same subject. He had committed to Mr Pinckney when here the other day on his return from Spain a letter from his bookseller in London, upon the propriety of carrying & delivering which unsealed Mr Pinckney asked my opinion. I frankly told him, in his place I wod carry nothing I did not see & approve of & as he was of the same opinion he desired me to communicate it to Mr. Paine & which I did. Mr Paine owned that his letter contained an extract of one he was writing or had written

Fre- der- ic- k Mu- h- le- n- berg
to 671. 1318. 771. 1251. 699. 1366. 1406. 640. 839.
in Philada
149. 51. upon engh & american affairs & which he intended shod be published with his name. Mr Pinckney returned the letter, not chusing to be the bearer of it. Upon this occasion I revived with Mr Paine the argument I had used before, expressing my extreme concern that he pursued a conduct which, under existing circumstances, gave me so much pain, & to which he made little other reply than to observe, he was surprised. I continued of the same opinion I formerly was upon this subject. Whether he will send the one or the other letter I know not. I shall certainly prevent it in both cases if in my power. That to Engld is not sent as yet. 'Tis possible the one for America has gone or will be sent. Let me entreat you therefore to confer with the gentlm to whom it is addressed & request him in my behalf if he receives such an one, to suppress it. In any event I have thought it necessary to possess you with these facts that you may use them

as occasion may require to guard me agñst unmerited slander.

Since my last which was of the inst nothing new has occurred. Murmurs are heard against the forced loan, but yet the collection progresses, so that there appears no reason to doubt its execution. The armies on both sides keep their respective positions near the Rhine; nor is it probable the truce will be renewed, tho' on this point nothing transpires. 'T is known that Engld is willing to leave France in possession of the Belgic & give up everything taken from her, provided she is permitted to retain the Cape of Good Hope etc. I say it is known because I have it from a respectable person who has had opportunities of knowing the views of the Engl gov^t^ But I think France will reject this with disdain, tho' indeed Holland has little claim on her to continue the war on that account, having made no effort whatever in her own behalf. This latter country presents to view a curious & interesting spectacle at the present moment. Its conquest by France was at the moment when the public mind was vibrating here from what was called Terrorism to the opposite extreme, the effect of antecedent & well known causes. Under this impression the Deputies in mission with the Armies in Holland were appointed & as they likewise felt and obeyed the same impulse, dreading terrorism as the worst of political evils (altho' there was no analogy in the situation of the two countries nor likely to be), it was natural they shod turn their attention to it where they were, as one it was more especially their duty to

avoid. Such too was their conduct by means whereof the early & flattering prospects of a complete revolution were checked. More latterly the error of this policy has been seen thro' & will doubtless be remedied so far as it depends now on the councils of France. Unless the govt is placed completely in the hands of the people there will be in the publick councils neither energy nor integrity to the cause of the people.

Your China will go from hence in the course of a few days when I will send you an invoice of it. It is a plain neat service, sufficient in number & cheap. If you will permit me I will procure for you in the course of the present year furniture for a drawing room, consisting of the following articles. 1. Chairs, suppose 12. or 18.—2d two tables or three after the taste which we prefer—3d a sofa, perhaps 2. These all of tapestry & to suit, if to be had, the curtains we sent you, either one or the other sett. 4th a clock to stand on the chimney piece, & which chimney piece I will send also, of marble, if you wish it. I wish you to send me a list of what other things you want & especially of books, & I will provide & send or bring them with me when I return home. I will procure every thing as cheap as possible, & adjust the amount when I have occasion for it. Mr. Jefferson proposes to have a house built for me on my plantation near him & to wh I have agreed under conditions that will make the burden as light as possible upon him. For this purpose I am about to send 2 plans to him submitting both to his judgment, & contemplate

accepting the offer of a skilful mason here who wishes to emigrate & settle with us, to execute the work. I wish yrself & Mr Jones to see the plans & council with Mr. Jefferson on the subject.

Sometime since Mr. Ketland from Philad^a^ came here with Mr. Yards recommendation & which disposed me to shew him & his family all the attention in my power.[1] Indeed the circumstance of his having married Mr. M's daughter who was with him was of itself a good recommendation. Mr K. however brought with him his sister who was an Engl^h^ subject as likewise was one of his servants for whom also he asked my passport. I told him I co^d^ grant it only to American citizens. He then asked me to demand it of this govt. & to which I replied that if I demanded it, I must do it as a favor. To ask a favor of this gov^t^ at the present time was not agreeable to me: to ask it in behalf of Eng^l^ subjects, in whose favor we were already suspected to be sufficiently biased was impolitick & against my uniform conduct, & in the rejection of the solicitations of Mr. Pinckney & Mr. Jay in many instances, one only excepted & that where the party had his wife & family in America: His father & mother were American citizens & himself about to remove there. I told him however I wo^d^ take charge of the cases & obtain passports if possible without compromitting myself, & in case this co^d^ not be done I wo^d^ ask for them. I requested in consequence an American citizen to state the case &

[1] James Yard and Thomas Ketland of Philadelphia were associated in shipping interests.

make the application in behalf of his sister & the servant, & which was done with effect. I mentioned when Mr. Ketland first called on me that we shoᵈ be happy to see his lady &c. when convenient &c. being disposed to shew her all the civilities in our power. But she never called & in consequence we never saw her. It is the rule of Paris, applicable in all cases, that when a stranger arrives male or female, he or she visit those whom they wish to visit. This rule applies with greater force to publick ministers & their families & is universal throughout Europe & I believe the world, especially on the part of the people of the countries they represent & for the obvious reason that in so great a city those resident woᵈ never know who arrived, if not thus advised of it. With this rule Mrs. M. complied herself on her arrival & many American ladies who have since arrived have also complied with it & who woᵈ have cause of offence if she changed it in favor of any other. I mention these things that you may apprize Mʳ Yard of them, that in case misrepresentation is given he may be aware of it. I do not know it was the wish of his family to be acquainted with us, or that any offense is taken. I presume the contrary is the case as I think you & Mʳ Yᵈ will upon the above statmᵗ ; but as I know that misrepresentation is sometimes made I have thought proper to give this statement. I shall write Mʳ Yᵈ & Dʳ Stevens in a day or two to whom & their families present our best respects. Our best wishes for your own & Mʳˢ M's health. Sincerely I am yʳ fnd.

Of the first paragraph of this letter I will send a copy to Col : Burr to g^d^ agnst. accidents.[1]

I am satisfied we shall never have our just weight upon the scale of nations, nor command the respect which is our due or enjoy the rights of neutrality without a small fleet. It is astonishing what weight a beginning in that line of the decent kind will have. Let our coasts be well fortified & such a force of the kind be raised as will protect us from small detachments (and they will never send others) and we take an imposing ground immediately. This is worthy your most serious consideration.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

PARIS, January 26th, 1796.

Some weeks past the property of William Vans, a citizen of the United States, was attached by Joseph Sands, another citizen of the said States, in a tribunal of France at Havre; where the cause was sustained, and judgment rendered in favour of the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Superior Tribunal of the department at Rouen, where

[1] The indorsement on this letter is "Duplicate letter to A. Burr & J. Madison, Jany 20th 1796. Copy inclosed to A. Burr 20th Jan^y^ & forw^d^ by S. P. Broome—Copy enclosed to J. Langdon under cover to Ch. Delamotte at Havre."—"The copy to Mr. Burr had the following postscript, to A. B.—You cannot conceive our solicitude to hear what passes on your side of the Atlantic. By the publick papers, as late as the 10. of Nov^r^, we find that Mr. Jay's treaty has given much dissatisfaction in many parts of the U. States, & we wish to know whether that sentiment has abated or still continues, & in the latter case what its object is. Assure yourself that the temper which was shewn upon that subject by our citizens at large has produced a happy effect here, & moderated &c."

I believe it is now depending. As soon as the suit commenced, Mr. Vans applied for my interference, claiming, by the 12th article of the consular convention between the two republics, an exemption, at the instance of a fellow citizen, from the tribunals of the country; the cognizance of such controversies being, as he supposed, thereby exclusively vested in the consuls of each nation, within the jurisdiction of the other. I examined attentively the convention, and was of opinion, that the construction insisted on by Mr. Vans was found; but yet as the subject was important in respect to the principle, and questionable in point of policy, I wished to decline any interference in it, until I had your instruction. He continued, however, to press me; urging that if such was the import of the article, it vested in him a right which I ought to secure him the enjoyment of; the deprivation of which too in the present instance would be his ruin; for that the execution of the judgment by the sale of the merchandize attached at Havre, where there was then no demand for it, would not only subject him in that view to a severe loss; but that he was likewise sued for the same debt in America, and where judgment would likewise be probably rendered against him. Finally, therefore, I did apply in his behalf, by a letter to the minister of foreign affairs, of which I send you a copy[1]; explaining my idea of

[1] CITIZEN MINISTER, I observe by record of the proceedings of the Tribunal of Commerce at Havre, of which I send you a copy, that a dispute is introduced and sustained there between Joseph Sands and William Vans, two American citizens; relative to a bill of exchange drawn from America, and which belongs exclusively to one of the parties. The property of Vans was arrested by Sands.

the import of the treaty in the case in question; and requesting that the executive (so far as depended on that branch, and provided it concurred with me in opinion) might cause the same to be executed; and to which I have yet received no answer, though I am assured verbally, that the Directoire concur with me in the construction; and that a correspondent intimation thereon will be given by the minister of justice, to the court where the suit now is; and with whom it will probably be decisive. I state this case that you may apprize me how it is the wish of the President I should act in cases of the future, and even in the present one, if not finally settled before I hear from

and condemned by the court of Havre, in satisfaction of the claim above mentioned; and from which decision it was carried by appeal to the Superior Court at Rouen, where it now is. In this stage I have thought proper to call your attention to the subject, that in case the executive government of this Republic should deem it proper to interpose, it may be able to do it with effect.

By the 12th article of the consular convention between France and the United States, it is stipulated, that all disputes which may happen between the citizens of either party, in the dominions of the other, shall be settled by their respective consuls, and by them only. The article specifies in its close, some particular parties whose disputes shall be thus adjusted: But yet the true construction appears to include within it all disputes which may take place between citizens of either party, within the jurisdiction of the other. If such then is the true construction of the article, and which I apprehend it is; it necessarily follows that the proceeding of this court is in contravention of that article, and in that view merits the attention of the executive government, whose opinion will doubtless be regarded by the court.

That the article was dictated by policy, and formed for the mutual accommodation of both parties, cannot be doubted. A principal object of it probably was, to prevent suits in both countries, between the same parties, for the same debt, and at the same time; whereby an innocent party might be doubly harassed, and to the general detriment of commerce. In this light, however, I do not think it necessary to discuss the subject. I think it my duty only to bring it before you, upon the principles of the treaty, and to ask that interference of the government in this case, which it may deem suitable.

you ; and which may possibly happen. If it be wished that such controversies should be decided by the courts of the country, I doubt not such a construction and practice will be agreeable to this government; but if the contrary is preferred, you will, I presume, see the necessity of prescribing by the suitable authority, how the consular courts are to be held ; how their process is to be executed, and appeals conducted.

As connected with this subject, permit me to call your attention to another, and upon which I likewise wish to be instructed. For the port of Havre there are at present two consuls, or rather a consul and a vice-consul ; both of whom, Mr. Cutting and Mr. Lamotte, are recognized by this government. Was it intended the latter commission should supercede the former, and in that case should I take in the former? or is it intended that both should exist at the same time ; the power of the vice-consul being dormant only when the consul is present? I wish to know in what light I am to consider these appointments, since thereby I shall know to whom I am to look for the performance of the consular duties of the port.[1]

A third one of the same kind occurs, and which I think proper to mention to you. Sometime since, Mr. Pitcairn was appointed vice-consul for Paris, and in respect to which appointment, I deemed it my duty to present before you several considerations, growing out of his character, as a British subject, and the actual state of things here ; which made it inexpedient to

[1] Not answered. See note, p. 484, post.

demand his recognition of this government, until after they were weighed, and I in consequence further instructed on that head. These were stated in my letter of the 17th of May last, and to which, as yet, I have received no answer. As Mr. Pitcairn probably expects to hear from me on this topic, I shall thank you for information of what I in to say to him, and how I am to act in that respect.

The collection of the force loan continues, and will, I think, succeed. But what its product will be, is a point upon which there is a diversity of opinion. Some think it will fall short of the sum at which it was estimated, whilst others carry it much beyond that estimation. Certain, however, it is that by means thereof the embarrassments of the government will for the present be relieved, and time given for the maturity and adoption of a more complete system of finance; which subject is now under consideration of the council of five hundred.

About the twenty-fifth of December last a truce was asked by the Austrian generals Wurmser and Clairfayt, of Pichegru and Jourdan, for three months, and granted, subject to the will of the Directoire; by whom it is said it was allowed for one only; the report at first circulated, that it was wholly rejected, being without foundation. Whether it will be prolonged, admitting the term as here stated to be correct, is unknown; as likewise is the motive of Austria in asking, or of France in granting, it. The presumption is, it was to try the experiment of negociation in the interim; and such is the report:

And it is likewise presumable, that such an experiment was made or is now making; but from what I can learn, there is little prospect of its producing a peace. It will be difficult to part Austria from England, whilst the latter supplies the former with money to carry on the war; and which she will probably continue to do whilst she carries it on herself. The present prospect, therefore is, that Europe is destined to sustain the waste and havock of another campaign; for, superior as England is at sea, with the recent conquest of the Cape of Good-Hope, it is not probable, if she escapes an internal convulsion, the symptoms of which have diminished of late, that she will restore every thing on her part and leave France in possession of the Belgic; and without which, I think France will not make peace. A doubt, indeed, has latterly been circulated, whether England will make any sacrifice in favor of the Emperor; whether, in short she would agree to restore the possessions taken by her from France and Holland, as a consideration for the restoration of the Belgic to the Emperor. It is even added, that intimations have been given by her, that if France will leave her in possession of her conquests from Holland, she will restore every thing taken from France, and leave her in possession of St. Domingo and the Belgic. If this is true, and is credited by the Emperor, it will certainly tend to weaken and perhaps absolutely to dissolve the connection between England and Austria.

I communicated to you in two preceding letters, the application of Count Carletti, minister from Tus-

cany for permission to visit the "*unfortunate young Princess, &c.*" and the displeasure which that demand gave to the Directoire, who suspended his powers immediately; ordered him to leave the Republic forthwith; and, finally, sent him by force beyond its limits. It was apprehended by many, that this peremptory mode of proceeding would give offence to the Grand Duke; the contrary however, was the case; for as soon as he heard of the transaction, he despatched another Envoy to the Directoire, to disavow the demand of Carletti, and declare his respect for the French government; and such was the solicitude for his hasty departure, that he actually departed without the ordinary credentials, bearing simply a letter of introduction from the Grand Duke himself. Thus, therefore, this business has ended without producing any injury to the French Republic, whilst it is a proof of the energy of its councils and of its decision upon the delicate subject to which it refers.

On the 21st instant, being the anniversary of the execution of the late King, the members of the legislative corps of the Directoire, and all public officers, took a new and solemn oath to support the Constitution, or rather of hatred to royalty. The Directoire gave, on the same day, what is called a *fete* in the champ de Mars; where an amphitheatre was erected, and from whence the President, surrounded by the other members and all the ministers of the government, delivered an oration suited to the occasion, to a numerous audience. It seems to be the policy of

the existing government to revive the zeal of the people in favor of the Republic and of the revolution; and measures of this kind are certainly well calculated to produce that effect.

With great respect and esteem, I am, Sir, y^r^ very humble Servant.

JA^s^ MONROE.

P. S. Since writing the above, I have heard, through a channel that merits confidence, that the term of the truce is prolonged, and which strengthens what I intimated above, that a negociation is depending with Austria. The recent departure too of one of the Dutch Ministers for Holland, after a conference with the Directoire, and which took place about the time the truce was probably prolonged,—is a circumstance which I think proper to communicate; since it gives cause to suspect, if a negociation is depending, it treats for a general and not a partial peace.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING.]

PARIS, February 16th, 1796.[1]

SIR,—I think it my duty to state to you, and without delay, a communication made me yesterday by the minister of foreign affairs, of a very interesting nature. I called to represent to him, the distress of several of my countrymen, occasioned by the protest at Hamburgh of bills given them for supplies, rendered the government; and to request his aid with

[1] *In Cipher.*

the Directoire to obtain them relief. This application was intended to harmonize with one, that was making informally by our Consul General with the Directoire, and which was arranged in a manner to present the demands of the claimants before that body, in a forcible manner; and at the same time without wounding its feelings. But before I entered on this subject, my attention was called to another more important; and upon which he seemed pleased with the opportunity of addressing me. He observed, that the Directoire had at length made up its mind, how to act in regard to our treaty with England:—That it considered the alliance between us, as ceasing to exist, from the moment the Treaty was ratified; and had or would appoint an Envoy Extraordinary, to attend and represent the same to our Government; that the person in view was known and esteemed in our country, and who would be specially commissioned on this business, and whose commission would expire with it: That Mr. Adet had asked and obtained his recall; but did not say whether any other minister would be appointed in his stead, for the present; though, as connected with Adet's resignation, it is reported that Maret,[1] lately returned from captivity with the Austrians, is to succeed him.[2] The minister added some general observations on the Treaty, tending to shew, that it was considered as throwing us into the scale of the coalesced powers; observing

[1] Hugues Bernard, Duke of Bassano.

[2] Adet's services terminated about December 1, 1796. L. A. Pichon presented his credentials as chargé d'affaires March 19, 1801; and, March 27, 1805, General Turreau presented his credentials as minister plenipotentiary.

that he should hand me an official note on this subject, being ordered so to do by the Directoire. As no specific objection was stated, I could make no specific reply. I expressed to him, however, my astonishment and concern at the measure spoken of, and inculcated in the short time I remained with him (for he was upon the point of going out) the propriety of candour in the discussion of the Treaty, in its several parts, and the benefit of great moderation towards us in all cases, since we were certainly their best friends. To this he made no reply, and whereupon I left him. I have since heard nothing from him nor on the subject. I mean to see him however to day; and, in case he permits me to act on the communication, to demand an audience of the Directoire, to endeavour to divert it, if possible, from the measure contemplated; of which, and of the business generally, I will write you again in a day or two.

With great respect and esteem, I am, Sir, y^r^ most ob^t^ and humble serv^t^

JA^s^ MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING.]

PARIS, February 20th 1796.

SIR,—Immediately after my last of the 16th February was concluded, I demanded and had a conference with the minister of foreign affairs, upon the communication given in that letter.

I represented to him, that the information he had given me, of the intention of the Directory to appoint

an Envoy extraordinary, to repair to the United States, to declare to our Government the dissatisfaction of this, in respect to our treaty with Great Britain, and other acts which they deemed unfriendly to them, had penetrated me with the deepest concern; because I feared from a measure so marked, and conspicuous, the most serious ill-consequences, both to them and to us. I stated to him, that such a mission was calculated to make an impression in America, and throughout the world; not only that they were deeply dissatisfied with us, but that even the issue of war and peace was suspended on the issue of the mission; that their and our enemies would rejoice at the event, whilst theirs and our friends would behold the spectacle with horror. That the mission itself would place both republics in a new dilemma, and from which they could not both well extricate themselves with honor; that something was due, in the opinion of the world, to the character of the mission, its success must be brilliant, or the public would be disappointed, and this might induce them to insist on terms they would not otherwise have thought of; and which would increase their mutual embarrassments; that as soon as the mission was known to foreign powers, they would commence their intrigues to make it the means of separating us; that all were interested in our separation, none in our union; and that our separation was an evil equally to be deprecated by both parties; that the success and terror of their arms might diminish the number of their active enemies, but as we had never confided in the friendship of any

power but it that of France as I was satisfied they had in real friendship except America: that republics could never count upon the friendship of monarchies; if they did count upon it they would always be deceived. Peace there might be: but peace and friendship did not always mean the same thing.

I observed further that France had gained credit by her late conduct towards us: For whilst England had seized our vessels and harassed our trade, she had pursued an opposite and more magnanimous policy: and which had produced and would continue to produce a correspondent effect by encreasing our resentment against England and attachment to France. But as soon as the latter should attempt to assume an hostile and menacing deportment towards us this motive diminishes, and the argument it furnished lose force. That by this, however, I did not mean to be understood as advising that well founded complaints, if such existed, or were thought to exist, should be withheld: On the contrary, I was of opinion, they should always be brought forward; as well to obtain redress where it was wished, and could be given, as to make known, in a frank and friendly manner, the sentiments which each entertained of the conduct of the other, in case that were interesting to it. That on my own part, I was always ready to enter into such explanations, when required, and would do it in the present instance with pleasure; since by being possessed of our view of the subject, they would be better able to decide, whether complaint was well or ill-founded, and of course how far

it merited to be considered in that light. In short, I used every argument that occurred to divert the Government from the measure proposed, assuring him, in the most earnest manner, that I was satisfied, it would produce no good effect to France; on the contrary, that it would produce much ill, both to her, and to us.

The minister replied, that France had much cause of complaint against us, independently of any treaty with England; but that, by this Treaty, ours with them was annihilated: That he considered our conduct, in these respects, as absolutely unfriendly to them, under which impression, that it was their duty, so to represent it to us: That the mode which was proposed of making such representation had been deemed mild and respectful, and as such ought not to give offence. He admitted, however, that the objections I had stated against it were strong and weighty with him, and that he would immediately make them known to the Directory, and by whom, he doubted not, all suitable attention would be paid to them. Since this I have not seen him, but propose seeing him again, either to-day or to-morrow, on this subject; and after which I will immediately apprize you of the state in which it may be.

This affair has given me great concern, because it opens a new era upon us; and whose consequences, unless the measure itself be prevented, may be of a very serious kind. I shall do every thing in my power to prevent it, and in any event communicate to you, and with the utmost despatch, every incident that turns up connected with it.

So far, my object has been to break the measure in question; and after which, if effected, I shall most probably be called on for explanations of the treaty complained of; and in which case I shall of course avail myself, in the best manner possible, of those communications, which have been heretofore received from your Department.[1]

I am, Sir, with great respect and esteem, y^r most ob^t servant, JA^s MONROE.

TO JAMES MADISON.

PARIS, February 27, 1796.

DEAR SIR,—This will accompany your china which is addressed to Mr. Yard.[2] I enclose also the charge by which you will be able to pay the duty—

the
About a fortnight past I was informed by 812.
minister of foreign affair- s that the govern- ment had
1515. 1352. 263. 433. 7. 698. 812. 1517. 664. 560.
at le- ng- th resolve- d with
301. 1406. 1199. 417. 337. 707. how to act 1687.
us in respect to our treat- y with England;
1162 149. 789. 770. 266. 986. 1247. 1687. 45. that
they consider- d it Cap- ol- ated
1174. 934. 707. 410. as having 1018. 142. 526. or
an- nul- ed our treat- y of alliance
rather 157. 138. 1359. 266. 986. 1247. 1352. 800.
with them and take- n part with the co- al-
1687. 412. 673. 475. 640. 1375. 1687. 812. 1428. 450.

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[1] Note, p. 484, post.

[2] I have received a Letter from Mr. Monroe by a Vessel which brought your Box of China to Wilmington a few days after. It was brought up and landed on our Wharf in such a crazy state that I apprehended much damage & concluded to have it unpacked without hazarding further movements—fortunately it was so well packed that it came out in excellent condition & is now at my house.—JAMES YARD TO MADISON, September 9, 1796.

ise- d money- s:— that they had rather have a
452. 707. 1057. 7. 698. 1174. 560. 672. 216. 101.
ope- n enemy than a per- fi- di- ous fri-
1332. 640. 991 974. 101. 576. 837. 979. 999. 948.
end resolve- d to sen- d an en-
790. That it was 337. 707. 770. 777. 707. 157. 923.
vo- y extra. to the United States to disc- uss
1391. 1247. 880. 770. 812. 49. 770. 1205. 1162.
this business with us power would exp-
1160. 376 1687. 1162. and whose 1017. 1254. 223.
in- e with the execut- ion of the trust. I
1418. 8. 1687. 812. 577. 918. 1352. 812. 763. 145.
was ast- on- ish- ed contrary [at] the communica- tion
1293. 169. 1179. 525. 1359. 1607. 812. 32. 761.
and al- arm- ed contrary [at] it- s probab- le
673. 450. 1624. 1359. 1607. 410. 7. 683. 939.
consequence- s it might probab- ly lea- d
81. 7. I told him 410. 219. 683. 1593. 1651. 707.
to war there- by se- per- ate us which
770. 1085. and 596 1461. 479. 576. 1000. 1162. 1287.
was what our enemie- s wi- she- d it
1293. 1380. 266. 991. 7. 1486. 1070. 707 That 410.
haz- ard- ed much and without a probab- le
1171 1331. 1359. 1077. 673. 1469. 101. 683. 1406.
ga- in a person of
420 149. That from the moment 101. 211, 1352
go- [such] character ar- rive- d their fri- end- s would
695. 31. 540. 1399. 707. 1096. 948: 790. 7. 1254
se- em to act under his ban- ner
479. 1395. 770. 531. 1054. 1108. 1014. 988, and
in- jur- e their character
which circumstance would 149. 1130. 8. 1096. 31.
and end their ef- for- t- s. In truth I did
673. 777. 1096. 882. 208. 865. 7. 149. 816. 145 1335.
ever- y thing in my power to prevent this measure
641. 1247. 877. 149. 951. 1017. 770. 661. 1160. 156.
the minister that I
and in which I am now told by 812 1515. 698. 145.
have suc- ced- ed, dir- ect- oi- re having
216. 1490. 276. 1359 the 459. 1135 457. 130. 351
resolve- d to con- tin- ue the ord- in- ar-
337. 707. 770. 1527. 945. 1098. 812. 499. 149. 540.
y course of rep- res- ent- ation only
1247. 769. 1352. 597. 1483. 630. 310. 1557. But

I hear str- ong sen- ti- ment- s
through this 145. 969. 1081. 196. 777. 507. 664. 7.
will be con- ve- ied. The whole of this
1268. 1569. 1527. 1058. 921. 812. 1284. 1352. 1160.
is made know- n to the execut- iv- e by
1341. 305. 1689. 640. 770. 812. 577. 639. 8. 1461.
me.
1214.—Mr Adet has sent in his resignation and pressed earnestly the acceptance of it. Of course a successor will be sent in his place. I am astonished that I have heard nothing from you. It is now I think 9 months, although I have written you so often and communicated so freely. From me too there is some hazard in communicating and for reasons that will occur and which has been increased by the multiplication of duplicate dispatches and which were forwarded merely because the originals if received were not acknowledged. To me the motive for this reserve is impenetrable & therefore I repeat my astonishment at it—The state of things has varied little since the organization of the new government. Great preparations are making for carrying out the war on both sides. It is said the army of the Rhine and Moselle will amount together to 300,000 men and that in Italy to 150,000. On the opposite side too great preparations are making so that unless peace should close the scene a greater carnage may be expected this than in any preceeding campaign and at present there is but little prospect of peace; at least I see none. The forced loan was less productive
and the em- bar- ras- ment
than was expected 673. 812. 1395. 1169. 128. 664.
in the fi- nance extreme thi- nk an other
149. 812 837. 909. 1259. Some 957. 454. 157. 1327.

move- ment at power but I se- e no e- vi-
402 664. 301. 1223. 963. 145. 479. 8. 222. 8. 1010.
den- ce of it
554. 276. 1352. 410. At present in all calculations
it ought to be re- col- lect-
on this subject 410. 294. 770 1569. 130. 750. 476.
ed execut- iv- e are so- un- d
1359 that the 577. 639. 8. 1470. 1196. 1495. 707.
and having the govern- ment in their power- s are
673. 351. 812. 1517. 664 149. 1096. 1223. 7. 910.
str- ong There are str- ong sim- p- to- m-
1081. 196. 596 1417. 1081. 196. 1250. 941. 770. 1324
s of an ac- tu- al rupt- ur- e between
7. 1352 157. 1700. 1094. 450. 1299. 1289. 8. 5.
us and this country minister, the govern- ment
1162. 673. 1160. 1339. The 1515. 812. 1517. 664.
pre- fer- d to have us as ope- n rather
1308 604. 707. 770. 216. 1162. 764. 1332. 640. 672.
than per- fi- di- ous fri- end- s
974. 576 837. 979. 999. 948. 790. 7. Other proofs
this sen- time- nt has gone
occur to show that 1160. 777. 1020. 1265. 1171. 1137.
deep into their council- s.
1695. 468. 1096. 813. 7.

JAS MONROE.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING.]

PARIS, March 10th, 1796.

SIR,—I informed you in my two last, of the 16th, and 20th, ultimo, of a communication made me by the minister of foreign affairs, that the Directory had resolved to send an Envoy Extraordinary to the United States, to remonstrate against the late treaty with England, and of my efforts to prevent it; and I now the pleasure to add, that I have reason to believe

those efforts have been successful; the minister having assured me in a late conference, that the Directory was disposed to accommodate in this respect, and to make its representations, on that subject, through the ordinary channel. He repeated, however, upon this occasion, in terms equally strong with those he had used before, the sense which he said the Directory entertained of the injury done to France, by that treaty, and upon which explanations were expected, and would be sought.

I asked him, what were his objections to the treaty; and to which he replied, as before, in general rather than in precise terms; urging that thereby we had violated our treaties with France, and greatly to her injury, in the present war. I replied, that it was not admitted by our government, that any, the slightest, deviation was made from our treaty with this republic; nor ought it to be presumed, until it was shewn, that such was the case, especially as I had before informed him, and now repeated my willingness to discuss that point, whenever he thought fit. He intimated, that I should certainly hear from him on the subject, and in time to receive a reply, and attend to any observations I chose to make on it; but being now before the Directory, he could not well enter on it, in the manner I proposed, until he had the further orders of that body, in that respect. Thus therefore the matter now stands; and I have only to repeat to you, my assurance, that I shall continue to pay to it all the attention it deservedly merits.[1]

[1] Cipher to this point.

The state of affairs here has not varied essentially of late, either in the internal, or in the external relations of the republic. The forced loan was less productive, than it was expected to be, and of course the relief it gives must be considered as partial, and temporary only. Nor is any system yet adopted to supply what will be necessary, after the amount thus raised is exhausted; though as the subject is still under consideration, it is possible this may yet be done. On the other hand, the Directory, by means of the organization and police seems to gain strength; and to which a late measure has essentially contributed. At the Pantheon, and other quarters, there were nightly meetings of people, not inconsiderable in point of numbers; and who complained of various grievances, proceeding as they said, from the actual government, and which ought therefore to be changed. The Directory had its eye upon those assemblages, and, as I hear, gained full proof, that they were put in motion by foreign influence; and, under the mask of patriotism, more effectually to promote the purpose of disorganization, and in consequence shut the doors of the houses where they resorted. As many of those who were at the head of those meetings were active and ferocious agents in the popular societies, during the reign of terror, and were probably then moved by the same cause,—this discovery, if to be relied on, tends to throw great light upon the source to which the atrocities that were then practised ought to be ascribed. Time, perhaps, and especially if the revolution weathers the storms it has yet to encounter,

will doubtless more fully unfold the real authors of those scenes, which were so frightful to humanity, and disgraceful to man; and that they may be discovered must be the wish of all those who are the friends of truth, wherever they reside.

Russia has in the course of the winter encreased her force, 40, or 50,000 men; and, it is said, exhibits a menacing aspect towards Holland; though her minister continues here, and is apparently well received. Spain too continues her military establishment, as before the peace, and whose minister, Del Campo, is daily expected from England, where he has long resided. The probable conjecture, with respect to Spain, is, that as she feared an attack from England, when she made her peace with France, so she finds it necessary to guard herself against it, by suitable precautions, till the war ends. Russia, it is believed, contemplates a blow against the Turks; in the hope, now that Poland is annihilated; France otherwise sufficiently occupied, and the other powers in amity with the Empress, to wrest Constantinople from the Porte, which has long been the object of her inordinate ambition. On the other hand, France seems to be collecting her forces together, and to exert every nerve her system admits of, in preparations for the war; exhibiting to her enemies a countenance, firm and independent, and announcing to the beholding nations her resolution to conquer, or to perish.

With due respect, I am, Sir, your most obedient and very humble servant,

Ja^{s} Monroe.

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

PARIS, March 15th,[1] 1796 [25 Ventose l'an 4] and 20th. of the Independence of the United States of America.

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I was lately honoured with your note of the 19th Ventose (March 9th) objecting to several measures of our government, that have occurred in the course of the present war, and to which, I presume I shall herein render you a satisfactory answer. For this purpose I shall pursue in reply the order you have observed, in stating those objections; and, according to the light I have on the subject, give to each the answer it requires.

These objections are comprized under three distinct heads, a summary of which I will first expose, that my reply to each may be better understood.

First. Your first complaint is, that we have failed to execute our treaties with you, and in the following respects.

1. By submitting to our tribunals the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports by your privateers. 2. By admitting English vessels of war into our ports, against the stipulation of the 17th article of our treaty of commerce, even after such vessels had taken prizes from you, and in some cases with their prizes. 3. By omitting to execute the consular convention in two of its most important clauses; having failed to

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provide, as you suggest, suitable means for carrying those clauses into effect; the first of which secures to your consuls within the United States the exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between French citizens: and the second, the right to pursue, and recover, all mariners who desert from your vessels. 4. By suffering in the port of Philadelphia, the arrestation of the captain of the Corvette Cassius, for an act committed by him on the high sea, and which you say is contrary to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which stipulates, that 'the commandants of public and private vessels shall not be detained in any manner;' and the rights of nations, which put such officers under the protection of their respective flags: And by likewise suffering the arrestation of that Corvette, though armed at the Cape,[1] upon the pretext, that she was armed in the United States.

Second. Your second complaint states, that an outrage, which was made to this republic, in the person of its minister, the citizen Fauchet, by an English vessel (the Africa) in concert with an English consul, —in arresting, within the jurisdiction of the United States, the packet-boat in which he had embarked, searching his trunks, and afterwards remaining within the waters of those States for near a month, to watch the movements of the vessel in which he finally sailed, was left unpunished; since you urge, that the measures which were taken by our government, in regard to that vessel, and the Consul, were not taken in a suitable time to remedy the evil, and were pro-

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duced by a subsequent outrage, and of a very different kind.

Third. Your third and last complaint applies to our late treaty with England and which you say, not only sacrifices, in favor of that power, our treaty with France, but departs from that line of impartiality, which, as a neutral nation, we were bound to observe. Particular exemplifications are given of this charge in your note, and which I shall particularly notice when I come to reply to it.

This is a summary of your complaints, and to each of which I will now give a precise, and I flatter myself, a satisfactory answer.

First. Of the inexecution of our treaties with this Republic, and of the first example given of it: 'The submission to our tribunals of the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports by your privateers.'

Permit me, in reply to this charge, to ask whether you insist, as a general principle, that our tribunals are inhibited the right of taking cognizance of the validity of your prizes, in all cases; or are there exceptions to it? As a general principle, without exception, I think it cannot be insisted on; because examples may be given, under it, of possible cases, which prove it cannot be so construed and executed, without an encroachment upon the inherent and unalienable rights of sovereignty in both nations, which neither intended to make, nor does the treaty warrant. Suppose, for instance, a prize was taken within our jurisdiction; not upon the high seas,

nor even at the entrance or mouths of those great rivers and bays, which penetrate and fertilize our country; but actually in the interior, and at the wharf of some one of our cities. Is this a case over which our tribunals, or some other branch of our government, have no right to take cognizance? Do you conceive, that the true import of the treaty imposes upon us, and likewise upon you in turn, the obligation thus to abandon, as a theatre of warfare, in which you bear no part, the interior police of your country? Can it be done consistently with the dignity or the rights of sovereignty? Or, suppose the privateer which took the prize and led it into port was fitted out within the United States, the act being unauthorized by treaty;—could we tolerate this, and refuse the like liberty to the other nation at war, without departing from that line of neutrality we ought to observe? You well know that those rights which are secured by treaties, form the only preference in a neutral port, which a neutral nation can give to either of the parties at war; and if these are transcended, that the nation so acting makes itself a party to the war; and in consequence merits to be considered and treated as such. These examples prove that there are some exceptions to the general principle; and perhaps there are others which do not occur to me at present. Are then the cases in question, and which form the basis of your complaint, within the scale of these exceptions? If they are, and I presume they are, I am persuaded you will concur with me in opinion, that the complaint is unfounded;

and that we have only done our duty; a duty we were bound to perform, as well from a respect to our rights as a sovereign and free People, as to the integrity of our character; being a neutral party in the present war.

You will observe, that I admit the principle, if a prize was taken upon the high sea by a privateer fitted out within the Republic, or its dominions;—that in such case our courts have no right to take cognizance of its validity. But is any case of this kind alledged? I presume none is or can be shewn.

2. The second article in this charge, of failing to execute our treaties with this Republic, states, that in contravention with the 17th article of the treaty of commerce, we have admitted British vessels of war into our ports; even such as have taken prizes, and in some cases with their prizes. The article referred to stipulates the right for your vessels of war and privateers to enter our ports with their prizes; and inhibits that right to your enemies. It does not stipulate that the vessels of war belonging to your enemies shall not enter; but simply that they shall not enter *with their prizes.* This latter act, therefore, is, I presume, the subject of your complaint. Here too, it only stipulates, that in case such vessels enter yours or our ports, proper measures shall be taken to compel them to retire as soon as possible. Whether you were rightly informed with respect to the fact, is a point upon which I cannot decide, as I know nothing about it. Our coast is extensive; our Harbours numerous, and the distress of the weather

may have forced them in: Or they may have entered wantonly and in contempt of the authority of our government. Many outrages have been committed on us by that nation in the course of the present war, and this may likewise be in the catalogue. But I will venture to affirm, that no countenance was given by our government to those vessels, whilst they were there; and that all suitable means were taken to compel them to retire, and without delay. You know we have no fleet, and how difficult it is, without one, to execute a stipulation of this kind, with that promptitude which your agents in our country, ardent in your cause, and faithful to your interest, might expect.

3. The third article under this head, states, that we have omitted to execute the consular convention in two of its most important clauses; the first of which secures to the consuls of each nation, in the ports of the other, the exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between their own citizens, and the second of which gives to the Consuls a right to recover such mariners as desert from the vessels of their respective nations.

Upon the first point, the supposed incompetency of the law provided on our part, to execute the judgments of your consuls within our jurisdiction,—I can only say, that as no particular defect is stated, so no precise answer can be given to the objection. And upon the second, which states, that the judges charged by our law to issue warrants for arresting such of your mariners, as desert from their vessels, have latterly required, and against the spirit of the treaty, the

presentation of the original registers of the vessels to which they originally belonged, as the ground whereon to issue these warrants, I have to observe; that by the clause in question (the 9th article) the originals seem to be required; and that the copies spoken of in another part of the treaty (the 5th article) obviously apply to other objects, and not to this. More fully, however, to explain to you the conduct of our government upon this subject, permit me here to add an extract from our law, passed on the 9th of April, 1792, expressly to carry into effect the convention in question, and which applies to both cases.

"The district judges of the United States shall, within their respective districts, be the competent judges for the purposes expressed in the 9th article of the said convention; and it shall be incumbent on them to give aid to the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France, in arresting and securing deserters from the vessels of the French nation, according to the tenor of the said article. And where, by any article of the said convention, the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France are entitled to the aid of the competent executive officers of the country, in the execution of any precept, the Marshals of the United States, and their deputies, shall within their respective districts be the competent officers, and shall give their aid, according to the tenor of the stipulations." By this extract you will clearly perceive, that it was not the intention of our government to frustrate or embarrass the execution of this treaty: On the contrary, that it was its intention to carry it into full effect, according to its

those efforts have been successful; the minister having assured me in a late conference, that the Directory was disposed to accommodate in this respect, and to make its representations, on that subject, through the ordinary channel. He repeated, however, upon this occasion, in terms equally strong with those he had used before, the sense which he said the Directory entertained of the injury done to France, by that treaty, and upon which explanations were expected, and would be sought.

I asked him, what were his objections to the treaty; and to which he replied, as before, in general rather than in precise terms; urging that thereby we had violated our treaties with France, and greatly to her injury, in the present war. I replied, that it was not admitted by our government, that any, the slightest, deviation was made from our treaty with this republic; nor ought it to be presumed, until it was shewn, that such was the case, especially as I had before informed him, and now repeated my willingness to discuss that point, whenever he thought fit. He intimated, that I should certainly hear from him on the subject, and in time to receive a reply, and attend to any observations I chose to make on it; but being now before the Directory, he could not well enter on it, in the manner I proposed, until he had the further orders of that body, in that respect. Thus therefore the matter now stands; and I have only to repeat to you, my assurance, that I shall continue to pay to it all the attention it deservedly merits.[1]

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will doubtless more fully unfold the real authors of those scenes, which were so frightful to humanity, and disgraceful to man; and that they may be discovered must be the wish of all those who are the friends of truth, wherever they reside.

Russia has in the course of the winter encreased her force, 40, or 50,000 men; and, it is said, exhibits a menacing aspect towards Holland; though her minister continues here, and is apparently well received. Spain too continues her military establishment, as before the peace, and whose minister, Del Campo, is daily expected from England, where he has long resided. The probable conjecture, with respect to Spain, is, that as she feared an attack from England, when she made her peace with France, so she finds it necessary to guard herself against it, by suitable precautions, till the war ends. Russia, it is believed, contemplates a blow against the Turks; in the hope, now that Poland is annihilated; France otherwise sufficiently occupied, and the other powers in amity with the Empress, to wrest Constantinople from the Porte, which has long been the object of her inordinate ambition. On the other hand, France seems to be collecting her forces together, and to exert every nerve her system admits of, in preparations for the war; exhibiting to her enemies a countenance, firm and independent, and announcing to the beholding nations her resolution to conquer, or to perish.

With due respect, I am, Sir, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JA^{s} MONROE.

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"The district judges of the United States shall, within their respective districts, be the competent judges for the purposes expressed in the 9th article of the said convention; and it shall be incumbent on them to give aid to the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France, in arresting and securing deserters from the vessels of the French nation, according to the tenor of the said article. And where, by any article of the said convention, the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France are entitled to the aid of the competent executive officers of the country, in the execution of any precept, the Marshals of the United States, and their deputies, shall within their respective districts be the competent officers, and shall give their aid, according to the tenor of the stipulations." By this extract you will clearly perceive, that it was not the intention of our government to frustrate or embarrass the execution of this treaty: On the contrary, that it was its intention to carry it into full effect, according to its

true intent and meaning: and that it has done so, so far as could be done by suitable legal provisions.

It may hereafter be deemed a subject worthy consideration, whether the first of these clauses in that convention had not better be expunged from it. The principle of a foreign court established within any country, with jurisdiction independent of that country, cannot well be reconciled with any correct idea of its sovereignty: Nor can it exercise its functions without frequent interference with the authorities of the country and which naturally occasions strife and discontent between the two governments. These, however, are not the only objections to the measure, though with me they are unanswerable. Under circumstances the most favorable, it were difficult for these consular tribunals to serve their process and execute their judgments. A limited jurisdiction to a town or village only, admits of it. In the United States, therefore, and in France, where the territory is immense, and the number of citizens of each country in the other considerable, as is now the case, it becomes impossible. Many of these, in each country, live perhaps in the interior, and not within one hundred leagues of any Consul of their nation; how compel their attendance before him? How execute the judgment afterwards? For the tribunals of one country to call in the aid of the officers of another, to execute its decrees or judgments, is an institution at best objectionable: but to send those officers round the country, through the range of one hundred leagues is more so.

Permit me then to ask, what are the motives on yours or our part for such an institution? In what respect are you or we interested, that yours or our consuls should have the exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between yours and our citizens, in each other's country? Why not submit those controversies, in common with all others, to the tribunals of each nation? Some considerations in favor of the institution, it is true, occur; but yet they are light and trifling, when compared with the numerous and strong objections that oppose it. So much, however, by way of digression.

4. Your fourth and last example, under this head, states, that the Captain of the Corvette Cassius was arrested in Philadelphia, for an act committed on the high sea; contrary, as you suggest, to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which stipulates, 'That the commandants of vessels, public and private, shall not be detained in any manner whatever;' and of the well known rights of nations, which put the officers of public vessels under the safeguard of their respective flags; and that the said Corvette was likewise seized, though armed at the Cape, upon the pretext that she was armed some time before in Philadelphia.

As you have not stated what the act was with the Commission whereof the Captain was charged, I can of course give no explanation on that head.[1] Satisfied, however, I am, that if the crime was of a nature to authorise our courts to take cognizance of it, he would not be exempted from their jurisdiction by the article of the treaty in question; since that article, as you

[1] *See* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, i., 629.

those efforts have been successful; the minister having assured me in a late conference, that the Directory was disposed to accommodate in this respect, and to make its representations, on that subject, through the ordinary channel. He repeated, however, upon this occasion, in terms equally strong with those he had used before, the sense which he said the Directory entertained of the injury done to France, by that treaty, and upon which explanations were expected, and would be sought.

I asked him, what were his objections to the treaty; and to which he replied, as before, in general rather than in precise terms; urging that thereby we had violated our treaties with France, and greatly to her injury, in the present war. I replied, that it was not admitted by our government, that any, the slightest, deviation was made from our treaty with this republic; nor ought it to be presumed, until it was shewn, that such was the case, especially as I had before informed him, and now repeated my willingness to discuss that point, whenever he thought fit. He intimated, that I should certainly hear from him on the subject, and in time to receive a reply, and attend to any observations I chose to make on it; but being now before the Directory, he could not well enter on it, in the manner I proposed, until he had the further orders of that body, in that respect. Thus therefore the matter now stands; and I have only to repeat to you, my assurance, that I shall continue to pay to it all the attention it deservedly merits.[1]

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First. Of the inexecution of our treaties with this Republic, and of the first example given of it: 'The submission to our tribunals of the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports by your privateers.'

Permit me, in reply to this charge, to ask whether you insist, as a general principle, that our tribunals are inhibited the right of taking cognizance of the validity of your prizes, in all cases; or are there exceptions to it? As a general principle, without exception, I think it cannot be insisted on; because examples may be given, under it, of possible cases, which prove it cannot be so construed and executed, without an encroachment upon the inherent and unalienable rights of sovereignty in both nations, which neither intended to make, nor does the treaty warrant. Suppose, for instance, a prize was taken within our jurisdiction; not upon the high seas,

and that we have only done our duty; a duty we were bound to perform, as well from a respect to our rights as a sovereign and free People, as to the integrity of our character; being a neutral party in the present war.

You will observe, that I admit the principle, if a prize was taken upon the high sea by a privateer fitted out within the Republic, or its dominions;—that in such case our courts have no right to take cognizance of its validity. But is any case of this kind alledged? I presume none is or can be shewn.

2. The second article in this charge, of failing to execute our treaties with this Republic, states, that in contravention with the 17th article of the treaty of commerce, we have admitted British vessels of war into our ports; even such as have taken prizes, and in some cases with their prizes. The article referred to stipulates the right for your vessels of war and privateers to enter our ports with their prizes; and inhibits that right to your enemies. It does not stipulate that the vessels of war belonging to your enemies shall not enter; but simply that they shall not enter *with their prizes.* This latter act, therefore, is, I presume, the subject of your complaint. Here too, it only stipulates, that in case such vessels enter yours or our ports, proper measures shall be taken to compel them to retire as soon as possible. Whether you were rightly informed with respect to the fact, is a point upon which I cannot decide, as I know nothing about it. Our coast is extensive; our Harbours numerous, and the distress of the weather



presentation of the original registers of the vessels to which they originally belonged, as the ground whereon to issue these warrants, I have to observe; that by the clause in question (the 9th article) the originals seem to be required; and that the copies spoken of in another part of the treaty (the 5th article) obviously apply to other objects, and not to this. More fully, however, to explain to you the conduct of our government upon this subject, permit me here to add an extract from our law, passed on the 9th of April, 1792, expressly to carry into effect the convention in question, and which applies to both cases.

"The district judges of the United States shall, within their respective districts, be the competent judges for the purposes expressed in the 9th article of the said convention; and it shall be incumbent on them to give aid to the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France, in arresting and securing deserters from the vessels of the French nation, according to the tenor of the said article. And where, by any article of the said convention, the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France are entitled to the aid of the competent executive officers of the country, in the execution of any precept, the Marshals of the United States, and their deputies, shall within their respective districts be the competent officers, and shall give their aid, according to the tenor of the stipulations." By this extract you will clearly perceive, that it was not the intention of our government to frustrate or embarrass the execution of this treaty: On the contrary, that it was its intention to carry it into full effect, according to its

true intent and meaning; and that it has done so, so far as could be done by suitable legal provisions.

It may hereafter be deemed a subject worthy consideration, whether the first of these clauses in that convention had not better be expunged from it. The principle of a foreign court established within any country, with jurisdiction independent of that country, cannot well be reconciled with any correct idea of its sovereignty: Nor can it exercise its functions without frequent interference with the authorities of the country; and which naturally occasions strife and discontent between the two governments. These, however, are not the only objections to the measure, though with me they are unanswerable. Under circumstances the most favorable, it were difficult for these consular tribunals to serve their process and execute their judgments. A limited jurisdiction to a town or village only, admits of it. In the United States, therefore, and in France, where the territory is immense, and the number of citizens of each country in the other considerable, as is now the case, it becomes impossible. Many of these, in each country, dwell perhaps in the interior, and not within one hundred leagues of any Consul of their nation; how compel their attendance before him? How execute the judgment afterwards? For the tribunals of one country to call in the aid of the officers of another, to execute its decrees or judgments, is an institution at best objectionable; but to send those officers round the country, through the range of one hundred leagues is more so.

Permit me then to ask, what are the motives on yours or our part for such an institution? In what respect are you or we interested, that yours or our consuls should have the exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between yours and our citizens, in each other's country? Why not submit those controversies, in common with all others, to the tribunals of each nation? Some considerations in favor of the institution, it is true, occur; but yet they are light and trifling, when compared with the numerous and strong objections that oppose it. So much, however, by way of digression.

4. Your fourth and last example, under this head, states, that the Captain of the Corvette Cassius was arrested in Philadelphia, for an act committed on the high sea; contrary, as you suggest, to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which stipulates, 'That the commandants of vessels, public and private, shall not be detained in any manner whatever;' and of the well known rights of nations, which put the officers of public vessels under the safeguard of their respective flags; and that the said Corvette was likewise seized, though armed at the Cape, upon the pretext that she was armed some time before in Philadelphia.

As you have not stated what the act was with the Commission whereof the Captain was charged, I can of course give no explanation on that head.[1] Satisfied, however, I am, that if the crime was of a nature to authorise our courts to take cognizance of it, he would not be exempted from their jurisdiction by the article of the treaty in question; since that article, as you

[1] *See* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, i., 629.

perceive, was intended to establish a general principle in the intercourse between the two countries; to give a privilege to the ships of war of each, to enter and retire from the ports of the other; and not to secure in favor of any particular delinquent, an immunity from crimes: Nor, in my opinion, does the law of nations admit of a different construction, or give any other protection. I am happy, however, to hear that he is released, since it furnishes an additional proof that the whole transaction was a judicial one; regular, according to the course of our law, and mingling nothing in it in any view that ought to give offence here.

With respect to the seizure of the Corvette, upon the pretext that she was armed in Philadelphia, I have only to say; that if she was armed there, it was the duty of our government to seize her; the right to arm not being stipulated by treaty: And if that was alledged upon sufficient testimony, as I presume was the case, there was no other way of determining the question than by an examination into it, and in the interim, preventing her sailing. It would be no satisfaction to the other party to the war, for us to examine into the case after she was gone, provided the decision was against her. On the contrary, such conduct would not only expose us to the charge of committing a breach of neutrality, but of likewise doing it collusively.

Second. Your second complaint states an outrage which was committed by a British frigate, upon your Minister, the Citizen Fauchet, in concert with a

British consul; in boarding the Packet in which he embarked, opening his trunks, *&c.* within the waters of the United States, and remaining there afterwards to watch the movements of the frigate in which he sailed; and which you say was not resented as it ought to have been by our government; since you add, the measures which were taken by it in regard to that vessel, and the consul, were the effect of another and subsequent outrage.

The punishment which was inflicted by our government upon the parties who committed that outrage, by revoking the exequatur of the Consul, and ordering that all supplies should be withheld from the Frigate; as likewise that she should forthwith depart without the waters of the United States, was, I think you will admit, an adequate one for the offence. Certain it is, that as we have no fleet, it was the only one in our power to inflict; and that this punishment was inflicted in consequence of that outrage, you will, I presume, likewise admit, after you have perused the act of the President upon that subject; a copy of which I herewith transmit to you; and by which you will perceive, that there was no distinct outrage offered to the United States, upon that occasion, by the parties in question; but that both the one and the other act (the attempt made upon the Packet boat in which your minister had embarked, by the Captain of a British Frigate,[1] and which constituted the first; and the writing of an insolent letter,

[1] "Frigate" in the original record changed to "ship of war" in Monroe's print appendixed to his *View* and in *State Papers*.

by the same Captain, to the governor of the State of Rhode-Island, in concert with the British consul there, and which constituted the second) were only several incidents to the same transaction, forming together a single offence; and for which that punishment was inflicted on those parties.

I think proper here to add, as a further proof that the President was neither inattentive to what was due to your rights upon that occasion, nor to the character of the United States; that he gave orders to our minister at London, to complain formally to that government of that outrage; and to demand of it such satisfaction upon the parties, as the nature of the insult required; and which has, doubtless, either been given, or is still expected.

Third. Your third, and last complaint applies to our late treaty with England; and which, you say, has sacrificed, in favor of that power, our connection with France, and the rights of neutrality the most common.

1. In support of this charge you observe, that we have not only departed from the principles of the armed neutrality adopted in the course of the late war; but have abandoned, in favor of England, the limits which the rights of nations and our own treaties with all other powers, and even England in her treaties with many other powers, have given to contraband.

2. That we have also consented that provisions should be deemed contraband, not when destined to a blockaded port only, as should be the case; but in

all cases, by tacitly acknowledging the pretensions of England, to place at pleasure and by proclamation, not only your Islands, but even France herself in that dilemma.

The principles of the armed neutrality set on foot by the Empress of Russia, in harmony with the other neutral powers, at the time you mention, and acceded to by all the powers then at war against England, are extremely dear to us; because they are just in themselves, and in many respects very important to our welfare: We insert them in every treaty we make with those powers who are willing to adopt them; and our hope is, that they will soon become universal. But even in the war of which you speak, and when the combination against England was most formidable, all the maritime powers being arranged against her, you well know that she never acceded to them. How compel her then, upon the present occasion, when that combination was not only broken, but many of the powers, then parties to it and against England, were now enlisted on her side, in support of her principles?[1] You must be sensible, that under these circumstances, it was impossible for us to obtain from that power the recognition of those principles; and that, of course, we are not culpable for having failed to accomplish that object.

I regret also, that we did not succeed in obtaining from that power, a more liberal scale of contraband, than was obtained: For as our articles of exportation are chiefly articles of the first necessity, and always in

[1] *See* Monroe's note, p. 142, ante.

will doubtless more fully unfold the real authors of those scenes, which were so frightful to humanity, and disgraceful to man; and that they may be discovered must be the wish of all those who are the friends of truth, wherever they reside.

Russia has in the course of the winter encreased her force, 40, or 50,000 men; and, it is said, exhibits a menacing aspect towards Holland; though her minister continues here, and is apparently well received. Spain too continues her military establishment, as before the peace, and whose minister, Del Campo, is daily expected from England, where he has long resided. The probable conjecture, with respect to Spain, is, that as she feared an attack from England, when she made her peace with France, so she finds it necessary to guard herself against it, by suitable precautions, till the war ends. Russia, it is believed, contemplates a blow against the Turks; in the hope, now that Poland is annihilated; France otherwise sufficiently occupied, and the other powers in amity with the Empress, to wrest Constantinople from the Porte, which has long been the object of her inordinate ambition. On the other hand, France seems to be collecting her forces together, and to exert every nerve her system admits of, in preparations for the war; exhibiting to her enemies a countenance, firm and independent, and announcing to the beholding nations her resolution to conquer, or to perish.

With due respect, I am, Sir, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JA^{s} MONROE.

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

PARIS, March 15th,[1] 1796 [25 Ventose l'an 4] and 20th. of the Independence of the United States of America.

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I was lately honoured with your note of the 19th Ventose (March 9th) objecting to several measures of our government, that have occurred in the course of the present war, and to which, I presume I shall herein render you a satisfactory answer. For this purpose I shall pursue in reply the order you have observed, in stating those objections; and, according to the light I have on the subject, give to each the answer it requires.

These objections are comprized under three distinct heads, a summary of which I will first expose, that my reply to each may be better understood.

First. Your first complaint is, that we have failed to execute our treaties with you, and in the following respects.

1. By submitting to our tribunals the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports by your privateers. 2. By admitting English vessels of war into our ports, against the stipulation of the 17th article of our treaty of commerce, even after such vessels had taken prizes from you, and in some cases with their prizes. 3. By omitting to execute the consular convention in two of its most important clauses; having failed to

[1] "Why these communications have these dates was explained to Mr. Pickering."

The foregoing note is appended to this communication as given by Monroe in his VIEW. For the explanation see page 491, post.

Monroe sent the copy of this with his letter of May 2, to the Secretary of State.

provide, as you suggest, suitable means for carrying those clauses into effect; the first of which secures to your consuls within the United States the exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between French citizens; and the second, the right to pursue, and recover, all mariners who desert from your vessels. 4. By suffering in the port of Philadelphia, the arrestation of the captain of the Corvette Cassius, for an act committed by him on the high sea, and which you say is contrary to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which stipulates, that 'the commandants of public and private vessels shall not be detained in any manner;' and the rights of nations, which put such officers under the protection of their respective flags: And by likewise suffering the arrestation of that Corvette, though armed at the Cape,[1] upon the pretext, that she was armed in the United States.

Second. Your second complaint states, that an outrage, which was made to this republic, in the person of its minister, the citizen Fauchet, by an English vessel (the Africa) in concert with an English consul, —in arresting, within the jurisdiction of the United States, the packet-boat in which he had embarked, searching his trunks, and afterwards remaining within the waters of those States for near a month, to watch the movements of the vessel in which he finally sailed, was left unpunished; since you urge, that the measures which were taken by our government, in regard to that vessel, and the Consul, were not taken in a suitable time to remedy the evil, and were pro-

[1] Cape François.

duced by a subsequent outrage, and of a very different kind.

Third. Your third and last complaint applies to our late treaty with England and which you say, not only sacrifices, in favor of that power, our treaty with France, but departs from that line of impartiality, which, as a neutral nation, we were bound to observe. Particular exemplifications are given of this charge in your note, and which I shall particularly notice when I come to reply to it.

This is a summary of your complaints, and to each of which I will now give a precise, and I flatter myself, a satisfactory answer.

First. Of the inexecution of our treaties with this Republic, and of the first example given of it: 'The submission to our tribunals of the cognizance of prizes brought into our ports by your privateers.'

Permit me, in reply to this charge, to ask whether you insist, as a general principle, that our tribunals are inhibited the right of taking cognizance of the validity of your prizes, in all cases; or are there exceptions to it? As a general principle, without exception, I think it cannot be insisted on; because examples may be given, under it, of possible cases, which prove it cannot be so construed and executed, without an encroachment upon the inherent and unalienable rights of sovereignty in both nations, which neither intended to make, nor does the treaty warrant. Suppose, for instance, a prize was taken within our jurisdiction; not upon the high seas,

nor even at the entrance or mouths of those great rivers and bays, which penetrate and fertilize our country; but actually in the interior, and at the wharf of some one of our cities. Is this a case over which our tribunals, or some other branch of our government, have no right to take cognizance? Do you conceive, that the true import of the treaty imposes upon us, and likewise upon you in turn, the obligation thus to abandon, as a theatre of warfare, in which you bear no part, the interior police of your country? Can it be done consistently with the dignity or the rights of sovereignty? Or, suppose the privateer which took the prize and led it into port was fitted out within the United States, the act being unauthorized by treaty;—could we tolerate this, and refuse the like liberty to the other nation at war, without departing from that line of neutrality we ought to observe? You well know that those rights which are secured by treaties, form the only preference in a neutral port, which a neutral nation can give to either of the parties at war; and if these are transcended, that the nation so acting makes itself a party to the war; and in consequence merits to be considered and treated as such. These examples prove that there are some exceptions to the general principle; and perhaps there are others which do not occur to me at present. Are then the cases in question, and which form the basis of your complaint, within the scale of these exceptions? If they are, and I presume they are, I am persuaded you will concur with me in opinion, that the complaint is unfounded;

and that we have only done our duty; a duty we were bound to perform, as well from a respect to our rights as a sovereign and free People, as to the integrity of our character; being a neutral party in the present war.

You will observe, that I admit the principle, if a prize was taken upon the high sea by a privateer fitted out within the Republic, or its dominions;—that in such case our courts have no right to take cognizance of its validity. But is any case of this kind alledged? I presume none is or can be shewn.

2. The second article in this charge, of failing to execute our treaties with this Republic, states, that in contravention with the 17th article of the treaty of commerce, we have admitted British vessels of war into our ports; even such as have taken prizes, and in some cases with their prizes. The article referred to stipulates the right for your vessels of war and privateers to enter our ports with their prizes; and inhibits that right to your enemies. It does not stipulate that the vessels of war belonging to your enemies shall not enter; but simply that they shall not enter *with their prizes.* This latter act, therefore, is, I presume, the subject of your complaint. Here too, it only stipulates, that in case such vessels enter yours or our ports, proper measures shall be taken to compel them to retire as soon as possible. Whether you were rightly informed with respect to the fact, is a point upon which I cannot decide, as I know nothing about it. Our coast is extensive; our Harbours numerous, and the distress of the weather

may have forced them in: Or they may have entered wantonly and in contempt of the authority of our government. Many outrages have been committed on us by that nation in the course of the present war. and this may likewise be in the catalogue. But I will venture to affirm, that no countenance was given by our government to those vessels, whilst they were there: and that all suitable means were taken to compel them to retire. and without delay. You know we have no fleet, and how difficult it is, without one. to execute a stipulation of this kind, with that promptitude which your agents in our country, ardent in your cause, and faithful to your interest, might expect.

3. The third article under this head, states, that we have omitted to execute the consular convention in two of its most important clauses; the first of which secures to the consuls of each nation, in the ports of the other, the exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between their own citizens, and the second of which gives to the Consuls a right to recover such mariners as desert from the vessels of their respective nations.

Upon the first point, the supposed incompetency of the law provided on our part, to execute the judgments of your consuls within our jurisdiction,—I can only say, that as no particular defect is stated, so no precise answer can be given to the objection. And upon the second, which states, that the judges charged by our law to issue warrants for arresting such of your mariners, as desert from their vessels, have latterly required, and against the spirit of the treaty, the

presentation of the original registers of the vessels to which they originally belonged, as the ground whereon to issue these warrants, I have to observe; that by the clause in question (the 9th article) the originals seem to be required; and that the copies spoken of in another part of the treaty (the 5th article) obviously apply to other objects, and not to this. More fully, however, to explain to you the conduct of our government upon this subject, permit me here to add an extract from our law, passed on the 9th of April, 1792, expressly to carry into effect the convention in question, and which applies to both cases.

"The district judges of the United States shall, within their respective districts, be the competent judges for the purposes expressed in the 9th article of the said convention; and it shall be incumbent on them to give aid to the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France, in arresting and securing deserters from the vessels of the French nation, according to the tenor of the said article. And where, by any article of the said convention, the Consuls and vice-Consuls of France are entitled to the aid of the competent executive officers of the country, in the execution of any precept, the Marshals of the United States, and their deputies, shall within their respective districts be the competent officers, and shall give their aid, according to the tenor of the stipulations." By this extract you will clearly perceive, that it was not the intention of our government to frustrate or embarrass the execution of this treaty: On the contrary, that it was its intention to carry it into full effect, according to its

true intent and meaning; and that it has done so, so far as could be done by suitable legal provisions.

It may hereafter be deemed a subject worthy consideration, whether the first of these clauses in that convention had not better be expunged from it. The principle of a foreign court established within any country, with jurisdiction independent of that country, cannot well be reconciled with any correct idea of its sovereignty: Nor can it exercise its functions without frequent interference with the authorities of the country; and which naturally occasions strife and discontent between the two governments. These, however, are not the only objections to the measure, though with me they are unanswerable. Under circumstances the most favorable, it were difficult for these consular tribunals to serve their process and execute their judgments. A limited jurisdiction to a town or village only, admits of it. In the United States, therefore, and in France, where the territory is immense, and the number of citizens of each country in the other considerable, as is now the case, it becomes impossible. Many of these, in each country, dwell perhaps in the interior, and not within one hundred leagues of any Consul of their nation; how compel their attendance before him? How execute the judgment afterwards? For the tribunals of one country to call in the aid of the officers of another, to execute its decrees or judgments, is an institution at best objectionable; but to send those officers round the country, through the range of one hundred leagues is more so.

Permit me then to ask, what are the motives on yours or our part for such an institution? In what respect are you or we interested, that yours or our consuls should have the exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between yours and our citizens, in each other's country? Why not submit those controversies, in common with all others, to the tribunals of each nation? Some considerations in favor of the institution, it is true, occur; but yet they are light and trifling, when compared with the numerous and strong objections that oppose it. So much, however, by way of digression.

4. Your fourth and last example, under this head, states, that the Captain of the Corvette Cassius was arrested in Philadelphia, for an act committed on the high sea; contrary, as you suggest, to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which stipulates, 'That the commandants of vessels, public and private, shall not be detained in any manner whatever;' and of the well known rights of nations, which put the officers of public vessels under the safeguard of their respective flags; and that the said Corvette was likewise seized, though armed at the Cape, upon the pretext that she was armed some time before in Philadelphia.

As you have not stated what the act was with the Commission whereof the Captain was charged, I can of course give no explanation on that head.[1] Satisfied, however, I am, that if the crime was of a nature to authorise our courts to take cognizance of it, he would not be exempted from their jurisdiction by the article of the treaty in question; since that article, as you

[1] *See* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, i., 629.

perceive, was intended to establish a general principle in the intercourse between the two countries; to give a privilege to the ships of war of each, to enter and retire from the ports of the other; and not to secure in favor of any particular delinquent, an immunity from crimes: Nor, in my opinion, does the law of nations admit of a different construction, or give any other protection. I am happy, however, to hear that he is released, since it furnishes an additional proof that the whole transaction was a judicial one; regular, according to the course of our law, and mingling nothing in it in any view that ought to give offence here.

With respect to the seizure of the Corvette, upon the pretext that she was armed in Philadelphia, I have only to say; that if she was armed there, it was the duty of our government to seize her; the right to arm not being stipulated by treaty: And if that was alledged upon sufficient testimony, as I presume was the case, there was no other way of determining the question than by an examination into it, and in the interim, preventing her sailing. It would be no satisfaction to the other party to the war, for us to examine into the case after she was gone, provided the decision was against her. On the contrary, such conduct would not only expose us to the charge of committing a breach of neutrality, but of likewise doing it collusively.

Second. Your second complaint states an outrage which was committed by a British frigate, upon your Minister, the Citizen Fauchet, in concert with a

British consul; in boarding the Packet in which he embarked, opening his trunks, *&c.* within the waters of the United States, and remaining there afterwards to watch the movements of the frigate in which he sailed; and which you say was not resented as it ought to have been by our government; since you add, the measures which were taken by it in regard to that vessel, and the consul, were the effect of another and subsequent outrage.

The punishment which was inflicted by our government upon the parties who committed that outrage, by revoking the exequatur of the Consul, and ordering that all supplies should be withheld from the Frigate; as likewise that she should forthwith depart without the waters of the United States, was, I think you will admit, an adequate one for the offence. Certain it is, that as we have no fleet, it was the only one in our power to inflict; and that this punishment was inflicted in consequence of that outrage, you will, I presume, likewise admit, after you have perused the act of the President upon that subject; a copy of which I herewith transmit to you; and by which you will perceive, that there was no distinct outrage offered to the United States, upon that occasion, by the parties in question; but that both the one and the other act (the attempt made upon the Packet boat in which your minister had embarked, by the Captain of a British Frigate,[1] and which constituted the first; and the writing of an insolent letter,

[1] "Frigate" in the original record changed to "ship of war" in Monroe's print appendixed to his *View* and in State Papers.

by the same Captain, to the governor of the State of Rhode-Island, in concert with the British consul there, and which constituted the second) were only several incidents to the same transaction, forming together a single offence; and for which that punishment was inflicted on those parties.

I think proper here to add, as a further proof that the President was neither inattentive to what was due to your rights upon that occasion, nor to the character of the United States; that he gave orders to our minister at London, to complain formally to that government of that outrage; and to demand of it such satisfaction upon the parties, as the nature of the insult required; and which has, doubtless, either been given, or is still expected.

Third. Your third, and last complaint applies to our late treaty with England; and which, you say, has sacrificed, in favor of that power, our connection with France, and the rights of neutrality the most common.

1. In support of this charge you observe, that we have not only departed from the principles of the armed neutrality adopted in the course of the late war; but have abandoned, in favor of England, the limits which the rights of nations and our own treaties with all other powers, and even England in her treaties with many other powers, have given to contraband.

2. That we have also consented that provisions should be deemed contraband, not when destined to a blockaded port only, as should be the case; but in

all cases, by tacitly acknowledging the pretensions of England, to place at pleasure and by proclamation, not only your Islands, but even France herself in that dilemma.

The principles of the armed neutrality set on foot by the Empress of Russia, in harmony with the other neutral powers, at the time you mention, and acceded to by all the powers then at war against England, are extremely dear to us; because they are just in themselves, and in many respects very important to our welfare: We insert them in every treaty we make with those powers who are willing to adopt them; and our hope is, that they will soon become universal. But even in the war of which you speak, and when the combination against England was most formidable, all the maritime powers being arranged against her, you well know that she never acceded to them. How compel her then, upon the present occasion, when that combination was not only broken, but many of the powers, then parties to it and against England, were now enlisted on her side, in support of her principles?[1] You must be sensible, that under these circumstances, it was impossible for us to obtain from that power the recognition of those principles; and that, of course, we are not culpable for having failed to accomplish that object.

I regret also, that we did not succeed in obtaining from that power, a more liberal scale of contraband, than was obtained: For as our articles of exportation are chiefly articles of the first necessity, and always in

[1] *See* Monroe's note, p. 142, ante.

great demand here, and every where else, it was equally an object of importance to us to enlarge the freedom of commerce in that respect, by diminishing the list of contraband. Perhaps no nation on the Globe is more interested in this object, than we are. But here too, the same difficulty occurred, that had in the preceding case; and it was in consequence deemed expedient, for the time, to relinquish a point we could not obtain; suffering the ancient law of nations to remain unchanged in any respect. Is it urged, that we have made any article contraband that was not so before, by the known and well established law of nations; which England had not a right to seize by that law, and did not daily seize, when they fell in her way? This cannot be urged; because the fact is otherwise: For although we have not ameliorated the law of nations in that respect, yet certainly we have not changed it for the worse; and which alone could give you just cause of complaint.

With respect to the objection stated to a clause in the 18th article of the treaty with England, which presumes we are thereby prohibited bringing provisions from the United States to France, I have only to add; that no such prohibition is to be found in it, or other stipulation which changes the law of nations in that respect: On the contrary, that article leaves the law of nations where it was before; authorizing the seizure in those cases only, where such provisions are contraband, 'by the existing law of nations,' and according to our construction, when carrying to a blockaded port; and in which case payment is stipu-

lated; but in no respect is the law of nations changed, or any right given to the British to seize other than they had before; and such, I presume, you will agree, is the true import of that article.

You will observe, by the article in question, that when our provisions destined for a blockaded port are seized, though by the law of nations subject to confiscation, they are nevertheless exempted from it; and the owners of such provisions entitled to the payment of their value. Surely this stipulation cannot tend to discourage my countrymen from adventuring with provisions into the ports of this Republic; nor in any other respect prevent their enterprises here: On the contrary, was it not probable, that it would produce the opposite effect; since thereby the only penalty which could deter them, that of confiscation, in the case above mentioned, was completely done away?

Thus, Citizen Minister, I have answered, according to the views of our government, and the light I have upon the subject, the objections you have stated against several of its measures adopted in the course of the present war; and I hope to your satisfaction. That any occurrence should take place in the annals of the Republics, which gave cause for suspicion, that you doubted, in any degree, our sincere and affectionate attachment to your welfare, is a circumstance that cannot otherwise than give pain to our government and our people. That these, however, should be removed by a fair and candid examination of your complaints, on both sides, is the best consolation that

such an occurrence can admit of. If by my feeble efforts, I contribute in any degree to promote that end, and preserve the harmony and affection which have so long subsisted between us, and I trust, will always subsist, be assured that I accomplish an object the most grateful to my feelings, that I can possibly accomplish.[1] Permit me in concluding this letter to assure you of the respect and esteem with which I am Sir your very humble servant.

JAMES MONROE.

[1] For the full text of "A Summary Exposition of the French Government against the United States." See *State Papers, Foreign Relations*, I., 732.

In transmitting the complaint of M. de la Croix with Monroe's answer to the President at Mount Vernon Pickering wrote to Washington "officially" as follows:

"After the multiplied rumours of serious uneasiness and even of resentment on the part of the French Republic towards the United States, it will give you great satisfaction to find their complaints to be such only as the statement of M. de la Croix exhibits; all being either wholly unfounded, or resting on erroneous representations or misconceptions of facts, or misconstructions of treaties and the law of nations. Mr. Monroe's answer to these complaints is sufficient to obviate them; although the facts and arguments with which he had been furnished authorized on some points, a more forcible explanation."

Privately on the same day (July 21, 1796) he wrote: "De La Croix exhibition of the causes of complaint from the French Republic against the 'government' of the U. States (which you will receive with Colo. Monroe's answer in my public letter of this date) will place you at ease respecting that country. The statement is as feeble as could have been desired; and serves to confirm the suspicions some months since entertained that the ominous letters of Mr. Monroe composed a part of a solemn farce to answer certain party purposes in the U. States. The fifteen sail of the line (as announced in the anonymous letters) and an envoy extraordinary, just to shew himself, make a declaration and return, were to begin the second act. The defeat of the British Treaty, and perhaps a change in our own administration & possibly a war, were to make up the catastrophe."

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

March 24, 1796.

DEAR SIR,—You will decipher the following by the public cipher in the hands of the Secry of State.

A letter from you to Gouv[r] Morris[1] inclosed to Mr Deas has fallen by some accident into the hands of the Directoire. It contains five or six pages, is said to be very confidential, authorizing communication with L[d] Grenville &c. The person who told me of it & who read it says it has produc'd an ill effect. He adds that you say you have kept no copy of the letter. I mention this that you may be aware of the fact upon the idea it may be useful & cannot be hurtful to you.

My publick communications are so full that I have little to add here, especially as Dr. Brokenborough will present this—a sensible young man who has been here thro' the winter. With great respect & esteem I am dear Sir your very humble servant.

JA[s] MONROE.

[1] From the Draft in the Monroe papers, the original not being among the Washington Papers. On this draft is endorsed, in the handwriting of Mr. Purviance the following:

"relative to a letter from Gen[l] Washington which has fallen through accident into the hands of the *French Directoire*—It was directed to Gouv[r] Morris thro' Mr. Deas—authorizing communications with Lord Grenville etc., etc. It caused a *very bad* effect in the *Directoire*"; and in Monroe's handwriting this note:

"Mr. Purviance will be so kind as put in cipher the middle par: & return it me as soon as possible that I may write it in my own hand."

Washington's letter to Morris is dated December 22, 1795. *See* Ford's *Writings of Washington*, vol. xiii., page 147. Washington replied to Monroe August 25. *Idem.*, page 260.

"William Allen Deas was chargé d'affaires in London during Mr. Pinckney's absence in Madrid."—FORD.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING.]

PARIS, March 25th, 1796.[1]

SIR,—Finding from the communication of the minister of foreign affairs, that the character of the mission about to be despatched to the United States, and its objects, were still before the Directoire, and fearing that the ulterior communication promised me by the minister, would be made at such a time, as to render it impossible for me to produce any effect on the measure itself (if, indeed, in any case it were so) I deemed it my duty, and accordingly demanded an audience of the Directoire on that subject, stating the information already received from the Minister thereon, as the basis or motive of that demand. An audience was granted, and in consequence I attended the Directoire on the 8th instant, in full council, assisted by the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of marine. As I had demanded the audience, it became necessary for me to open the subject; and I did by stating what the Minister had informed me of their dissatisfaction with our treaty with England, and some other meas-

[1] This letter concludes the series of letters (November 5, December 6 and 22, 1795, January 26, February 16 and 20, and March 10 and 25, 1796) that Pickering acknowledged so severely in his reply of June 13, wherein—although admitting that the reasons by which Monroe had dissuaded France from her contemplated course "were certainly very cogent"—he conveyed to our Minister Plenipotentiary the Administration's censure on his line of conduct in regard to the Jay Treaty, alleging that he had withheld documents (Randolph's letter of July 14, 1795,—received by Monroe about the first of October, and Pickering's letter of September 12,—received about the first of December,) illustrative of our government's views on that treaty. Monroe received Pickering's letter of June 13, in September, answering it on the 10th of that month. His recall, dated August 22, 1796, was received in November.

ures that had occurred during the present war; and respecting which it was contemplated to make some representation to our government by their Minister, who was about to depart for the United States. I told them, that unless I knew distinctly what their complaints were, it was impossible for me to refute, or even answer them: That I did not come there to ask from that body such exposition, for the purpose of discussing the subject with it, because I knew it was against rule: That I wished, however, the Directoire would cause the minister of foreign affairs to lay open those complaints to me; receive my answer, and enter into a full discussion of them; and in the interim, that it would suspend any decision, in regard to the merit of those complaints, or of the mission spoken of, until the result of that discussion was before it: That the discussion itself could not otherwise than throw light on the subject, and in the degree promote the interest of both countries, so far as that might be affected by their decision in the case in question. The Directoire replied that nothing was more reasonable than my demand, and that it should be complied with. Some general observations were then made by that body, upon the subject of its complaints; and to which I made the answers that occurred at the time; dissipating its doubts in one or two instances at once, and particularly with respect to the countenance it heared was given in the United States to their emigrants; by stating, that we received all Frenchmen who visited us, as friends: That we did not, nor could we, discriminate between them generally, on account of their

political principles; because we did not know what their principles were: That we saw in them all, the people of a nation to which we were much attached for services rendered us by it in the day of our difficulties, and treated them accordingly: And with respect to the President, that he had given orders, that certain distinguished Emigrants, otherwise in some respect entitled to attention, but known to be obnoxious here, should on that account be excluded his public Hall, which was open to all other persons. Several of the members of the Directoire reciprocated with great earnestness, professions of friendship for us; assuring me at the same time, that no step should be taken in the business in question, but upon due deliberation, and after the discussion I had asked should be finished, and my arguments fully weighed; and thus I left them.

I shall transmit to you, as soon as it is closed, the result of any communication which may pass between the minister and myself; and I doubt not the discussion will produce a favorable effect. I shall certainly avail myself of all the lights within my reach, to do justice to a cause of so much importance to my country.

Upon some misunderstanding with the Directoire, Pichegru has sent in his resignation, and obtained his dismission; an event that must be deemed unfortunate to the Republic, as he is, doubtless, a man of great talents, and integrity. Clairfait has done the same thing with the Emperor; so that each army is deprived of a great chief.

The finances here continue in derangement; and which is not likely to be remedied by a late act, calling in the assignats, and issuing in their stead a species of paper, called mandats, founded on the national domains, with the right in the holder of that paper to take property for it, where he likes and where he pleases, at the ancient value. This project resembles a bank whose stock consists of, and whose credit of course depends on, land; and which, as it never succeeded well in the lands of individuals, will most probably never succeed well in the lands of the public.

I herewith transmit you extracts of two letters [1]

[1] Extract from Joel Barlow's letter of February 23, 1796, dated at Alicante: "I promised to write you from time to time such details as might be interesting for you to know respecting the business with which I am charged. I am sorry however that my first letter must be occupied with circumstances which look rather discouraging. It is almost needless to mention to you the delays I met with on my way to this place, as the story has very little connection with what is to follow, and as these delays have not at all affected the public interest, although the apprehension that they might affect it gave me some vexation at the time. At Marseilles I freighted an American Brig on which I embarked myself and the public property which I brought to touch at Alicante and proceed to the place of destination. This vessel arrived at Alicante after fighting the storms and contrary winds 21 days; but fortunately for my poor stomach, the first violent gale forced us to take shelter in the Bay of Roses, where I went on shore and pursued my journey by land.

"On my arrival here I found no letters or orders from M[r]. Humphreys, but instead of them have collected from the best information I can obtain here, the following state of facts relative to the business in question.

"It appears that in the Treaty made by Mr. Donaldson no precise time was fixed upon for the payment of the money stipulated to be paid by the United States, but it was understood that it should be within about three months. The treaty I believe was signed in the early part of September. After the expiration of the above term the Dey began to be impatient and to manifest his uneasiness that the money did not appear, and that there were no signs of its appearance, saying he was sorry he had made the treaty, as from present circumstances it was against the interest of the regency, but as he had signed the

lately received from Mr. Barlow; and which I do with a view of giving you every information that comes to my knowledge upon the interesting topic on which they treat.

With great respect I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, JA^s^ MONROE.

treaty it should be faithfully executed on his part provided the money came within reasonable time.

"Mr Donaldson being somewhat alarmed at these appearances and at hearing nothing from the money, procured a Moorish barque and sent Mr Sloan, his interpreter, to Alicante with despatches for Mr Humphreys. Sloan left Algiers about the 5th of January and arrived here about the 10th, he being obliged to perform quarantine. Mr. Montgomery our Consul here, took the despatches and went to Lisbon supposing the affair too pressing to admit of delay, and the despatches too important to be entrusted to the port. Sloan was one of the American prisoners and had been employed as a domestic servant to the Dey. He is now here waiting an answer from Lisbon. It is from him and Mr. John Montgomery, the Consul's brother, that I have the above information.

"We will now look to the side of Lisbon and the causes of delay in that quarter. You know the credit on which the money was to be lodged in London. You know too that Mr Humphreys who left Havre some time in October had a passage of above 40 days from that place to Lisbon. Mr. Donaldson had despatched Captain O'Brien from Algiers to Lisbon with the treaty early in September; he probably arrived within that month. But as Mr. Humphreys did not arrive until towards the last of November everything must have remained inactive during that interval. I am informed that Mr. Humphreys after his arrival could not negociate bills on London for more than one fourth of the sum, and it appears that on this account he did not negociate any. Of this however I am not sure. But in consequence of his not being able to raise money in that place sufficient to fulfill the contract with the Dey, he sent Captain O'Brien to London (not earlier than January I believe but am not accurately informed as to the date) to bring the specie from thence. O'Brien went in the brig which Mr. Humphreys had retained in the public service. By the last letters from Mr. Montgomery at Lisbon of the 13th. of February nothing had been heard there of O'Brien since he sailed. Indeed if no other accident has delayed him, the contrary winds must have prevented his return. They have been without packets from Lisbon for near two months; one vessel has arrived after a passage of 70 days. It is now six months since the signing of the treaty, and it must be at least another month before the treaty can be paid.

"But there are some other circumstances which serve to increase my apprehensions as to the result of this affair, as they convince me that the Dey is sincere in saying that the treaty is against the interests of the regency and that

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

[TIMOTHY PICKERING.]

PARIS, May 2d, 1796.

SIR,—I informed you in my last of the 25th of March, that I was promised by the Directoire in an audience I had obtained of that body, that the minister of foreign affairs should state to me such objec-

he is sorry it is made. Since this was done, he had a rupture with the English which is now settled as it appears much to his satisfaction. Sloan says that he told him he would rather wish the Americans would not comply with the treaty, for since his new treaty with England he could do much better to be at war with us; but that he was ready to terminate the matter either one way or the other, and it should be done immediately. The meaning of which as I conjecture is that he is to make a peace with Portugal, if he does not conclude one with us, but if he is obliged to be at peace with us he will not accept the terms which Portugal will offer, as a peace with that power can be of no service to him unless he can cruize against us.

"In consequence of his new treaty with England, he has refused to accept the same Consul who was there before the rupture, but has desired that the old one be sent—a Mr. Logge—who was there in 1793, and who persuaded him to the truce with Portugal by holding up the advantages of going out of the Straights after the Americans. Sloan says he was present at some of these conversations, and that he saw Logge in the presence of the Dey instructing the captains by charts where they were to cruise for the American ships, saying he would forfeit his head if they did not catch a dozen of them in a month provided they would follow his directions. It is certain that the most inveterate enemies we have in that place as well as all others under heaven are the English.

"Another circumstance has been mentioned to me—how much weight it will bear I know not—that the French consul there is rather in disgrace at present; said to be on account of a delay in a payment of the part of the republic for some cargoes of grain.

"I ought to have told you that after receiving the above information on my arrival here, I was clearly of opinion that it was best to wait here till the money should come or be absolutely on its way, as I was well convinced that for any more of us to appear in Algiers without the means of fulfilling the contract, and without any thing new to say on the subject would only serve to irritate the Dey. And a few days after my arrival I received a letter from Humphreys in answer to what I wrote him in Paris, advising me to the same thing." On the 26th. of February Barlow again wrote from which it appeared that the Dey had conceived a strong personal dislike to Donaldson said to be owing to a peevish uncomplying temper in this latter. But this adds Barlow is perhaps

tions, as were entertained by this government, to certain measures of our own; and, in the interim, that no step should be taken, under the existing impression, nor until my reply was received and fully weighed; and I now have the pleasure to transmit the result of the communication which afterwards took place between the minister and myself, on that subject.

I do not know what effect my reply has had upon the mind of the Directoire; because it was only sent in a few days since. I shall endeavour to ascertain this, if possible, and in case I do, will immediately afterwards apprize you of it.

[1] I think proper to communicate to you an incident which took place between the minister and myself, after I had obtained from the Directoire a promise that he should state the objections above referred to and discuss their merits with me, and which was as heretofore intimated to you on the 8th. of March last. Soon after that period I received from the minister the communication promised in a note of the same date but different in some other respects from the present one, and particularly in the number of complaints, two of the catalogue being now given up by him and to which I replied as soon as I could prepare my reply in a note bearing likewise the same date with that which I now inclose you. After he had

calumny. Mr. Cathart, who styled himself "The Dey's head Christian Clerk," reported a conversation he had with the Dey in which the latter declared that unless the matter in hand was settled within one month he would order back into captivity. The Dey was strongly of the opinion that the United States were trifling with him.

[1] This and the paragraphs immediately following omitted by Monroe in his print appended to his *View*: omitted also in State Papers.

perused my reply he was sensible he had insisted on some points that were not tenable, and in consequence asked that I would permit him to retake his note returning mine, that he might correct himself, and of course that I would consider the discussion as yet to be commenced. I told him immediately that I would do so with pleasure, because I did not consider myself in the light of a solictor bound to catch at and take advantage of little errors: that I wished upon all occasions, and with every one, and especially upon the present occasion with him to act with candour and in consequence I soon afterwards restored him his note and took back my own.

At the time when I made the minister this promise, I thought it in my power fully to comply with it. I had it is true, according to custom, written and enclosed you a copy of both papers but yet I thought Dr Brockenbrough to whom I had entrusted my letter to you was in France within my reach, so that I might recover it. Upon enquiry however I found he had departed by way of Dunkirk for London, a route I knew he intended to take, and in which state of things all that I could do was to write and request him to return me that letter and which I immediately did. I have not yet heard from him and of course cannot tell whether I shall recover it or not. As soon however as I knew that he had gone I apprised the Minister of it, as likewise of the above circumstances, satisfying him that I had acted with good faith so far as depended on me, in fulfilling in every respect the promise I had made; and in communicating the above to you. I do it as well to explain this transaction,

and which will require explanation in case you receive that letter, as to make known to you as far as depends on me, the condition in which you receive it.

The Minister thought proper to give his second communication the same date with the former one, although more than a fortnight had intervened between the one and the other: and in consequence I followed his example giving my latter reply the same date with the former one. His motive I did not enquire into: mine was that the Directoire might see that the delay which took place did not proceed from me.[1]

In some respects I was pleased that the minister requested this accommodation from me because the yielding it could not be otherwise than grateful to him and produce in consequence a suitable correspondent impression in his mind towards: and because I knew that time would thereby be gained for reflexion, always necessary upon great questions, and often favourable to wise and temperate councils; and lastly because I knew that no possible injury could arise from the delay, the Directoire having promised me that no step should be taken until after my answer was received and fully weighed, and in none of these respects have I according to appearances been disappointed.

The campaign was lately opened on the side of Italy, by a suite of three brilliant victories obtained in the space of a few days, by the French under Buonaparte, over the Austrians, commanded by Beaulieu; and in which the latter lost, in slain, about five thou-

[1] *See* Monroe's note, page 467, ante.

sand men, and in prisoners, between 8 and 10,000! The road is now open to Turin, where it is thought the French are pressing and perhaps by this time arrived. On the Rhine, however, the armies are still inactive; and from which circumstance some persons conjecture, that a negociation is still depending with the Emperor, and will doubtless, if such is the case, be essentially aided, on the part of France, by these late victories. The Vendée war was lately greatly checked, to say no more, by the total dispersion of the troops gathered there, in opposition to the government, and the apprehension and execution of Charette and Stofflet; the two principal chiefs who heretofore headed it: And subsequent circumstances favor the idea, that rebellion there is laid more prostrate than it was at any preceding period, since it began. But such has been the varied fortune of that extraordinary war, and so often has it revived after it was supposed to be totally extinguished, that appearances, however strong, are not to be too implicitly confided in; nor can it well be pronounced at an end, until the revolution itself is closed.

I send you herewith an extract of a letter from Mr. Barlow, from Algiers, just received; and which will, perhaps, give you the latest intelligence from that quarter.

With great respect and esteem, I am, Sir, your very humble servt. JAs. MONROE.

P. S. Mr. John Gregorie, late of Petersburg, in Virginia (a naturalized citizen of the United States) originally established at Dunkirk, and now residing there,—has been recommended to me, by respectable

authority, as a fit person to fill the Consulate in that city; I add therefore his name to the list heretofore sent you, of competitors for that office.[1]

[1] In connection with this letter, the last from Monroe immediately preceding his recall, Pickering wrote to the President the following account of the reception of the letter, with the French government's complaints, from John Churchman the Maryland scientist.

(Private) Department of State, July 29, 1796.—Sir, About noon today Mr. John Churchman who has been these two or three years in Europe on account of his supposed discoveries relative to the variation of the magnetic needle, called at the office. He came last from Bordeaux, and was the bearer of Mr. Monroe's letter of the 2nd May. I told him it had been broken open; & after a few questions, asked him to give me a certificate of the circumstances which attended his receipt of it; and offered him pen, ink and paper to write it; unless he chose to do it at home. He said he would go home, and call himself at five in the afternoon (if that hour was convenient to me) as the matter required some consideration.—He called at five accordingly; and then told me (with some emotion) that he thought it best to be candid; for he could not think of giving a certificate that might excite suspicions of innocent people—He had himself broken the seal, tho' by mere accident; and as soon as he discovered his mistake, closed the letter again, without reading it. He handed me a letter from his friend in London, (a quaker) inclosing the copy of a diploma, in Latin, given him by order of the Empress of Russia, declaring him a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This letter he recd thro' Mr. Monroe; and by the same channel expected to receive the Diploma itself. When therefore at the point of embarcation at Bordeaux for America, he received a letter from Mr. Monroe, addressed to him, and within the cover another of a size likely to contain the Diploma, without looking at the superscription, he broke the seal.—He had hoped this inadvertence would be excused; and especially as he was careful to deliver the letter with his own hand; it was he who called and delivered it in the evening, as mentioned in my former letter. This account, having all the marks of truth and candour I begged him give himself no further uneasiness about it; promising to communicate the explanation to you.

I then entered into conversation with him about his travels in France, and the sentiments of the French people towards America & particularly the *government;* and as he had been so long in France, whether he had observed any material change of sentiment, especially on account of the Treaty with Great-Britain. He answered that he had observed no material change; that very little was said by *Frenchmen* about the treaty—tho' much was said against it by the *American Citizens* in Paris."

END OF VOL. II.

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